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the judiciary (reflecting the state’s role as ‘guarantor of the employment relationship’). It is no 
exaggeration to say that many of the objectives policy makers subscribe to – ending child poverty, 
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This text deals with issues that, traditionally, have appeared under 
labels such as ‘industrial relations’, ‘human resource management’ 
and ‘employee relations’. It adopts ‘employment relations’ as its title 
for two main reasons. The first is that it accurately describes what the 
text is about – it’s about the employment relationship, the institutions 
involved in its ‘governance’ and the impact on a wide range of 
economic and social outcomes. The second is that it’s increasingly 
difficult to use the traditional labels without causing confusion. 
Regardless of intention, ‘industrial relations’ is associated with trade 
unions, collective bargaining and strikes, while 'human resource 
management' and 'employee relations' are seen as being about 
managing relations with individual employees. It also seems that there 
is to be no meeting on the ideological plain – ‘industrial relations’ is 
assumed to be conflict-based, while ‘human resource management’ 
and ‘employee relations’ are said to be ‘unitarist’ and ‘managerialist’ 
in their approach. Meanwhile, ever-increasing fragmentation means 
that the area’s overall significance gets lost sight of.  
The text has the double intention that I’ve tried to capture in the 
title: to bring people up to date with the matters that the study of 
employment relations deals with and to explain why they matter. 
Trade unions and collective bargaining certainly feature – collective 
bargaining remains the dominant way of settling the pay and 
conditions of employment of employees in many EU countries; the 
same is true of the six million or so public sector employees in the 
UK. Employment relations is far from being just about trade unions 
and collective bargaining, however. It is also about work organisation 
– the nature and extent of managerial hierarchies and control 
structures, which have profound implications for health, personal 
development and a country's social capital stock; personnel policies 
and practices, which are critical not just for business performance, but 
also income levels, life chances, the family (the duration, distribution 
and flexibility of working time are especially important here) and the 
development of human and social capital (reflecting not just the nature 
and extent of continuing vocational training but also the opportunities 
for on-the-job learning and personal development); and the decisions 
of government and the judiciary (reflecting the state’s role as 
‘guarantor of the employment relationship’1). It is no exaggeration to 
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say that many of the objectives policy makers subscribe to – ending 
child poverty, enhancing the quality of family life, improving health, 
increasing social mobility and building a knowledge economy – 
depend to a very large extent on the quality of employment relations.  
I've had two main audiences in mind in writing Employment 
Relations Matters. The first are those who teach and study in the area. 
For this group, the text is intended to be a resource. For example, it 
could be used as a stand-alone set of materials for a typically ten week 
programme. Alternatively, it could serve as a companion text to more 
traditional textbooks. Here it would provide a much-needed reality 
check for the texts used on Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development courses, where issues such as institutions, power, 
negotiation and conflict do not always receive the attention they 
deserve. The same is true of many ‘Organisational Behaviour’ courses 
on MBA programmes. 
I appreciate that there are some excellent textbooks already 
available in the area. Arguably, however, there are several features 
that make Employment Relations Matters distinctive. First, it makes 
the employment relationship and its ‘governance’ the central focus 
and so is equally relevant to those teaching/studying courses labeled 
‘HRM’ or ‘industrial relations’. Second, it is analytical in approach, 
which means it does things that other textbooks are rarely able to do: 
it outlines the subject's approach, values and core assumptions, 
locating them within a wider critical social sciences framework; it 
reviews the relationship between employment relations and a number 
of economic and social outcomes, ranging from living standards 
through the quality of family life to macroeconomic performance; it 
goes beyond the description of institutions that is typically found to 
explain why they are so important; and its treatment of matters such as 
power, negotiation and conflict is also more extensive than it normally 
is. Third, and perhaps most important, it offers a framework that is 
comprehensive in its treatment and yet universal in its application. 
Indeed, it was this that posed the main intellectual challenge in its 
writing. Most current textbooks focus on one country and its 
institutions, making it difficult, especially for international students, to 
grasp the underlying messages. Although it mainly uses UK examples, 
Employment Relations Matters is comparatively informed throughout. 
Furthermore, its integrated and thematic treatment means that the text 
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can be adapted to reflect other countries’ experience. Indeed, the hope 
is that the text will be developed by scholars not just from the UK but 
also other countries, helping to develop the cross-national analytical 
framework that the subject needs. 
The second audience I have in mind for Employment Relations 
Matters are practitioners and policymakers. I don’t expect that too 
many in this group will read it, but I’ve tried to make the text as 
accessible as I can. Thus the text has summaries at the beginning of 
each chapter, is relatively concise in its style, is not over-burdened 
with academic debates, and keeps references to a minimum - they only 
appear where there is a direct quote or a substantial argument is being 
paraphrase; to avoid too many disruptions in the text, their details also 
appear at the end of each chapter. It is also primarily for their benefit 
that Appendix 1 draws attention to the UK’s comparative 
performance, along with the missed opportunities for plugging some 
of the UK’s institutional ‘gaps’ that this comparison reveals. 
In the case of this second audience, the text has its origins in some 
very personal experiences. I can’t remember the number of times I’ve 
found myself in recent years trying to explain what employment 
relations is about and why it matters. I can remember some of the 
specific occasions, however, the one I’m about to be quote being 
typical of many others. I was talking to a senior official of a Regional 
Development Agency, stressing the importance of employment 
relations. A very perplexed look came across her face. She didn’t 
think that this was a big issue in her region. She must have seen a 
pained look on mine. She quickly responded that she thought it was 
because they didn’t have any car plants in their region and overall 
trade union membership was relatively low. It was only when the 
conversation moved on to issues such as productivity and absenteeism 
that her interest flickered. Even then there was some reluctance to 
accept that work organisation or, indeed, anything that was to do with 
the workplace, was important – as far as she was concerned, it was all 
about the supply side and skills etc etc.  
Arguably, there are two main reasons for this state of affairs. The 
first is that those of us who teach and research in the area haven't done 
anything like enough to explain to the outside world how the study of 
employment relations has been changing and why it has continuing 
relevance to policy and practice. The result is that there are many 
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myths and misunderstandings that have been allowed to perpetuate 
(see below). Certainly it has been difficult to point people in the 
direction of a single text that does these jobs, while many of the 
papers appearing at British University Industrial Relations Association 
conferences, as well as some public interventions, would suggest that 
there has been more talk than action about the subject changing. The 
second reason is that practitioners and policymakers have found the 
messages from economists and psychologists about the overriding 
importance of individual motivation more comforting than the ones 
they get from employment relations specialists about the significance 
of institutions.  
Especially important here has been the ‘neo-liberal’ approach to 
running the economy. Since the 1980s, the emphasis has been on 
‘markets’ and ensuring that they work effectively. Significantly, the 
government department with prime responsibility for the area in the 
UK, the Employment Relations Directorate, sits within the Business, 
Innovation and Skills' ‘Fair Markets’ group - a major task, in the 
words of ‘Departmental Strategic Objective No 3’, is to ‘Deliver free 
and fair markets, with greater competition’. It isn’t just that 
organisations like trade unions and institutions such as collective 
bargaining tend to be viewed negatively. The role of the workplace as 
a key decision making unit is largely ignored as are the complexities 
of managing the employment relationship – the workplace is regarded 
as a ‘black box’ where participants are expected to respond 
economically rationally to the broader regional and national economic 
framework. Public intervention can only be justified on grounds of 
‘market failure’. If managers are behaving in a particular way, it must 
be economically rational for them to do so; if not, the ‘market’ will 
correct. The idea of ‘institutional failure’ is rarely entertained and so 
the status quo goes unquestioned. Underpinning everything else is the 
view is that sensible governments don’t have much choice: 
globalisation is dictating the policy agenda. In Kay’s words, the 
principles of what is otherwise known as the ‘American business 
model’ or ‘Washington consensus’ (reflecting links with the 
Washington-based International Monetary Fund and World Bank) are 
‘unavoidable’, ‘because global business will migrate to the 
jurisdictions closest to them’2. 
It remains to be seen if the global financial crisis that ‘neo-
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liberalism’ has helped to bring about creates a more receptive 
environment for the argument that employment relations matter. 
Certainly the ‘market fundamentalism’ at the heart of ‘neo-liberalism’ 
is being questioned – the talk is of the ‘failure of market failure3. In 
the real world, it is slowly being remembered, ‘markets’ do not exist 
in a vacuum; they do not automatically deliver efficient solutions and 
they do not necessarily weed out ‘inferior institutions’4. Rather it is 
institutions,  especially in the form of incentive structures, that give 
‘markets’ their shape and structure; if these are fixed without 
reference to the needs of the wider society, as they have been in 
banking and finance, the results can be disastrous. ‘Light touch’ 
regulation, which is widely seen to have been a major factor in 
contributing to the crisis, is no longer the mantra it was. In this regard, 
much of what has been written about banking and finance could just 
as equally be applied to employment relations. Calls for a return to a 
more pragmatic approach that combines a mix of ‘government’ and 
the ‘market’ also chime well with the messy realities of employment 
relations. 
In any event, two things are becoming clear. The first is that it is 
not just trade unions and collective bargaining that are under threat 
from the unfettered global capital market that has been allowed to 
develop. Arguably, something even more fundamental is at stake, 
which takes us back to the origins of the subject of employment 
relations at the end of the 19
th
 century. The crisis suggests that the 
broad consensus underpinning the traditional model of the 
employment relationship for much of the post-World War 2 period is 
no more. Ideologically, ‘financialisation’ and ‘casino capitalism’ 
mean the dominance of ‘nexus of contract’ thinking and the notion of 
labour as something that is brought and sold just like other 
commodities. Practically, ‘financialisation’ and ‘casino capitalism’ 
mean ‘permanent restructuring’, along with the ‘fragmentation of 
employment’ and the undermining of the ‘welfare state’ system that 
has grown up to support the traditional model. In the process, the 
fundamentally important role of work organisations in developing 
human and social capital is in danger of being lost sight of, 
threatening many of the goals to which policy makers aspire. The 
same goes for their equally fundamentally important role in sustaining 
well-remunerated workforces who, as consumers, generate demand 
Preface 
 
x 
 
and so profitability and growth. 
This brings me to my second point which is, arguably, better news 
from the point of view of the subject of employment relations. The 
crisis confirms, if it needed to be, that understanding of the 
employment relationship cannot be extracted from consideration of 
the wider political economy – approaches that focus exclusively on 
the organisation and, narrower still, on the individual ‘psychological 
contract’ simply don’t cut the mustard. At the same time, recent 
events reinforce the view that none of the traditional disciplines is in a 
position to shed much light on unfolding developments in the 
employment relationship and their considerable implications touched 
on above – partly because they are not centrally concerned with the 
employment relationship as employment relations is and partly 
because they tend to be more interested in burnishing the discipline 
than illuminating the specific issues in hand. As Flanders, one of the 
pioneers of employment relations study in the UK insisted many years 
ago, while the traditional disciplines have many valuable insights to 
offer, they tend to ‘tear the subject apart by concentrating attention on 
some of its aspects to the exclusion or comparative neglect of others 
… a partial view of anything, accurate as it may be within its limits, 
must of necessity be a distorted one’5. A focus on the employment 
relationship, a distinctive multi-disciplinary approach grounded in 
critical social science and a mix of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods means that employment relations is uniquely 
qualified to highlight the fundamental importance of the employment 
relationship, what is happening to it and the wide-ranging implications 
likely to be involved. 
A great many people have helped to make this text possible. They 
range from the national newspaper managers and trade union and 
Chapel officials of Fleet Street in the 1960s, through colleagues and 
students of the University of Warwick’s Business School and 
Industrial Relations Research Unit in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, to 
the research community of the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in the 1990s and the 
staff of Acas in the first half of the ‘noughties’. In no small measure, 
it’s the accumulation of their knowledge and wisdom that I’m 
capturing and reflecting here. I’ve never ceased to be stimulated by 
the issues that employment relations deals with and couldn’t think of a 
Preface 
 
xi 
 
better way of thanking them for helping to make it so.  
The same sentiment also helps to account for the form of the 
publication. Here, though, there were also some eminently practical 
considerations, Weighing up the pros and cons of the traditional 
publication route as against the internet proved a 'no brainer' for 
someone who no longer has to bother about Research Assessment 
Exercises and the like. Time to publication via the traditional route 
would have been months at least. Heaven knows how much the final 
publication is likely to have been, but one thing is certain - I would 
have received but a small fraction in royalties. An internet publication 
not only means reducing both time and price/costs considerably. A 
Creative Commons Licence means that it will also be possible for 
colleagues to update, adapt and develop the text, helping to create the 
cross-national framework that the study of employment relations 
needs for its further development.  
  
 
Keith Sisson 
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Some employment relations myths 
 
1. Employment relations is about trade unions, collective bargaining 
and strikes. Not true. It’s about the ‘governance’ of the 
employment relationship regardless of the presence of trade unions 
and collective bargaining. 
 
2. Anyway, the decline of trade unions and collective bargaining 
means that institutions are no longer important. Not true. 
Institutions are the ‘stuff’ of work organisations - most are the 
responsibility of managers. 
 
3. But the decline of trade unions and collective bargaining at least 
means a reduced role for negotiation. It doesn’t. Negotiation is as 
much a feature of employer-employee relations as it is of 
management-trade union ones. Negotiation is a collection of 
processes that all of us use to define and redefine the terms of our 
interdependence with one another.  
 
4. The decline in strikes means that there must be little or no 
workplace conflict. It doesn’t. In the UK, the number of individual 
Employment Tribunal cases has been rising and forms of 
'unorganised' conflict such as absenteeism maintaining a steady 
level. 
 
5. The UK suffers from too much employment protection regulation. 
It doesn’t. Only the USA has less such regulation than the UK. A 
major problem is that the UK lacks the social dialogue and 
collective bargaining structures of many of other countries to 
transpose EU measures by agreement. 
 
6. Flexibility is everything. Not so. Managers cannot cope with too 
much flexibility. Management is the source of the bulk of the rules 
involved in governing the employment relationship. 
 
7. Lack of employee engagement is largely a question of attitudes, 
which can be solved by motivational programmes. It isn’t and it 
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can’t. It’s largely a question of peoples’ work experience and 
requires changes in underlying structures. 
 
8. Most problems will be resolved by moving into the knowledge 
work/economy. They won’t. There has to be an increase in the 
demand for as well as the supply of skills. In the ‘restricted’ as 
opposed to ‘expansive’ learning environment characterizing many 
UK workplaces
6
, investment in skills could be tantamount to 
pouring money down the drain.  
 
9. Competition will force changes in management’s approach. Not 
necessarily so. Many organisations are locked into traditional 
ways of organising work and management is not fully exploiting 
the available opportunities to improve performance and 
profitability.  
 
10. Globalisation means that managers, along with governments, have 
little choice in their approach. Not so. For example, the nature and 
extent of managerial hierarchies is a question of degree. 
Proportionately, Sweden has only a quarter of the number of 
people involved in management and supervision as the UK. 
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 Introduction:  
studying employment relations 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Clarify the subject matter of employment relations 
 
 Outline its approaches to theorising  
 
 Review the methods it uses to acquire knowledge  
 
Summary 
Although mainly taught in business schools in the English-speaking 
world, employment relations‟ intellectual roots are firmly rooted in the 
social sciences and a particular academic tradition dating back to the 
end of the 19 century. The subject deals with an extensive list of 
employment-related subjects, but also has a robust analytical focus, 
which may be summarised as the „governance of the employment 
relationship‟. It sees the employment relationship first and foremost as 
a managerial one – with all the uncertainty, contradictions and 
potential for conflict that such a relationship entails: the employee 
receives tangible and intangible rewards in return for the employer‟s 
right to direct them to do their bidding. It pays particular regard to the 
complex „multi-level governance‟ regime of institutions or rules 
involved in the exercise of the employer‟s discretionary rights. This 
embraces organisation structure and job design, personnel policies and 
practices, legislation that the state introduces in attempting to strike a 
balance between the flexibility and security intrinsic to the 
employment relationship, and the efforts of employees‟ trade unions 
and professional organisations to influence the rules and rule making 
processes. In terms of its approach, employment relations is an area of 
study rather than a discipline. Indeed, its distinctive feature is that it is 
multi-disciplinary - more concerned with developing theory‟ in‟ 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
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employment relations than developing a theory „of‟ employment 
relations. Examples of all three approaches to theorising can be found 
in the employment relations literature, i.e. „positivism‟, „social 
constructivism‟ and „critical realism‟. The dominant one, however, 
approximates to „critical realism‟. Employment relations seeks to 
identify key regularities and asks why they occur as they do, what are 
the underlying mechanisms producing them and any variations, what 
effects do they have and what are the conditions under which they 
happen. To acquire such knowledge, employment relations has always 
put strong emphasis on empirical inquiry, using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. In the UK, this has been reinforced with the 
regular undertaking of the representative Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey. In recent years, there has been an increasing 
tendency to combine induction with deduction, where the researcher 
starts with a proposition or hypothesis derived from established facts 
or theoretical assumptions. 
 
A core principle 
Although, especially in the UK and USA, it is mostly taught in 
management and business schools, „employment relations‟ does not see 
itself serving one particular interest group - it is relatively „inclusive‟ or  
impartial in terms of the interests involved in the employment 
relationship that is its focus. It also does not claim to offer quick-fix 
solutions to the problems these groups experience. Rather it seeks to 
hold a mirror up to what goes on in the world of employment, its 
practical relevance lying in the improved quality of data and analysis 
that policy makers and practitioners can draw on about what „works‟ 
and „doesn‟t work‟ and „why‟. Crucially, its intellectual roots are firmly 
rooted in the social sciences, being grounded in a particular academic 
tradition that dates back to the end of the 19th century. At one and the 
same time, this was both theoretical and practical - it was about 
understanding the world of employment and drawing implications for 
practice and policy. In the UK, pioneers of this tradition were the likes 
of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, whose History of Trade Unionism and 
Industrial Democracy were among the first works to prioritise 
empirically grounded analysis; in the USA, their counterparts were 
John Commons and his colleagues at the University of Wisconsin - 
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Industrial Goodwill and Institutional Economics were among the books 
that laid the foundation for institutional analysis more generally.  
The tradition‟s values are distinctive as well as powerfully 
grounded. As Kaufmann, the subject‟s main historian, emphasises, the 
starting point is a core principle that is „both positive and normative. 
Stated in the affirmative, this core principle asserts that labor is human; 
stated in the negative it asserts labor is not a commodity‟1. He reminds 
us that this core principle is most prominently displayed in the 
Constitution of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), created by 
the Treaty of Paris and signed in 1919 at the end of World War I. The 
first of nine principles enumerated in the ILO Constitution reads: 
„Labor should not be regarded as a commodity or article of commerce‟. 
The point is that, unlike other resources, „human resources‟ are 
embodied in people and cannot be 'commodified'. Moreover, employers 
do not own employees in the way they do other resources – if they did, 
it would be tantamount to slavery. A further consideration is that, in 
democratic societies, employees are citizens, who have the right to vote 
to determine those who govern and the way that they govern; they are 
also encouraged to have expectations about justice and due process.  
It also follows that to talk in terms of a „labour market‟ is to give a 
false impression of what is at stake in the employment relationship. 
Certainly the overall levels of employment can rise and fall, reflecting 
changes in the demand for specific products and services. But, as 
Chapter 3 explains in greater detail, nothing is automatic about the 
employment relationship. For example, employers are not limited to 
hiring and firing employees in response to changes in such demand. 
They can ask existing employees to work harder or smarter. To 
encourage them to do so, they can also pay some employees higher 
wages at the same time as making others redundant – something which 
traditional labour market analysis sees as irrational and yet which is 
perfectly sensible if motivation is built into the equation. 
The subject's ethical position has never been seriously questioned. 
It is a different matter, however, in the case of the other three inter-
linked issues that any area of university level teaching has to be clear 
about. These are the subject matter or ontological question; the 
approach or epistemological question (what is knowable about the 
subject matter); and the methodological question (how the knowledge 
can be acquired).  
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
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Here there has been considerable reflection and introspection in the 
light of recent changes in the world of work such as the shift in 
employment from manufacturing to services, the increasing 
feminisation of the workforce and the decline of trade union 
membership and coverage of collective bargaining. This has often been 
interpreted as a sign of crisis. Arguably, however, this process has 
given rise to something of a consensus about the essentials for further 
development. The result is a pretty robust framework that any area of 
study needs to address if it is to have enduring status. 
It is with the subject matter, approach and methods of 
employment relations that this opening chapter is concerned. In each 
case, the discussion tries to give a flavour of the current state of play, 
the history of developments and the key influences. It also covers the 
main variations and nuances that the reader will come across in the 
literature dealing with employment relations. 
 
Subject matter  
As the Preface suggests, employment relations deals with a fairly 
extensive list of employment-related subjects – these range from the 
changing composition of the labour force and the nature of work 
organisation, through personnel policies and practices, to the structure 
of collective bargaining and the national legal framework, along with 
the role and functioning of the many representative organisations and 
government agencies involved. Employment relations is more than 
just a collection of related topics, however. Although it may not 
always be made explicit, employment relations has an analytical 
focus, which may be summarised as the governance of the 
employment relationship. If a more encompassing statement is 
required, it might be the institutions involved in governing the 
employment relationship, the people and organisations that make and 
administer them, and the rule making processes that are involved, 
together with their economic and social outcomes.  
 
The employment relationship: concept and conduct 
The employment relationship has always been there or thereabouts in 
employment relations, but during the so-called „golden age‟2 of the 
subject (i.e. the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s) was more or less taken for 
granted: the main emphasis, which reflected the concerns of policy 
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makers and practitioners, was on the role of trade unions and 
collective bargaining in fixing the terms and conditions of the 
relationship, along with the strikes and other forms of industrial action 
that often accompanied them. In recent years, there has been a return 
to prioritising the employment relationship that was a feature of earlier 
generations. The result is the development of a very particular 
perspective on the employment relationship, which Chapter 3 sets out 
in some detail.  
For present purposes, it is enough to note that the distinguishing 
feature of the employment relationship is that it is not so much a 
market or psychological or legal one. Rather, as this summary 
suggests, it is a managerial one – with all the uncertainty, 
contradictions and potential for conflict that such a relationship 
entails:  
 The basis of the exchange is security and flexibility - employees 
receive tangible and intangible rewards, in return for which employers 
acquire the right to direct them to do their bidding.   
 The nature of the exchange is, by definition, indeterminate, 
continuous, contradictory and exploitative, with cooperation and 
conflict being integral features.  
 Regardless of the presence of trade unions, the process of the 
exchange is essentially political involving on-going negotiation, 
implicit as well as explicit, against the background of an asymmetrical 
or unequal power relationship. 
Complicating matters is that, although „the employment 
relationship is by definition one between an employee and an 
employer'
3
, yet it is not exclusively private as much of the human 
resource management literature encourages us to assume. For the great 
majority of employees, employment is a collective activity. 
Employees typically work in groups. Many belong to trade unions or 
professional organisations. For their part, managers find it inefficient 
to differentiate between individual employees because of the costs and 
so most contracts of employment take a 'standard form'
4
.  Their 
behaviour also reflects the organisations in which they work, the 
nature and extent of the targets and controls they are subject to being 
especially important. These organisations, in turn, are not islands unto 
themselves, being typically part of a larger enterprise - the Workplace 
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Employment Relations Survey (WERS) estimates that, of workplaces 
in the UK with more than 10 employees in 2004, just over two-thirds 
(68 per cent) were units of larger organisations
5
. Complicating matters 
further, as the next section emphasises, is that such enterprises operate 
in a complex multi-level institutional environment, where sectoral, 
national and supranational influences increasingly interact.  
Employment relations is not just concerned with concepts, 
however. The employment relationship is also one of the main social 
institutions in a capitalist society: it is something that the great 
majority of us are involved in for much of our lives. As Chapter 2 
demonstrates, the conduct of the employment relationship can be 
shown to have a considerable impact on a wide range of economic and 
social issues such as health, personal development opportunities, the 
family and the development of social capital; organisations and 
business performance; and significant macroeconomic considerations 
such as the trade off between wages and employment and the links 
between inequality and productivity.  
 
Institutions: causes and consequences 
Accompanying the renewed emphasis on the employment relationship 
has been a re-affirmation of the importance of the institutions involved 
in its governance. One reason for this has been the need to confront 
the argument that a decline in the institution of collective bargaining 
means that employment relations runs out of the things to study. 
Certainly the causes and consequences of the structure of collective 
bargaining (i.e. its levels, units, scope and form) have figured 
prominently in employment relations studies. There has also been 
considerable emphasis on how the structure of collective bargaining 
has evolved and is changing, with particular emphasis on the impact 
of economic globalisation (i.e. the growth of trade liberalisation and 
the development of a global capital market) and regionalisation 
(particularly in the form of greater European economic and social 
integration).  
But collective bargaining is not the only institution that 
employment relations is concerned with. An „institution‟, in the words 
of the Concise Oxford Dictionary, is an „established law, custom, or 
practice‟. If a more detailed definition is required, the Penguin 
Dictionary of Sociology suggests that „institution‟ is „a term widely 
used to describe social practices that are regularly and continuously 
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repeated, that are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and that 
have a major significance in the social structure‟6. Two main types 
may be identified – the substantive rules that cover the „what‟ of the 
employment relationship and the procedural ones that deal with the 
„how‟. In each of these areas, the institutions involved can also be 
informal as well formal. In Edwards‟ words, a rule or institution 'can 
comprise beliefs, ideologies and taken-for-granted assumptions as 
well as formal provisions of rights and obligations'
7
. Not only do the 
informal norms and expected patterns of behaviour of work groups 
typically sit alongside the formal rules. There can also be a mix of 
formality and informality in the administration of the rules. One 
example is the „psychological contract‟ that will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapters 4 and 5. In the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
Development‟s (CIPD) words, „The psychological contract … may be 
more influential than the formal contract in affecting how employees 
behave from day to day‟8. 
On the basis of these definitions, institutions are the stuff of work 
organisations, the provisions of collective agreements and legislation 
being but the tip of the iceberg. The conduct of the employment 
relationship entails a hierarchy-based structure in which some 
(managers) make rules and others (employees) are expected to obey 
them. There are institutions that deal with the organisation of work, 
i.e. job design, the grouping of jobs into activities and the structures 
used to co-ordinate these activities. There are institutions that deal 
with recruitment and selection and training and development. There 
are institutions that deal with „performance management‟, i.e. the type 
of payment system and the level of wages, the working time 
arrangements, the disciplinary arrangements and so on. To put no finer 
point on it, without any „rules of the „game‟, there is no organisation.  
Moreover, despite their high profile campaign against the 
„burdens of regulation‟, it is management that in recent years has been 
adding to the stock of institutions dealing with the employment 
relationship. Most obvious are arrangements for appraisal and target-
setting, together with individual performance pay and share option 
schemes for senior executives. Supposedly, today‟s „knowledge 
organisation‟ 're-engineered corporation', 'network organisation, 
'boundary-less company' and the like bring greater individual initiative 
and local autonomy
9
. Yet, because of the nature and extent of the 
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targets built into performance management systems, many employees 
complain that they have less discretion than they used to
10
. 
The second consideration behind the renewed emphasis on 
institutions reflects developments in the social sciences more 
generally. The irony is that, at a time when some people appear to 
want to bury „institutions‟ in employment relations, many in the 
traditional disciplines have been emphasising or re-emphasising their 
importance. The result is a growing literature dealing with what has 
come to be known as „new institutionalism‟. This means that 
employment relations is increasingly able to draw on a potentially rich 
harvest in terms of language, concepts and approaches that is helping 
to analyse and explain the causes and effects of these institutions; to 
clarify the nature of and role for theory, more of which below; and to 
contribute to the wider debate on institutions, which is helping to 
broaden the subject‟s appeal as well as sharpen its analytical content. 
At the risk of over-simplifying matters, three main tendencies or 
schools of „new institutionalism' may be identified: „rational choice‟, 
sociological‟ (sometimes referred to as 'organisational') and 
„historical‟. There is a measure of agreement about the definitions of 
institution, which are consistent with those quoted earlier. Both formal 
and informal institutions are also covered, with the 'sociological' 
tendency in particular emphasising the cognitive or „second nature‟ 
dimensions of many institutions. Most importantly, all three 
emphasise the importance of institutions as „rules of the game‟ which 
not only constrain but also enable. In Campbell‟s words, „Institutions 
are the foundation of social life … [they] help determine how people 
make sense of their world and act in it‟11.  
The differences between the three tendencies, which Chapter 4 
deals with, mainly revolve around the relationship between actors and 
institutions and reflect their different disciplinary roots. „Rational 
choice‟ institutionalism reflects its origins in economics and 
„methodological individualism‟. Actors are assumed to have 
standardised and stable preferences defined by their personal or 
organisational self-interest. The approaches in „sociological‟ and 
„historical institutionalism‟ reflect their roots in organisational 
psychology, politics and sociology. Rather than being standardised 
and stable, preferences are seen to be time and context-dependent 
One implication of 'new institutionalism‟ deserves particular 
emphasis: it has encouraged the adoption of 'governance‟ as 
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employment relations‟ analytical focus. The subject's long-standing 
focus, i.e. 'job' or 'employment regulation', had come to have little 
meaning for most people - it is something that even employment 
relations scholars rarely made a central focus of their work. 
Complicating matters is that the term „regulation‟ has come to be 
viewed very negatively, being narrowly associated with individual 
employment rights. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the absence of a 
widely recognised focus, many of the myths and misunderstandings 
about employment relations highlighted in the Preface have been 
allowed to perpetuate: for example, that it was essentially concerned 
with „problem‟ issues such as strikes, which had been „dealt with‟. 
„Governance‟ is an umbrella term embracing different 
arrangements for handling exchanges and transactions such as the 
employment relationship. Initially, two main types of governance 
structures were proposed, „markets‟ and „hierarchies‟ (organisations), 
the choice between the two boiling down to the transaction costs 
involved in negotiating, drafting and, most critically, administering/ 
enforcing contracts. Increasingly, however, it is accepted that there are 
other forms of „governance‟ as well. Most obviously in the area of 
employment relations, there are the activities of „government‟ and 
„association' in the form of collective bargaining between groups of 
employers and trade unions. Other forms, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3, include 'community' and 'network'.  
„Governance‟ is not just a matter of language or fashion. First, and 
fundamentally important, it helps us to answer what has been 
described as the 'baseline question …antecedent to all others‟ in 
employment relations, i.e. „Why is there an employment relationship 
and under what conditions will societies choose to use an employment 
relationship in the production of goods and services?‟12. Essentially, 
as Chapter 3 will explain in more detail, the employment relationship 
is preferred over a contract for labour services because it gives 
employers residual control rights over employees in exchange for 
employees enjoying a measure of employment security. Second, it 
reminds us that the hierarchy entailed in exercising these rights is an 
intrinsic feature of the employment relationship – however extensive 
collective bargaining and legal enactment may be, management 
remains responsible for the basic parameters of the „governance‟ 
regime in the form of the organisation structure, job design and 
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personnel policies and practices. Third, „governance‟ is more 
encompassing than „regulation‟. At one extreme, it embraces 
organisation structure and work organisation. At the other, as well as 
highlighting the multi-level character of the arrangements involved in 
the employment relationship, it enables us to make much better sense 
of the 'softer' governance instruments that have come to prominence in 
recent years such as „benchmarking‟ and „coordinated bargaining‟, the 
EU's „social dialogue‟ arrangements and the Lisbon strategy's 'open 
method of coordination'. Fourth, it offers a much more realistic and 
potentially fruitful paradigm for policy making. It not only accurately 
portrays the issues policy makers have to consider – much more so 
than the currently dominant „labour market‟ paradigm – but also gives 
greater legitimacy to their involvement.  
A closely associated term is „multi-level governance‟. At first 
sight, „multi-level governance‟ appears to be little more than a 
statement of the obvious: most organisations, like nation states, 
comprise several levels of decision making – department, workplace, 
company, division and so on. There is more to the usage of the term 
than description, however. Typically, „multi-level governance‟ 
situations involve public and private sector actors and are negotiated 
rather than defined by a formalised framework. Relationships are also 
very fluid and often contested. Olsen‟s portrayal of the EU‟s 
development could just as well be applied to the development of the 
„governance‟ arrangements involved in the employment relationship: 
a history of „informal and gradual institutional evolution‟ as well as 
„founding acts and deliberate institution building‟13. At each step, 
developments have been highly contested and the outcome is best 
imagined as the complex consequence of the acts of multiple political 
and economic agents with differing views about the speed and 
direction of development and also the destination. Tensions abound, 
with complexity, uncertainty and instability typically the defining 
characteristics. 
„Multi-level governance‟ also raises highly significant policy and 
practical issues revolving around the balance between „heteronomy‟ 
and „autonomy‟, i.e. central regulation, on the one hand, and local 
responsibility, on the other. There are important implications, for both 
public and private sector organisations, relating to the responsibilities 
of the different levels of management, the nature and extent of the 
autonomy of individual business units and the „tightness‟ and 
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„looseness‟ of head office controls. At national and EU levels, the 
„heteronomy-autonomy‟ issue is mirrored in debates about 
„subsidiarity‟ (the balance between and national level decision 
making) and the form of legal intervention. Noteworthy here are the 
debates about „procedural‟ and „reflexive  law‟, i.e. the extent to 
which „the preferred mode of intervention is for the law to underpin 
and encourage autonomous processes of adjustment, in particular by 
supporting mechanisms of group representation and participation, 
rather than to intervene by imposing particular distributive 
outcomes‟14. 
As in the case of the employment relationship, the focus on 
institutions is not just for their own sake, which is a criticism that has 
been made in the past. Rather it is because, to borrow a phrase from 
„new institutionalism‟, they are the „rules of the game‟ linking practice 
and performance. In formal terms, the governance structures involved 
in the employment relationship are to be seen as an intervening or 
mediating variable as well as a dependent one. This means that they 
have both causes and effects. The generic features of the employment 
relationship do not exist in a vacuum. Not only do they find 
expression in institutions that are deeply embedded in the many 
„varieties of capitalism‟, reflecting the interplay between internal 
performance issues and external market, technological and political 
developments, but they also have a very significant effect on the key 
economic, social and political outcomes that are the subject of Chapter 
2.  
 
Variations on a theme: ‘materialists’ and ‘institutionalists’ 
 Hardly surprisingly, there are different emphases to be found in 
employment relations studies. Historically, there was a tendency to 
talk in terms of two main ideal-typical positions: 'radical‟ and 
'pluralist'. Much more meaningful is to see employment relations 
studies involving „materialists‟ and „institutionalists'15. Although to be 
a „materialist‟ is not necessarily to be a „Marxist‟, the starting point is 
Marx‟s analysis of capitalism. „Materialists‟ hold that the „material‟ or 
productive base of society is the dominant consideration in accounting 
for a society‟s institutions. Thus, they argue that it is the prevailing 
„market capitalism‟ that gives rise to the main features of the 
employment relationship discussed earlier along with the associated 
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institutions and modes of thought. Blyton and Turnbull put the point 
like this: “It is these features of the employment relationship – the 
creation of an economic surplus, the co-existence of co-operation and 
conflict, the indeterminate nature of the exchange relationship, and 
the asymmetry of power – not the institutions of trade unions, 
employers‟ associations or government agencies, that makes the 
subject of employee relations distinctive”. (their emphasis)16. 
There are important implications for the both the level of and the 
approach to analysis. The focus on the employment relationship or, to 
use the preferred term, the „labour process‟, makes the workplace 
itself the centre of attention and case studies the favourite research 
method. „Materialists‟ also operate within a predominantly deductive 
paradigm. In their research and writings, the main activity is involved 
in demonstrating how the „structured antagonism‟ they associate with 
the employment relationship works out in practice.  
A further implication is that many „materialists‟ do not see it as 
their job to tease out the policy or practical implications of their work. 
Indeed, some do not see their role to be that of empirical researchers at 
all. Rather they see their main task to be one of „demystification‟ - 
developing critiques of the prevailing managerial and government 
„wisdoms‟, for example, about „flexibility‟ or „partnership‟ or „high 
performance working‟ or the links between „globalisation‟ and 
employment relations. Their starting point also leads them to question 
the likely effectiveness of what they would regard as „institutional 
engineering‟ designed to manage the conflict that they see as intrinsic 
to the employment relationship in a „market capitalist‟ society. 
The second group, the „institutionalists‟, embrace the main stream 
and is the dominant influence on this text. As the label suggests, 
„institutionalists‟ tend to concentrate on the „rules of the game‟, the 
organisations that make and administer them, and the rule making 
processes that are involved. They recognise that the employment 
relationship is fundamentally important and that it is what 
distinguishes the field of employment relations from others. They do 
not accept, however, that the nature of the employment relationship is 
a „given‟ in the way that some „materialists‟ see it - it differs from 
occupation to occupation as well as from country to country. Just as 
the activities of institutions cannot be understood in isolation from the 
employment relationship, so the employment relationship cannot be 
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understood in isolation from the arrangements that govern it. The 
„governance‟ arrangements can and do make the difference.  
Again, there are important implications for the both the level of 
and the approach to analysis. „Institutionalists‟ tend to focus as much 
on the wider institutions of employment relations as they do on those 
to be found inside the workplace. This helps to explain the focus on 
trade unions and the structure of collective bargaining, along with the 
nature and extent of the legal regulation.  
„Institutionalists‟ can also be said to be „pluralist‟ in their 
approach. They accept that conflict is endemic to the employment 
relationship. They do not go so far as some „materialists‟ tend to, 
however, in denying the possibility of seeking a better balance of 
interests between employers and employees to the mutual advantage 
of both – the balance between cooperation and conflict is an empirical 
question. They therefore tend to go further than „materialists‟ do in 
considering the implications of their research for policy and practice. 
Not surprisingly, the emphasis tends to be on institutional reform.  
 
Approach: theory ‘in’ rather than theory ‘of’ 
If subject matter is about the nature of a study, approach is about its 
purpose, raising the fundamental issue of the role for and nature of 
theory or epistemology. Here too 'new institutionalism' has proved to 
be a breath of fresh air. In particular, it has encouraged a rich variety 
of positions leading to an increasing acceptance that it is inappropriate 
to think in terms of one universal standard. Rather theorising can be 
variable, reflecting „different assumptions about the nature of the … 
reality being investigated, the extent of the knowledge we can hope to 
acquire of it, and the strategies appropriate to its analysis‟17. 
Three main perspectives on theorising can be found in the 
institutional literature. As Table 1.2 outlines, one is „positivism‟, 
which is closely associated with the „rational choice‟ institutionalism 
introduced earlier. The other two are „constructivism‟ and „critical‟ or 
„scientific realism‟, which more loosely reflect contributions from the 
'sociological' 'historical' and schools of institutionalism. Following 
Hay, these perspectives can be contrasted on a number of dimensions: 
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 The role of theory. The main distinguishing feature involves 
expectations about the type of explanation and whether or not the 
aim is the discovery of laws dealing with empirical regularities. 
 Theoretical assumptions. Especially important here is the extent to 
which the world is seen as characterised by regularities; whether 
the main actors are thought to be individuals and/or groups; 
whether rationality is regarded as universal or context and time 
dependent; the degree to which social systems are thought to be 
closed or open; and the causal role for ideas. 
 Analytical approach. The critical consideration here is the balance 
between induction and deduction. The first privileges evidence and 
observation and, on the basis of these, tries to draw some 
generalisable conclusions. The second starts with a proposition or 
hypothesis derived from established facts or their theoretical 
assumptions. It then uses empirical enquiry to confirm, reject or 
modify the initial proposition.  
 Methods. The main contrast is between, on the one hand, 
comparative and historical analysis and, on the other, modelling, 
i.e. developing idealisations that seek to portray the essential 
features of a situation. 
 Values. Especially important here is the relative priority accorded 
to the complexity or parsimony (i.e. simplicity and succinctness) of 
the assumptions that are made, together with the emphasis placed 
on their realism
18
. 
All three perspectives can be found in the employment relations 
literature. Here again, though, it is possible to identify two main 
positions. The first holds that employment relations should aspire to 
be a discipline and develop an integrated theory „of‟ employment 
relations that seeks explanation in terms of the law-like and predictive 
approach of the „positivist‟ perspective. In most cases, the starting 
point is Dunlop‟s seminal Industrial Relations Systems published in 
1959
19
. Put briefly, this sees employees, employers, trade unions, 
employers‟ organisations and governments as members of an 
interlocking system of institutions, processes and rules working to its 
own internal logic, but shaped by technology, markets and the 
distribution of power in the wider society.  
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The second, and dominant, view is that the subject should focus 
on developing theory „in‟ employment relations20. One concern is the 
systems approach underlying Dunlop‟s framework does not reflect the 
contested nature of the field. Another consideration is that, although 
the subject can claim a specialist focus in the employment 
relationship, it does not make sense to see it as a „largely self-
contained sphere of social life‟21 – the financial crisis has shown the 
weaknesses of doing this in the case of the traditional disciplines. 
Another concern is the level of abstraction that would have to be 
involved in a theory „of‟: the context-dependent phenomena of 
employment relations do not easily lend themselves to such an 
approach as the difficulties in developing Dunlop‟s framework 
confirm. 
In a much-used phrase, employment relations is multi-
disciplinary. Roughly translated, this means two things: first, building 
on and seeking to integrate the often contending insights from the 
traditional disciplines of economics, sociology, psychology, law and 
politics; and, second, focusing on what is sometimes described as 
„middle range‟ theorising, i.e. achieving greater understanding of the 
causes and consequences of the key institutions involved in governing 
the employment relationship – for example, the enduring features of 
work organisation or the structure of collective bargaining. 
In the language of Table 1.2, the dominant approach approximates 
to „critical realism‟. Employment relations does not seek to derive 
general laws or predict outcomes. Rather it seeks to identify key 
regularities and asks why they occur as they do, what are the 
underlying mechanisms producing them and any variations, what 
effects do they have and what are the conditions under which they 
happen. In doing so, it is also very careful to emphasis the 
contingency of events and the importance of context.  
Thus, a more or less common concern is with the why and 
wherefore of the changes taking place, helping to account for the 
subject matter of Chapters 8, 9 and 10. In Chapter 8, the focus is on 
the nature, extent and direction of change in management‟s approach, 
carefully distinguishing between the differences at workplace and 
company level in the light of developments in „financialisation‟, i.e. 
the shift in the basis of competition from products and services to 
financial results in the form of current and projected cash returns on 
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investment. In Chapter 9 it is on the decline in trade union 
membership and collective bargaining and the reasons for them. In 
Chapter 10, it is on the role of the state and its seemingly changing 
agenda. On the one hand, most governments seem to have been 
withdrawing from some of their traditional activities: there is also talk 
of the „hollowing out‟ of the state and the delegation of duties and 
responsibilities to other social actors or executive agencies
22
. On the 
other, there has been a very considerable increase in legal enactment 
(„juridification‟). 
Tackling these issues is requiring employment relations scholars 
to engage with wider debates about theorising in the social sciences, 
reinforcing the importance of a multi-disciplinary approach. This is 
because accounting for diversity and change involves a number of 
„big‟ knowledge questions that are to a greater or lesser extent 
common across the social sciences, i.e.: 
 structure and agency - how much choice do actors have?  
 the relative importance of economic and political forces  
 the role of ideas and ideology  
 the role of power  
 the relative importance of different levels of activity (individual, 
the workplace, the organisation, the sector, the societal) and the 
relationship between them  
 the relationship between behaviour and context - the extent to 
which actors are driven by individual preferences that apply 
universally or that reflect different contexts and experience. 
In terms of the disciplinary mix, employment relations has always 
been a „broad church‟. This is above all true in the UK. Arguably, the 
history that was the starting point for several of the pioneers in the UK 
was more accommodating of other disciplines than the economics that 
dominated and still dominates employment relations in the USA. A 
British Journal of Industrial Relations editorial statement nicely 
captures the mood in encouraging a 'pluralism' not just of interests but 
also 'disciplines' and 'styles of work'
23
. The statement is also spot on in 
discussing the balance of disciplinary influence. Labour economics 
has a 'strong presence', but is not 'sovereign‟. If there is a growing 
influence, it is that of politics, reflecting interest in theories of 
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'contentious politics'
24
 as well as the institutional 'turn' discussed 
earlier. Also growing is an interest in jurisprudence, i.e. the theory and 
philosophy of law, which is necessary not just to appreciate the 
increasing „juridifcation‟ employment relations matters, but also 
variations in the extent to which legal rules are implemented in 
countries reflecting „common law‟ and „statute law‟ traditions. 
Some worry that employment relations‟ approach is too eclectic. 
Yet being multi-disciplinary and coherent are not incompatible if, as it 
increasingly is, the subject is held together by shared values, a fair 
measure of consensus about the key issues and a distinctive approach 
in terms of the questions posed and methods used. Arguably, as the 
Preface emphasised, an approach that is grounded in the traditional 
disciplines runs the risk of leading to even greater fragmentation. 
Labour economics is primarily concerned with the supply and demand 
of labour. Sociology deals with issues of work and employment in 
general. Psychology is concerned with the individual, while Law 
focuses on the legal dimension. A main concern of the traditional 
disciplines, especially economics and psychology, also tends to be 
with confirming the theoretical propositions or methods of the 
discipline; the result is that understanding of issues often takes second 
place.  
 
Methodology 
Historically, employment relations was renowned for being very 
empirical in the choice of methods to acquire its knowledge. In the 
UK, in the words attributed to the Research Director of the 1965-8 
Donovan Royal Commission (Lord McCarthy), 'an ounce of facts is 
worth a ton of theory'. Employment relations certainly puts great store 
by induction – most studies tend to privilege evidence and observation 
and, on the basis of these, try to draw some generalisable conclusions. 
A key consideration in the UK is that employment relations is also 
more or less unique among subjects taught in business schools in that 
it is able to draw on a large regular representative investigation of 
policy and practice at workplace level in the form of the Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey. Begun in 1980, WERS has been 
repeated on no fewer than four occasions (1984, 1990, 1998 and 2004) 
and has been important in providing a wealth of empirical data about 
both the collective and individual dimensions of employment relations 
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practice in the UK. Not only has interpreting these data been a major 
activity of employment relations scholars and launch pad for fresh 
research. Data about managerial policies and practices have been 
fundamental in bringing about a change in the terms of debate in areas 
traditionally dominated by the prescriptive tradition. WERS has 
helped to bring about a significant shift towards evidence-based 
evaluation of policy and practice, with the CIPD itself becoming a 
major funder of empirical research.  
If employment relations' strong emphasis on empirical inquiry has 
been maintained, there has been an increasing tendency in recent years 
to combine induction with deduction, where the researcher starts with 
a proposition or hypothesis derived from established facts or their 
theoretical assumptions. Indeed, almost invariably these days, such 
empirical work is theoretically informed. For example, many of the 
questions that have been added to the WERS down through the years 
represent a form of theory testing - case study research in the 
intervening years has raised questions and suggested hypotheses that 
such a large scale representative survey can answer and/or test. 
A combination of different theoretical starting points involving 
different forms of „counter-factual‟ method is also increasingly to be 
found. These can be „deductive‟, where outcomes are compared to 
what might have been expected if the parties had pursued their 
„rational‟ interests, or „inductive‟, where actual outcomes are 
compared to empirically-based accounts of actors‟ interests and 
preferences. Importance of history/importance of comparative 
method/contextualised 
A combination approach that has been particularly influential with 
Dutch and German employment relations scholars
25
 is the „actor-
centred‟ institutionalism associated with Scharpf26 and his colleagues. 
In this, actors and their preferences and perceptions are treated as „a 
theoretically distinct category - influenced, but not determined by the 
institutional framework within which interactions occur …‟ Actors‟ 
preferences are also seen as having at least two dimensions, 
„individual and organisational self-interest on the one hand, and 
(internalised) normative obligations and aspirations on the other .... 
For that reason, they will vary greatly between different types of 
actors - political parties, government ministries, unions, central banks, 
etc. - and in time and place. By contrast, the „maintenance‟ or survival 
interests in assuring organisational resources, defending organisational 
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autonomy, and achieving competitive success, are likely to be more 
uniform and constant, allowing for fairly general and reliable 
predictions of organisational responses to institutional incentives‟27. 
Turning specifically to research methods, no one seriously 
disputes that both quantitative and qualitative methods have their 
place. The progression of WERS has reinforced the value of the 
survey method and the associated quantitative methods.  Equally, 
there is a recognition that an „exclusive concern with the quantitative 
is as one-eyed as that which draws only on the qualitative'
28
. 
Understanding the complex, unpredictable processes involved in 
employment relations developments needs in-depth qualitative 
methods like the case study.  
Here, as well as the growth of multi-method studies combining 
quantitative and qualitative techniques, there is evidence of the 
increasing use of multiple case study designs that capture variation 
whilst continuing to seek depth of understanding. Similarly, there are 
research programmes in which studies seek to build from and on the 
findings of previous ones
29
.  
Perhaps most significant has been the increase in cross-national 
comparative activity, largely reflecting EU developments. This has 
ranged from national level comparisons through to detailed analysis of 
specific issues such as the impact of financial institutions and foreign 
ownership, and the implications of European integration. Much of it 
has also extended beyond the standard country-by-country 
comparisons to embrace integrated treatment of key themes and 
issues. It has also involved multi-level analysis, with „firm in sector‟ 
research designs and the breaking down of the barrier between EU-
level and national systems developments. Such work has provided a 
powerful intellectual stimulus, helping us to re-think the subject 
matter of employment relations and approaches to it. Paraphrasing 
Hyman again, it has forced us to look again at many taken-for-granted 
assumptions and causal explanations that apparently fit one country; it 
has encouraged an appreciation of the need for more theorising; and it 
has exposed us to different theoretical traditions
30
. 
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On-going challenges  
It would be wrong to think that the mood of employment relations 
scholars is one of complacency. Certainly there are many challenges. 
At the top of many lists is likely to be that of unraveling the links 
between practice and performance. This is particularly true of the links 
between working practices and business performance. There can be 
little doubt that success here would help to confirm employment 
relations' importance in the eyes of policy makers and practitioners. It 
would also pave the way to assessing the consequences for other key 
outcomes such as personal development. Yet enough is known to 
appreciate the immensity of the task – indeed, it could be as 
frustrating as the search for the 'holy grail'. For, arguably, it is not just 
a matter of „big science‟ comprising large-scale surveys and the 
collection of detailed data using sophisticated instruments
31
; there is 
also need for contextualised inquiry reflecting the complexity and 
variability of the relationships between practice and performance
32
.  
Developing a truly „multi-level‟ perspective is another major 
challenge. Much employment relations analysis prioritises either the 
national level or the workplace level. In the first instance, there is 
what might be described as a „top-down‟ view of arrangements. In the 
second, the concern is with the labour process and its implications. 
These approaches need to come together, with attention focused on 
the interaction between the levels and the forces driving the 
relationship between them. Arguably, Morgan‟s comments on the 
national business systems literature apply equally to its employment 
relations counterpart: there is a need to take into account „the layered 
nature of social space, the simultaneity of the context and the 
consequences of action and institutions at the local, regional national 
and international levels‟33. Certainly the more internationally 
comparative work in the area becomes, the greater the need for 
sensitivity to the articulation between „top down‟ and „bottom up‟ 
developments. 
A third challenge is to develop a „progressive‟ research agenda, 
i.e. one that „builds on what has gone before to improve 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon in question and to advance 
explanation of its causes and consequences‟34. It is not just that 
employment relations has tended to be ad hoc in its choice of issues 
for attention, very often reflecting immediate policy maker and 
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practitioner concerns. Arguably, it has too often in the past developed 
analysis that has wider significance, only to allow it to lie fallow and 
see a very similar approach or idea emerging much later in another 
field. Take the issue of change. Even if the language is not used, 
issues of „entrepreneurship‟, „bricolage‟, „translation‟ and „enactment‟ 
figure prominently throughout British studies of workplace 
employment relations, going as far back as Flanders‟ classic 1964 
study of the Fawley productivity agreements.  
A final challenge takes us back to the Preface. Those of us who 
teach and research in the area have to do much more to explain to the 
outside world why the subject has on-going relevance to policy 
makers and practitioners. This does not mean pretending to have quick 
fix solutions. Rather it means teasing out the policy and practical 
implications of analysis and research; focusing on outcomes as well as 
processes - not just in terms of business performance, but also wider 
concerns such as the contribution of work organisations to social 
capital development; and making things more accessible. All these are 
important not just because, in the climate of limited resources, the 
appeal of teaching programmes and the success of research 
applications depend on relevance. Much more fundamentally, they 
take us back to the origins of the subject. Because none of the 
traditional disciplines is centrally concerned with the employment 
relationship, there is a great danger that the unfolding developments 
and their considerable implications will only be appreciated when it is 
too late to do anything about them.  
 
The rest of the text 
The chapter that follows is concerned with why employment relations 
matter. It not only covers the impact of employment relations in areas 
that have traditionally featured, namely conflict and business 
performance, but also living standards, health, and personal 
development opportunities. It also deals with the wider impact of the 
conduct of the employment relationship on the family, social capital 
and macroeconomic performance.  
The remaining chapters focus on the matters that the study of 
employment relations deals with. In each case, they seek to explain 
why the issue is seen as worthy of study, account for why things are as 
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they are, and tease out the underlying trends and developments. They 
also highlight the main controversies and debates.   
Chapter 3 is concerned with the employment relationship, 
highlighting its distinctive features and the main variations that it 
takes. It goes on to consider whether intensifying competition is 
bringing about fundamental changes in the traditional model. Chapter 
4 is concerned with institutions, explaining why they are the focus of 
so much attention, identifying the ones that are especially significant 
and accounting for the main cross-national differences. It also reviews 
the forces driving change, the mechanisms involved and direction of 
travel. 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the two key underlying issues that are 
all too often neglected. Chapter 5 emphasises that „negotiation‟ is as 
much a feature of individual employment relations as it is of collective 
ones. It is also not just about „exchange‟. It is also about influencing 
relationships, changing attitudes and shaping preferences. Chapter 6 is 
concerned with the nature, distribution and exercise of power that is 
involved in the employment relationship. It explores the different 
types and „faces‟ of power and their relevance, explains why the 
nature of power in the employment relationship is so asymmetrical 
(unequal) and discusses attempts handle the tension between „power 
to‟ and „power over‟. 
Chapter 7 explains why conflict is an integral feature of the 
employment relationship. It reviews the main expressions that conflict 
at work takes and considers the changing patterns of these and the 
reasons for them. 
Chapters 8, 9 and 10 go on to consider three main areas of debate 
relevant to the practice and theory of employment relations. Chapter 8 
focuses on the nature, extent and direction of change in management's 
approach, linking them to the particular „varieties of capitalism‟. 
Chapter 9 deals with trade unions and collective bargaining and 
considers whether the decline in membership and coverage represents 
the passing of an era. Chapter 10 is devoted to the role of government 
and the ongoing public policy issues that policy makers find 
themselves having to confront.   
The Appendix compares and contrasts the impact of employment 
relations in the UK and a selection of other countries (Germany, 
France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the USA), largely drawing on 
social and economic indicator data from the main international 
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agencies. It also discusses the missed opportunities for plugging some 
of the UK‟s institutional „gaps‟ that this comparison reveals.  
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Table 1.1 Theorising’s three perspectives35 
 
Positivism 
This holds that the role of theory is to simplify our understanding of 
social phenomena. It seeks to go beyond explanation to identify 
timeless laws along the lines of the natural sciences. The analytical 
approach is essentially deductive, with hypotheses being derived from 
theoretical assumptions grounded in „methodological individualism‟, 
rationality and self-interest. Methods typically involve modelling with 
mathematics and econometrics playing an increasingly important role. 
The approach especially values parsimony in its theoretical 
assumptions and predictive capacity in its explanations. It is criticised 
for working with unrealistic assumptions, giving limited attention to 
preference formation, ignoring context in understanding individual 
motivation and addressing empirical regularities rather than the 
underlying causal mechanisms.  
 
Social constructionism 
This holds that the role of theory is to inform and sensitise analysis to 
the complexity of social phenomena. It focuses on explanation and 
equates it with identifying the beliefs and desires that lead people to 
act in particular ways. A core assumption is that there can be no 
objective social or political reality independent of our understanding 
of it. The method is essentially comparative and historical with a focus 
on the social processes through which people create meaning. It 
especially values complexity and realism in making assumptions. It is 
criticised for working with untestable assumptions, stressing generic 
processes over causal explanation, ignoring the influences of 
structures that lie outside the processes and failing to ask why 
construction takes a particular form under given conditions.  
 
Critical realism 
This holds that the role of theory is to understand the empirical 
regularities of social phenomena and to determine when they occur/do 
not occur. It focuses on explanation and equates it with identifying the 
causal mechanisms behind these regularities. Although the social 
world is seen as being different from the natural in that it involves 
human intervention, institutions nonetheless develop with logics 
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independent of the choices of individual actors. The method is 
essentially comparative and historical involving a mix of deduction 
and induction. It especially values complexity and realism in making 
assumptions; it is also stresses the importance of context in shaping 
individual preferences. It is criticised for its lack of predictive 
capability, a tendency to description for its own sake, proneness to 
structuralism and difficulty in adequately accounting for change. 
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2 
 
Why employment relations matter 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Establish the areas where employment relations has a 
major impact 
 
 Identify the links and mechanisms involved 
 
 
Summary 
A measure of the significance of employment relations is the number 
of people that are directly involved. For example, in the UK, at the 
end of 2009, just under 29 million or something approaching six out 
of ten of the population above the age of 16 were regarded as being in 
‘employment’ according to the Office for National Statistics. Of these, 
just under 25 million people or 86 per cent were classified as 
‘employees’ and nearly 3.9 million as ‘self employed’. The absolute 
and relative levels of pay of these employees are major determinants 
of poverty and inequality and, along with the duration, distribution 
and flexibility of working time, have substantial implications for 
work-life-family balance. The type of work organisation in which they 
are involved has profound implications for both health and personal 
development opportunities. This is especially so in the case of the 
extent to which it enables control over demand and encourages 
autonomy and decision making. Similarly, the extent to which work 
organisation encourages information/ knowledge sharing and 
cooperation/team working influences business performance and 
productivity. The same goes for personnel policies and practices - 
especially important here are those dealing with participation and 
involvement. Furthermore, the greater the integration of personnel 
policies and practices with business strategy, the greater is their 
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influence. How managers are recruited, developed and, above all, 
rewarded is fundamentally important not just for the way they manage 
‘other’ employees, but also for the balance between short–term 
profitability and investment and so the organisation’s strategic 
direction. Employment relations matter for macro considerations as 
well. The workplace is a major source of social capital - the level of 
employment security and the nature and extent of employee ‘voice’ 
influence levels of trust and so make for a cohesive society with the 
capacity to innovate and change. The results are reflected in 
macroeconomic performance indicators such as the level of GPD and 
competitiveness. The workplace also plays a fundamentally important 
role in producing consumers who generate demand and so profitability 
and growth. 
 
Introduction 
For much of the 20
th
 century employment relations were more or less 
equated with trade unions, collective bargaining and strikes. Asking 
why employment relations mattered was rather pointless. Trade 
unions were major political players and strikes a key concern of 
governments, providing the rationale for intervention not just in the 
area of dispute resolution procedures, but also minimum standards and 
support for collective bargaining. Strikes were also very newsworthy. 
Fueling the employment relations-trade union-strikes equation in the 
UK, for example, was a cadre of specialist labour editors who enjoyed 
a status matched only by the political 'lobby' correspondents. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, a reduction in the number of strikes, along with 
decline in trade union membership and collective bargaining 
coverage, has led to the view that employment relations no longer 
matter.  
This chapter does its best to counter this view by bringing together 
evidence establishing the links between employment relations and a 
range of social and economic outcomes, together with the mechanisms 
involved. It focuses on the main levels of activity – from individuals 
through the family and workplace to the macro level – drawing on a 
wide range of international as well as UK sources. Table 1.1 
summarises the results. The Appendix at the end of the text compares 
and contrasts the impact of employment relations in the UK and a 
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selection of other countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the USA), largely drawing on social and economic 
indicator data from the main international agencies.  
 
Living standards  
There are several possible measures of living standards, including 
gross domestic product (GDP) that features later in the Chapter and 
the Appendix; some embrace both material and non-material 
considerations such as longevity. The focus here is on what, arguably, 
is the most meaningful material measure so far as individuals are 
concerned, namely income from employment: for most of us such 
income is the only source there is. Two dimensions have to be 
considered. The first is the absolute level. If income from employment 
is absolutely low, the result is likely to be poverty, with implications 
not just for individuals and their families but also national social 
security systems: unlike physical capital, human capital is not 
something that employers 'own ' and so there is little incentive for 
them to meet the so-called 'social costs of labour’ (i.e. the 'minimum 
on-going expenditure for upkeep, repair and depreciation if the input 
is to be maintained’1). Not surprisingly, the avoidance of poverty 
figures prominently in the justification for minimum wages legislation 
now present in around 90 per cent of countries
2
. 
The second dimension is the relative level of income, which 
brings in the issue of inequality. Even people who are absolutely well 
paid may nonetheless experience a sense of deprivation if they find 
that others are earning more for what they think is no good reason; the 
same is true if they think the size of the difference is unjustified. This 
is because fairness plays a key role in shaping expectations and 
fairness depends on comparisons
3
.  
Arguably, for example, it is so-called ‘relative deprivation’ that 
helps to explain the rapid growth of banker and executive pay in 
recent years. The stimulus has been the earnings of former colleagues 
and acquaintances working for hedge funds and private equity groups 
who, because of their partnership-type organisation, have been able to 
reward themselves especially handsomely. 
Poverty and inequality are analytically distinct, but closely related 
in practice. As well as significantly affecting life expectancy via the 
'social gradient' discussed in the next section, both national and 
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international evidence confirms that poverty also results in lower 
social mobility – the lower the social mobility, the greater the prospect 
of areas of high deprivation growing up from which it is difficult to 
escape. In the words of the TUC’s Commission on Vulnerable 
Employment, 'persistent poverty isolates and excludes'
4
. This is 
because, as the UN Human Development Report emphasises on the 
basis of extensive international evidence, 'The main form of ... mental 
illness, anxiety disorders, the main forms of inequality - income, 
gender, and regional - seldom exist in isolation. Rather they create 
'mutually reinforcing structures of disadvantage that follow people 
through life cycles and are transmitted across generations'
5
. The UN's 
central message is that distribution should be put 'at the centre of 
strategies for human development':  
People are likely to be restricted in what they can do with their 
freedom and their rights if they are poor, ill, denied an education 
or lack the capacity to influence what happens to them. To be 
meaningful, formal equalities have to be backed by what Amartya 
Sen has called the ‘substantive freedoms’6 - the capabilities - to 
choose a way of life and do the things that one values. Deep 
inequalities in life chances limit these substantive freedoms, 
rendering hollow the idea of equality before the law
7
. 
As the UN’s Human Development Report emphasises, inequality 
matters not just because of the implications for individual well-being, 
however, but also society at large. To paraphrase: 
 Inequality fuels people’s sense of social injustice. Trust, which is a 
critical ingredient in the social capital that business is able to call 
on, suffers, resulting in the corroding of institutions and 
weakening of political legitimacy.  
 Inequality is inefficient. Society as a whole suffers where 
inequalities based on wealth, gender or region leave a large section 
of the population with insufficient assets and endowments to make 
a full contribution. 
 Inequality impedes growth. This effect is especially strong for asset 
inequality. Limited access to productive assets and/or limited 
capacity to enforce legal claims can restrict poor people’s ability to 
borrow and invest, holding back growth. By contrast, greater 
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distributional equity can accelerate growth with no inherent trade-
offs between growth and equity
8
.  
There are especially strong links between inequality and mental 
health, above all in the form of anxiety disorders reflecting concerns 
about both the financial and status implications of ‘relative 
deprivation’. Here the work of the WHO’s ‘World Mental Health 
Survey Consortium’ covering with Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands,  New Zealand, Spain and the USA is 
especially relevant. Wilkinson and Pickett have brought these results 
together with those of national studies in Australia, Canada and the 
UK to show that the more unequal a country’s income distribution, the 
greater the tendency to mental illness
9
. 
In the UK, there has been a significant growth in the proportion 
of low paid workers. In 1977, 12 per cent of workers earned less than 
two-thirds of the median. By 1998, this had risen to 21 per cent. By 
April 2006, it was more than one-fifth (23 per cent)
10
.  
Nearly two-thirds (60 per cent) of low-paid workers were women, 
and over two-fifths of low-paid workers in total are women working 
part time. Disabled people were also at greater risk of being in low-
paid work, being 10 per cent more likely than the able bodied to be in 
low-paid jobs. Ethnicity and age were also important: Bangladeshi, 
Pakistani and black African were the ethnic groups most likely to be 
low paid, as were young people11. 
There has also been a considerable increase in 'in-work poverty', 
i.e. being in low-paid work and living in a household on a low income. 
In the words of the ‘almost six in ten households in which adults are 
living in poverty (57 per cent) are households where one or more 
adults are in paid employment, up from under a half ten years ago’12. 
At the other end of the scale, nearly five million people in the UK 
earned over £35,000 a year in 2004-5; 4.2 million earned between 
£35,000 and £100,000; 422,000 between £100,000 and £350,000; and 
47,000 earned more than £350,000. The details will be found in Table 
1.1. 
A widely used single figure measure of income inequality is the 
‘Gini’ coefficient, which condenses the entire income distribution into 
a single number between zero and one: the higher the number, the 
greater the degree of income inequality. On the basis of this, inequality 
in the UK rose dramatically over the 1980s, the coefficient rising from 
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a value of around 0.25 in 1979 and reaching a peak in the early 1990s 
of around 0.34
13
 
A particular feature of this inequality is the gender pay gap. In the 
opening words of the Women in Work Commission's (2006) 
Executive Summary, 
In the 30 years since the Equal Pay Act, there have been many 
advances in women’s position in society and at work. More 
women are in employment and occupy a greater number of senior 
positions. Girls are outperforming boys at school and their 
aspirations are high. Despite these important changes, the pay and 
opportunity gap for women remains. Women who work full time 
earn 13 per cent less than men who work full time, based on 
median hourly earnings, and 17 per cent less based on mean 
hourly earnings
14
. These lower earnings leave women at greater 
risk of falling below the poverty line and of being worse off than 
men in retirement. Women face an unfair disadvantage and the 
UK economy is losing productivity and output.  
Many factors contribute to a country's pay structure. One is 
employment structure. Take the UK. Although some object to the 
description of the UK as an 'hour glass economy'
15
, employment 
structure is nonetheless skewed towards services, which have large 
numbers of both high- and low-paying employees – finance is an 
example of the former and hotels and restaurants the latter. In the 
words of a European restructuring monitor report using the median 
hourly wage as a proxy for job quality, the UK is a hybrid case of 
'polarisation' and 'upgrading' – in recent years it has experienced 
moderate but clear job growth in the second lowest earnings quintile, 
little growth or net job destruction in the lowest and middle quintiles 
and strong growth in the top two quintiles
16
. The report goes to 
suggest that this pattern is related to the destruction of manufacturing 
jobs (especially in low-technology industries) and the creation of 
middle-paying to low-paid jobs in personal and social services (many 
of which have been filled by women working part-time).  
A second factor affecting pay structure is productivity. Important 
here is the business strategy that a company pursues. If a country has a 
concentration of businesses in sectors with low R&D, as is the case 
for the UK, pay levels are likely to be low. The same is true if 
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companies compete on the basis of costs rather than quality and 
‘numerical’ rather than ‘functional’ flexibility: the result is low levels 
of skill, of productivity and, most immediately relevant, of pay
17
. 
Underpinning these features of business strategy are two 
institutional considerations, the significance of which will be 
discussed in more detail in later sections and chapters. One is the 
extent to which corporate governance arrangements encourage a 
focus on short-term profitability as opposed to long-term market share 
or added value – the former makes it difficult to prioritise quality and 
build the relationships necessary for its achievement. The other is the 
structure of collective bargaining. Critical here is the level at which 
collective bargaining takes place and so the coverage. Collective 
bargaining that is multi-employer and sector wide has two advantages 
over its single employer equivalent when it comes to low pay: trade 
unions are better able to confront the monopsony power of employers, 
especially where there are legal provisions for extending terms and 
conditions across a sector; and there is a greater pressure on all firms 
in the sector to adopt more efficient working arrangements to offset 
the increases in their employment costs.  
 
Health 
In the words of a recent authoritative review of the health of Britain's 
working population, 'There is ... compelling evidence that work has an 
inherently beneficial impact on an individual’s state of health ... 
Overall, the beneficial effects of work were shown to outweigh the 
risks and to be much greater than the harmful effects of long term 
worklessness or prolonged sickness absence'
18
. Even so, the 'risks' are 
not insubstantial. Employees are not only vulnerable to injuries and 
illnesses that take place in the workplace and/or are directly caused by 
employment ('occupational health'). Many illnesses and mortality are 
influenced by conditions in the workplace, but may occur later in life 
beyond the work environment ('occupationally-related health'). 
 
Occupational health 
Historically, the emphasis has been on injuries arising from accidents, 
musculoskeletal disorders reflecting the organisation of work and/or 
inadequate equipment, and illnesses, such as cancer, dermatitis and 
Why employment relations matter 
 
37 
 
asthma, associated with the use of chemicals and other harmful 
substances. In recent years, there has been growing concern with the 
emotional work environment and the links with stress and mental 
health. The very graphic words of the director of the Work Foundation 
sum up a widely argued position: 
The cause [of stress and mental health] is modernity in all its 
guises - family and community breakdown, the ever harder quest 
to find meaning in life, the cheapness of mind-wrenching drugs, 
the discontinuity between reality as portrayed by the media and 
real life and so on. But one cause gets too little exposure - the role 
of work. The ills of modernity have been around for decades; the 
construction of the contemporary 'flexible' labour market began 20 
years ago and it has been hardening ever since ... No story of the 
rise in mental ill-health is complete without recognition of the 
increasingly grad-grind character of many British workplaces ...
19
 
Different commentators emphasise different features of the 
'flexible' labour market. As Chapter 1 observed, these include greater 
pressure on performance involving the adoption of stretching targets, 
along with rigorous appraisal of performance and greater surveillance; 
greater insecurity arising from the 'permanent restructuring', 
'competitive tendering', ‘market testing’ and the subcontracting or 
outsourcing of activities previously undertaken in-house; and 
questioning of some of the long-standing benefits of the employment 
relationship that many employers no longer feel they can afford, such 
as careers and final salary pensions. More fundamentally, it is argued, 
people's sense of certainty about their place in the world is being 
undermined, threatening their individual resilience
20
.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the recession appears to be reinforcing 
these tendencies. In the UK, a CIPD survey suggests that job 
satisfaction had dipped considerably in recent years across all sectors 
and organisation sizes
21
. Its Annual absence management survey, 2009 
also suggests that some of the reduction in levels of absenteeism 
might be attributed to people worrying that going off sick might make 
them a target for redundancy – something that information on calls to 
the Acas Helpline corroborate
22
. 
As the Appendix will confirm, the UK has a relatively good 
record for safety at work. Even so, the impact of employment is 
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considerable, as these Health and Safety Executive statistics for 
2007/08 confirm: 229 workers were killed at work, a rate of 0.8 per 
100 000 workers; 136 771 other injuries to employees were directly 
reported, a rate of 517.9 per 100 000 employees; and 299 000 
reportable injuries occurred, according to the Labour Force Survey, a 
rate of 1000 per 100 000 workers. It also emerges that 2.1 million 
people during the year were suffering from an illness they believed 
was caused or made worse by their current or past work, of which 563 
000 were new cases. 2056 people died of mesothelioma (2006), and 
thousands more from other occupational cancers and lung diseases. 
Overall, 34 million days (1.4 days per worker), were lost 28 million 
due to work-related ill health and 6 million due to workplace injury.  
 
Occupationally-related health 
Stress figures especially prominently in discussions of 
‘occupationally-related health’. The basic proposition is that working 
in hierarchical organisations leads to stress, which in turn can lead in 
later life to the heart disease, stroke and diabetes that together 
represent 50-75 percent of all mortality. This is because of the 
instinctive biological mechanisms involved. Stress increases the levels 
of the hormone cortisol; the higher the levels of cortisol, the greater 
risk of 'metabolic syndrome', which can have a direct impact on the 
risk of a person developing such diseases. Stress also affects the 
sympathetic nervous system that is responsible for the adrenaline rush 
caused in situations where the individual is faced with the option 
between a 'fight’ or ‘flight' response. This effect, which causes 
inflammation, is also related to metabolic syndrome. 
The main strand of the argument focuses on the impact of the 
'social gradient', i.e. where the individual stands in the hierarchy. 
Much of the work stems from the development by Karasek of what 
has come to be known as the ‘demand-control model'. Basically, 
Karasek defines stress on the job according to the demands of the task 
(how fast-paced and chaotic the workplace is) and the amount of 
control a worker has in deciding how to meet them. This produces 
four categories: 
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 low-demand, low-control 
 low-demand, high-control 
 high demand, high control 
 high demand, little control23  
A popular perception is that stress is associated with those in 
especially ‘high demand’ jobs such as senior managers. Yet 
employees in these jobs may not experience stress, if demand is 
predictable and, above all, within their control. This is especially so if 
their status brings more support and more outlets. By contrast, it is the 
workers in Karasek's fourth category, most of whom are relatively low 
status, who are held to be at most risk. This because, ‘The more 
extensive the hierarchy, the lower the control and autonomy that 
employees can exercise vis-à-vis management’24. 
The second strand, which has its origins in the work of 19
th
 
century thinkers such as Durkheim and Simmel, focuses on the 
availability of support to individuals and makes links with issues of 
social capital discussed later. The argument is that, controlling for the 
influence of economic growth, the availability of 'social support' helps 
to diminish the harshness of the effects of lack of autonomy and 
control in leading to stress or illness. In practice, the focus has been on 
the most fundamental difference observable at cross-national level, 
namely that between those employed in complex organisations with 
social hierarchies and those involved in self-employed and family-
owned businesses
25
.  
Pretty robust data are available for both strands of the argument. 
Thus, Karasek’s original findings having been replicated over the last 
20 years in many countries. Perhaps the best known work in the UK is 
associated with Marmot, who is Professor of Epidemiology and Public 
Health at University College. His so-called 'Whitehall studies' track 
the health of British civil servants from 1967 onwards. In 'Whitehall 
1', the focus was on men and examined mortality rates over 10 years 
among 18,000 civil servants across the range of job grades; in 
'Whitehall 11', which involved just over 10,000 civil servants, women 
were covered as well as men.  
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Whitehall 1 established that there was a 'social gradient' in 
mortality that ran from bottom to top of the organisation. In the words 
of the WHO's summary: 
Men in the lowest grade (others = messengers, doorkeepers, etc.) 
had a three-fold higher mortality rate than men in the highest 
grade (administrators) ... Grade is also associated with other 
specific causes of death, whether or not the causes were related to 
smoking ... While low status was associated with obesity, 
smoking, less leisure time physical activity, more baseline illness, 
higher blood pressure, and shorter height (78), controlling for all 
of these risk factors accounted for no more than 40 per cent of the 
grade difference in CHD mortality ... After controlling for 
standard risk factors, the lowest grade still had a relative risk of 
2.1 for CHD mortality compared to the highest grade ...
26
 
As for 'Whitehall 11', the joint Civil Service Unions/Cabinet 
Office publication came to the following conclusion: 
Whitehall II showed that the association between low control and 
increased risk of heart disease was independent of a range of 
personal characteristics of individuals. The implication was that 
the relationship related to the way work was organised and the 
opportunity it gives people for control rather than to any 
characteristics of the individuals in those jobs ... Low control at 
work makes an important contribution to the social gradient in 
mental and physical ill health
27
. 
In the case of support to individuals, there is a large 
epidemiological literature confirming that the more frequent and 
intense one’s social relationships, the more protective an effect there 
is on illness and mortality, regardless of the type of disease and 
disability. Brenner’s work for the European Commission, which draws 
on both time-series and cross-sectional analysis for OECD as well as 
EU countries also confirms this. Controlling for GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity, it finds that 'the extent to which a nation’s 
formal workforce consists of employees operating outside of standard 
wage and salary employment (i.e., outside of hierarchical work 
organisations) is associated with lower age-adjusted mortality 
(including cardiovascular and accident related mortality)'
28
. Brenner 
suggests on the same page that the 'data are also consistent in 
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demonstrating that the extent to which a nation’s formal workforce 
consists of self-employed, and/or are family workers, is inversely 
related to age-adjusted mortality rates'. 
 
Personal development 
The development of human capital does not just involve schools or 
institutions of higher education: in the words of the OECD, ‘Learning 
and the acquisition of skills and knowledge takes place from birth to 
death’29. If the family is of overriding importance in our early years, it 
is employment that is important for most of our lives. In a phrase, and 
for better or worse, the firm is a ‘learning organisation’. Moreover, the 
learning involved is not just a matter of technical skills, but also social 
ones such as perseverance and self-discipline, communications, and 
the capacity to make judgments, along with critical inter-personal 
skills such as the ability to work in teams and exercise leadership. 
Again, there are profound implications for individuals, organisations 
and society.  
Continuing vocational training 
There are three main ways in which employment is held to contribute 
to personal development. The first, continuing vocational training 
(CVT), may be specific or general and may or may not involve public 
recognised credentials and diplomas. It may take place on or off the 
premises, but is invariably structured. Individuals and/or the state may 
bear some of the costs. In the main, however, it is employers who bear 
the main burden, which can be seen as an explicit form of investment 
in human capital. 
An overview of the literature on the impact of CVT suggests that 
individual workers receiving on-the-job training have 'consistently 
been found to earn higher wages’30. One UK study referred to found 
that individuals undertaking CVT were found to earn on average 5 
percent more than individuals who had not
31
.  
As for the incidence of CVT, there are three main sources. One is 
Eurobarometer. Here a review drawing on data for 1996 and 2001 
finds that dominant trend was towards upskilling in the 1990s, but no 
evidence that the pace of change increased in the second half of the 
period
32
.  Even so, over half of employees in both years (59.0 per cent 
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and 54.9 per cent) said they had received no training. A further 14.7 
per cent and 17.1 per cent said the training was less than one week.  
A second source is the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) 
covering OECD countries.
33
. On average, one in four (26 per cent) of 
employees participated in employer-sponsored CVT each year with an 
annual training intensity, on average, of about 68 hours, i.e. slightly 
less than nine working days
34
.  
As in the case of health, there are winners and losers. Overall, the 
authors suggest, CVT may have the perverse effect of increasing 
inequalities between different groups. Thus, although participation 
rates are roughly the same for men and women, intensity differs, with 
women receiving on average 17 per cent fewer hours training than 
men. The incidence and intensity of training also tended to decline 
with age and differ considerably across educational and occupational 
groups. Participation in low-skilled occupations (13 per cent) was 
about one third of participation in high-skilled occupations (38 per 
cent). Similarly, it was 16 per cent for workers with less than upper 
secondary education against 35 per cent for those having a tertiary 
degree. Hence, the three components of human capital (early human 
capital, formal education, and on-the-job training) tended to be 
complementary over the life-cycle of workers. Employees with a high 
degree of supervisory responsibility were also twice as likely to 
benefit from CVT as are employees without. Intensity was greater as 
well: on average, employees performing non-supervisory functions 
spend less than one-third as much time on training as employees with 
a great supervisory role.   
The third, and most up-to-date, source is Eurostat's Continuing 
Vocational Training Survey (CVTS2)
35
. As well as cross national 
comparisons, which are considered later, key findings indicate that:  
 large companies invest considerably more of their employees’ 
working time in continuing vocational training (CVT) than small- 
and medium-sized companies do; candidate countries have the 
highest intensity of CVT in small enterprises  
 the amount of working time devoted to CVT in the services sectors, 
particularly in financial intermediation, is above average 
 there is a correlation between participation in continuing vocational 
training and the use of ‘new technologies’. In most countries, the 
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participation rates and the hours spent in CVT are higher in 
companies with new technologies.  
 
Opportunities for on-the-job development 
Arguably, CVT is just the tip of the iceberg of the development 
opportunities that employment offers. Also important are the 
opportunities that come with day-to-day working on the job. Here two 
features of work organisation are critical. One is the degree of task 
complexity: the higher the degree of task complexity, the greater the 
requirement for the exercise of problem-solving skills and continuous 
learning. The other is the nature and extent of autonomy – the extent 
to which employees are allowed to make decisions. A high degree of 
task complexity can go hand-in-hand with considerable scope for 
employees to exercise their initiative. Or it can be accompanied by 
relatively little discretion, where there a more formal structure of 
protocols (e.g. team work and job rotation practices) and/or tight 
quantitative targets. For example, two main types of team working 
have been identified that reflect these different combinations: the 
'Scandinavian' or 'Volvo', where team members have considerable 
autonomy in deciding how their jobs are done; and the ‘Toyota’, 
where  managers have much greater control over the processes
36
. 
Capturing data on the nature, extent and impact of on-the-job 
learning is a much more difficult exercise than that for CVT. 
Eurobarometer data for 1996 and 2001 suggest that only 23.3 per cent 
(1996) and 18.3 per cent (2001) said it was very true that they had a 
lot of say over what happens on the job. Only 26.0 per cent and 23.2 
per cent said this was the case for their ability to take part in decisions 
affecting their work
37
. 
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions undertakes a regular representative ‘European 
survey on Working Conditions' across EU countries. Especially 
interesting is the analysis done on the results of the third and fourth 
surveys carried out in 2000 and 2005. Briefly, it uses a form of factor 
analysis that takes into account variables such as the use of team 
work, job rotation, repetitiveness of tasks, the complexity of tasks, and 
the learning dynamics in work (whether the individual learns new 
things in work and whether the work requires problem-solving 
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activity). On the basis of these, it develops four models of work 
organisation covering EU countries. Table 1.2 gives an overview of 
the results across the 15 countries for which data were available in the 
2005 survey. 
 
Opportunities for upward mobility  
For many employees, the most extensive opportunities for 
development come not from the present job, but the challenges arising 
from promotion. It is also through these opportunities that employees 
are most likely to achieve the benefits that come from social mobility. 
In practice, the debate has centred on the role that employment 
relations play in reducing people’s scope for advancement and making 
the contribution they might be capable of. The most obvious groups 
affected are those who have come to be covered by equality legislation 
dealing with discrimination on grounds of age, disability, gender, race, 
religion or belief, and sexual orientation.  
The attention here focuses on women, who are not only the largest 
group, but the one for whom the data are most extensive. In the UK, 
there have been two major reports in recent years that bear on these 
issues: the Kingsmill committee's (2001)
38
 and the Women and Work 
Commission's (2006)
39
.  Internationally, the EU, ILO and OECD have 
been active in developing their own cross-national data bases. Broadly 
speaking, the data identify a common problem that is similar in its 
main proportions across countries. Relatively few women break 
through the ‘glass ceiling’, the lack of flexibility at senior levels being 
particularly acute. The gender gap appears to be largest for the 
highest-level category of managers – directors and chief executives – 
with 1.4 per cent of men holding such titles compared with only 0.4 
per cent of women. Moreover, data from the EU’s Women and men in 
decision-making database show that women are almost invisible in 
the top 50 publicly quoted companies. On average, only 3 per cent of 
presidents and just 10 per cent of board members of these key 
companies were women.   
To paraphrase the ILO
40
, in spite of the slow but steady increase 
being seen in the share of professional women in the workplace, the 
nature of women’s career paths continues to block them from making 
progress in organisational hierarchies. Even in female-dominated 
sectors, a disproportionate number of men rise to the more senior 
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positions. The rule of thumb is still: the higher up an organisation’s 
hierarchy, the fewer the women. On recruitment, qualified women 
tend to be placed in jobs that have a lower value in terms of skill 
requirements and remuneration. They find themselves in what are 
considered 'non-strategic' jobs, rather than in line and management 
jobs leading to higher positions. Thus, they effectively become 
support staff for their more strategically positioned male colleagues. 
Women also find it difficult to combine work and family life, 
facing substantial penalties, in terms of pay and progression, for 
taking time out of the labour market or reducing their working hours 
to care for children or other relatives. Women who work part time 
earn 32 per cent less than the median hourly earnings of women who 
work full time and 41 per cent less per hour than men who work full 
time. Women returning to the labour market after time spent looking 
after children often find it difficult to find a job that matches their 
skills. Those looking for part-time work crowd into a narrow range of 
lower-paying occupations due to a lack of quality part-time jobs. 
Often they have to change employer and occupation – and accept 
lower pay – to get part-time work.  
There is also a measure of consensus about the three main sources 
of institutions stopping women from climbing career ladders, many of 
which are common to other disadvantaged groups. One is the 
workplace, where formal/informal policies and practices dealing with 
issues such as recruitment, access to training and the operation of 
payment systems pose barriers. The second is the occupation. Many 
discriminatory barriers are the ‘property’ of the occupation in as much 
as there are limits on access that may penalise particular groups
41
. The 
third is the wider society, where social norms and traditions regarding 
education, labour market participation, job choice, career patterns and 
the evaluation of male- and female-dominated occupations may be 
influential.  
These factors come together to produce a situation where jobs 
come to be seen as 'male' or 'female', with both sexes being streamed 
(or streaming themselves) into different occupations and therefore 
sectors. As the ILO reminds us in discussing the ‘glass ceiling' that 
confronts many women, this segregation can be 'horizontal' or 
'vertical'
42
. In the first instance, sectors come to be seen as male or 
female. Traditionally, engineering, physics, the judiciary, law and 
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health service administration are considered ‘male’ jobs and library 
work, nursing and teaching (especially in primary education) are 
considered ‘female’ jobs. In the second, specific jobs within the sector 
come to be associated with one or other of the sexes. Thus, even in 
sectors where women predominate, such as teaching or personnel, 
men are more likely to hold the more senior and better-remunerated 
positions. Additionally, the wider institutional framework may help or 
hinder mobility. Features highlighted include age-related education 
and training systems, tax and benefit systems, parental leave 
arrangements and, perhaps most crucially, the provision of childcare 
facilities before and during compulsory school years. 
In the case of the UK, the opening paragraph of the Executive 
Summary of the Women in Work Commission’s Shaping a Fairer 
Future published in February 2006 gives an impression of what is at 
stake:  
The Commission estimates that removing barriers to women 
working in occupations traditionally done by men, and increasing 
women’s participation in the labour market, could be worth 
between £15 billion and £23 billion or 1.3 to 2.0 per cent of GDP. 
There are huge opportunities for change. Over the next decade, 
1.3 million new jobs are likely to be created and 12 million jobs 
will change hands as workers leave the labour market ....  
 
The family 
The family plays a key role in developing human and social capital. In 
the words of the Ministerial foreword to the Cabinet Office Strategy 
Unit's Families in Britain: evidence paper,  
 
Families are the bedrock of our society. They nurture children, 
help to build strength, resilience and moral values in young 
people, and provide the love and encouragement that helps them 
lead fulfilling lives. Extended family members provide one 
another with support throughout life, especially in difficult times 
and during critical moments, such as when a child is born, when a 
couple is separating or when relatives need caring for. It is within 
families that a sense of identity develops, and cultural and social 
values are passed on from one generation to the next. We often 
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take for granted the fact that families are unparalleled in the sheer 
range of what they do and provide for us
43
.  
In as much as it impacts on family life, the nature of employment 
influences the development of human and social capital indirectly as 
well as directly. Several links are emphasised. One already touched on 
is the absolute levels of pay. The argument is that relatively low levels 
of pay mean that many families have little choice: women have to go 
out to work to maintain a reasonable standard of living. Being dual 
income households (or, perhaps more appropriately, '1.5' in the light 
of the growth in part-time working) means they may achieve this 
objective, but the quality of family life may also suffer.  
Another long-standing issue in the UK is the impact of the long 
working hours of fathers. These do not just affect individual health 
and well-being, it is argued, but also the quality of family life
44
. Boys 
and teenagers in particular strongly notice the absence of a father 
whose long working hours keep him from the family home. Family 
and community interaction are also linked: many employees simply 
lack the time or energy, after long hours at work, for even basic forms 
of community participation. More recently, the duration and flexibility 
of working time is seen as an issue affecting women as well as men 
with talk of a new 'temporality'
45
. In this, working patterns are 
increasingly employer-led, that is organised by firms to suit their own 
specific ways of working, seen as being crucial to competitiveness, 
rather than around traditional social rhythms. They suggest that the 
new patterns required workers to work harder and longer and in ways 
that minimise labour costs. 
Much attention focuses on the impact on family life of the 
increasing feminisation of the workforce, reflecting the growth of the 
service sector. One strand is concerned with the impact working 
mothers have on their children's development in terms of their 
educational attainment or psychological adjustment. A second links to 
wider debates about the break up of the nuclear family and the 
implications for the care of elderly relatives in an increasingly ageing 
society.  
Also being highlighted is the impact of increasing feminisation of 
the workforce on the birthrate. Career pressures, together with the cost 
and difficulty of combining work and family, are reckoned to be 
leading couples to delay having children or not have them at all. 
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‘Britons put work and fun before babies’ is the headline of one 
newspaper story drawing on an ICM survey story in The Guardian
46
. 
Similar features followed on Germany (‘Germany agonises over 30 
per cent childless women’47) and Japan (‘Japan to tell its workers: take 
time off – for the sake of the nation’48). 
As for changes in family life and their impact on children's life 
chances, the Rowntree Foundations 'Work and family life' programme 
found that parents thought that employment had a number of negative 
day-to-day effects: 
 irritability and bad moods with the family, especially after a 
bad day;  
 impatience with children and their slow pace after the fast pace 
of work;  
 lower quality of relationships at home because of the stresses 
of work;  
 time with spouse curtailed;  
 insufficient energy to respond to children's requests;  
 children not liking parents working at the weekend or when 
they are ill;  
 parents' feelings of guilt;  
 time with children squeezed due to long hours of work; and  
 work encroaching into family life where parents worked at 
home
49
.  
Other bad effects were considerably more pronounced for couples 
and lone parents who worked at atypical times of day, reducing their 
frequencies of family meals, outings and holidays, and helping 
children with reading and homework. Although it had expanded under 
the National Child Care Strategy and the Sure Start programme, child 
care provision was also seen to be a problem for working parents of 
school aged children, co-ordinating different child care provision 
being especially fraught.  
Business performance 
Managing the managed 
The notion that employment relations have a direct impact on business 
performance has a long history. The costs of conflict at work have 
always loomed large. Initially, as the introduction pointed out, the 
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main concern was with organised conflict and the costs of strikes or 
collective action short of strikes, such as an overtime ban or ‘work to 
rule’. More recently, with the decline in trade union membership and 
collective bargaining, the focus of attention in the UK has shifted to 
individual disputes and, in particular, those involving an appeal to an 
Employment Tribunal (ET) under the various statutory provisions. As 
the Gibbons (2007) report on the operation of ETs establishes, both 
employers and employees find the tribunal process expensive and 
stressful
50
. The financial costs of a claim to businesses include time 
spent by staff handling the claim and the costs of specialist advice. It 
has been estimated that the Regulations cost firms nearly £290 million 
a year, including an average of £4,360 in legal fees and 7.71 days of 
which is directors’ and senior managers’ time. Tribunal claims are 
also costly for employees, an average of £2,493 being spent on legal 
fees alone. In this case, however, the non-financial problems are also 
important. The burden of preparation and anxiety over what is to come 
can adversely affect health and strain relationships both within and 
outside the workplace, and the experience can damage future career 
prospects. Survey data shows stress and depression were reported in 
33 per cent of cases (rising to 43 per cent for discrimination cases). 
Last but by no means, there the costs to government incurred through 
funding the Tribunals Service and Acas - in 2005/06 the combined 
budget being £120 million.  
Other expressions of conflict, such as absence and resignation, 
also show few signs of long-term decline. The WERS data suggest 
that, in workplaces with more than 10 employees, the incidence of 
these two indicators was relatively stable between 1990 and 2004: 
around three per cent of working days were lost through absenteeism 
in each of the years in which the survey had been undertaken, while 
voluntary resignations run at around 14 per cent
51
. Absenteeism, the 
Confederation of British Industry
52
 suggests, cost around £13.2 billion 
in 2007. 
Important though handling conflict has been, much more is 
involved in managing the employment relationship. Early examples 
reflect what Commons
53
 called the ‘good will’ model and start from 
the idea that better treatment of employees leads to increased 
motivation and commitment and thereby improved productivity and/or 
reduction in costs. In the UK, pioneers included Robert Owen and his 
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Lanark factory system and the Quaker firms and their introduction of 
superior welfare arrangements at the turn of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. In the USA, Henry Ford's willingness to pay 
higher wages than competitors is also an example. More generally, 
there was a recognition that employers had to make investments in 
specific forms of CVT if they were to maximise employee's 
performance. 
In the 1960s, the emphasis shifted onto specific features of 
traditional ways of working, with major weaknesses being identified 
and alternative practices put forward to deal with them. For example, 
individual payment by results came to be seen as a major source of 
conflict as well as poor productivity, with measured day work systems 
promoted as a superior alternative
54
. Low basic rates of pay and 
extensive overtime working were similarly criticised for encouraging 
restrictive practices, with the recipe being annual hours arrangements 
that introduced disincentives to extending working time beyond basic 
shift hours
55
. Tayloristic forms of job design were associated with 
high levels of absenteeism, with job enrichment being promoted
56
. 
Perhaps most controversial was the recognition that the lack of 
opportunity for employees to make their contribution was putting 
employers at a serious competitive disadvantage. In this case, it took 
Japanese manufacturers to prove the point using techniques such as 
problem-solving groups and semi-autonomous team working to 
reduce costs and improve productivity and quality.  
Since the 1980s, the emphasis of academics, practitioners and 
policy makers has moved on to bundles of practices, variously 
described as ‘high performance work systems’ (HPWS), ‘high-
commitment management’ and ‘high involvement management’. Put 
simply, the whole of these systems is seen as greater than the sum of 
the parts. Especially important is the extent to which practices are both 
mutually integrated and complementary to operating practices 
consistent with business strategy. A recent overview
57
 usefully draws 
on one of the pioneering studies, across-national investigation of 62 
car assembly plants
58
, to highlight two sets of linkages. The first is 
that task-related practices such as team-working and the use of 
problem-solving groups are likely to positively affect labour 
productivity when combined with supportive human resource 
practices, such as contingent pay, designed to enhance employee 
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motivation and commitment. The second is that these internally-
consistent ‘bundles’ of HR practices raise productivity most when 
there is complementarity with operating arrangements. Workplaces 
pursuing a ‘flexible production’ approach with team-based work 
systems, supporting HR practices and low inventory and repair buffers 
‘consistently outperformed mass production plants’.  
Most of the evidence linking individual practices to performance 
comes from case studies and small group and national surveys. Each 
year, the Acas Annual Report also gives details of up-to-date cases 
dealing with changes in working practices such as multi-skilling or a 
reduction of overtime working or the handling of stress absence. 
Typically, the changes result in considerable improvements in the 
status quo, albeit little can be said about the durability of changes 
because of the lack of longitudinal information – most case studies 
and surveys are one-off.  
The most comprehensive cross-national representative survey, the 
so-called EPOC study, investigates the role of direct participation in 
organisational change in ten EU countries in the mid-1990s
59
. Like 
most such surveys, it relies on the reported views of individual 
managers. Its organisation nonetheless makes it possible to minimise 
many of the weaknesses of previous surveys by going beyond the 
simple incidence of named practices such as team working to take into 
account dimensions such as the coverage, scope and autonomy 
involved in the practice. Key findings include the following: 
 Each of the six different forms of direct participation was 
associated with improved performance across a range of 
performance indicators: reduction of costs and throughput time; 
improvement in quality; increase in total output; decrease in 
sickness and absenteeism; and reduction in the number of 
employees and managers.  
 The more the number forms of direct participation were involved, 
the greater the effects – those using 3-4 reported greater effects 
than those with 1-2 on every variable; and those 5-6 practices 
similarly reported greater effects than those with 3-4. 
 The greater the intensity of the form’s practice, the greater the 
effects – for example, the greater the scope of team members to 
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make decisions about task performance and the greater their 
autonomy in choosing members, the greater the effects. 
As for the HPWS debate, the jury remains out. In the words of  
Delbridge and his colleagues, 'the enthusiasm for ‘high-involvement’ 
approaches that was generated by studies of manufacturing plants …  
has been tempered by a less than consistent body of evidence that has 
emerged from subsequent analyses seeking to investigate the broader 
generalisability of these findings'
60
. As well as the measurement 
difficulties touched on in Chapter 1, two main explanations are 
advanced for the tempering. One turns on the connection between 
working practices and business strategy: moves towards more 
involved forms of work organisation are most effective in 
organisations emphasizing quality and value-added; they are unlikely 
to deliver maximum benefits for those operating under a cost-
minimisation model. The other is that effective HWPS require high 
levels of trust, which are difficult to achieve, given the contradictory 
pressures to maintain motivation and yet cut costs to the bone. In 
particular, employee enthusiasm may be limited by past experience, 
especially if it has involved little more than work intensification 
and/or job loss.   
Further research will no doubt clarify the issues. The current 
controversy surrounding HPWS should not be allowed to cloud two 
very clear findings, however. The first is that firms' policies and 
practices do make a difference - there is considerable dispersion in 
productivity levels between establishments within both manufacturing 
and services. The second is that the scope for improvement is 
considerable even allowing for existing business strategies - the 
simplest of changes can make a difference. 
 
Managing managers 
The proposition in Table 1.1 that employment relations impacts on 
virtually every aspect of business performance, including its strategic 
direction, may appear to exaggerate their significance. Arguably, 
however, this is because employment relations are associated 
exclusively with the ‘managed’. It is often forgotten that most 
managers are also employees. How managers are recruited, developed 
and, above all, rewarded is fundamentally important not just for the 
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way they manage ‘other’ employees, but also for the balance between 
short–term profitability and investment. It is this balance that 
influences the organisation’s strategic direction. In the USA and the 
USA in particular, the last two decades have seen a substantial 
increase in the use of appraisal systems and managerial stock options, 
together with other share-related bonuses. As well as opening up the 
substantial gap between the pay of managers and the managed referred 
to earlier, this is believed to be a major contributory factor in the 
process known as 'financialisation', i.e. the prioritisation of short term 
financial results at the expense of longer term development of product 
market share. It is 'financialisation' that has helped to produce the 
‘permanent restructuring’ introduced earlier.  
In his RSA/Sky Sustainable Business Lecture in March 2010, the 
then Director General of the UK’s Confederation of British Industry 
(Richard Lambert) made very similar points, which also take us back 
to the issue of inequality:  
For the first time in history, it has become possible for a 
manager – as opposed to an owner – of a large public company to 
become seriously rich. 
Of course there are all kinds of reasons why pay levels in our 
largest companies have risen so rapidly in recent years: the 
emergence of a global market for talent, much more critical 
exposure in the public eye, a shorter shelf-life for chief 
executives, competition from other forms of capitalism like 
private equity – I don’t need to list them all now. 
But there are at least two potentially adverse consequences. 
One is that where compensation is closely linked to shareholder 
returns, which it usually is, executives have another powerful 
incentive to maximise short term profits – especially as their time 
in office is often strictly limited. If they are only going to be in the 
job for a few years, it’s hard for them to place great weight on 
plans that might take a lot longer than that to pay off. 
The other adverse consequence is that it is difficult to 
persuade the public that profits are no more than the necessary 
lifeblood of a successful business if they see a small cohort at the 
top reaping such large rewards. 
If leaders of big companies seem to occupy a different galaxy 
from the rest of the community, they risk being treated as aliens
61
. 
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Macro-level considerations: social capital  
This dimension raises the links between the world of employment and 
levels of trust in the wider society. On the face of it, employment 
relations would seem to have little connection with issues such as 
these. Yet this is one of the implications of the increasingly influential 
social capital thinking. In the words of the OECD, social capital is 
understood in terms of the 'networks, norms, relationships, values and 
informal sanctions that shape the quantity and co-operative quality of 
a society’s social interactions'62. It resides in relations rather than 
individuals; it is mainly to be seen as a public good, although it can be 
dysfunctional if when used by one group against another; and it comes 
from societal investments as well as being the product of inherited 
cultural and norms of behaviour.  Three main types of social capital 
can be distinguished: 
 bonding – refers to close connections between people, e.g. among 
family members or among members of the same ethnic groups 
 bridging – refers to more distant connections and cross-cutting ties, 
e.g. between business associates, acquaintances, friends from 
different ethnic groups, friends of friends 
 linking – describes connections between individuals with differing 
levels of power within hierarchies. 
Essentially, it is about trust not only in those with whom we are 
familiar, but also strangers and institutions, and is fundamentally 
important in facilitating the resolution of collective problems: 
individuals are more likely to cooperate when others can be relied 
upon to act in a similar way. The proposition is that the greater social 
capital, the greater the contribution to a range of beneficial economic 
and social outcomes. These include: 'high levels of and growth in 
GDP; more efficiently functioning labour markets; higher educational 
attainment; lower levels of crime; better health; and more effective 
institutions of government'
63
. 
Along with family, schools, voluntary and civic associations, 
work organisations are a major source as well as beneficiary of social 
capital. Views about justice, for example, or participation and 
involvement or bullying and harassment are likely to be significantly 
shaped by workplace experience. Similarly, the extent to which 
Why employment relations matter 
 
55 
 
employees feel they can trust colleagues and, perhaps above all, their 
employer might be expected to have a significant impact on their 
willingness to think in terms of collaborative and collective solutions 
more generally. In the words of the OECD, ‘Organisations which 
‘learn’ to socialize knowledge and skills through more effective forms 
of interaction, networks and norms of trust and co-operation are 
important sources of social capital’64. The OECD goes on to quote 
studies suggesting that cooperation between management and 
employees is the basic reason for the competitiveness of the Japanese 
automotive industry
65
. In the words of Omori, 'In the US company, 
each worker is eager to make his individual success, and unwilling to 
tell what he knows to his colleagues. But here, everybody is willing to 
tell what he knows as much as possible to colleagues. This is because 
he believes that he can make a success only as a team, not on his 
own'
66
.  
The OECD also suggests that 'more effective forms of interaction, 
networks and norms of trust and co-operation' can have an importance 
beyond the immediate workplace. It reminds us that another reported 
element in the competitive advantage of manufacturing firms in Japan, 
along with Germany, and parts of Italy, is reckoned to be the higher 
levels of trust relations between 'clusters' of local firms, enabling 
greater cooperation in areas such as R&D, marketing and training and 
development
67
. 
The issue of employee 'voice' figures especially prominently. 
Coats puts the argument most forcibly. Democracy, he argues, ‘is 
about more than periodic elections on a one-person-one-vote universal 
franchise … Citizenship has to be learned. It depends on discussion, 
debate, the assessment of alternative points of view, a democratic 
decision by majority vote and a willingness by the losers to live with 
the outcome’68. It is here that membership of trade unions and 
involvement in collective bargaining is to be seen as fundamentally 
important. Trade unions not only ensure an independent voice, but 
also an opportunity to be involved in the democratic processes of 
argument and voting, while collective bargaining means involvement 
in both making and administering the rules governing the employment 
relationship. Coats' conclusion does not pull any punches: 'If worker 
voice institutions are weak then the public domain is weakened. If the 
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public domain is weakened then the quality of our democracy is 
diminished'.  
 
Macro-level considerations: the economy 
A basic consideration here, helping to explain why the state has 
become the 'guarantor of the employment relationship’
69
,  is the need 
for policy makers to ensure that employees are able to achieve 
sufficient levels of purchasing power to be ‘confident consumers’70. It 
is not just a matter of the ‘social costs’ of employment that policy 
makers have to take into account, in other words, but also the 
production of consumers who generate demand and hence profitability 
and growth - it is a therefore a crucial ingredient of macroeconomic 
policy. As Kaletsky reminds us, this is why Kalecki and the 
Cambridge school of post-Keynesian economists such as Joan 
Robinson put so much emphasis on the distribution of income 
between capital and labour
71
. Owners of capital tend to spend less than 
they earn, whereas workers tend to spend more. If there is a shift in 
distribution from labour to capital, which there has in most countries 
in recent years
72
, the danger is that wage earners will run down their 
savings and increase their debt to maintain the standard of living. The 
problem is that, in these conditions, the only way to keep the economy 
going is for government to support demand and banking systems to 
expand credit – encouraging the ‘house price’73 or ‘privatised’74  
‘Keynesianism’ that many countries have experienced. But, if this 
carries on, as it has done in recent years, it is likely to lead to a 
financial crisis. Chapter 10 returns to the challenge that recent 
developments pose. 
There are also two particular issues that have given rise to 
considerable controversy. The first turns on the impact of the legal 
framework of employment relations and the degree of protection it 
gives to employees. The second brings in the degree of centralisation 
of a country's structure of collective bargaining/social dialogue 
arrangements.  
 
The significance of employment protection 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) has always been 
controversial: employers complain that it restricts their flexibility to 
Why employment relations matter 
 
57 
 
hire and fire; trade unions argue that it is necessary to guarantee a 
measure of security both on grounds of social justice and 
performance. In 1999, the OECD produced an index of employment 
protection legislation, made up of regulation on temporary forms of 
employment, specific requirements for collective dismissal and 
protection of permanent workers against (individual) dismissal, which 
purported to show that that there was a positive correlation between 
the extent of employment protection and the level of unemployment: 
the higher the levels of EPL, the higher the levels of unemployment
75
. 
The findings proved to be highly controversial, critics arguing that the 
OECD was wrong to consider employment protection just as an 
exogenous cost for employers and had failed to recognise the potential 
positive welfare implications. In 2004, the OECD returned to the issue 
with a more balanced appraisal
76
. To paraphrase its overall 
conclusions: 
 
 The net impact of EPL on aggregate unemployment is ambiguous 
and can only be resolved by empirical investigation. Employment 
protection regulation fulfils its stated purpose, which is to protect 
existing jobs. At the same time, it tends to limit firms’ ability to fire 
and so reduce the re-employment chances of the unemployed. 
 It is possible to detect a link between EPL and employment rates 
for specific groups such as the young and prime-age women, while 
there may be positive links to the employment rates of other 
groups. This is because these two groups are more likely to be 
subject to entry problems in the labour market than other groups 
and so disproportionately affected by the effects of EPL on hiring 
decisions. Differences in the strictness of EPL for regular and 
temporary jobs may be an important element in explaining the rise 
in the incidence of temporary work for youth and the low skilled 
(this is less the case for other groups, notably prime-age men).  
 EPL has benefits as well as costs and these need to be taken into 
account in any overall assessment. It may foster long-term 
employment relationships, thus promoting workers’ effort, co-
operation and willingness to be trained, which is positive for 
aggregate employment and economic efficiency. In addition, by 
promoting firms’ social responsibility in the face of adjustment to 
unfavourable economic circumstances, a reasonable degree of 
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employment protection could be welfare-improving, i.e. it can help 
balance concern for workers’ job security with the need for labour 
market adjustment and dynamism
77
.  
 
The significance of the structure of collective bargaining 
The second debate centres on the impact of the degree of 
centralisation of a country's structure of collective bargaining and/or 
social dialogue arrangements. Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, 
the level at which pay bargaining took place was held to play a key 
role in the trade off between wages, inflation, levels of unemployment 
and rates of economic growth. In a first phase, the emphasis was on 
the level where collective contracts were formally negotiated
78
. In a 
second, the focus shifted onto the degree of co-ordination of 
bargaining. Centralisation and co-ordination, it was argued
79
, should 
not be confused.  
Both highly centralised and/or highly co-ordinated and highly 
decentralised bargaining structures were held to outperform 
intermediate ones, the argument going like this. Where collective 
bargaining was centralised/ co-ordinated, negotiators had to take 
account of the wider economic consequences of their actions. Where it 
was fully decentralised, negotiators had to have concern for the impact 
of settlements on the firm’s competitiveness. Under collective 
bargaining which was neither centralised/co-ordinated nor fully 
decentralised, such as the sector-based systems common amongst 
continental European countries, the wider economic consequences of 
a decision by wage negotiators in any one sector, in terms of higher 
costs and unemployment, could largely be externalised to other 
sectors.  
In the 1990s, the links between the rate of increase in wages and 
unit labour costs and the co-ordination of collective bargaining broke 
down, reflecting the adoption by central banks of non-accommodating 
monetary regimes committed to very specific inflationary targets. 
Even so, the structure of collective bargaining and social dialogue 
remains influential. For a start, as the OECD observes, 'high union 
density and bargaining coverage, and the centralisation/co-ordination 
of wage bargaining tend to go hand-in-hand with lower overall wage 
inequality
80
. There is also some, albeit weaker, evidence that these 
features of collective bargaining are positively associated with the 
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relative wages of youths, older workers and women, with little 
evidence that employment of these groups is adversely affected'. More 
generally, to paraphrase Lorenz and Valeyre
81
, collective coordination 
is believed to play an important role in securing greater cooperation 
and flexibility at local level: it buffers the workplace from the 
distributional bargaining over pay that can so easily prejudice such 
cooperation; and it provides a more solid foundation upon which 
employers can make the investments in training and skills that are a 
precondition for adopting high performance working. The implication 
of Coats' argument quoted earlier is that those countries with wide-
ranging provisions for employee 'voice' also reap a benefit in terms of 
greater trust. In Panic's words, discussing the significance of 
centralised collective bargaining/social dialogue in Sweden, 
The importance of these and similar policies is that they create a 
unity of purpose and trust ... that enable employers, employees 
and government to cooperate closely in finding mutually 
satisfactory solutions to major economic challenges and crises. 
That gives the countries an advantage of critical importance in 
conditions of globalisation, which invariably creates serious 
adjustment problems ...
82
 
Hutton also makes the links with the limits on inequality that the 
OECD findings associated with greater collective coordination. 
Capitalism, he argues, depends on trust and a willingness to shake 
hands. Ordinary citizens will only embrace change and potential loss 
of jobs if they have fair opportunity to benefit and acquire assets to 
cushion themselves. In his view, the evidence is overwhelming that 
trust and reciprocity are best fostered where reward and risk are 
distributed fairly
83
. 
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                      Table 2.1            
 
     Main areas of impact 
 
          Living standards 
 
 poverty 
 inequality 
 
 
 
 
     Health 
 
 physical health  
 mental health  
 
 
 
Personal development 
 
 technical skills 
 social skills 
 personal development 
Why Employment relations matter: summary of findings 
 
             Links and mechanisms 
 
 pay levels (absolute and relative) reflect inter-relationship between type of work organisation, business 
strategy and employment structure - the more emphasis on 'low cost' as opposed to 'high quality' operations, 
the greater the likelihood of low pay 
 the design and operation of pay & reward systems, in particular, managerial systems, have major implications 
for pay structure and equality/inequality  
 the same is true of the level of collective bargaining/social dialogue  - collective coordination (multi-employer) 
helps to achieve greater equality 
 
 the extent to which work organisation exposes employees to heath and safety hazards is critical; but nature and 
extent of safety policies/practices can moderate the impact - the more employees and their representatives are 
involved in their design and operation, the greater the moderation  
 the greater the employment insecurity, the greater the vulnerability to stress and mental illness 
 the more control the type of work organisation allows employees over work demands, the less likely they are 
to suffer stress leading to cardiovascular diseases and relatively premature death 
 
 
 the workplace is a major source of human capital  
 the greater the availability of CVT opportunities, the greater the individual's career prospects and earnings 
potential  
 the more work organisation involves autonomy, task complexity and problem-solving, the more scope for 
individual learning and development work organisation and HR policies/practices are a major influence on 
promotion opportunities and so scope for personal growth/upward mobility 
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                      Table 2.1            
 
     Main areas of impact 
           
The family 
 
 children’s upbringing 
 extended family 
 marriage & birthrate 
 
Business performance 
 
 strategic direction 
 investment 
 innovation 
 productivity 
 quality & reliability 
 costs 
 profitability 
 
 
Social capital & macro-
economic considerations 
 
 levels of trust 
 levels of /growth in GDP 
 employment/unemployment 
 competitiveness 
Why Employment relations matter: summary of findings (cont) 
 
             Links and mechanisms 
 
 
 pay levels that are absolutely low are a major cause of child poverty;  
 duration, distribution and flexibility of working time have major implications for work-life-family balance 
(including ability to undertake caring responsibilities) potentially influencing birth and divorce rates 
 
 
 
 managerial pay & reward systems influence balance between 'short' and 'long' term horizons and so strategic 
direction, investment decisions and profitability;  
 the nature and extent of managerial hierarchy have cost as well as control implications 
 the type of work organisation and the extent to which it encourages information/knowledge sharing and 
cooperation/team working influence performance and productivity  
 the nature and extent of HR policies/practices (especially those providing for participation and involvement) 
do the same 
 the greater the integration of HR policies/practices, the greater the influence 
 
 
 the workplace is a major source of social capital 
 employees' experience of trust spills over into other spheres  
 the same is true of views about the appropriateness of behaviour, eg bullying and harassment, fairness and 
justice 
 the nature and extent of employment protection legislation are linked to levels of growth and 
competitiveness - employees who feel more secure in their jobs are more likely to embrace change 
 the structure of collective bargaining and 'voice' arrangements are similarly linked - collective coordination 
(multi-employer ) helps to secure workplace cooperation and flexibility as well as greater equality 
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Table 2.2  Incomes and taxes of ‘high-income’ individuals in the UK in 2004–05 
 
    All   Top 10–1 per cent    Top 1–0.1 per cent   Top 0.1 per cent  
    taxpayers    of adults      of adults    of adults  
 
Number of adults   29,500,000         4,215,483  421,702        46,854 
 
Before-tax annual income  
Minimum value    £5,093   £35,345   £99,727       £351,137 
Average value    £24,769   £49,960    £155,832      £780,043 
Average relative to all taxpayers     1.0      2.0         6.3             31.5 
 
Net taxes paid 
Higher-rate taxpayers          11.0 per cent         6.6 per cent            99.6 per cent          99.2 per cent 
Average net income tax paid  £4,415   £10,550    £49,477       £274,482 
Average net income tax rate
a
  17.8 per cent  21.1 per cent   31.8 per cent          35.2 per cent 
Deductions permitted from pre-tax 2.3 per cent  4.0 per cent   5.2 per cent           6.3 per cent 
income, e.g. pension contributions
b 
 
a This is measured as average tax paid for each group divided by average total income for each group. 
b This represents the average proportion of before-tax income that is deducted from before-tax income in order to arrive at taxable 
income (excluding personal allowances). 
Notes: All data are presented at the adult level and for Great Britain only. There were 46.8 million adults in Great Britain in 2004–05, and 
the numbers of adults in the richest bands have been calculated assuming that adults not represented in the Survey of Personal Incomes 
have incomes below the income tax personal allowance. 
Source: Brewer and his colleagues’ calculations based on the Survey of Personal Incomes, which is constructed from income tax records 
by Revenue Customs and allows a more detail look at high-income individuals
84
.
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Table 2.3 Models of work organisation85. 
 
The ‘discretionary learning’ model. Accounts for 38 per cent of 
employees covered in the survey; characterised by the over-
representation of the variables measuring autonomy and task 
complexity, learning and problem-solving and to a lesser degree by an 
over-representation of the variable measuring individual responsibility 
for quality management. The variables reflecting monotony, 
repetitiveness and work rate constraints are under-represented.  
 
The ‘lean’ model. Accounts for 26 per cent of the population and is 
characterised by an over-representation of team work and job rotation, 
the quality management variables and the various factors constraining 
work pace, i.e. worker autonomy is bracketed by the importance of 
work pace constraints linked to the collective nature of the work and 
to the requirement of respecting strict quantitative production norms. 
Like the discretionary learning’ model, it displays strong learning 
dynamics and relies on employees’ contribution to problem-solving. 
By contrast, autonomy in work is relatively low and tight quantitative 
production norms are used to control employee effort.  
 
The ‘Taylorist’ model. The work situation here, which accounts for 20 
per cent of the employees in the survey, is in most respects the 
opposite of that of the discretionary learning’ model. There are 
minimal learning dynamics, low complexity, low autonomy and an 
over-representation of the variables measuring constraints on the pace 
of work. Interestingly, however, teams and job rotation are somewhat 
overrepresented in this cluster.  
 
The traditional model. This accounts for 16 per cent of employees in 
the survey. It is poorly described by the work organisation variables 
which, with the exception of monotony in work, are all under 
represented. Methods are for the most part informal and non-codified.  
 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
64 
 
References and notes 
                                                 
1
  Kaufman, B. 2009. 'Promoting labour market efficiency and fairness 
through a legal minimum wage: the Webbs and the social cost of labour'. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol 47, No 2, 306—26. 
 
Kaufmann reminds us that it was the Webbs who developed the 'social cost' 
justification for minimum wage legislation more than a century ago.  
 
2
  International Labour Office. 2006. Minimum wages. Geneva: 
International Labour Office. 
 
3
  Brown, W. A. and Sisson. K. 1975. ‘The use of Comparisons in 
Workplace Wage Determination’. British Journal of Industrial Relations. 
Vol 8, No 1, 23-53. 
 
4
 TUC. 2008. Hard work, hidden lives. The full report of the 
Commission on Vulnerable Employment. London: TUC. p.21. 
 
5
  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2005. Human 
Development Report 2005. International cooperation at a crossroads: Aid, 
trade and security in an unequal world, Chapter 2 'Inequality and human 
development'. New York: United Nations. p.58. 
 
6
  Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
 
7
  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2005. Human 
Development Report 2005. International cooperation at a crossroads: Aid, 
trade and security in an unequal world, Chapter 2 'Inequality and human 
development'. New York: United Nations. p.54. 
 
8
  United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2005. Human 
Development Report 2005. International cooperation at a crossroads: Aid, 
trade and security in an unequal world, Chapter 2 'Inequality and human 
development'. New York: United Nations.  
 
9
  Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. 2009. The spirit level: why more 
equal societies almost always do better. London: Allen Lane p.67, Figure 
5.1. 
 
Why employment relations matter 
 
65 
 
                                                                                                                   
10
 TUC. 2008. Hard work, hidden lives. The full report of the 
Commission on Vulnerable Employment. London: TUC. p.20. 
 
11
  Bunting, M. 2008. ‘Fair wages are a fantasy in the brutal underside 
of Cowboy Boss Britain’. The Guardian, 5 May. 
 
12
  TUC. 2008. Hard work, hidden lives. The full report of the 
Commission on Vulnerable Employment. London: TUC. p 20. 
 
13
  Brewer, M., Muriel, A. Phillps, D. and Sibieta, L. 2009. 'Poverty 
and Inequality in the UK'. IFS Commentary C109. London: The Institute for 
Fiscal Studies.p.3. 
 
14
  The gender pay gap refers to the differences between men and 
women's gross hourly earnings, women’s pay being expressed as a 
percentage of men’ pay, and the gap being the difference between this and 
100 percent. It can relate to median or mean earnings. The ONS prefers the 
former because it is less influenced by the extreme values of pay 
distribution. As the TUC points out, however, 'The difficulty with this 
approach is that part of the story about pay inequality is that women are 
over-represented at one extreme of the distribution and men are 
overrepresented at the other extreme; this means that gaps calculated using 
the median under-state the size of the problem'. TUC. 2008. Hard work, 
hidden lives. The full report of the Commission on Vulnerable Employment. 
London: TUC. p.13. 
 
15
  Fitzner, G. 2006. 'How have employees fared? Recent UK trends'. 
Employment Relations Research Series No. 56. Employment Market 
Analysis and Research. London: DTI. 
 
16
  European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions. 2008. More and better jobs: Patterns of employment expansion 
in Europe. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions. Available at www.eurofound.europa.eu.  
 
17
 Delbridge, R., Edwards, P. Forth, J, Miskell, P. and Payne, J. 2006. The 
Organisation of Productivity: Re-thinking Skills and Work Organisation. 
London: Advanced Institute of Management Research. 
 
18
 Black, C. 2008. Working for a healthier tomorrow. Review of the 
health of Britain's working age population. Presented to the Secretary of 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
66 
 
                                                                                                                   
state for Health and the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 17th 
March. London: TSO. p.21. 
 
19
 Hutton, W. 2005. 'Let's work to make Britain sane'. The Observer, 
22 May. 
 
20
  Coats, D. 2004. Speaking Up! Voice, Industrial Democracy and 
Organisational Performance. London: The Work Foundation. 
 
21
  CIPD. 2009. Employee Outlook. Working life in a Recession. 
Quarterly Survey Report. Autumn: London: CIPD. 
 
22
  Acas. 2010. ‘Riding out the storm: managing conflict in a recession 
and beyond’ Acas Policy Discussion Papers. March. Available at 
www.acas.org.uk 
 
23
  See Karasek, R. and Theorell, T. 1990. Healthy work: Stress, 
productivity and the reconstruction of working life. New York: Basic Books; 
Karasek, R. 1979.’ Job demands, job decision latitude and mental strain: 
Implications for job redesign’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 285-
306.  
 
24
 Brenner, M. H. 2005. 'Background paper' for European Commission 
Conference on Health and quality in work, Bedford Hotel, Brussels, 25 
October. For Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Unit 
D1.p. 5. 
 
25 Brenner, M. H. 2006. Health and quality in work. Impact of 
Macroeconomic Factors on Mortality in Europe and the OECD. Volume 11 
Annex 1 Literature review – Health and quality of working life. Annex 11 
Stress and stress responses: an overview. Available at 
www.ec.europa.eu/employment 
 
26
  The WHO's summary is available at www.workhealth.org 
 
27
  PCU (Public and Commercial Services Union) on behalf of Council 
of Civil Service Unions/Cabinet Office. 2004. Work, Stress, Health: the 
Whitehall 11 study. London: CSU/Cabinet Office. p.8. 
 
28
  Brenner, M. H. 2006. Health and quality in work. Impact of 
Macroeconomic Factors on Mortality in Europe and the OECD. Volume 11 
Why employment relations matter 
 
67 
 
                                                                                                                   
Annex 1 Literature review – Health and quality of working life. Annex 11 
Stress and stress responses: an overview. p.7; Brenner, M. H. 2006. Health 
and quality in work. Impact of Macroeconomic Factors on Mortality in 
Europe and the OECD.  Executive summary & conclusions and policy 
implications. Final report. European Commission Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities Unit D1. Available at 
www.ec.europa.eu/employment 
 
29
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Cote, S 
and Healey, T.). 2001. The Well Being of Nations. The Role of Human and 
Social Capital. Paris: OECD. p.18. 
 
30
  de la Fuente, A.  and Ciccone. 2003. Human capital in a global and 
knowledge-based economy. Final Report for DGV.  Available at 
www.ec.europa.eu/employment_social/publications/2003 
 
31
  Blundell, R.L., Dearden, L., Meghir, C. and Sianesi, B. 1999. 
‘Human Capital Investment: The returns from Education and Training to the 
Individual, The Firm and the Economy’, Fiscal Studies, Vol. 20, No.1, 1-3. 
 
32
  Gallie, D. 2005. 'Work pressures in Europe', British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol 43, No 3. p.359. 
 
33
  Data refer to 1994 for Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Switzerland (German and French-speaking regions), and the United States, 
to 1996 for Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom and to 1998 for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, 
Italy, Norway and the Italian-speaking regions of Switzerland.  
 A follow up study, the Adult Literacy and Life Skill Survey (ALL), 
was carried out in 2003 in six countries: Bermuda, Canada, Italy, Norway, 
Switzerland, and the USA (OECD, 2005). The plan is that this will extended 
to other countries. 
 
34
  Bassanini, A. and Ok, W. 2004. 'How do firms' and individuals' 
incentive to invest in human capital vary across groups? Paper for EC-
OECD seminar on Human Capital and Labour Market performance: 
Evidence and Policy Challenges, 8 December.  
 
35
  Eurostat (Nestler, K. and Kailis, E). 2003. ‘Continuing vocational 
training in enterprises in the European Union (CVT2)’. Statistics in focus. 
Population and Social Conditions, Theme 3. Luxembourg: Office for 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
68 
 
                                                                                                                   
Official Publications of the European Communities. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Eurostat (Nestler, K. and Kailis, E.) 2003. 
‘Working time spent on continuing vocational training in enterprises in 
Europe’. Statistics in focus. Population and Social Conditions, Theme 3. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Checcaglini, A. and Marion-
Vernoux, I. 2008 ‘Trends in European companies’ vocational training 
practices’. Céreq, No 80 May-June. 
 
36
  Fröhlich, D. and U. Pekruhl. 1996. Direct Participation and 
Organisational Change - Fashionable but Misunderstood? An analysis of 
recent research in Europe, Japan and the USA. EF/96/38/EN. Luxembourg: 
Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities.  
 
37
  Gallie, D. 2005. 'Work pressures in Europe', British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol 43, No 3. p.361. 
 
38
  Kingsmill, D. 2001. A Review of Women's Employment and Pay. 
London: DTI (The Women and Equality Unit). 
 
39
  Women in Work Commission. 2006. Shaping a Fairer Future. 
Available at www.equalities.gov.uk. 
 
40
  International Labour Office. 2004. Breaking through the glass 
ceiling. Women in management. Update. Geneva: International Labour 
Office. 
 
41
 Cabinet Office - the Strategy Unit. 2009. Unleashing aspirations: 
the final report of the Panel on fair access to the professions. Available at 
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy. 
 
42
  International Labour Office. 2004. Breaking through the glass 
ceiling. Women in management. Update. Geneva: International Labour 
Office. 
 
43
  Ministerial foreword to the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit's Families 
in Britain: evidence paper. 2008. Available at 
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy. 
 
44
  See, for example, Pocock, B. 2003. The work/life collision. 
Federation Press distributed by Willan Publishing. 
Why employment relations matter 
 
69 
 
                                                                                                                   
 
45
  Rubery, J., Grimshaw, D., and Ward K. 2005. 'Working Time, 
Industrial Relations and the Employment Relationship', Time & Society, 
Vol.14, No 1, 89-111. 
 
46
  Gillan, A. 2006. ‘Britons put work and fun before babies’, The 
Guardian, 2 May. Harding, L. 2006. ‘Germany agonises over 30 per cent 
childless women’. The Guardian Friday 27 January;  
 
47
  Harding, L. 2006. ‘Germany agonises over 30 per cent childless 
women’. The Guardian Friday 27 January. 
 
48
  McVurry, J. 2006. ‘Japan to tell its workers: take time off – for the 
sake of the nation’. The Guardian 17 January. 
 
49
  Dex, S. 2003. Families and Work in the 21st century. Leeds: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. p.44. 
 
50
  Gibbons, M. 2007. Better dispute resolution. A review of 
employment dispute resolution in Great Britain. Available at 
www.berr.gov.uk. 
 
51
 Kersely, B., Alpin, C., Forth, J., Bryson, A., Bewley, H., Dix, G. and 
Oxenbridge, S. 2006. Inside the Workplace: Findings from the 2004 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey London: Routledge. pp. 230-1. 
 
52
  CBI (Confederation of British Industry)/Axa. 2008. At work and 
working well? CBI/AXA Absence and labour turnover survey 2007. 
 
53
 Commons, J. 1919. Industrial Goodwill. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
54
  National Board for Prices and Incomes. 1968. Payment by results 
systems. Report No. 65. London: HMSO. 
 
55
 National Board for Prices and Incomes. 1970. Hours of work, overtime 
and shiftworking. Report No. 161. London: HMSO. 
 
56
  Buchanan, D.A. 1994. 'Principles and practice in work design', in 
Sisson, K. (ed). Personnel Management: a comprehensive guide to theory 
and practice in Britain. Oxford: Blackwell 
 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
70 
 
                                                                                                                   
57
  Delbridge, R., Edwards, P. Forth, J, Miskell, P. and Payne, J. 2006. 
The Organisation of Productivity: Re-thinking Skills and Work 
Organisation. London: Advanced Institute of Management Research. 
 
58
  MacDuffie, J. P. 1995. ‘Human resource bundles and manufacturing 
performance: organizational logic and flexible production systems in the 
world auto industry’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48, 2: 197-221. 
 
59
 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions. 1997. New forms of work organisation. Can Europe realise its 
potential?results of a survey of direct participation in Europe. Luxembourg: 
Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities; Geary, J., 
Edwards, P.K. and Sisson, K. 2002. ‘New forms of workplace organization 
in the workplace: transformative, exploitative, or limited and controlled?’,  
in Murray, G., Bélanger, J., Giles, A. and Lapointe, P-A. (eds) Work and 
employment relations in the high-performance workplace. London: 
Continuum.   
 
60
  Delbridge, R., Edwards, P. Forth, J, Miskell, P. and Payne, J. 2006. 
The Organisation of Productivity: Re-thinking Skills and Work 
Organisation. London: Advanced Institute of Management Research. p.23. 
 
61
  Lambert, R. 2010. RSA/Sky Sustainable Business Lecture Series – 
30 March. ‘Does business have a role as a ‘force for good’ in creating a 
more sustainable economic, social and environmental future?’ 
 
62
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Cote, S 
and Healey, T.). 2001. The Well Being of Nations. The Role of Human and 
Social Capital. Paris: OECD. p.42; Office for National Statistics (Babb, P.)  
2005. Measurement of social capital in the UK. London: Office for National 
Statistics. Available at www.ons.gov.uk. 
 
63
  Performance and Innovation Unit (Aldridge S. and Halpern, D. with 
Fitzpatrick, S.). 2002. Social capital: a discussion paper. Performance and 
Innovation Unit. 
 
64
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Cote, S 
and Healey, T.). 2001. The Well Being of Nations. The Role of Human and 
Social Capital. Paris: OECD. p.48. 
 
Why employment relations matter 
 
71 
 
                                                                                                                   
65
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Cote, S 
and Healey, T.). 2001. The Well Being of Nations. The Role of Human and 
Social Capital. Paris: OECD. pp.58. 
 
66
  Omori, T. 2001. ‘Balancing Economic Growth with well-being: 
Implication of the Japanese Experience’, in Halliwell, J, (ed) The 
Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained Economic Growth 
and Well-being. International Symposium Report. Human Resources 
Development Canada and OECD. 
 
67
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Cote, S 
and Healey, T.). 2001. The Well Being of Nations. The Role of Human and 
Social Capital. Paris: OECD. pp.57-8. 
 
68
  Coats, D. 2004. Speaking Up! Voice, Industrial Democracy and 
Organisational Performance. London: The Work Foundation. p.11. 
 
69
  Heyes, J. and Nolan, P. 2009. ‘State, Capital and Labour in Crisis’, 
in T. Colling and M. Terry (eds) Industrial Relations Theory and Practice. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. p.106. 
 
70
  Crouch, C. 2009. ‘British industrial relations: between security and 
flexibility’, in T. Colling and M. Terry (eds) Industrial Relations Theory and 
Practice. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. p.31. 
 
71
 Kaletsky, A. 2010. Capitalism 4.0. The birth of a new economy. 
London: Bloomsbury. pp.119-20. 
 
72
  Guscina1, A. 2006. ‘Effects of Globalization on Labor’s Share in 
National Income’. IMF Working Paper WP/ 06/294; Lȕbker, M. ‘Labour 
Shares’. Technical Brief No 01. Geneva: ILO. 
 
73
  Hay, C., Riiheläinen, J.M., Smith, M.J. and Watson, M. 2008. 
‘Ireland: the outside inside’, in Dyson, K. (ed) The Euro at 10: 
Europeanisation, power and convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
74
  Crouch, C. 2008. ‘What will follow the demise of privatized 
Keynesianism?’. The Political Quarterly, Vol 79, No 4, 476-87. 
 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
72 
 
                                                                                                                   
75
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1999. 
'Employment protection and labour market performance'. Chapter 2. OECD 
Employment Outlook. Paris: OECD. 
 
76
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2004. 
'Employment protection and labour market performance'. Chapter 2. OECD 
Employment Outlook. Paris: OECD. 
 
77
 The OECD updated its analysis two years later. Its conclusion was 
that, 'In line with a number of previous studies, no significant impact of 
employment protection legislation on aggregate employment was found. 
However, effects appear to vary across labour market groups. Stringent 
employment protection seems to depress youth employment while it may 
benefit older workers'. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 2006. Employment outlook 2006 - Boosting Jobs and Incomes 
(Chapter 7. 'Reassessing the Role of Policies and Institutions for Labour 
Market Performance: A Quantitative Analysis'). Paris: OECD. p.20. 
 
78
  Calmfors, L. and Driffill, J. 1988. ‘Bargaining structure, 
corporatism and macroeconomic performance’. Economic Policy 6, 13-61.  
 
79  Soskice, D. 1990. ‘Wage Determination: the Changing Role of 
Institutions in Advanced Industrialized Countries’. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy  6(4), 36-61.  
 
80
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2004. 
‘Wage-setting institutions and outcomes’. Chapter 3. OECD Employment 
Outlook. Paris: OECD. p.130. 
 
81
  Lorenz, E. and Valeyre, A. 2004. ‘Organisational Change in 
Europe: National Models or the Diffusion of a New ‘One Best Way’?’ Paper 
prepared for the 2004 DRUID Summer Conference, 14-16 June, 
Copenhagen. 
 
82
  Panic, M. 2007. Does Europe need neoliberal reforms? Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, No 31. p.159. 
 
Why employment relations matter 
 
73 
 
                                                                                                                   
83
  Hutton, W. 2008. ‘The fallacy of the fix. Reform just won't cut it. 
We need nothing less than an overhaul of the way we do capitalism’. The 
Guardian. 19 November. 
 
84
  Brewer, M., Muriel, A. Phillps, D. and Sibieta, L. 2009. 'Poverty and 
Inequality in the UK'. IFS Commentary C109. London: The Institute for 
Fiscal Studies. 
 
85
  Lorenz, E. and Valeyre, A. 2004. ‘Organizational Change in Europe: 
National Models or the Diffusion of a New ‘One Best Way’?’. Paper 
prepared for the 2004 DRUID Summer Conference, 14-16 June, 
Copenhagen. 
74 
 
3 
 
Coming to terms with the employment 
relationship 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Outline the employment relationship’s enduring 
features 
 
 Review the significant variations to be found in 
practice 
 
 Consider the nature and extent of the impact of  
intensifying competition on the traditional model 
 
Summary 
The employment contract involves a special form of exchange that 
brings benefits to both parties over and above the labour service 
equivalent. As well as receiving tangible and intangible rewards, 
employees are guaranteed a measure of security of employment, while 
the employer buys the right to use their labour and/or knowledge 
power largely at their discretion. Each of the disciplines applies it own 
adjective to describe the employment relationship: economic, legal, 
psychological, political and social. It is best understood, however, as a 
managerial relationship. This means there is great uncertainty, fuelling 
the prospect of divergent goals and interpretation. The relationship is 
also on-going, which means that there are more or less constant 
pressures on - and opportunities for - both parties to seek to adjust the 
exchange in their favour, and it is contradictory, in much as 
employees cannot be ‘commodified’ and employers have to pursue the 
potentially mutually-exclusive strategies of control and commitment. 
Complicating matters is that the employment relationship involves a 
complex ‘governance’ regime of institutions or rules, with scope for 
differences over both substance and process. Variations reflect two 
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main considerations. One, which depends on the occupation, involves 
the balance between ‘contract’ and ‘status’ and largely turns on the 
extent to which skills are general or specific. The other, which is 
cross-national, reflects fundamentally different conceptions of the 
work organisation – whether it is to be seen as a ‘nexus of contracts’ 
or as a source as well as consumer of human capital. These, in turn, 
are grounded in different varieties of capitalism and their associated 
civil law and common law legal systems. Even so, there are common 
trends. Everywhere, the employment relationship seems prone to 
‘juridification’, i.e. the greater involvement of the law and the courts 
in employment relations matters. At the same time, the traditional 
model of the employment relationship faces major challenges in the 
light of competitive pressures in an increasingly global economy: the 
talk is of a shift in the basis of the ‘psychological contract’ from the 
‘relational’ to the ‘transactional’; and the ‘fragmentation of the 
employment relationship’ resulting from different forms of 
‘externalisation’ such as sub-contracting, outsourcing, business sell-
offs, spin-offs and buy-outs. Yet management needs commitment as 
well as compliance. There are also limits to ‘fragmentation’ - 
managing an ‘extended organisation’ is fraught with difficulties.  
 
Introduction 
The employment relationship comes first in the 'matters' that the text 
deals with because it is central to both practice and theory. It has been 
described as ‘the characteristic institution’ of capitalism1; along with 
limited liability, it is said to be one of the ‘two great inventions [that] 
lie behind the rise of the modern business enterprise’2. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, therefore the employment relationship is far from being a 
straightforward concept. Terms such as ‘work’ and ‘employment’, for 
example, are very often used inter-changeably. In discussing the 
employment relationship, however, they need to be clearly 
distinguished. Work can be defined as ‘purposeful activity directed at 
producing a valued good or service’, whereas employment is a 
particular form of ‘work that is performed under contractual 
arrangements and that involves material rewards’3.  
There are also three main types of such arrangements. In the first, 
the employer hires workers on a service contract to undertake a 
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specified task or set of tasks - it could be a builder, for example, or an 
architect or a solicitor. In the second, they hire workers on 
employment contracts to undertake a range of tasks largely at their 
discretion or managers who are their agents. The third type of 
employment relationship may be described as trilateral or multilateral. 
One employer subcontracts responsibility for providing labour 
services by entering into a service agreement with another employer, 
which puts the relationship at second remove. Here the traditional 
‘binary divide’ between dependent and independent employment 
becomes blurred. Workers may be employees, but 'The traditional 
functions of the employer may be split between a number of separate 
entities'
4:  in the case of 'agency work’, for example, the employer 
who pays is not necessarily the one who coordinates. 
In most countries the direct or dependent employment contract is 
by far and away the dominant form of the employment relationship. 
Indeed, this is so much so that the terms ‘employment relationship’ 
and ‘employment contract’ are used inter-changeably as they are in 
this text. As the previous chapter pointed out, in the UK, at the end of 
2009, according to the Office for National Statistics, just under 29 
million or something approaching six out of ten of the population 
above the age of 16 were regarded as being in ‘employment’. Of 
these, just under 25 million people or 86 per cent were classified as 
‘employees’ and nearly 3.9 million as ‘self employed’. Even if every 
one of the 3.9 million or so self-employed were involved in labour 
service contracts, which is most certainly not the case, it would still 
mean that more than eight out of ten were involved in a contract of 
employment. 
The great majority of ‘employees’ were also on permanent 
contracts, with 1.4 million or 5.8 per cent on temporary fixed term 
contracts, which is a proportion that has not changed, contrary to some 
punditry about developments in atypical working. If there has been a 
change, it is the balance between full-time and part-time employment. 
In the same year many more were part-time, i.e. just over a quarter.  
Arguably, though, this more to do with shifts in employment structure, 
notably from manufacturing to services, than changing views about 
the employment relationship.  
It is difficult to be precise about the size of the workforce 
involved in multi-lateral arrangements. It seems safe to conclude, 
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however, that it remains in the minority. In the UK, the Business 
Services Association (BSA), which represents companies providing 
outsourced services, estimates its members employ 350,000 workers 
producing a turnover of £14.3 billion
5
. Agency workers in the UK, the 
BSA adds, number some 1.3 million. 
 
Enduring features 
A special form of exchange 
The reason why the employment contract is the dominant form of the 
employment relationship is that it involves a special form of exchange 
that brings benefits to both parties over and above those involved in 
the labour services agreement. In a phrase, the employment 
relationship involves a trade-off between employees’ need for security 
and employers’ requirements for flexibility6.   
Tangible and intangible rewards. In the case of employees, most 
attention focuses on the tangible rewards that come from employment, 
i.e. wages and conditions such as holidays and pensions. There are 
two main reasons. One is practical. Not only are such rewards critical 
in living standards but, being quantifiable, and thus generalisable 
across all manner of jobs, they are the common focus of policy makers 
and practitioners alike
7
. The second is their significance to employers 
as well as employees. For wages and conditions, hours of work, 
holidays and pension rights are not just what the employee receives. 
They are also ‘a price which represents the total cost of enjoying its 
use’8 
Intangible rewards have both an internal and external dimension. 
In Edwards' words, ‘what goes on within the employment relationship 
is crucial, not only in terms of the pay that is earned but also the 
condition under which it is earned: the degree of autonomy the 
employee is granted, the safety of the work environment, the 
opportunity for training and development, and so on’9. Fairness has 
also been a major focus of attention. Externally, employment brings 
the opportunity for social contact and social status as well as a sense 
of purpose and personal identity. 
Less attention has focused on what is perhaps the greatest 
intangible of the employment contract: the relative security that comes 
from a measure of continuity of employment. The point can best be 
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made by contrasting the employment contract with the labour services 
agreement. Clearly, the labour services contract also brings both 
tangible and intangible rewards. Indeed, at first sight, it might be 
thought that they would be superior on both dimensions. Being one’s 
own boss brings much greater discretion as well as the possibility of 
higher economic rewards. The great disadvantage of the labour 
services contract is that it brings little or no employment continuity - 
which is fundamentally important if the individual has no other source 
of income. The self-employed also forgo a number of the practical 
advantages of the employment contract. Arguably, payments for 
holidays, sickness and pensions are simply a form of deferred pay and 
provision for them accommodated in higher fees. Their organisation, 
however, takes time and effort. 
Residual control rights. The benefits that employers receive from the 
employment relationship very rarely receive the attention they deserve 
and yet are critically important if the full significance of the 
employment relationship is to be appreciated. In both the labour 
services agreement and employment contract, employees sell their 
labour and/or knowledge power. Whereas the labour services 
agreement spells out the work that is to be done in return, however, 
the employment contract is relatively silent; in one well-celebrated 
phrase, the employee in effect signs a ‘blank cheque’10. The point is 
that the employer does not acquire a specific or quantifiable amount of 
labour from the employment relationship - if they wanted this, they 
might just as well opt for a labour service agreement. Rather the 
employer buys the employee's capacity to work (commonly known as 
‘labour power’ following Marx’s original formulation), which requires 
direction. In the language of transaction cost economics, the 
employment contract gives the employer 'residual control rights' over 
employees, which are ex post rather than ex ante. 
Transaction costs thinking also helps us to understand the 
benefits. The would-be employer can be seen as being confronted by a 
choice between different ‘governance’ regimes. Other things being 
equal, the assumption is that they will seek to organise their activities 
on the basis of market contracts. To do so, however, they have to cope 
with three main problems: the difficulties of search and information 
costs occurred in acquiring adequate information about available 
reliability and price (‘bounded rationality’); the costs required to come 
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to an acceptable agreement and draw up an appropriate contract with 
the other party; and the policing and enforcement costs of making sure 
the other party does not renege on the terms of the contract 
(‘opportunism’). Also the more specific the skills are to the employer 
(‘asset specificity’), the more acute these problems are likely to be.  
In these circumstances, the open-ended employment relationship, 
coupled with a managerial hierarchy, has traditionally had 
considerable advantages over the labour service agreement, helping to 
explain what has been described as the ‘historical tendency towards 
the internalisation of employment relationships’11. To paraphrase 
Marsden
12
, the employment contract is more flexible – managers do 
not have to specify everything in advance of the act of hiring, which 
means, in turn, that it is possible to vary detailed assignments in the 
light of changing circumstances. It is more efficient – it cuts down on 
the three types of costs (information, bargaining and enforcement) that 
managers would otherwise incur. It means that managers are able both 
to develop specific skills that cannot be secured on the ‘external’ 
labour market and to ensure an adequate return on that investment. It 
also means that managers are able to exercise greater control over 
enforcement of the agreement along with issues such as cost and 
quality, subject only to the constraints imposed by the law or 
collective agreements or societal norms.  
In short, in the case of the labour service agreement ‘governance’ 
is contract-based – the assumption is that the agreement is self-
enforcing, with the courts adjudicating in the light of any dispute. In 
the case of the employment relationship, ‘governance’ is hierarchy-
based – it is managers who determine ‘how much work is performed 
in that time, at what specific task or tasks, who has the right to define 
the tasks and change a particular mix of tasks and what penalties will 
be deployed for any failure to meet these obligations’13  
 
A managerial relationship 
Each of the traditional disciplines applies its own adjective to describe 
the employment relationship. Thus, for economists, the employment 
relationship is essentially an economic or market relationship; for 
lawyers it is a legal relationship; for politicians it is a political or 
power relationship; for sociologists it is a social relationship; and for 
psychologists it is a psychologist one. For the most part, however, 
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each discipline ploughs it own furrow without reference to the others. 
Very often, too, as Chapter 1 observed, the primary concern is with 
confirming the theoretical propositions or methods of the discipline 
rather than helping to understand the employment relationship itself. 
Arguably, although each of these perspectives highlights an 
important dimension of the employment relationship, helping to 
explain why its study is multi-disciplinary, none of them captures the 
essence. For the feature that distinguishes the employment 
relationship from the labour services agreement is that it is a 
managerial relationship
14
. This is because, to repeat the argument of 
the previous section, in entering into an employment relationship, the 
employer does not acquire a specific or quantifiable amount of labour. 
Rather they require the right to direct employees. An important 
corollary, as Chapter 1 pointed out, is that to talk in terms of a labour 
market gives a very false impression of what is at stake in the 
employment relationship. Hiring and firing is not even the half of it. 
The employment contract may have advantages over the labour 
services agreement. But managing the employment relationship is far 
from being straightforward. There are a number of intrinsic features 
reflecting the trade-off trade-off between employees’ need for security 
and employers’ requirements for flexibility that complicate mmatters 
considerably.  
Indeterminate. First of all, the employment relationship is 
indeterminate or incomplete. Many of the benefits that employees 
receive from the exchange can be set. This is particularly true of 
wages and conditions, helping to explain why they are so often the 
focus of attention. The residual control rights that employers receive 
in return are a very different proposition, however. In Collins' words
15
, 
contracts of employment are ‘incomplete by design’, in the sense that 
the details of the work to be done are largely left to be decided by 
managerial direction. Consequently, nothing is automatic about the 
employment relationship. ‘The act of hiring … is not sufficient to 
ensure that the job gets done in an acceptable way … The employee 
has to be motivated – by encouragement, threats, loyalty, discipline, 
money, competition, pride, promotion, or whatever else is deemed 
effective to work with the required pace and care’16. Managers also 
need employees to do more than simply comply with instructions. 
They need their co-operation and commitment to continuously 
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improve performance. The sting in the tail is that the motivation and 
commitment so critical to performance reflect not just the economic 
return, but also the job satisfaction and emotional reward that people 
derive from their work. As Chapters 5 and 6 explain in more detail, 
the upshot is that negotiation and the exercise of domination or power 
‘over’ are integral to the conduct of the employment relationship, 
regardless of the presence of trade unions. 
Continuous. The employment relationship is not a one-off exchange as 
in the case of the labour services agreement – it is continuous or open-
ended. This means that it is a relationship that has a history and a 
future, in which learning and socialisation play important roles. 
Moreover, the longer the employee is involved, the more experienced 
and socialised they become, with responses to an immediate situation 
reflecting this experience and socialisation.  
Being continuous also means that there are more or less constant 
pressures on and opportunities for the parties to seek to adjust the 
exchange in their favour, reinforcing the importance of negotiation 
and the exercise of power. Most obvious are the occasions of pay 
reviews that have typically come to take place annually. Any increases 
in pay, be they individual or collective in coverage, are likely to be 
linked to expectations of improved performance. Yet more or less any 
change in the environment can generate pressures on and 
opportunities for the parties to seek to adjust the basis of the 
exchange. Historically, it was employees and their trade unions that 
were most associated with such change and the focus was on terms 
and conditions. More recently, with intensifying pressure on business 
performance, it is managers who have come to the fore, with the 
emphasis shifting to 'continuous improvement' and 'smarter working'.  
Exploitative. This term is used in both derogatory and literal senses. In 
the derogatory sense, it is a value judgment about the conduct of the 
employment relationship in a specific instance. Typically, it is used to 
describe a situation where the employer pays less than the going rate. 
In the literal sense, it is a statement of fact about the employment 
relationship in general. In the words of the Oxford Dictionary, to 
exploit is to 'utilise (person etc.) for one's own ends'. Employers 
'exploit' employees in as much as they deploy their labour and/or 
knowledge power in order to meet their objectives which, in the case 
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of private sector companies, is to generate a surplus. Unlike the 
independent worker, moreover, many employees have little or no say 
in how their labour or knowledge is deployed. As Chapter 6 explains 
in more detail, this is because the employment relationship is 
asymmetric or unequal. Superficially, there are two equal parties – the 
employer and employee. In practice, these parties are very unequal. 
Domination or power ‘over’ is a design feature of the employment 
relationship, being implicit in the basis of the exchange discussed 
above. Also the employee is a single individual usually with very 
limited resources who does not have much choice – he/she needs to 
work in order to secure income. By contrast, the employer is typically 
a corporate entity very often with substantial resources at its disposal.  
Contradictory. Another key feature of the employment relationship is 
that it is contradictory. An underlying assumption is that, in as much 
as they 'sell' their labour and/or knowledge power to be used at the 
discretion of the employer's agents, the employment relationship 
involves employees in an act of submission or subordination, 
regardless of any job satisfaction or material rewards. Yet, unlike 
other resources, ‘human resources’ are embodied in people - labour 
differs from other commodities in that ‘it is enjoyed in use and is 
embodied in people’17. To carry on in Edwards’ words, ‘A machine in 
a factory is also enjoyed in its use and for what it can produce. Yet 
how it is used is solely up to its owner. The 'owner' of labour, the 
employer, has to persuade the worker, that is the person in whom the 
labour is embodied, to work. Managerial relations are the relationships 
that define how this process take place ...’ As Chapter 1 pointed out, 
for many employees in democratic societies, the contrast between 
their organisational and civil lives could hardly be sharper – on the 
one hand, ‘political democracy’ and, on the other, ‘economic 
autocracy’18. 
The employment relationship is also contradictory for those who 
have to manage it. Employees represent both a cost and an investment, 
which means constantly making compromises. Motivating employees 
to do what managers want is also nowhere as simple as it is often 
portrayed. In Edwards' words again, 'managements have to pursue the 
objectives of control and releasing creativity ... [and] the problem is 
that these involve very different and conflicting strategies'
19
. Very 
tight monitoring is not only costly, but also can reduce the prospects 
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of employees using their initiative. But lax control can mean that 
different groups and/or individuals may pursue aims and objectives 
that are incompatible with one another. 
 
Co-operative and antagonistic. It is because of these features that the 
employment contract locks employers and employees into a 
relationship that is at one and the same time co-operative and 
antagonistic. It is co-operative in a much as neither party can secure 
their goals without the cooperation of the other - employers and 
employees are mutually dependent on one another. Employers may 
own the capital, but it is employees who deliver the goods or services. 
Equally true is that employees cannot secure their means to a 
livelihood unless they help the employer to make a surplus and/or 
keep costs to a minimum. Similarly, they risk denying themselves 
opportunities to develop new skills and abilities as well as fulfil 
themselves. 
At the same time, however, the employment relationship is 
antagonistic because it is exploitative and contradictory – in Edwards' 
words, there is an in-built ‘structural antagonism’20. Importantly, this 
does not necessarily mean that there is a general conflict of interest - 
employees have many interests that the employment relationship may 
serve. It does mean, though, that the potential for specific conflicts of 
interest is ever present and that the expressions of such conflicts, be 
they over the fixing of wages and conditions or the exercise of the 
employer’s discretionary rights, is not just a matter of faulty 
procedures, ‘bad’ management or wilful employees. In the UK, recent 
high profile Employment Tribunal cases in investment banking also 
confirm that employees at every level of the organisation are affected.  
Disputes are the most manifest expression of the conflicts of 
interest and can be individual or collective, involving a grievance or 
an appeal to an Employment Tribunal or a strike or collective action 
short of a strike, such as an overtime ban or ‘work to rule’. Other 
expressions of these conflicts range from the voicing of discontent in 
attitude surveys, through absence and resignation, which can be 
regarded as ways of ‘exiting’ from a relationship regarded as 
unsatisactory, to so-called ‘organisational misbehaviour’ such as theft 
and sabotage. Chapter 7 deals with the changing pattern of disputes in 
more detail. 
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Variations on a theme 
So far the discussion has focused on what might be described as the 
generic features of the employment relationship. As Chapter 1 
emphasised, however, the workplace is not an island unto itself and 
conduct of the employment relationship depends on the specific social 
and institutional context. Employees can have very different 
expectations of their employment relationship as the ‘psychological 
contract’ literature discussed later suggests. They can have very 
different ‘orientations to work’ as the older sociological studies 
clearly demonstrated
21
, with very different emphases placed on 
income, status, identity and social opportunity. The behaviour of 
managers also reflects the organisations in which they work. For 
example, the parent company may have a very well-defined 
philosophical approach to managing people that it extends across its 
businesses or it may have very strong affiliations to a particular sector 
that are influential. Of the main dimensions, two main ones stand. One 
is the occupation. The other is the national system.  
 
Contract and status 
To make sense of the differences between types of occupation, there is 
useful distinction to be made between ‘contract’ and ‘status’22. The 
distinction has both a specific and general meaning. Thus, in 
Germany, the relationship between career public servants (Beamte) 
and the state is not a private contractual one, but is defined by public 
law. Disputes are settled by administrative courts rather than labour 
ones. 
More generally, the distinction reflects the differences between 
the labour services agreement and the employment relationship 
referred to in earlier. A key consideration is the degree of ‘asset 
specificity’. The more general the skills are, the more likely is the 
tendency towards ‘contract’; the more specific the skills, the greater 
the tendency to see employees as an investment for the longer term 
with a special ‘statusd’. Employment relationships based on 'contract' 
are very close to labour services agreements - indeed, the employees 
involved are very often the ones whose work is subcontracted, the 
extreme case being the so-called ‘spot market’ for daily labourers.  
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At first sight, ‘contract’ and ‘status’ roughly equate with the 
‘transactional’ and ‘relational’ types of employment relationship that 
feature in the psychological literature
23. ‘Contract’ and ‘status’ are not 
concepts along a single continuum, however. Rather they comprise 
several dimensions. Some of these involve a continuum - career is an 
example. Others represent contrasting types such as 'numerical' and 
'functional' flexibility. Table 3.1 illustrates. 
Such a framework also does not necessarily mean equating low 
skill with 'contract' and high skill with 'status'. As already indicated, 
much depends of the degree of specificity of the skills: a lawyer or 
financial accountant, for example, may be highly skilled, but their 
skills are of general rather than specific application. Employees in 
occupations where the profession offers greater career prospects than 
the individual organisation – for example, lawyers, financial managers 
and computer specialists - may incline to the 'contract' model. Some of 
the trends are also contradictory. Many unskilled groups have only 
recently been moving towards the ‘status’ model with the extension of 
pensions, sick pay and other fringe benefits - indeed, as Jacoby 
reminds us, many of the features associated with the ‘status’ model are 
much more recent than often assumed, with different forms of 
subcontracting being dominant in many sectors until the end of the 
19
th
 century; they also reflect legal pressures and employee demands 
as much as they do managerial strategy
24
.  Meanwhile, some high 
‘status’ groups, such as senior managers, have experienced the 
imposition of very tight targets and performance controls considerably 
reducing their discretion. There can also be reversions. Some 
subcontracted work is being brought back in house as practice 
confirms the importance of having workers under managerial control 
– maintenance on the national rail network is an example. The 
situation can also differ significantly between different workplaces. A 
part-time worker in one of the UK's top supermarket chains such as 
Tesco or Waitrose may enjoy greater de facto employment security 
that a high ‘status’ individual in a less successful organisation.  
The 'contract-status formulation is especially helpful in making 
sense of many of the changes supposedly taking place in employment 
relationships. It may be true that employers feel under pressure to 
make increasing demands on flexibility and greater sharing of the 
risk
25
. Yet this does not necessarily mean a coherent shift in approach 
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that characterises many interpretations. Rather industrial relations 
emphasise an eclectic mix as employers grapple with the 
contradictions arising from their need for commitment and control 
discussed earlier
26
. Thus the two approaches can co-exist in the same 
workplace in the form of the so-called 'core-periphery' model – core 
employees usually fall into the ‘status’ category , while the periphery 
are closer to the ‘contract’ equivalent.  
 
Varieties of capitalism - competing views of the organisation 
As Chapter 2 observed, even though the employment relationship has 
many common features, there are considerable cross-national 
differences. In every country, the state has become the ‘guarantor of 
the employment relationship’ and yet legal frameworks differ 
considerably in the nature and extent of the legal protection that is 
afforded to it in areas such as the formation of individual contracts, 
their relationship to collective agreements and their provision for 
termination. These, in turn, reflect contrasting views about the nature 
of the work organisation, which are grounded in the wider legal, 
political and social context.  
On the one hand is the doctrine of the firm as a 'nexus of 
contracts', which has been described as the 'dominant legal and 
economic perspective' in the UK and the USA
27
. Largely developed as 
the result of economists grappling with the need to accommodate the 
organisation into neo-classical thinking, it starts from the proposition 
that the firm is a legal fiction to which the term ownership cannot be 
meaningfully applied - it is a 'contracting site at which the parties to a 
business enterprise agree the terms on which they are prepared to 
supply the firm’s inputs and which they are to be rewarded for doing 
so’28. Crucially important for present purposes is that the employment 
contract is seen as being no different from other contracts – it is purely 
a market relationship and the parties owe no responsibilities to one 
another beyond those expected of participants acting in good faith. 
The mutual advantages of the employment contract over the labour 
services agreement are effectively ignored as are its implications. 
Thus, in the words of Alchian and Demsetz
29
, who were responsible 
for much of the initial thinking, the organisation is merely ‘the 
centralised contractual agent in a team productive process – not some 
superior authoritarian directive or disciplinary process’. Exclusive 
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residual rights are vested in shareholders on efficiency grounds and 
managers are responsible to them only, the share price representing 
the best value the market can put on the company. Market competition 
is the key to governance with the emphasis on ‘pay for performance 
schemes such as stock option grants, an active market for corporate 
control, and the fiscal discipline of leverage’30. The approach, suggest 
supporters, avoids potential confusion of objectives associated with 
the alternative stakeholder model that sees managers having 
responsibilities to multiple interests; it is important in increasing 
efficiency - in particular it prevents the ‘managerial empire-building’ 
associated with the growth of large diversified conglomerates in the 
1960s and 1970s; and it helps to insure that resources are re-allocated 
to new initiatives
31
. 
One other hand is the variously described ‘capability approach’ or 
‘resource-based view’ that informs the thinking behind HRM, the 
‘learning/knowledge organisation’ and ‘high performance working’. It 
also approximates to the thinking in a number of EU countries and is 
associated with the EU social model. As Table 3.2 outlines, the 
starting point is that the firm or business is a social organisation, with 
success largely depending on the ability to satisfy markets for 
products and services. Management is a key resource as well as 
process, with responsibilities for coordinating, developing and 
enabling the skills and talents of other employees. The employment 
relationship involves market and managerial relationships and its 
conduct is critical. The key to governance are institutions in the broad 
sense of the term. In the words of a summary of the position, work 
organisations are seen as ‘capability structures’32. The focus is on how 
the organisation, ‘an authoritatively structured set of relationships’, 
creates ‘distinctive capabilities through establishing routines that co-
ordinate complementary activities and skills for particular strategic 
purposes’33.  
These perspectives are grounded in a recognition that capitalism 
does not exist in a vacuum. Rather than a single form, there are 
‘varieties of capitalism’ with very considerable differences from 
country to country in the way that economic activity is organised. This 
is above all true of the way in which the organisation of production at 
firm level is linked to the support provided by the external institutions 
at many levels of the political economy. ‘Markets’ and ‘hierarchies’, it 
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argued, are not the only coordination (‘governance’) mechanisms for 
economic behavior: ‘social networks’, ‘association’, and ‘state 
intervention’ can also be important. Overall, businesses are said to be 
‘embedded’ within social contexts with the relationship being 
mediated by institutions that shape the collective supply of inputs 
(e.g., skills, capital) available to firms and other economic actors with 
significant implications for the various economic outcomes (e.g., 
growth, efficiency, innovation)
 34
. 
A voluminous ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature has emerged with 
many different strands. Most attention has focused on the suggestion 
that there are two main types: the ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs) 
of the Anglo-Saxon countries with their ‘shareholder’ or ‘outsider’ 
systems and the ‘co-ordinated market economies’ (CMEs) found in 
Japan and some continental European countries characterised by their 
‘stakeholder’ or ‘insider’ systems. ‘Outsider’ systems are associated 
with dispersed networks of shareholdings, greater reliance on external 
sources of finance, highly developed stock markets and an active 
market for corporate control - companies are largely discrete 
economic actors - ‘islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market 
relations’35 - primarily accountable to shareholders. In contrast,’ 
insider’ systems, are distinguished by interlinked networks of 
corporate, institutional or family shareholdings, a financial system 
based on long-term bank credit, less developed stock markets and 
constraints on hostile take-over In this case, companies’ ability to act 
independently is restricted by ties of mutual obligation to and 
dependence on various stakeholder groups, including employees. 
There is a considerable degree of congruency with another binary 
model that is rooted in differences in legal systems: CLEs tend to be 
characterised by ‘civil law’ systems and LMEs by ‘common law’ 
ones. To paraphrase Colling, ‘civil law’ systems are driven by the 
desire for one common statement that is applied universally and takes 
precedent over the wishes of the contracting parties
36
. The courts also 
play important roles in diffusing these general principles through the 
influence their decisions exert with widespread implications for 
commercial and inter-firm relations. The result is that both the 
substantive and procedural content of employment contracts are 
affected, with deviation from generally applied business conventions 
generally frowned on. By contrast, in common law systems the courts 
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have a much bigger say in the development and application of legal 
principles. They also prioritise the freedom of social actors to reach 
the contracts that they want, with the result that precedent is applied 
through fragmented case by case processes. Thus, whereas in ‘civil 
law’ systems the incorporation of the terms of collective agreements is 
more or less automatic, in ‘common law’ ones it is selective 
depending on the prevailing custom and practice 
These binary classifications can be criticised for glossing over the 
very considerable differences between countries in the same category. 
This is especially so in the case of the CLEs. The role of the state, for 
example has been fundamentally different in, say, the Latin countries 
as opposed to Germany or Sweden: in the first case, descriptions such 
as ‘state-led’ are appropriate, whereas ‘collaborative’ or ‘consensus’ 
fits the second better. Similarly, while the banks have been the main 
source of funding in Germany, investment foundations have played 
this role in Sweden. Also the LMEs are not as homogenous as they 
appear:  for example, there are considerable difference in the common 
law systems of the UK and the USA - in the UK collective agreements 
are binding in honour only, whereas in the USA they are deemed to be 
legal enforceable contracts.  
Much depends on different conceptions of how institutions 
constrain and relate to actor behaviour, which takes us back to Chapter 
1 and the different types of institutionalist analysis. Those who 
advocate the binary model tend to come at the issues from a ‘rational 
choice’ perspective and favour parsimony. By contrast, those inclining 
to a broader categorisation tend to come from the ‘historical 
institutionalist’ approach and emphasise complexity.  
Arguably, however, it is not so much the typologies that are 
important for present purposes. Rather it is the dimensions or basic 
building blocks that different authors draw on that deserve the 
attention. In drawing this section to a close, therefore, Table 3.3 draws 
together the main institutional features that enable and constrain 
different sorts of business systems, which might also be seen a 
summary of the influences on the conduct of the employment 
relationship. In simple terms, the configurations of variables in 
column 1 are seen as strongly encouraging management to opt for one 
or other of two main combinations of business strategy/form of work 
organisation that, in turn, shape the management of the employment 
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relationship. 
 
The traditional model under threat? 
There is something of a paradox about developments in the 
employment relationship. Everywhere the employment relationship 
seems prone to the process know as ‘juridification’, i.e. the greater 
involvement of the law and the courts in employment relations 
matters. This is above all true of the UK, where there has been a 
considerable increase in legislation that shapes the substance of the 
employment relationship as well as the processes dealing with it. One 
factor is the coming of the EU – for reasons that Chapter 10 spells out 
in more detail, the price of having a ‘Single European Market’, was a 
considerable extension of individual employment rights. Another is 
the decline of collective bargaining: the less the coverage of collective 
bargaining, the greater is the tendency to look to legal regulation to fill 
the gaps. More generally, what has been described as ‘law’s allure’37 
can be seen as part of a wider process in society in which legal rules 
are introduced to help deal with risks and uncertainties that might 
otherwise result in conflict if actors were left to their own device. 
Here, contrary to what might have been expected, ‘market 
liberalisation’ has been a major cause of ‘juridification’38; covering 
for risk has also been a significant factor in the increase in 
occupational licensing. In any event, the notion of the employment 
relationship being an essentially private one no longer holds true if it 
ever did.  
At the same time as the law would seem to be minimising the 
uncertainties associated with the employment relationship, however, 
there are other developments that are calling into question the stability 
and security that have come to be associated with it. The mainspring is 
intensifying competition in an increasingly global market place 
leading to more or less continuous change and ‘permanent 
restructuring’. Employers, it is proposed, are introducing new 
organisational forms in place of traditional bureaucratic structures; 
they are seeking a range of flexibilities – numerical, functional, 
financial and temporal; they are introducing new forms of agency, 
temporary and fixed term contracts; and they are focusing more and 
more on the individual employee, with the adoption of stretching 
targets and rigorous appraisal and surveillance of performance
39
. 
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Arguably, much of this has to be taken with a considerable grain 
salt. As the figures quoted earlier suggest, temporary working is very 
much the exception rather than the rule. Many supposedly new 
organisational forms, as Chapter 8 will argue in greater detail, do not 
involve serious change in work organisation. There are also limits to 
the flexibility that managers can bear. There are two areas, however, 
where the implications have to be taken more seriously. These are the 
‘changing psychological contract’ and the ‘fragmentation of the 
employment relationship’.  
 
A changing psychological contract? 
There is an on-going debate about whether changes are taking place in 
the ‘psychological contract’ involved in the employment 
relationship
40
. As the outline of what the ‘psychological contract’ 
entails in Table 3.4 suggests, the starting point is the recognition that, 
for all the talk of managerial hierarchy, employment law and 
collective agreements, individuals cannot be left out of discussions of 
the employment relationship: the day-to-day conduct of the 
employment relationship depends very much on perceptions and 
expectations, reflecting the enduring features of the employment 
relationship discussed earlier. Indeed, given the imprecision of the 
employment relationship, these perceptions and expectations may play 
a more important role than the formal contract. This is above all true 
of countries such as the UK, where the ‘individualisation’ of the 
employment relationship has gathered a pace as a result of the decline 
in proportion of the workforce in trade unions and/or covered by 
collective agreements as Chapter 9 will confirm. 
It is what might be described as the ‘old core issues’ of careers 
and pensions that have loomed especially large
41
. Historically, these 
have been seen to be two critical elements in the ‘psychological 
contract’ in which employees trade off security for their loyalty. 
Increasingly, however, employers are said to be finding it increasingly 
difficult to honour these expectations – partly because of the pressure 
from intensifying competition and partly because of the rising cost of 
funding pension schemes due to longer life expectancy. Overall, the 
basis of the employment relationship is said to be moving from the 
‘relational’ to the ‘transactional’, with employers seeking to avoid 
and/or shift the risk involved in some of the traditional features of the 
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employment relationship. In terms of pensions, it means a move from 
schemes with defined benefits to ones involving defined contributions. 
In terms of careers, it means an emphasis on 'employability' (helping 
employees to become as 'employable' as possible) and 'portfolio 
careers' (encouraging employees to think in terms of a number of 
careers with a number of employers rather than a single career with 
one employer).  
For the UK, there is certainly considerable evidence to support the 
'permanent restructuring' thesis, which will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 8.  Stability is something that few managers can 
contemplate. Short-term pressures to maximise the share price or, in 
the case of public services, implement top-down policy changes from 
governments, mean that day-to-day management of organisations is 
constantly being disrupted. Adding to the problem in many 
organisations is the rapid turnover among managers – expectations 
raised and promises made by one manager can be quickly set aside or 
disabused by another. The redundancy that was historically associated 
with economic down-turns has become an accepted or normal way in 
which firms handle restructuring regardless of overall business 
performance
42
.  
There is also no disputing the facts so far as pensions are 
concerned. In the UK, there has been a considerable decline in final 
salary pension or defined benefit schemes in which both parties pay 
and the employee is guaranteed  a pension depending on income and 
years of employment. In their place have been substituted defined 
contribution schemes very often accompanied by a reduction in the 
level of employers’ contribution. The result is that many more 
employees now face the uncertainty of defined contribution schemes 
with the outcome dependent on stock market performance of the 
pension fund(s) into which they contribute 
The problem of pensions and their funding is universal, but the 
precise form depends on the balance of funding between employers 
and the state. In some countries, the proportion of older people’s 
incomes coming from public sources is more than half, i.e. France (85 
per cent), Germany (73 per cent) and Sweden (68 per cent). In others, 
the balance of public–private pension provision is the other way: in 
the Netherlands public provision accounts for 48 per cent, in the UK 
49 per cent and in the USA 36 per cent. In countries where pensions 
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are predominately funded by the state, the issues are largely general 
ones. In those where they are they funded mainly by employers and 
employees, they mainly involve individuals
43
.  
There is less evidence to support the notion of the 'end of 
careers'
44
. In the UK, overall job tenure remained relatively stable in 
the 1980s and 1990s with change being relatively small at between 2 
and 5 per cent: the proportion in long term employment (ten years or 
more) also showed little change between 1994 and 2004, being just 
over 30 per cent in both years
45
. A detailed breakdown suggests that it 
is particular groups for whom employment security has declined. 
Thus, the job tenure of men over the age of 50 declined as did that of 
men in lower paid jobs: the Commission on Vulnerable Employment
46
 
reports that average job tenure for men in the bottom income quartile 
was seven years, whereas it was 12 years for those in the top income 
quartile. Furthermore, tenure rates for the lowest-paid have also fallen 
– from nine years in 1982 to seven years in –.  
Further evidence comes from the CBI Director General’s telling 
of the ‘remarkable story of what happened to employment numbers’ in 
the UK in the most recent recession
47
. Although they had been cutting 
costs wherever they could, many employers had decided to retain 
more people than they had need for, even though that temporarily 
pushed productivity down and unit costs up - output had fallen by 6.2 
per cent from the peak, but unemployment was down just 1.9 per cent. 
The much greater reluctance to lay people off than was the case in the 
past, suggested CBI surveys, reflected two main considerations. One 
was the greater flexibility of wages. Such was the impact that, as well 
as voluntary unpaid leave and short time working, many employees 
had been willing to take a reduction. The second was that, since the 
early 1990s, the proportion of UK working age employees, above all 
in manufacturing, who have been through higher education had risen 
from around a fifth to a third. Skilled employees were harder and 
more expensive to hire and to lay off than others, with plenty of 
companies complaining of skills shortages before the recession hit
48
.  
It also seems that employers recognise that a general shortage of 
skills means they will have to do more to retain key employees. One 
consideration is the greater functional flexibility that many require 
from their employees. In the words of the CBI, ‘There will … be a 
trend to select and develop employees for a career within 
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organisations rather than for a specific job, reflecting businesses’ 
preference for staff to be multi-skilled’49. A second is the priority that 
is being accorded to management and leadership skills. Shortages of 
these are also anticipated and dealing with them seen as a particular 
challenge to address given the timescale for investment returns – 
typically it can take 3-4 years to see a return on leadership training. 
 
Limits to fragmentation? 
Arguably, it is the second of the main challenges, ‘fragmentation’, that 
is the most threatening to the traditional model. ‘Fragmentation’ takes 
several forms. One is ‘individualisation’. Not only has there been a 
considerable decline in trade union membership and the coverage of 
collective bargaining, but also a growth in individual performance pay 
and the like. In terms of pay, as Chapter 8 will argue in greater detail, 
it may not make a great deal of difference, but it means an 
undermining of a sense of ‘occupational community’ associated with 
trade union membership and collective action. Another form of 
‘fragmentation’ might be described as ‘occupational’. In the UK, for 
example, there has been a considerable growth in the number of 
‘assistant’ jobs in fields such as teaching and nursing, which is 
blurring the boundaries of long-standing occupations 
Perhaps most deserving of attention, though, is the 'fragmentation’ 
that seemingly reverses the historical tendency towards the 
internalisation of employment relationships within hierarchies touched 
on earlier. The employment relationship, it seems, is increasingly the 
subject of ‘externalisation’. One form is the subcontracting of some of 
a business’ activities which have previously been undertaken in-
house. In some cases, recalling the contract-status in a previous 
section, this involves the explicit adoption of a ‘core-periphery’ 
model, in which the organisation distinguishes between those 
employees who have skills that are very ‘specific’ to the business and 
those that are more ‘general’ in character. Another form is associated 
with what have been described as ‘platform’ companies - Apple and 
Dell are examples. In this case, the outsourcing of most activities is a 
key element of business strategy from the very beginning. A third type 
combines the first two and is to be found in the public sector. At the 
time of writing at the end of September 2010, Suffolk county council 
in the UK is proposing to make itself into a ‘virtual’ or ‘enabling’ 
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authority. It would not be providing public services itself, in other 
words, but commissioning them from social enterprises or private 
sector companies. In practice, this means that, instead of employing 
around 27,000 people as it currently does, the council would be 
responsible for but a few hundred primarily involved in contract 
management
50
. On the face of it, there could hardly be a more extreme 
application of the ‘nexus of contract thinking’ discussed earlier.  
Subcontracting and outsourcing are not the only types of 
‘externalisation’, however. In the UK, organisations are said to be 
being subjected to a process of 'permanent restructuring’51. In part, 
such restructuring follows from the widespread adoption of 
‘divisionalisation’ (the break-up of large-scale organisation into semi-
autonomous businesses units or Executive agencies), ‘budgetary 
devolution’ (the allocation of responsibility for managing activities 
within financial resources or targets) and ‘marketisation’ (the greater 
application of market principles to decision making, e.g. in the form of 
'competitive tendering' and ‘market testing’, joint ventures and 
partnerships). In part, it reflects a process of 'financialisation', in 
which competition is based not so much on products and services, but 
the returns on investment regardless of sector, leading to a variety of 
investment/divestment forms such as business sell-offs, spin-offs and 
different forms of buy-outs, along with merger and acquisition.  
The result, as an earlier section pointed out, is that the traditional 
binary divide between contracts of employment and contracts for 
services is becoming increasingly blurred. Indeed, in the UK, the 
growth of trilateral or multilateral arrangements is leading some 
employment lawyers to suggest that it is time to replace the ‘contract 
of employment’ with the ‘personal employment contract’ as the core 
concept of labour law
52
.  
Certainly the effects of ‘externalisation’ can be considerable as far 
as employees are concerned. Many find themselves working for very 
different organisations from the ones they joined, with significant 
implications for their pay, career prospects and pensions, not to 
mention their health and well-being. Some who were in permanent 
jobs are now in temporary ones, with the employer who pays often 
being different from the one who directs. Morale and commitment are 
also affected with implications for productivity and performance - 
collective or organised conflict in the form of strikes may have 
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declined, but individual expressions such as absenteeism show no 
signs of abating.  
Establishing how widespread ‘externalisation’ is poses problems 
because of the variety of forms that it takes. Certainly, in the UK, 
there has been an increase in the number of workers involved in non-
standard forms of contract such as temporary and fixed-term contract 
working; the same goes for agency working. There has also been an 
increase in subcontracting and self-employment
53
. Much of this took 
place in the 1980s and 1900s, however. On the face of it, although the 
‘core-periphery’ model mentioned earlier has been canvassed for 
around a quarter of a century, yet its extent appears to remain 
relatively limited. In 2004, according to WERS, 16 per cent of 
establishments reported having temporary agency workers, but these 
only amounted to two per cent of the combined workforce
54
. Only one 
in ten had freelancers, very few of whom were engaged in the work of 
the largest occupational group. The great majority (86 per cent) 
subcontracted some services. Again, however, these rarely involved 
the largest occupational group - the mostly common subcontracted 
activities were building maintenance and cleaning affecting 59 per 
cent and 52 per cent of the total number of establishments 
respectively. Also it emerges that, over the previous five years, eleven 
per cent of establishments had brought in-house activities that had 
previously been provided by sub-contractors. Not to be forgotten 
either is that the number of self-employed remains very much a 
minority. 
It may be that with the onset of the recession, there will be further 
increases, especially as a result of public expenditure cuts. This is 
particularly true of subcontracting and outsourcing, which appear to 
have considerable continuing appeal for employers as a recent CBI 
overview suggests in the case of the UK
55
. 
Yet there are grounds for being cautious in making such a 
prediction. The logic of subcontracting and outsourcing is clear 
enough. It is difficult to quarrel with the argument that managers need 
to focus their energies on the ‘core’ business. If they are running 
airlines or railways, for example, they should leave matters such as 
catering or maintenance to ‘specialist’ businesses. The ‘market’ will 
ensure that these businesses operate as effectively and efficiently as 
possible. It also means that pay and conditions will reflect those 
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prevailing in the sector rather than those of employees in the ‘core’ 
business. Perhaps even more basically, there is an understandable 
tendency to assume that, once activities are subcontracted or 
outsourced, managing the employment relationships becomes 
someone else’s problem - out of sight becomes out of mind.  
Arguably, however, there are limits to ‘fragmentation’ that take us 
back to the earlier discussion of the enduring features of the 
employment relationship. The problem is that, while subcontracting 
and outsourcing may be fine in theory, managing the ‘extended 
organisation’ that they involve is far from straightforward – which is 
why companies brought many ancillary activities in-house in the first 
place and why others are doing the same presently. Like the 
employment relationship, subcontracting and outsourcing are not 
automatic in their effects – the contracting process can be time 
consuming and complex, while ensuring adherence to the contract 
requires skills in relationship management which few operational 
managers who managed the function before possess. Also, unless the 
main contractor is involved in managing the employment relationship 
throughout the supply chain, the danger is that they will experience 
many of the problems that can be incurred, but will not have the 
capability to deal with them. Indeed, if their relationship with their 
subcontractors is based simply on low cost, the problems are likely to 
be exaggerated – for the avoidance and shifting of risk affects 
employer-employer as well as employer-employee relationships. Not 
only is there likely to be a lack of commitment and/or identification 
with the parent company and its products/ services. There also likely 
to be costs to quality and reputation that are rarely fully considered. 
For example, organisations that do not seek to ensure that their supply 
chains maintain decent standards are likely to find themselves the 
increasing focus of ‘naming and shaming’ campaigns as has happened 
in the case of some of the large retail clothing chains in the UK which 
outsource manufacturing to developing countries. 
Many examples of organisations experiencing subcontracting and 
outsourcing problems can be quoted. In the UK, recent high profile 
cases would include National Rail and London Transport, where 
maintenance has been brought back in house, and BA, which 
experienced considerable disruption as a result of the activities of Gate 
Gourmet, the company to which it outsourced its catering services. 
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Perhaps, though, there can be hardly be a more dramatic illustration 
than that of Toyota, It was not just the scale of the problem that 
Toyota experienced, with the company having to recall over million 
cars world-wide in 2009-10 due to complaints about reliability. The 
‘Toyota’ model had been universally recognised to be the supreme 
exemplar of ‘lean production’ not just in the automotive industries, 
but across the board. The main problem, as Toyota’s chief executive 
publicly acknowledged, was that the company had become ‘confused 
about some of the principles that had made the company great: its 
focus on putting customers first and its ability ‘to stop, think and make 
improvements’’56. More specifically, it seems, the majority of 
problems originated in the ‘tier-two’ suppliers which provide 
individual parts or assembled components for Toyota and/or its ‘tier-
one’ original equipment manufacturers. Break-neck expansion to 
overtake General Motors meant that many of these were from outside 
Japan and Toyota did not have decades of experience working with 
them as it had with its other suppliers. Making matters worse was that 
the company did not have enough senior engineers to maintain the 
levels of contract supervision that it had applied to long-standing 
suppliers.  
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Table 3.1 ‘Contract' and 'status' 
 
    Contract  Status 
tasks/ work organization highly prescribed   some discretion 
 
security of employment  low   relatively high 
 
type of flexibility  mainly ‘numerical’ mainly ‘functional’ 
 
skill specificity   relatively low  relatively high 
 
training and development very little  some 
 
career prospects  very limited  fairly extensive  
 
‘voice’     very little  some 
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Table 3.2 Competing views of the work organisation
57
 
 
 
Nexus of contracts  
 
Resource-based  
 
Role of the organisation  
 
Role of managers 
 
Responsibilities 
 
Main focus 
 
Main form of competition 
 
 
Performance measures 
 
Scope for coordinated action 
 
Horizons  
 
Relationship between 
management and employees 
 
View of labour 
 
 
Methods of securing  
commitment 
vehicle for contracting  
 
coordinate contacts 
 
shareholders only 
 
capital market 
 
external/merger and takeover 
 
 
share price 
 
limited 
 
 
short term 
 
purely market  
 
 
commodity whose cost is to be 
minimised  
 
financial/use of market type 
devices such as stock options 
maximisation 
 
providing goods and services  
 
direct and support  
 
multiple stakeholders 
 
product market 
 
internal growth/process and  
product development 
 
market share  
 
significant 
 
 
medium/long term 
 
market and managerial  
 
 
resource to be developed 
 
 
financial plus training and 
development/voice/consultatio
n 
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Table 3.3 Varieties of capitalism: building blocks and links
58
 
1  Role of the state 
 degree to which state 
relies on market 
regulation 
 degree to which state 
encourages intermediary 
organisations 
2  Financial systems  
 ‘capital-market-based’ v 
‘bank-based’   
 ‘blockholder’ v 
‘dispersed’ share 
ownership  
3 Corporate governance 
arrangements (‘insider’ v 
‘outsider’ control) 
4 Nature & extent of 
vocational training provision 
( balance between state, 
market, individual cos, co 
associations & co networks) 
5 structure of collective 
bargaining/ social dialogue 
 levels of bargaining/ 
social dialogue 
 scope of collective 
agreements  
 nature and extent of 
coordination 
6 Nature & extent of 
employment protection 
legislation 
7 Nature & extent of 
employee ‘voice’ provisions 
8 Social security provisions  
 level of benefits  
 balance of public–private 
pension provision 
 administration 
(government v ‘Ghent-
type’ v company)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balance between 
coordination 
mechanisms, ie 
 
 markets 
 hierarchies, 
 state 
intervention 
 associations  
 social networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nature of business 
strategy, ie extent to 
which 
 
 products/ services 
are standardised 
or customised 
 competition is 
primarily via 
price or quality 
 product/ service 
volume is high or 
low  
 
 
 
 
 
Nature of work 
organisation, ie 
 
 ‘traditional’  
 ‘Taylorist’ 
 ‘lean’ 
 ‘learning’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance of 
employment 
relationship 
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Table 3.4 The psychological contract  
To paraphrase the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development 
(CIPD)
59
, the psychological contract is a concept developed by the 
likes of Argyris, Levinson and Schein in the early 1960s. It has been 
defined as 'the perceptions of the two parties, employee and employer, 
of what their mutual obligations are towards each other'. These 
obligations will often be informal and imprecise: they may be inferred 
from actions or from what has happened in the past, as well as from 
statements made by the employer, for example during the recruitment 
process or in performance appraisals. Some obligations may be seen 
as 'promises' and others as 'expectations'. The important thing is that 
they are believed by the employee to be part of the relationship with 
the employer. 
 
The psychological contract can be distinguished from the legal 
contract of employment. The latter will in many cases offer only a 
limited and uncertain representation of the reality of the employment 
relationship. The employee may have contributed little to its terms 
beyond accepting them. The nature and content of the legal contract 
may only emerge clearly if and when it comes to be tested in an 
employment tribunal. 
 
The psychological contract looks at the reality of the situation as 
perceived by the parties, and may be more influential than the formal 
contract in affecting how employees behave from day to day. It is the 
psychological contract that effectively tells employees what they are 
required to do in order to meet their side of the bargain, and what they 
can expect from their job. It may not - indeed in general it will not - be 
strictly enforceable, though courts may be influenced by a view of the 
underlying relationship between employer and employee, for example 
in interpreting the common law duty to show mutual trust and 
confidence. 
 
The CIPD draws on Guest and Conway
60
 to outline below the kinds of 
commitments employers and employees might make to one another: 
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Employees promise to: Employers promise to provide: 
Work hard 
 
Pay commensurate with 
performance 
Uphold company reputation 
 
Opportunities for training and 
development 
 
Maintain high levels of attendance 
and punctuality 
Opportunities for promotion 
Show loyalty to the organisation 
 
Recognition for innovation or 
new idea 
 
Work extra hours when required 
Feedback on performance 
 
Develop new skills and update 
old ones 
Interesting tasks 
 
Be flexible, for example, by  
taking on a colleague’s work 
An attractive benefits package 
 
Be courteous to clients and 
colleagues  
Respectful treatment 
 
Be honest 
Reasonable job security 
Come up with new ideas 
A pleasant and safe working 
environment 
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4 
 
Institutions – the stuff of employment relations 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Identify the core organisations, institutions and 
processes with which employment relations is 
concerned 
 
 Emphasise importance of these institutions as the 
‘rules of the game’, together with their role in 
promoting ‘path dependency’ and ‘isomorphism’ 
 
 Explain why employment relations institutions 
differ cross-nationally, highlighting ‘critical 
junctures’ rooted in different ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ 
 
 Review the forces driving change, the mechanisms 
involved and the direction of travel 
 
Summary 
The ‘governance’ of the employment relationship involves a mix of 
internal and external institutions. Although work groups are important, 
the internal are largely the result of management decision making – 
these embrace not just the personnel policies and practice that are the 
standard fare of personnel management and HRM courses, but also 
work organisation and coordination and control structures. The 
external reflect the activities of trade union and professional 
associations, the results of collective bargaining (joint regulation) and 
decisions of the legislature and judiciary (legal enactment). 
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Institutions are central to employment relations because they influence 
beliefs and actions, and so help to shape outcomes in the ways 
described in Chapter 2. Institutions constitute the rules of the game’ – 
they are not only ‘regulative’, but also ‘normative’ and ‘cognitive’; 
they make for behaviour that is ‘path dependent’, helping to explain 
why history is important in understanding their origins and 
development; and they encourage a strong tendency towards imitative 
behaviour, helping to explain within-country similarities. Cross-
nationally, there are substantial differences in the institutions of 
employment relations. This is above all true of the external dimension, 
i.e. the structure of collective bargaining and legal framework, mainly 
reflecting ‘critical junctures’ in the development of the many ‘varieties 
of capitalism’. There are major debates as there are in other fields of 
institutional analysis about the drivers of change and the balance 
between, on the one hand, ‘markets’ (e.g. the globalisation of capital 
and product markets) and, on the other hand, political developments 
such as the EU’s ‘social dimension’; the mechanisms of change – 
where the issue of the agency (‘entrepreneurship’) of management and 
the state is especially prominent, along with different types of 
adaptation or ‘bricolage’; and the direction of change – whether 
common developments such as the process of economic globalisation, 
the rise of services and demographic changes are leading to greater 
convergence or, rather, ‘converging divergences’1, with developments 
characterised by ‘increasing diversity within national systems but … 
increasing convergence between them’2.  
 
Introduction 
Institutions have always loomed large in employment relations 
studies. Indeed, some of the pioneers of the study, notably Commons 
in the USA, are regarded as seminal figures in the development of 
institutional analysis more generally. As in other areas, however, as 
time went by, there was a tendency to assume that the underlying 
importance of institutions could be taken for granted, along with their 
meanings for the different actors. The focus shifted onto the detail of 
the institutions of employment relations and the organisations 
involved – the workings of trade unions, the origins and development 
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of the structure of collective bargaining, and so on. The result was that 
employment relations increasingly came to share the ‘serious 
shortcoming’ associated with institutional studies more generally, i.e. 
it very often degenerated into ‘naïve empiricism and historicism’3. 
Fortunately, as the institutional ‘turn’ has taken hold, things are 
changing, making it possible to begin to answer some of the main 
criticisms of institutionalist analysis
4
. One, that it does not do enough 
to tease out the links between behaviour and outcomes, was a feature 
of Chapter 2. Others, which are the subject of the present chapter, are 
that it does not identify the institutions that matter or explain why they 
do, why they existing configurations take their present form given 
very similar conditions and why and how they change over time. 
 
Mapping the terrain 
As Chapter 1 has pointed out, employment relations deals with two 
main types of institutions or ‘rule’. The substantive rules cover the 
‘what’ of the employment relationship. The procedural deal with how 
the substantive rules are made, bringing in issues of process such as 
management decision making, collective bargaining or joint regulation 
and legal enactment. In each case, these institutions can be formal or 
informal. Most obvious are the formal rules that flow from 
management decisions, the rule books of trade unions and professional 
associations, collective agreements and legislation. Sitting alongside 
the formal rules, however, will be informal norms, expected patterns 
of behaviour and ‘custom and practice’. For example, the formal rules 
may be interpreted very differently from one unit to another in the 
same workplace – there may even be an informal rule that the formal 
rules will be ignored by managers and employees. Or work groups 
may develop their own codes of behaviour, which may parallel or 
substitute for the formal rules.  
The main focus here is on the formal institutions and the task is to 
outline the core ones, along with the organisations and processes 
involved. As the overview in Table 4.1 confirms, there are a number 
of levels and a number of authors, helping to explain the increasing 
dominance of the term multi-level governance. At the risk of over-
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simplification, however, a distinction can be drawn between internal 
and external dimensions. 
 
The internal dimension 
The exercise of the residual control rights involved in managing the 
employment relationship entails a hierarchy-based ‘governance’ 
structure, i.e. institutions or rules, in which superordinates (managers) 
give instructions to subordinates (employees). As Table 4.1 shows, 
there are three main areas where the managerial hierarchy finds 
expression. Most attention focuses on personnel or HR policies and 
practice, which tend to be the centrepiece/standard fare of personnel 
management and HRM courses. Clearly, how people are recruited, 
trained, appraised, paid and disciplined are important, which is why 
they underpin concerns with the impact on businesses performance 
discussed in the previous chapter. Arguably, however, such policies 
and practices are only the tip of the iceberg. Decisions about the other 
two areas outlined in Table 4.1 are fundamentally important.  
One is the nature of work organisation. As Chapter 2 explained, 
this is especially important because of its very considerable 
implications for health and personal development opportunities. 
Relevant here are the extent to which tasks are complex or simple and 
repetitive or varying; whether there is job rotation and team working; 
the nature of the constraints determining the pace or rate of work 
(whether, for example, there are ‘automatic’ constraints linked to the 
rate as which equipment is operated or a product is displaced in the 
production flow or 'norm-based' constraints linked to the setting of 
quantitative production norms; the nature and extent of the 
‘hierarchical’ constraints linked to the direct control exercised by 
immediate superiors; and ‘horizontal’ constraints linked to way work 
rate is dependent on the work of colleagues; the degree of 
autonomy(methods used and the pace or rate at which work is carried 
out); the learning dynamics (whether the individual learns new things 
in work and whether the work requires problem-solving activity). the 
way quality is controlled (the use of precise quality norms and 
individual responsibility for the control of quality)
5
. 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
114 
 
Also important are the wider arrangements for the coordination 
and control encapsulated in the term ‘organisation structure’. Thus 
activities can be organised around products or functions or some 
combination of the two (i.e. a ‘matrix’ organisation). In the case of the 
large multi-establishment enterprise, there can also be considerable 
differences in the extent to which decision making is centralised or 
decentralised reflecting the variety of products and services. In single 
business businesses (so-called ‘critical function’) organisations such 
as a car manufacturer or retailer, decision making tends to be highly 
centralised, with individual establishments being seen largely as cost 
centres. In multi-business (‘multi-divisional’) organisations, by 
contrast, strategy and investment decisions are decided centrally, but 
responsibility for operating management is much more decentralised 
with individual establishments being treated like profit centres subject 
to a variety of ‘key performance indicators’ (KPIs). In recent years, as 
later chapters will elaborate, in both cases there has been a 
considerable shift in emphasis from the management by task 
characteristic of traditional organisational structures to management 
by financial performance with the consequences for the fragmentation 
of the employment relationship discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
The external dimension 
As Table 4.1 also makes clear, management decision making is not 
the only rule-making process involved in the governance of the 
employment relationship. There are other processes that involve 
external agencies/organisations, helping to explain why the 
employment relationship is a multi-level phenomenon. Thus, almost 
invariably, trade unions and professional organisations have emerged 
to represent their members’ interests at the level of the occupation 
and/or sector. Looking at the left hand column, many occupations are 
to a great or lesser extent subject to decisions and norms of trade 
unions and professional organisations. Indeed, historically, it was out 
of this unilateral regulation, and the ‘closed shop’ that was effectively 
involved, that collective bargaining often developed. Even with the 
banning of the ‘closed shop’ in most countries, the requirements of 
entry, the length of the training programme, and codes of conduct help 
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to make employment what it is for many of the ‘professional’ groups 
involved in finance, health and the law. Training programmes, for 
example, typically involve arrangements that gradually and selectively 
induct new members into the network and up the social hierarchy. 
There has also been an increase in the workforce subject to some form 
of occupational licensing – in the UK it is of the order of 13.5 per cent 
and in the USA almost 30 per cent
6
.
Paralleling unilateral regulation has been the collective bargaining 
shown in Table 4.1 (1). This process, as the next chapter explains in 
more detail, is not just about setting wages or the other conditions of 
employment. A more appropriate term is ‘joint regulation’. Collective 
bargaining, in other words, describes a process of making and 
administering the rules that govern the employment relationship. 
Crucial here is the structure of collective bargaining, where four main 
dimensions have to be highlighted.  One is the level of the 
negotiations – whether, for example, the negotiations affect one or all 
the workplaces in a company and, even more importantly, whether 
they affect just the single employer or many employers. A second is 
the unit of negotiations – whether an entire occupation or sector is 
covered or just an individual employer. A third is the scope of 
collective agreements – to take the extremes, there can be an emphasis 
on procedures to deal with any of the substantive issues involved or 
there can be an attempt to deal comprehensively with specific 
substantive issues. A fourth is the form of collective agreements, the 
main feature of which is their legal status: in most countries, collective 
agreements are deemed to be legally enforceable contracts, whereas in 
the UK they are binding in honour, unless the parties stipulate 
otherwise; in most countries where multi-employer bargaining is the 
dominant form, they also have the effect of compulsory codes and 
supplementing or replace legal regulation. As Chapter 2 showed, the 
structure of collective bargaining and in particular the levels at which 
it takes place are linked to issues of inequality, social capital and 
economic performance.  
The ‘governance’ of the employment relationship does not just 
involve a private system of rule-making, however. As previous 
chapters have emphasised, the nature of employment relationship 
obliges the state to intervene. In most countries, employment law 
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intervenes directly or indirectly to help shape the contract of 
employment at the heart of the employment relationship. As well as 
procedures for resolving disputes, the state intervenes in two main 
ways. The first is in setting mandatory standards. Most attention 
focuses on individual employment rights dealing with discipline and 
dismissal, equality, minimum wages, health & safety and so on. It is 
not to be forgotten, however, that the expectations of and obligations 
of employees are also covered. The second main way in which the 
state influences the employment relationship is by introducing 
procedures making possible variations in the terms of the employment 
relationship to the employee’s advantage. Most notably, there are the 
provisions under which trade unions are to be recognised and 
collective bargaining practised. In many countries, there are also 
provisions for employee ‘voice’ in the form of statutory works 
councils with powers of information, consultation and (in some 
countries) co-determination.  
The role of the state is also fundamentally important in setting the 
framework of corporate governance of the business in which the 
employment relationship is conducted. Again, this can be directly in 
the form of legislation or indirectly in the form of codes of principles 
very often overseen by a financial services authority or its equivalent. 
Crucial issues include the function and purpose of the company, the 
role and composition of boards of directors, the audit process, the 
interests of the different stakeholder groups and merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity. 
As Chapter 10 discusses in more detail, the motivation for the 
state assuming the role of what has been described as the ‘guarantor’ 
of the employment relationship
7
 is complex. It is not just a matter of 
‘holding the ring’ as many studies assume. Equally, it is not just about 
dealing with market failure, which is the starting point for economists. 
Basically, the state intervenes in the attempt to maintain a balance 
between employees’ need for security and employers’ requirements 
for flexibility
8
.    
The other main source of public rules is the judicial system 
ranging from local employment tribunals or their equivalent through 
to the European Court of Justice. In the UK, where the common law 
system prevails, much employment regulation reflects the decisions of 
Institutions – the stuff of employment relations 
117 
 
Employment Tribunals and the judges. At EU level, there have been 
some landmark decisions of the European Court of Justice with a 
fundamental impact. For example, the decision that health and safety 
should be considered as part of the move to the Single European 
Market, and therefore subject to majority voting, was a major catalyst 
for developments in the 1990s. Similarly, the Court has come up with 
landmark rulings on pensions. 
 
The significance of institutions  
The reason why these institutions are a major focus of employment 
relations study is that they give effect to the employment relationship. 
The generic features of the employment relationship discussed in the 
previous chapter do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in 
institutions and it is these that help to explain why conduct of the 
employment relationship can differ from one occupation and 
workplace to another.  
In formal terms, the institutions involved in the governance of the 
employment relationship are an intervening or mediating variable as 
well as a dependent one, meaning that they have effects as well as 
causes. Crucially, as Chapter 2 argued, employment relations holds 
that these governance structures have a very significant effect on key 
outcomes – notably on the quality of working life, the economic 
performance of business and a country’s ‘social capital’. 
In terms of its approach, all three types of institutionalism 
mentioned in Chapter 1 are to be found
9
. If there is a dominant 
tendency, however, is that of ‘sociological’ and ‘historical’ 
institutionalism. Crucially, the influence of institutions is seen as not 
just constraining and/or enabling actions, as it is in the case of 
‘rational choice’ treatments but also shaping individual preferences as 
well. In Scharpf’s words, ‘institutions … define not only what actors 
can do, but also their perceptions and preferences - and thus what they 
will want to do’10. As he goes on to summarise: whereas the logic of 
action for ‘rational choice’ institutionalists is one of ‘instrumentality’, 
for their ‘sociological’ and ‘historical’ counterparts it is 
‘appropriateness’. 
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 These differences are also reflected in the treatment of 
organisations. In ‘rational choice’ treatments, organisations are 
usually excluded from definitions of institutions. The ‘players’ have to 
be separated from the ‘rules’, in North’s words, in order to maintain 
the notion of rational actors making decisions within an institutional 
environment11. In ‘sociological’ and ‘historical’ institutionalism, there 
is not this clear-cut distinction. In keeping with this approach, 
employment relations views organisations as structures of rules and 
rule-making processes. Furthermore, it does not assume a community 
of interest so far as these rules and the processes involved in their 
making are concerned. 
The remainder of this section singles out three concepts that help 
to understand why employment relations holds institutions matter so 
much: the significance of institutions as the ‘rules of the game’; their 
importance in promoting ‘path dependency’; and their role in 
explaining why there is such a strong tendency towards imitative 
behaviour on the part of those who run work organisations.  
 
The ‘rules of the game’ 
The phrase ‘rules of the game’ is increasingly used to capture the 
significance of institutions. Institutions are regarded so because they 
establish both rights and obligations - from one point of view they 
constrain behaviour; but from another they enable it
12
. They also do so 
both directly and indirectly - even if individuals do not always strictly 
obey the rules, the way they adapt their behaviour is affected by them. 
Moreover, rules are deemed to be especially important in situations 
where actors are involved in co-operative endeavour involving 
uncertainty and concerns about the enforcement of any agreement. 
The employment relationship is perhaps the extreme case for the 
reasons quoted the previous chapter. 
Yet it is not just a case of being able to read off standard 
behaviour from a particular set of institutions. Much depends on the 
way that people relate to rules. Here it is useful to distinguish between 
the three main dimensions or, following Scott
13
, 'pillars' of 
institutions. The first is ‘regulative’. Institutions can cause individuals 
to make certain choices or perform certain actions because they fear 
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punishment. For example, employees may see little point in a 
particular management rule, but they conform because managers have 
the power to impose sanctions on them if they do not. Similarly, 
employers may strongly object to a particular piece of employment 
protection, but go along with it to avoid a claim before an 
Employment Tribunal or its equivalent.  
The second pillar is normative. In Hay’s14 words, ‘institutions are 
normalising in the sense that they tend to embody shared codes, rules 
and conventions, thereby imposing … value systems which may 
constrain behaviour’. A good example would be the norms governing 
the behaviour of particular groups of employees with common beliefs 
and values. People act out of a sense of duty or an awareness of what 
one is ‘supposed’ to do – things are done because this is the right way 
or proper way to behave. For example, professional employees such as 
doctors or nurses may have expectations about appropriate behaviour 
that reflect the acculturation that takes place during the long period of 
their training and development.  
In the case of the third or ‘cognitive’ pillar, the reaction to rules is 
likely to be largely unconscious. Essentially, the norms are shared 
conceptions that individuals have internalised. In Scott's words, 
‘compliance occurs in many circumstances because other types of 
behaviour are inconceivable; routines are followed because they are 
taken for granted as 'the way we do these things'’15. Not only that. 
‘Institutions serve to embody sets of ideas about what is possible, 
feasible and desirable and the means, tools and techniques appropriate 
to realise a given set of policy goals’16. Such is the force of the 
routines and associated ways of thinking, in other words,  that people 
seem to be unable to 'think outside the box'. It is in this way that 
conceptual frameworks and policy paradigms can become ‘self-
fulfilling'
17
. A good example is that of neo-liberalism raised in the 
Preface – the more dominant this ideology became, the more difficult 
it became for policy makers to think in terms of pragmatic solutions to 
problems, let alone conceive of alternative ways of thinking about 
them.  
Several points are worth emphasizing. The first involves the 
legitimacy of the three different 'pillars'. ‘Regulative’ rules that are 
obeyed simply because of the fear of sanctions tend to enjoy less 
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legitimacy in the eyes of those subjected to them than those that are 
‘normative’ and ‘cognitive’. The result, very often, is that employees 
do what they have to and no more. It is this reaction that many 
managers are highlighting when they refer to a lack of engagement – 
the reluctance to go the extra mile. The second is that there is very 
considerable potential for conflict between the ‘regulative’ pillar, on 
the one hand, and ‘normative’ and ‘cognitive’ pillars, on the other. 
Examples of the clash between the 'regulative' and 'normative' pillars 
are to be found in the health sector. The stringency of managers’ 
budgets can sit very uneasily with strong notions of professional ethics 
of doctors or nurses or care workers. The 'regulative' and 'normative' 
pillars can similarly collide. The desire of managers to raise 
productivity may come up against employees’ long standing notions 
of what constitutes a ‘fair day’s work’. This is above all true where 
such notions are long standing and have been informally condoned by 
previous generations of managers. 
The complexity and multiplicity of the formal and informal 
institutions typically in play can also pose problems. A good 
illustration involves bullying and harassment at work, which are 
recognised to be an increasing problem. Conventional management 
wisdom sees this as largely a matter of individual behaviour. Some 
people doubtless get pleasure from hurting others. There is a growing 
body of evidence, however, to suggest that most bullies are a product 
of circumstances rather than personality. Most bullies are managers. 
Many managers, it seems, cannot distinguish strong management from 
bullying. Many believe that they are simply conforming to the 
‘command and control’ model of management that their senior 
managers promote. Others are encouraged to believe that the ‘stick’ is 
more effective than the ‘carrot’. Being under pressure themselves is 
another common characteristic. In short, bullying and harassment are 
largely a product of the structure of rules, formal and informal, within 
which managers work. The remedy involves a combination of high 
profile procedures, i.e. formal countervailing rules, and intensive 
training that is designed to deal with informal as well as formal 
behaviour 
It is sometimes suggested that the coming of the ‘knowledge 
organisation’ changes things. True, the setting changes - workplaces 
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tend to be smaller and the boundaries of work organisations more 
blurred; collectivism and collective bargaining are usually less 
important; and there is more emphasis on culture, i.e. informal 
institutions, than formal rules. Even though they may be different, 
‘rules of the game’ there undoubtedly are. ‘Knowledge organisations’ 
have hierarchies; recruitment and selection processes; job 
descriptions; training and development routines; posting and transfer 
arrangements; performance management systems; disciplinary 
processes; and so on – all of which have a significant influence.  
 
Path dependency 
The second key concept anticipates some of the later discussion about 
change. Most immediately, it helps to explain why there is so much 
attention to historical development in employment relations. It is 
widely assumed that not only do actors have considerable ‘strategic 
choice’ in what they do, but also that their decisions reflect the 
demands of the immediate situation – it is as if they take a snapshot of 
the ‘market’ and technological situation confronting them and proceed 
accordingly. More often than not, however, these considerations take 
second place. It is institutions that ‘lock’ actors into a particular course 
from which they find it difficult to deviate and the ‘evolution of 
institutions is conditioned by path dependency’18. The more 
institutions become embedded in routine and convention, in other 
words, the more influence they exert - today’s decision reflects 
yesterday’s decision, which reflects the decision the day before and so 
on. It is these past decisions about institutions that set actors on a 
particular course that they find it difficult to deviate from even if the 
situation might seem to demand it. Indeed, actors are unlikely even to 
consider the full range of options that might be available to them. To 
go back to the discussion of the importance of context in Chapter 1, 
the notion that the status quo reflects a process in which the ‘natural 
selection of market forces weeds out inferior institutions’ is far from 
being the case
19
. 
Three considerations are particularly important in explaining why 
people can become locked into a particular path, helping to explain the 
enduring features of institutions. One is the costs associated with 
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change. Celebrated examples include the QWERTY keyboard – 
although the development of electronic keyboards allows more 
effective layouts, QWERTY remains the standard because of the costs 
that would be involved in changing.  
The second is that ‘the density of the existing institutional fabric 
in given social or political context renders established practices 
process and tendencies difficult to reform and steer.’20 Here public 
services reform in the UK offers good example. Time and time again 
policymakers have sought to make major changes on a piecemeal 
basis, failing to recognise that the individual changes they wish to 
make are significantly affected by a raft of other issues. 
The third is that the process of institutional development gives 
some a position of privilege and strength to fight for the maintenance 
of the status quo. Scharpf, who is one of Germany’s foremost policy 
process analysts, puts it nicely in discussing the immense difficulties 
of changing long-established pension and social protection 
arrangements in EU countries. It is the 'path-dependent constraints of 
existing policy legacies' and the 'institutional constraints of existing 
veto positions' that deserve our attention in understanding why things 
happen or do not happen
21
.  
The concept of ‘path dependency’ is useful not just in 
understanding national level frameworks. To illustrate its wider 
potential, a strong case can be made for suggesting that ‘path 
dependency’ is fundamentally important in helping to explain what 
has been described as one of the great ‘conundrums’ of employment 
relations namely why, despite the evidence and exhortation, there has 
been so little movement in the direction of ‘high performance 
working’22. Arguably, each of the three considerations is in play. The 
costs of changing are likely to be considerable, above all in terms of 
training and learning. The existing institutional framework also 
represents a major problem. For example, the introduction of ‘serious’ 
team working has significant implications for almost every aspect of 
personnel policy, ranging from recruitment and selection, through 
training and development to appraisal and reward. Finally, there is the 
importance of vested interests. Very often managers themselves 
represent the biggest barrier to changes in work organisation. Major 
changes in the direction of team working, for example, not only have 
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implications for skills of individual managers, but also their numbers, 
privileges and status.  
 
Isomorphism  
The language and concepts of our third consideration come most 
immediately from the ‘organisational’ strand of institutionalism. The 
underlying sense, however, has deep roots in employment relations 
analysis as will be shown below. Basically the argument is that, 
because organisations operate in an environment made up of 
institutions, survival does not just depend on being successful 
economically, but also on the legitimacy of the ways in which they 
conduct their business. One key way in which those in control seek to 
achieve legitimacy is to adopt ‘accepted’ practice, i.e. behave like 
other organisations undertaking similar activities. But the more people 
behave like one another, the greater the expectation that they will do 
so. In Marsden’s words, ‘Predominance feeds on itself’23.  
‘Isomorphism’ is the term used to describe this tendency24. There 
are two main types – ‘competitive’ and ‘institutional’. The first, 
‘competitive isomorphism’, is informal and assumes a system of 
economic rationality presupposing market competition. The second, 
‘institutional isomorphism’, is what concerns us here.  Essentially, it 
involves three political mechanisms, which can be formal or informal:  
 ‘coercive’, in which actors come under pressure to conform to 
particular policy or practice  
 ‘mimetic’, in which there is a strong tendency for actors faced 
with common constraints to respond to uncertainty by copying 
others 
 ‘normative’, in which policies and practices become 
‘professionalised’ and assume the status of accepted standards. 
In the first case, for example, managers may find themselves 
constrained to commit themselves to progammes of corporate social 
responsibility, which may include community activities as well as 
arrangements to protect the environment and be ‘good’ employers. 
The more companies become involved in these kinds of activities, the 
more pressure on others to follow suit. In the second, managers may 
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embark on significant benchmarking exercises with a view to 
legitimizing the need for change in the eyes of employees and 
uncertain management colleagues. They may target close competitors 
and/or companies well known for expertise in particular functional 
areas. The widespread promotion of Japanese ‘lean production’ 
methods in the 1980s is a very good example
25
. In the third, managers 
may feel that they have to adopt the policies and practices that have 
come to be incorporated into the prescriptions of consultancy and 
professional organisations, thereby attaining normative status. In the 
UK, for example, achieving Investors in People status is a way of 
demonstrating an organisation’s commitment to the development of its 
employees. 
Although the language of ‘isomorphism’ is relatively recent, the 
underlying ideas have long been a feature of employment relations 
analysis. Thus it is widely accepted that fairness plays a key role in 
shaping employee expectations and fairness depends on comparisons. 
Runciman’s three types of reference groups, ‘membership’, 
‘comparative’ and ‘normative’26, which are helpful in understanding 
the varying intensity of comparisons, are very similar to DiMaggio 
and Powell’s three types of ‘institutional isomorphism’. Or, to quote 
another example, it was Ross who originally coined the term ‘orbits of 
coercive comparison’ as long ago as 1948 in emphasizing the 
importance of institutions in wage determination. Following the 
‘pattern’, suggested Ross, enables employers and trade unions to 
reconcile the former’s competitive constraints with the latter’s need to 
achieve fairness: 
The ready-made settlement provides an answer, a solution, a 
formula. It is mutually face-saving … it is the one settlement 
which permits both parties to believe that they have done a proper 
job, the one settlement which has the best chance of being ‘sold’ 
to the company’s board of directors and the union’s rank and 
file’27. 
Such tendencies appear to be an enduring feature that cut across the 
boundaries of national institutions. Thus, in recent years, there has 
been a very considerable convergence in the rates of change of wages 
across EU member states. This rarely results from a formal process of 
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co-ordination, however. Rather it reflects the more informal process of 
‘isomorphism’ discussed here28. 
 
Diversity issues 
There is much that is common cross-nationally about the institutions 
involved in employment relations. The employment relationship has 
given rise not just to managerial hierarchies, but also to trade unions 
and professional associations; and the state has intervened both 
directly in the form of legislation and indirectly via agencies to deal 
with specific issues such as the resolution of disputes and some form 
of collective bargaining. At the same time, however, in each of these 
areas, there are considerable differences even allowing for very 
similar technology and market structure. This is even true of the 
managerial hierarchies. As Chapter 2 has shown, these can differ 
considerably in their nature and extent from one country to another- 
organisations are said to be ‘heterogeneous’29, reflecting the ‘visible 
hand’ of managerial decision making, as Chandler famously 
suggested, rather than the ‘hidden hand’ of market forces30. Clear too 
is that these differences are not just filters for the impact of wider 
forces – they make a difference to outcomes as Chapter 2 has shown.  
Most obviously, there is the balance between the different 
processes of rule-making - unilateral and joint, public and private – 
reflecting the ‘varieties of capitalism’ discussed in Chapter 3. It is the 
external dimension where the most obvious difference are to be found, 
for example, in the balance between internal and external regulation 
and in the structure of collective bargaining and legal framework. 
First, individual rights tend to be more extensive in co-ordinated 
market economies’ (CMEs) than ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs), 
helping to explain the position of the USA and the UK in the OECD’s 
employment protection legislation ranking discussed in Chapter 2. 
Second, the universal rights to representation for the purposes of 
employee information, consultation and, in several cases 
codetermination, are greater CMEs than LMEs, reflecting the formal 
‘voice’ rights accorded to employees as stakeholders in ‘insider 
systems’. Thus, works councils or equivalent trade union bodies have, 
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for example, the right to be informed of – and in most cases consulted 
over – major changes to the company.  
A third distinguishing feature is the structure of collective 
bargaining. In the CMEs the predominant multi-employer structure of 
bargaining, in which collective agreements are deemed to be not just 
compulsory contracts but also compulsory codes, means that 
collective bargaining is more inclusive than in the LMEs, where 
single-employer bargaining is the norm. Consequently, the benefits of 
employer association–trade union negotiations are in practice 
extended throughout a sector or across a country and are not just the 
preserve of the well organised. Such a structure also enables the 
participation of employers’ organisations and trade unions in macro-
level dialogue with governments over economic and policy. Many 
features of the overall employment relations systems are affected, 
including the membership density, structure and organisation of trade 
unions and employers’ associations, along with the role of the state in 
wage bargaining, which also has implications for the degree of 
centralisation of trade unions and employers’ organisations.  
These features are refracted in corporate governance 
arrangements. As Chapter 3 suggested, there has been a tendency to 
distinguish two main types: the ‘outsider’ system characteristic of the 
LMEs and the ‘insider’ systems found in the CMEs. In the first, the 
legal framework gives overwhelming priority to shareholder interests, 
whereas the second emphasise those of a wider range of ‘stakeholders’ 
including employees.   
There is a broad consensus that the different ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ are grounded in the prevailing economic and political 
context at the time of industrialisation. At the risk of over-
simplification, two sets of variables stand out. First, state and legal 
traditions were a critical component. For example, in the so-called 
‘Latin’ countries (France, Italy and Spain), the Napoleonic tradition of 
the all-powerful state was deeply embedded. The way the state dealt 
with issues such as trade policy and protection crucially affected the 
strategies and behaviour of enterprises and so the emerging business 
system. By contrast, state traditions in the UK and USA were much 
more laisser-faire.  
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Closely related were legal traditions. A key implication of the 
‘legal origin’ hypothesis is that one of the main influences on national 
business systems is one or other of the principal legal families, namely 
the English ‘common law’, and the ‘civil law’ in its French, German 
and Nordic variants
31
. In brief, countries with a ‘common law’ 
background are said to have found it easier than their ‘civil law’ 
counterparts to develop rules for the ‘governance’ of the business 
enterprise. One reason is that systems of the ‘common law’ are more 
adaptive than ‘civil’ ones to changing economic conditions because of 
differences in the ‘political channel’ of influence. Another is that the 
‘common law’ provides fewer opportunities than the ‘civil law’ for 
rent-extraction by ‘insiders’. In each case, the basis for the claim is the 
association of the ‘common law’ with contract and self-regulation and 
of the ‘civil law’ with centralised state control. 
The second set relate to the emerging business system in which 
organised labour emerged. A key factor here was the timing and pace 
of industrialisation: in countries that industrialised early, such as the 
UK, craft production exerted a strong influence; in countries 
industrializing later, mass production technology tended to be more 
predominant. The significance of such variables as the patterns of 
ownership and control, the financial system and the stock market has 
been mentioned above. Also important was the size of firms. Other 
things being equal, the larger firms found it easier to resist the 
challenge of trade unions using company unions and the like. Smaller 
firms, by contrast, found it more difficult to go it alone, helping to 
explain different resort to employers’ organisations.  
The extent of concentration was also important. In countries such 
as the UK, where was a greater concentration of firms in industries 
such a  metalworking, powerful sector employers’ organisations 
emerged; in others, such as Sweden and Italy, where the business 
structure was more diverse, multi-sector employers’ confederation 
quickly came to prominence. Making a link with state traditions, the 
ability of employers to withstand trade unions reflected not just the 
nature of the market, but also the degree of protection the state 
afforded them. In some cases - Sweden is an example - relatively 
small firms operating in competitive export markets were constrained  
to reach a compromise with trade unions relatively early in the process 
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of industrialisation, albeit it with an important co-ordinating role for 
the peak employers’ confederation. In others - Germany is the obvious 
case - the large firms operating in protected domestic markets were 
able to withstand the pressure for much longer.  
Important though the political and economic context of 
industrialisation was, they do not provide the complete explanation for 
unfolding developments. Also important were ‘critical junctures’ 
involving the emergence of organised labour with the ability to cause 
problems in the form of strikes and other demonstrations. In the UK 
and Sweden, for example, the critical developments took place in 
engineering in 1998 and 1906 respectively. In most other European 
countries the die was cast in the periods following the two world wars. 
In the USA, the period of Roosevelt and the ‘New Deal’ confirmed 
the emerging pattern. In Japan, it was the period immediately after 
World War 2 and US occupation that did the same
32
.  
Important to note is that, with the exception of Germany and 
Japan, where arrangements were drawn up by the allied powers, there 
was no grand design. Rather the institutions that emerged were borne 
of conflict, negotiation and compromise. Sometimes employers 
imposed the compromise; sometimes the state did. Far from being the 
‘self-balancing equilibrium’ that they may appear today, the 
compromises were much contested and essentially reflected a truce 
rather than a final settlement. Moreover, few of the parties were happy 
to let matters rest; most looked for opportunities of shifts in the 
balance of power to improve their relative position
33
.  Take multi-
employer bargaining. For trade unions, the sector agreement was the 
beginning of the process of seeking influence over the employment 
relationship; for employers it was the end - the neutralisation of the 
workplace involved helped to uphold managerial prerogative. 
It also follows that, although they set countries on a particular 
course, the compromises were not as fixed or immutable as may 
appear from a present day perspective. This is especially true of 
employment relations’ external institutions. Further ‘critical junctures’ 
punctuated any ‘equilibrium’ that may have seemed apparent. In the 
UK, developments in the 1920s such as the engineering lockout of 
1922 and the failure of the Mond-Turner talks following the 1926 
General Strike help to explain why the parties stayed on the path of 
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‘voluntarism’ – employers were in the ascendancy and saw no good 
reason to disturb the status quo; in Sweden, by contrast, growing 
industrial conflict  led to the passage of the Collective Agreements 
Act and Labour Court Act in 1928 and the long-standing desire of 
Swedish employers to confirm the legal status of their substantively-
based collective agreements.  
More generally, following Thelen, two main mechanisms can be 
also identified through which institutions are transformed. One is 
‘institutional layering’, which involves the ‘grafting of new elements 
onto an otherwise stable institutional framework’ – in the UK, the 
extension of collective bargaining to sectors where it previously had 
not existed, (e.g. the chemicals industry)  following the Whitley 
Committee report at the end of World War 1 would be an example. 
The other is ‘conversion’, where the ‘adoption of new goals or the 
incorporation of new groups into the coalitions on which institutions 
are founded can drive a change in the functions these institutions serve 
or the role they perform’ – Thelen quotes the example of the German 
trade unions, who initially saw the training arrangements as a major 
threat, but who were subsequently incorporated into their operation to 
become major champions
34
. Briefly put, change is largely seen in 
terms of ‘punctuated evolution’, in which ‘periods of comparatively 
modest institutional change are interrupted by more rapid and intense 
moments of transformation’35  
Space does not allow accounting for every single institution that is 
involved even in the external framework of employment relations. 
One of the most important is the structure of collective bargaining and 
whether the negotiations are single or multi-employer. Table 4.2 
therefore seeks to account for the differences, with Chapter 9 updating 
developments in multi-employer bargaining in the light of recent 
pressures. 
 
Change issues 
Change looms increasingly large in employment relations analysis 
because of the particularly destabilizing impact associated with 
developments in globalisation. Three major dimensions predominate. 
The first revolves around the drivers of change and the balance 
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between economic and political forces. The second involves the 
mechanisms of change. The third issue is the direction of change and 
the extent to which this involves greater convergence and, if so, what 
is involved. 
As Chapter 1 has emphasised, these issues have raised a number 
of fundamental philosophical issues that are the subject of debate 
across the social sciences. One revolves around the balance between 
structure and agency in accounting for outcomes and largely boils 
down to a question of how much choice actors have. Following Hay
36
, 
two extreme positions can be identified. At one extreme is 
‘intentionalism’, i.e. the tendency to account for outcomes purely in 
terms of the agency of actors. At the other is ‘structuralism’, i.e. the 
tendency to reduce outcomes to the operation of institutions or 
structures beyond the control of actors. A key issue is how structure 
and agency are connected and how they influence each other.  
A second issue concerns the role of ideas in helping to bring about 
change. Here, again, Hay
37
 is helpful in summarising the main 
positions that can be identified. In the first, ‘idealism’, ideas are held 
to have an independent influence on outcomes – it is not just a 
question, in other words, of rational actors operating within material 
structures. In the second, ‘materialism’, ideas are accorded little or no 
influence and/or are regarded themselves as a product of material 
conditions. In the third, ‘constructivism’, it is the interaction between 
ideas and material conditions that are emphasised. Outcomes cannot 
be read off of the ideas or material conditions. Instead, they are ‘a 
product of the impact of the strategies actors devise … to realise their 
intentions upon a context which favours certain strategies over others 
and does so irrespective of the intentions of the actors themselves’38. 
The third issue goes to heart of the differences between the three 
strands of institutionalist analysis discussed earlier. The key 
distinction turns on the assumptions made about actors and their 
preferences. ‘Rational choice’ institutionalists start from the 
proposition that actors have standardised and stable preferences 
defined by their personal or organisational self-interest. As in 
economics, these actors are assumed to act rationally in their self-
interest. ‘Organisational’ and ‘historical’ institutionalists, by contrast, 
emphasise that the attitudes, expectations and interaction of individual 
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actors reflect different contexts and different experiences – hence the 
emphasis on a logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of 
instrumentality. In Ackers words, individuals are social rather than 
economic beings 'living in real time and places …. They are products 
not only of their own histories but also those of the institutions within 
which they live and work
39
.  
As the remainder of the chapter will try to show, although some of 
the terminology may be different, most of these issues have figured in 
employment relations analysis, along with an awareness of the 
underlying philosophical debates. Most obviously, the issues of the 
drivers and direction of change have been a live debate for a half a 
century. Until recently, the mechanism of change had received less 
attention. Such is the pace of change popularly associated with 
‘globalisation’, however, that topic is receiving increasing attention. 
 
The drivers of change 
As long ago as 1958, Dunlop asked whether the main drivers of 
change were ‘technological and market considerations’ or institutions 
generated by the interaction of social actors and reflecting the ‘locus 
and distribution of power in the wider society’ typically expressed in 
the form of public policy
40
. In discussing the main drivers of 
employment relations change, most recent commentators emphasise 
the impact of globalisation. Two sets of trends have to be 
distinguished. First are the developments that are integral to a process 
of economic globalisation. These include the removal of trade barriers 
and the expansion of international markets for products; the spatial 
extension of international competition as new market economies, such 
as China and central and eastern Europe, have emerged; the sectoral 
extension of international competition as economic activities 
previously conducted within national boundaries and/or on a non-
market basis are opened up, through market deregulation, privatisation 
and/or marketisation; the liberalisation of financial markets and the 
development of a world-wide capital market; and the 
internationalisation of production and market servicing through the 
operations of MNCs whose growth the other developments have 
encouraged
41
. It is these that most commentators seem to think lie 
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behind changes such as the role reversal of management and trade 
unions and the changing policies of the state. 
Arguably, however, it is the second set - the trends that are 
essentially global in incidence – that are just as if not more important. 
Here three main ones may be identified. First, the new technologies 
and revolution in information processing facilities made possible by 
the microchip and associated software developments, which are not 
only affecting the way operations are performed and products 
delivered, but also leading to the creation of new economic activity. 
Second is the seemingly inexorable rise of the service sector. Both 
have important implications for the size and location of workplaces, 
the occupational and gender composition of the workforce, the nature 
of employment contracts and trade union membership. Many of the 
emerging new economic and service activities are also out with the 
established structures of collective bargaining. Third are the 
demographic changes affecting the industrialised countries. Key 
trends have been low birth rates and a decline in the working life – 
reflecting a fall in youth participation rates and an increase in the 
proportion of older workers withdrawing from the workforce before 
official retirement age. 
Important though these considerations undoubtedly are in driving 
change, public policy also continues to matter reflecting Dunlop’s 
‘locus and distribution of power in the wider society’. Thus, while 
many policy makers see European integration primarily as a market 
phenomenon, others see it as offering new opportunities to deal with 
the multiple challenges confronting existing employment relations 
systems, helping to explain why the EU has developed a not 
inconsiderable social policy competence. In the UK especially, this 
has had a profound impact. In many other EU countries, criticism of 
the EU’s so-called acquis communautaire comes predominantly from 
those who think it has not gone far enough. This is because, in most 
cases, extensive regulation already exists either in the form of national 
legislation or multi-employer agreements. In the UK, however, where 
there has been a lack of comparable regulation reflecting the tradition 
of ‘voluntarism’, the acquis has touched on virtually every area of 
employment relations other than association, industrial action and 
wage determination – not to mention human rights. Listing only those 
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areas where there has been major legislation gives us freedom of 
movement of workers; equal opportunities in terms of age, disability, 
gender, race, religion and sexual orientation; health and safety; 
collective redundancy and business transfers; working time; the proof 
of employment; information and consultation – both national and 
cross-national; maternity and parental leave; equal treatment for part-
time and temporary workers (with agency workers to come); pensions; 
employment agencies; data protection and corporate governance. The 
result has been a fundamental shift in emphasis from collective to 
individual rights with an increase in ‘juridification’ in the sense of the 
involvement of the law and the courts in employment relations 
matters. 
The contrast also nicely illustrates the battle of ideas that is taking 
place. To paraphrase Salais and Villeneuve
42
, EU social and 
employment development is seen as being at the crossroads between 
'activation' and 'capability' routes, reflected in debates about which of 
the two Treaty ‘titles’ is to be accorded priority: Title V11 dealing 
with ‘Employment’ or Title X1 on ‘Social policy, education, 
vocational training and youth’. The 'activation' approach (arguably, 
another term for ‘neo-liberal') is about ‘activating’ people into jobs, 
the main instrument being welfare regulation reform. By contrast, the 
'capability' approach seeks to improve living and working conditions, 
along with social protection, both as an end and a means to an end: 
what matters is what a person can do and be, given the appropriate 
resources. Similarly, a firm's competitiveness resides not in cost 
minimisation, but in its capacity to innovate, learn from and cooperate 
with others. Consequently, rather than deregulating labour markets, 
government intervention should be designed to improve capabilities - 
of firms, sectors and territories as well as individual citizens. Herein is 
the basis for endogenous development that emphasises specialisation 
in products and services reflecting Europe’s specific advantages.  
 
The mechanisms of change 
Historically, most commentators emphasised the agency or 
‘entrepreneurship’ of trade unions and the state in bringing about 
change, with management receiving little more than perfunctory 
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attention. Thus, it was the policies and approaches of the state and 
trade unions, for example, which were seen as largely shaping the 
development of collective bargaining and the legal framework. More 
recently, there has been a considerable shift in emphasis from the role 
of trade unions and the state to that of management, helping to explain 
the emphasis on human resource management. A key turning point 
was the publication of The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations by Kochan and his colleagues in 1986. Here management is 
seen as a ‘strategic actor’ or agent of change in determining the main 
changes taking place in employment relations, reflecting the pressures 
of business strategy to be pursued. Faced with intensifying 
international competition, above all in key manufacturing sectors such 
as aircraft manufacturing, autos and steel, US management was said to 
be confronted with the choice of pursuing a strategy of either quality 
or low cost. Both routes involved making radical changes in existing 
industrial relations arrangements and, in particular, in the provisions 
for collective bargaining of the 'New Deal' system dating back to the 
1930s.  
As for specific mechanism of change, it will be recalled that 
Chapter 1 outlined the ‘actor-centred’ institutionalist approach. Visser 
and Hemerijck use of this to analyze developments in Dutch 
employment relations shows how actors are able to make changes 
notwithstanding the constraints of ‘path dependency’. In particular, 
they highlight the role of three types of adaptation or ‘bricolage’43. In 
the first, ‘patching up’, additional rules and procedures are grafted 
onto existing institutions and processes. An example, which Chapter 9 
will expand on, is the increasing flexibility built into multi-employer 
agreements in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the 
second, ‘transposition’, institutions established for a particular 
purpose are put to different uses. Here perhaps the clearest example is 
that of collective bargaining itself.  In most countries, collective 
bargaining has been seen primarily as a vehicle for improving on the 
legal status of employees. In recent years, however, as the next 
chapter will show, it has added a wider range of functions: it has 
become an instrument of adaptability as the bargaining agenda is 
oriented towards questions of competitiveness and employment; and it 
has also assumed or re-assumed a key role in macro-economic 
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management as many national governments have responded to the 
adjustment pressures under European Monetary Union (EMU) by 
seeking cross-sector national agreements with employers’ 
organisations and trade union  (so-called ‘social pacts’) embracing 
wage moderation, greater labour market flexibility and reform of 
social protection systems.  
The third mechanism is ‘social learning’ – the creation of 
situations where actors are exposed to a range of fresh influences 
whose implications they have to discuss and debate in a ‘public 
regarding way’44. Again, a good illustration is the negotiation of 
‘social pacts to deal with the implications of the EMU – an example of 
‘Europe learning from Europe’ in Teague’s words45. The process of 
EMU itself did not involve European-wide mechanisms for handling 
the implications of a single market and a single currency. It did 
nonetheless put a figure on the external constraint in the form of the 
convergence criteria for monetary union, along with a clear timetable 
for its achievement, both of which sharply focused attention on the 
need for action. The European Commission’s ‘policy 
entrepreneurship’ in encouraging of an all-round view of policy-
making (on wages, employment, social protection, fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies) also played a part: ‘The Member States’ 
joint experience in these areas has been harnessed and exchanged at 
European level … This pooling of European experience has 
undoubtedly contributed towards a broader perspective on national 
views and deeds’46. Especially significant was that social pacts were 
consistent with the approach being advocated at EU- level and were a 
cross-national phenomenon – it was this that helped to give them 
considerable legitimacy. Even though member states had willingly 
entered into EMU they were able to present it in the national arena as 
an ‘external constraint’ helping to justify far-reaching reform. 
 
The direction of change - convergence and diversity? 
The direction of change has been a recurring theme in comparative 
employment relations analysis. Kerr and his colleagues laid down the 
gauntlet a half century ago (1960) in their Industrialism and industrial 
man. Not only were the main drivers of change held to be markets and 
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technology. They were also supposedly leading to a convergence of 
approach that would slowly, but surely, supersede the essentially 
idiosyncratic arrangements, reflecting different historical 
development, patterns of industrialisation and business systems. The 
presumption was also of convergence towards the US model, based on 
internal labour markets and company-based collective contracts.  
An alternative view, appropriately dubbed the ‘diversity 
approach’, developed in response. One variant was the ‘societal 
approach’ of Maurice and his colleagues47. There were key enduring 
cross-national differences, they argued, that resulted from the 
structural interdependencies peculiar to each society, involving 
interactions between the training, production and industrial relations 
systems. Another was the ‘national business systems’ approach, which 
argued that persistent differences in capitalist organisation reflect 
distinctive national development paths along the lines discussed 
earlier
48
. Both variants have contributed to the view that has become 
central to employment relations analysis, namely that institutions are 
not simply the shells and transmission belts for economic and 
technological forces. Rather institutions are generated by the 
interaction of social actors at critical historical junctures and persist 
over time, creating ‘path dependency’.  
Most recently, the so-called ‘dual’ or ‘co-convergence’ thesis has 
become prominent. Thus, in distinguishing the two main ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ introduced in Chapter 3, Hall and Soskice suggest that 
convergence within each type is accompanied by divergence between 
them
49
. Traxler arrives at a not dissimilar position, although in this 
case ‘path dependency’ rather than convergence is the dominant force. 
His main thesis is that the ‘way in which industrial relations systems 
accommodate to external changes is self-referential’ - the prevailing 
structure of collective and legal framework ‘guide the direction of 
adaption by defining the possibilities for renewing the compromise 
between capital and labour under changed conditions’50. On this basis, 
a fundamental distinction is to be drawn between the countries with 
multi-employer bargaining and legal frameworks supportive of 
collective bargaining (which roughly correspond with the CMEs) and 
those with single-employer bargaining and less supportive 
frameworks (which fit the LME category).  
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In a further development a strand of comparative analysis has 
emerged that underlines the ‘interdependency’ inherent to the 
processes of convergence and divergence reflecting differences in the 
speed, form and spatial ‘reach’ of developments at the various 
levels
51
. Much depends, in other words, on the level of activity, 
recalling the discussion of ‘multi-level governance’ in Chapter 1. The 
cross-national diversity so evident at national level can hide 
significant similarities at sector and company level, reflecting the need 
to confront common problems as Dunlop himself suggested in 
Industrial Relations Systems
52
. It is not a question of convergence or 
diversity, but of both convergence and diversity. Growing 
international integration may prompt convergent developments within 
sectors, and in particular within MNCs, across national systems, 
which may result in increased diversity between sectors and 
companies within national systems. Surveying developments across 
seventeen European countries in the 1990s, Ferner and Hyman 
conclude that: ‘… the (somewhat paradoxical) picture that emerges is 
one of increasing diversity within national systems but of increasing 
convergence between them’53.  
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Table 4.1 Core processes and structures (1) 
 
 
Organisational structure 
 
 product or business or area based 
 task and/or performance controls 
 tiers of managers/ spans of control 
 target-setting/ resource allocation processes 
 budgetary controls 
 
HR policies and practices 
 
 recruitment & selection 
 training & development 
 appraisal 
 reward 
 participation & involvement 
 discipline & dismissal 
 
Work organisation 
 
 nature of tasks (repetitiveness/monotony/complexity) 
 degree of autonomy (methods used/ pace of work/ responsibility for quality) 
 ‘hierarchical’ constraints (direct control by supervisors/targets/budgets) 
 ‘horizontal’ constraints (extent of dependency on colleagues) 
 opportunity for on-the-job problem-solving 
 opportunity for on-the-job learning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutions – the stuff of employment relations 
139 
 
 
Table 4.1 Core processes and structures (2) 
 
 
The legal framework: corporate governance 
 
 business function & purpose 
 balance between shareholder and employee rights 
 board composition 
 codes of conduct 
 merger and acquisition 
 
The legal framework: employment 
 
 health & safety 
 individual employment rights 
 TU recognition and collective bargaining 
 employee representation 
 dispute resolution 
 role in pay determination 
 
Professional regulation 
 
 entry standards 
 training & development 
 promotion 
 role in pay determination 
 
Collective bargaining 
 
 level – multi-employer or single employer; multi-industry or single industry; 
company or workplace 
 unit – coverage in terms of  occupation (single or multi-occupation) 
 scope – coverage in terms of subject matter 
 form – voluntary agreements or legally enforceable contracts/codes 
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Table 4.2 The structure of collective bargaining
54
 
For the most part the recognition of trade unions did not occur in a 
piecemeal and ad hoc fashion, with individual employers weighing up 
the advantages and disadvantages of such a decision; the structure of 
collective bargaining was not the result of employers or, for that 
matter, trade unions or governments making a rational choice from a 
number of possible options. Rather both recognition and the structure 
of collective bargaining are deeply rooted in an historical compromise 
which reflects the impact of industrialisation, in particular in the 
metalworking industries. In the UK and Western Europe, multi-
employer bargaining emerged as the predominant pattern largely 
because employers, above all, in the metalworking industries were 
confronted with the challenge of national unions organised along 
occupational or industrial lines. In Britain, the procedural bias of 
multi-employer has its origins in the engineering industry’s 
'Provisions for Avoiding Disputes' of 1898 and implicitly recognised 
that craft trade unions, such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, 
had already established a firm foundation in the workplace and its 
district committees had the power to impose their own regulations. In 
Sweden, the national agreement reached in engineering in 1905 was, 
by contrast, rooted in the substantive terms and conditions and 
reflected the relative weakness of employers at local level and the 
apparent centralisation of the trade union movement. In France and 
Germany, where the crisis in the years immediately following the First 
World War was on a much larger scale, the government being 
involved as well as employers and trade unions. In both cases, the 
compromise was underwritten by compulsory rules - government and 
trade unions were anxious lest the large metalworking employers, who 
hitherto had been able to resist trade unionism with little difficulty, 
would revert to their previous position once the immediate crisis was 
over. 
Only in the USA and Japan did single-employer bargaining 
emerge as the predominant pattern in the metalworking industries. By 
the time legislation was introduced requiring employers to recognise 
trade unions in the 1930s and 1940s respectively, the relatively large 
individual employers that had emerged at an early date in 
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industrialisation in both countries had already exerted a profound 
influence on the trade union movement. In the circumstances, 
employers and governments did not come under strong pressure to 
introduce multi-employer bargaining and most employers opted for 
dealing with trade unions at enterprise or establishment level - largely 
out of the desire to maintain their internal systems of job regulation 
and, especially in Japan, to deny the trade unions the platform from 
which to push for more effective national unionism.  
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5 
 
Negotiation – 
 breathing life into the employment relationship 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Highlight the role negotiation plays in employment 
relations 
 
 Outline the main negotiating processes and differences 
between them 
 
 Consider the changing balance between the different 
processes 
 
Summary 
It is negotiation that gives effect to the employment relationship. 
Negotiation involves far more than the management-trade union 
bargaining over wages and conditions with which it is popularly 
associated, however. In a phrase, the work organisation is ‘a system of 
negotiated order’. Negotiation is a collection of processes that 
individuals as well as groups use to define and redefine the terms of 
their interdependence with other parties – it is especially important 
where this interdependency is characterised by uncertainty and 
incompleteness as in the case of the employment relationship. 
Following Walton and McKersie, these processes embrace not just 
‘fixed sum’ and ‘variable sum situations’ (‘distributive’ and 
‘integrative’ bargaining), but also influencing relationships, changing 
attitudes and shaping preferences (‘attitudinal structuring’). A fourth 
process (‘intra-organisational’ bargaining) reflects the vertical as well 
as horizontal relationship involved in the employment relationship – 
the fact that the parties typically involve more than one individual and 
have to reach some accommodation among themselves about how 
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they are going to deal with the other groups. In recent years, reflecting 
the economic and political changes discussed in the previous chapter, 
the emphasis in management-trade union relations appears to be 
shifting from ‘distributive’ to ‘integrative bargaining’ or, to use the 
terms that have become more common, ‘mutual gains bargaining, 
‘partnership’ and ‘social partnership’. There is also a lot more 
‘attitudinal structuring’ taking place as management simultaneously 
seeks to persuade employees to work harder and accept greater 
responsibilities for many of the benefits traditionally associated with 
the employment relationship such as careers and pensions. 
Additionally, the EU’s social dimension is drawing attention to 
developments such as framework agreements, coordinated bargaining, 
benchmarking, and the ‘open method of coordination’, all of which 
are designed to overcome the ‘collective action’ problems inherent in 
multi-level governance situations. 
 
Introduction: not just a matter of collective bargaining 
The popular understanding is that negotiation is something that 
management and trade unions do. It seemingly defies any kind of 
logic, takes up an inordinate amount of time and often results in 
strikes or other expressions of conflict. The focus is also on the 
negotiation of wages or other economic dimensions of the 
employment relationship such as working time. Negotiation, in other 
words, is about bargaining. The widespread assumption, perhaps not 
surprisingly, is that the decline of trade union density and collective 
bargaining coverage confirmed in Chapter 9 means a reduced role for 
negotiation, along with the strikes and other forms of industrial action 
that seemed to accompany it.  
The reality is very different, however. Negotiation is by no means 
restricted to collective actors, being as much a feature of employer-
employee relations as it is of management-trade union ones. 
Negotiation is a collection of processes that all of us use to define and 
redefine the terms of our interdependence with other parties. It plays 
an especially vital role where this interdependence is characterised by 
uncertainty and incompleteness as in the case of the employment 
relationship. Nothing, it must be remembered, is automatic about the 
employment relationship – to put management decisions, collective 
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agreements and employment rights into effect involves dialogue, day-
to-day consensus building and ‘give-and-take’, i.e. ‘negotiation’. True, 
as Chapter 6 will explain in more detail, the employment relationship 
involves an asymmetric or unequal power balance. But there is 
considerable mutual dependency – just as employees rely on the 
employer for their income, managers depend on employees to achieve 
their own goals and targets. The result is that coercion is very rarely a 
serious option. In the words of Muller-Jentsch, ‘any type of order, 
even the most repressive, is to a certain degree negotiated order. It 
springs from the interaction of the individual and collective actors; 
they produce and reproduce social order in organisations … ‘. They 
can do so explicitly through formal negotiations or implicitly through 
‘tacit agreements’ and ‘silent bargaining’ or ‘implicit negotiation’1. 
For example, ‘implicit negotiation’ and or ‘tacit agreements’ are 
part and parcel of the notion of the ‘psychological contract’ introduced 
in Chapter 3. In Guest and Conway’s words, such a contract can be 
viewed as ‘a set of reciprocal or two-way obligations and promises 
between the worker and the employer’2. To paraphrase them further, 
in the first instance, it may involve specific levels of performance or a 
contribution to innovation or a willingness to share knowledge; in the 
second, it may cover fair pay, security of employment, equality of 
treatment, involvement and consultation and so on. The negotiation 
involved is sometimes explicit, e.g. in appraisal or performance 
review sessions, or in discussions about working time flexibility, but 
is more often ‘implicit’, taking the form of behavioural action and 
reaction through which the parties explore and draw the boundaries of 
their mutual expectations. The state of the ‘psychological contract’ is 
also typically measured in terms that underlay every type of 
negotiation: the fairness of obligations and promises, the extent of the 
trust that the parties have in them and the extent to which they are 
honoured. In short, it is not the legal contract that determines how 
employers, supervisors and managers behave on a day-to-day basis. 
Rather it is the ‘psychological contract’ that determines what the 
parties will, or will not do and how it will be done and this is more or 
less continuously being negotiated. 
Similarly, negotiation is not restricted to economic issues. Indeed, 
it extends far beyond the ‘exchange’ and ‘contracts’ with which is 
popularly associated and embraces the conduct of employment 
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relationship, including how the ‘rules of the game’ are administered as 
well as made. It also involves a strong element of seeking to influence 
relationships, change attitudes and shape preferences. In short, it is 
negotiation that breathes life into the employment relationship.  
The process of interaction involved in negotiation is also 
fundamentally important in the wider scheme of things. Crucially, it 
helps to explain why it is so rarely possible to establish a 
straightforward link between particular practices and outcomes. It is 
the state of the relationship that makes the critical difference. Such 
relationships can also take considerable time and effort to change. One 
reversal to original type or a case of what one party sees as a breach of 
trust can also confirm their underlying suspicions.  
 
The main processes 
Although it was published as long ago as 1965, Walton and 
McKersie’s Behavioural theory of labor negotiation remains the most 
extensively quoted and widely used text for understanding the role of 
negotiation in employment relations, along with its significance. It is 
valued not just because of the terminology and ideas that it has given 
us, but also because it is one of the best examples of literature in the 
employment relations tradition. It is multi-disciplinary and multi-level 
in its approach. It also respects the complexity of its subject matter. 
Although it does not make predictions, it does generate deductive 
propositions that can be tested in empirical research: for example, that 
there are links between the type of negotiating process and the tactical 
behaviour of the parties; or the more knowledge a party has about the 
other’s position, the more likely they are to make their ‘last offer 
first’; and so on. In the words of the authors themselves, it is a 
‘framework or a good comprehensive way to think about the 
complexity of negotiations’3.  
The starting point is that negotiation comprises four systems of 
activity, each with its own function, its own internal logics, and its 
own identifiable set of instrumental acts or tactics. The discussion is 
couched mainly in the context of management-trade union 
negotiations, but can also be applied to management-employee 
relations as well as other areas of social activity such as inter-business 
dealings and international relations. 
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Distributive (‘win-lose’) bargaining  
‘Distributive bargaining’ is the process that most people are likely to 
think of when negotiation is discussed. It deals with issues where one 
party's goals are in basic conflict with those of another - it is 
'bargaining' in the strictest sense of the word. In the language of game 
theory, there is a fixed or ‘zero sum’ in which one party wins what the 
other looses. In more normal language, there is a cake of a given size 
– the bigger one party’s share, the smaller the other party’s. 
The most obvious example is that of wages. Any improvement in 
wages means an increase in management’s costs; the bigger the 
improvement, the bigger the increase in these costs. By the same 
token, the lower the wage increase, the less is employees’ income.  
‘Distributive bargaining’ is not just restricted to economic 
resources such as wages or working time, however. Issues of power 
and status can also be involved. In the UK, an excellent example is the 
long-running dispute between British Airways and its cabin crew, 
which began in 2009 as a result of the management’s attempt to 
impose new working practices and manning levels. As time went by, 
with the basis of agreement emerging about how to handle the original 
problem, the focus of the dispute shifted. In an attempt to influence 
opinion in the run up to one of the several strike ballots that were held, 
the management said that it would withdraw the travel privileges of 
cabin crew taking strike action. Having gone ahead with its threat, 
management felt unable to withdraw its decision without losing face. 
As for the trade union, withdrawal of the ban became the main issue - 
especially as many members claimed that it would be difficult for 
them to get to and from assignments without the benefits of the 
arrangements. At the time of writing, the dispute remained in 
stalemate.  
Another example is a demarcation dispute between two groups of 
employees over ‘whose work’ it is. Such disputes were notorious in 
the national newspaper industry in the 1960s, where virtually every 
group was represented by a different trade union. Indeed, the author 
remembers one such dispute where brothers from the then National 
Graphical Association and the National Society of Operative Printers 
and Assistants literally came to blows over who was to operate a lever 
on a new rotary press. 
It is its fixed or ‘zero sum’ nature that helps to explain why 
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bargaining over issues of power and status can prove to be especially 
intractable. In the case of economic issues such as wage increases, it is 
usually possible to reach some kind of compromise – in the case of 
collective issues, the trade union does not usually get what it asked 
for, but management gives more than it wanted to. In disputes over 
discipline or demarcation, however, compromise is much more 
difficult to achieve. One party clearly ‘wins’ and the other ‘loses’ – 
the travel privileges are re-instated or not; one group or the other ends 
up doing the job - which means that loss of face is an important 
consideration.   
In terms of tactics, threats and bluffs tend to abound where 
‘distributive bargaining’ is involved, along with every effort to 
demonstrate commitment to positions. At the same time, there will be 
efforts to establish what the other party’ true settlement point is and 
attempts to convince them that it should be nearer to their own. 
In the case of wages, trade unions typically ask for and 
management offers more/less than they will finally settle for. Indeed, 
moving position is seen as a key point in reasonableness. Sometimes, 
however, one or other parties may opt for a ‘last offer first’ approach 
as a way of seeking to demonstrate out-and-out commitment to their 
position. Or it could be because they genuinely believe that they have 
little or no room for movement. Either way, the strategy can go badly 
wrong if the party making the offer cannot convince the other that it 
really is the ‘last’ one. 
In the case of individuals, ‘distributive bargaining’ is less obvious 
– partly because it is a much more private affair and partly because 
most employees are paid under grade structures that rarely give the 
individual the opportunity to negotiate a change in position. It is not 
unusual for there to be negotiations over starting salaries, however, 
even in the case of individuals in relatively junior grades. Equally, 
employees may threaten to tender their resignation in the hope of 
securing promotion and/or an increase in wages from their present 
employer. Former employees many also become involved in 
negotiations over the terms of their departure in the event of a claim 
for unfair dismissal.  
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Integrative (‘win-win’) bargaining  
A second sub-process Walton and McKersie identify is ‘integrative’ 
or ‘co-operative’ bargaining. This recognises that there are some 
issues that involve objectives that are not in fundamental conflict with 
those of the other party and which therefore can be integrated to some 
degree. Such objectives are said to define an area of common concern 
– they are essentially a ‘problem’ to be solved, where a compromise 
can bring benefits to both parties. There may be intense arguments 
over the precise trade-offs that have all the hall marks of ‘distributive 
bargaining’. Agreement can nonetheless bring mutual gains – the 
major changes in working practices and structures that senior 
managers seek can also mean considerable improvements in 
employee’s terms and conditions. Rather than being fixed, to go back 
to the language of game theory, the sum is variable.  
In practice, negotiation typically involves an element of 
‘integrative bargaining’. There have also been periods, however, when 
it is has been especially important. In the UK, the productivity 
bargaining under incomes policy in the 1960s and early 1970s is a 
very good example. More recently, for reasons which the next section 
will explore in more detail, there seems to have been significant shifts 
across the board. In the UK, this takes the form of ‘partnership’ 
agreements and in the USA ‘mutual gains bargaining’. In mainland 
Europe, much the same ground has been covered in ‘pacts for 
employment and competitiveness’. Also in many EU countries, at the 
cross-sector level, there has been a spate of so-called 'social pacts', 
involving governments as well as the peak employers’ organisations 
and trade unions.  
Like its ‘distributive’ counterpart, ‘integrative bargaining’ is not 
something that is restricted to collective actors. Arguably, it is the 
dominant form of negotiation so far as individual employees are 
concerned, becoming more and more important as the need for greater 
flexibility intensifies. As Chapter 3 emphasised, in principle, the 
employment relationship bestows residual rights of control of the 
employer. In practice, there develops what Marsden calls a ‘zone of 
acceptance’ within which employees agree to let management direct 
their labour
4
. This may relate to the range of tasks that employees are 
willing to undertake at management’s direction, but it may also 
include the priority to be accorded to different types of work, along 
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with a willingness to vary working time according to management’s 
requirements. From time to time, these limits need to be updated, and 
given that the employment relationship is built on exchange, the 
logical way to change terms is also by agreement, which involves a 
form of ‘tacit’ or ‘implicit’ negotiation. 
Marsden gives two detailed examples involving performance 
management in the British public services that help to illustrate the 
point
5
. The first concerns teachers and the priorities accorded to 
teaching test and non-test elements of their subjects. In recent years a 
range of government initiatives has increased the pressure on schools, 
and on their management, to do more to ensure good exam results. In 
response to ‘league table’ pressures, many schools have directed more 
resources towards subjects covered by tests, the increased academic 
content of courses and the teaching of test-taking skills. Almost 
invariably, such a change of priorities involved the active agreement 
of classroom teachers. School management recognised that it was 
unlikely to succeed in imposing such changes top-down: it was unable 
to easily monitor the breakdown of time between classroom activities: 
it lacked knowledge of the subject matter and relevant teaching 
methods, and could not establish a clear relationship between 
teachers’ efforts and exam outcomes. For all these reasons, new 
objectives unacceptable to teachers were likely to remain a fiction in 
the classroom.  
The second example involves multi-skilled care teams in a 
National Health Service (NHS) trust hospital providing general and 
acute care services. A key obstacle to more flexible work patterns was 
that different categories of staff had their ‘zones of acceptance’ drawn 
in different ways and supported by different principles. Thus, some 
categories, such as ward nurses, worked shifts, whereas others, such as 
physiotherapists, worked Monday to Friday, with premium payments 
for working overtime and unsocial hours. The solution to the problem 
involved scrapping payment of special allowances for unsocial hours, 
in return for adjustments to basic pay and the introduction of a 
performance bonus whose absolute size was determined by how well 
the hospital achieved its objectives, and which was payable to 
satisfactory and good performers. Accompanying the new pay 
structure was an individual performance appraisal and goal setting 
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system, involving the clarification of work roles, setting goals, 
planning personal development and regular reviewing. Managers and 
staff were encouraged to discuss, on a one-to-one basis, the purpose of 
the job, its main activities, responsibilities, resources and so on, and 
whether the job description needed revision. They were also 
encouraged to ‘jointly develop, goals, tasks or objectives’ which 
facilitated achievement of the job’s purpose, along with a personal 
development plan.  
Different strategies and tactics will be found in ‘integrative’ as 
opposed to ‘distributive bargaining’. There are likely to be less threats 
and bluffs. Instead, there will much more focus of the ordering of the 
agenda and the items that people are prepared to put on the table. 
There will also be greater concern to establish what they have in 
common and to avoid putting one another is a seemingly ‘win-lose’ 
situation. Often, too, a number of mechanisms will be used to help the 
central negotiators to do this, including joint working parties, third-
party facilitation and continuous review of progress. 
 
‘Attitudinal structuring’ 
‘Distributive’ and ‘integrative bargaining’ can be involved in either 
the one-off negotiation such as the labour services agreement or on-
going ones as in the case of the employment relationship. ‘Attitudinal 
structuring’ is the term predominately reserved for the on-going 
relationship that has a past and a future. The term is something of a 
mouthful, but has the virtue of saying what it means. It reminds us that 
negotiation is not just about exchange or, indeed, making decisions. It 
is also about influencing and shaping preferences. This process is 
therefore critically important in the employment relationship for all 
the features highlighted in Chapter 3 – it is on-going or continuous; it 
is incomplete; and it brings numerous opportunities for the parties to 
seek to change the relationship to their advantage.  
In face-to-face negotiations involving either ‘distributive’ or 
‘integrative bargaining’, ‘attitudinal structuring’ is used to confirm 
strength of position. In his Fleet Street days, the author well 
remembers that, whenever there was a dispute involving compositors, 
almost invariably the London Branch of the then National Graphical 
Association would include a representative from The Financial Times 
on their negotiating team dealing with problems in other newspaper 
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offices. At the time, The Financial Times was by far and away the 
highest paying office because of the volume of share prices that had to 
be set under the London Scale of Prices governing type-setting 
charges. As if on cue, this representative would invariably express 
astonishment that so much time was being taken up in dealing with 
such a trivial issue. He and his colleagues had settled this with their 
management long ago. The tactic was not only designed to unsettle the 
management team, but also to embolden the Chapel representative 
colleagues from the newspaper office where the dispute was taking 
place.   
‘Attitudinal structuring’ can also serve as a substitute for the face-
to-face processes of ‘distributive’ and ‘integrative’ bargaining. 
Management-trade union relations in France are a good illustration. 
Historically, France was held to be the exception among industrialised 
economies in that formal collective agreements between trade unions 
and employers’ organisations were rare and seemingly lasted for long 
periods of time without change. This led commentators to draw the 
conclusion that the parties preferred the legal enactment route to that 
of collective bargaining. Case study research showed that this view 
was too simplistic, however. A process of ‘arms-length bargaining’6 
was going on that performed many of the functions of the more 
traditional forms. Agreement may have been rare, but the parties were 
regularly seeking to influence one another’s position. In the case of 
wages, for example, managers would very often try to estimate what 
would keep the peace and make a formal statement to that effect. The 
trade union would not formally accept. But the threatened strike 
would not take place. If management underestimated what was 
necessary, however, or if the militants had been able to raise 
expectations, there might be industrial action. Depending on 
circumstances, this might be followed by a management decision to 
increase the size of the wage increase it was going to introduce. In this 
way, in other words, managers could maintain the appearance of not 
conceding managerial prerogative, while the militants could argue that 
they had not recognised management’s right to manage by actually 
agreeing to anything
7
.  
Arguably, ‘attitudinal structuring’ is most prominent in the case of 
the relationship between management and individual employees and is 
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an integral feature of most communications activity. In many cases, 
the aim of managers is not just to give employees information. Rather 
it is to structure their attitudes and shape their preferences. It has long 
been accepted that managers have been much more prone to share the 
bad rather than the good news in the hope and expectation of 
dampening expectations about a wage increase or other improvements 
in terms and conditions. In recent years, however, for reasons 
explored in more detail in the next section, the boundary between 
communications and what might be described as ‘marketing’ has 
become increasingly blurred. In many organisations the aim is now 
quite openly to ‘win hearts and minds’, above all where employees are 
required to interact with customers or clients - programmes of ‘total 
quality management’ (TQM), ‘customer care’ and 'management by 
customers' (i.e. customer surveys) have proliferated, along with a 
series of initiatives targeting individual performance.  
Arguably, in many instances promotion of the ‘psychological 
contract’ is tantamount to ‘attitudinal structuring’. To expand on the 
discussion in Chapter 3, there are two main traditions of 
‘psychological contract’ thinking. In the older tradition, which is 
mostly followed in the UK, the ‘psychological contract’ is seen as the 
perceptions of the two parties of their mutual obligations
8
. In the more 
recent one, which is associated with Rousseau in the USA, the 
emphasis is very much on individual employees and their beliefs
9
. 
Organisations are encouraged to deal with the problem of ‘drift’ in 
employee attitudes and induce change by communicating with their 
employees in order to revise their beliefs and expectations concerning 
the ‘deal’ implicit in the psychological contract. Regrettably, however, 
the term ‘negotiation’ is rarely mentioned, let alone ‘attitudinal 
structuring’. As Marsden points out, ‘psychological contract’ 
researchers appear to have difficulty in finding a place for negotiation 
in their analysis – partly, he suggests, because they address a largely 
management audience and partly because they treat the ‘psychological 
contract’ as a set of beliefs or expectations, rather than focusing on the 
nature of the transaction itself
10. The ‘negotiation’ of the 
‘psychological contract’, say defenders11, raises theoretical difficulties 
because it is not clear how one can negotiate over changes in beliefs. 
The answer is very simple: ‘attitudinal structuring’ is a form of 
negotiation. 
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Intra-organisational bargaining 
The fourth process to be considered draws attention to something that 
very rarely receives the attention it deserves in discussions of 
negotiation - the importance of the ‘collective action’ problem and the 
behaviour involved in resolving it. Negotiation is seen largely in terms 
of a ‘horizontal relationship’ – A tries to reach some accommodation 
with B and vice versa. In the typical situation, however, things are 
more complicated: there is ‘vertical’ as well as ‘horizontal’ 
relationship. A and/or B usually involve more than one individual and 
the groups comprising A and B have to reach some accommodation 
among themselves about how they are going to deal with the issues.  
The greater the complexity of the issue, the greater is the 
collective action problem. This is because, in practice, wherever 
groups of people are involved, there are usually quite fundamental 
differences of opinion or position to be found between the members. 
Moreover, this is true of even the most apparently homogenous groups 
such as ‘management’. For example, there may differences of opinion 
between the different levels of line management about how to handle 
an issue. Or the differences may be of position and functionally-based. 
For example, the line manager driven by operational needs may say or 
do things on the spur of the moment, whereas the HR manager may be 
more concerned to maintain consistency of behaviour. 
In management-trade union negotiations, the parties usually spend 
a considerable amount of time and effort before any face-to-face 
negotiation in trying to come to a common position, while 
simultaneously trying to find out how whether there are any 
differences of opinion on the other side that can be exploited. In the 
face-to-face negotiations themselves, everything will be done to avoid 
differences emerging. Each party may involve several members, but 
only one member is likely to do the talking - if others wish to make a 
point, they will be expected to pass or note take great care to resolve 
their differences or hide them from the other party. Or members may 
be given very clear cut roles. In the author’s Fleet Street days, the 
Chapels very often designated a 'hatchet man' whose role was to 
disrupt the management and exaggerate the strength of feeling of 
Chapel members – the Father of the Chapel (shop steward) was being 
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extremely reasonable and moderate in his demands and management 
would do well to support him etc etc. 
 
Negotiation in practice: a changing balance 
The balance between the different negotiating processes, like so much 
else in employment relations, is heavily influenced by context. Recent 
years have seen a considerable shift from ‘distributive’ to ‘integrative 
bargaining’. ‘Attitudinal structuring’ also figures much more 
prominently. Similarly, there is growing recognition of the problems 
that ‘intra-organisational bargaining’ gives rise to, which is reflected 
in the coming to prominence of forms of so-called ‘soft regulation’. 
 
From ‘distributive’ to ‘integrative bargaining’? 
As the previous section suggested, on the face of it, there has been a 
shift in the nature of management-trade union negotiations, with a 
wider range of topics on the table and management very often taking 
the initiative in raising them – the negotiation of ‘pacts for 
employment and competitiveness’ in most EU members countries in 
the second half of the 1990s is an example. Or, in the case of national 
‘social pacts’, it has been governments that have most often taken the 
initiative. In both cases, a strong element of problem solving and ‘quid 
pro quo’ bargaining characterises the process of negotiating. Many of 
the mechanisms of ‘integrative bargaining’ listed earlier are also to be 
found, i.e. joint working parties, third-party facilitation and continuous 
review of progress.  
Table 5.1 gives an idea of the issues that were typically involved 
in the negotiation of ‘pacts for employment and competitiveness’. 
More recently, similar issues have loomed large in the light of the 
global financial crisis. Thus there have been major restructuring 
exercises involving companies such as Daimler (Germany), Škoda 
Auto (Czeck Republic), Hewlett-Packard (Spain), Axa (Ireland), 
Electrolux (Italy), Volvo (Sweden), and JaguarLand Rover and JCB 
(UK)
12
. Typically, redundancies and skill loss have been avoided. In 
return, however, there have been pay freezes and short-time working, 
leading sceptics to argue that what is involved simply boils down to 
‘concession bargaining’.  
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In the case of cross-sector ‘social pacts’, the scope has been 
similarly broad. Most have involved a form of ‘soft’ incomes policy 
with wages guidelines rather than explicit and binding figures and the 
main concern is with competitiveness, helping to explain why a major 
feature is external benchmarking, more of which below. Wages, 
though, are far from the only topic covered: tax, social security and 
education policy strongly feature, along with active employment 
policies, the overall aim being to reduce non-wage costs in the form of 
pension and social security charges.   
There are two main considerations that lie behind the shift in 
emphasis from ‘distributive’ to ‘integrative bargaining’, which are 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 8 and 9. The first is the increasing 
competitive pressures on management above all in manufacturing. In 
part, this reflects the rise of Japanese/Chinese manufacturers; the 
introduction of the Single European Market – which encouraged a 
considerable restructuring as companies looked to service one 
regional, rather than a series of national, markets as well as the 
opening up of markets and privatisation; and the collapse of the 
former USSR and the incorporation of Poland, Hungary etc into the 
EU – which has offered alternative locations for investment close by. 
In part, it also results from the liberalisation and deregulation of 
capital markets that have much greater pressure on senior managers to 
maximise returns to shareholders. Put simply, as Chapter 9 argues in 
greater detail, there are much smaller ‘rents’ to share with trade 
unions. Indeed, the only way that managements have been able to 
satisfy trade union demands for annual wage increase in line with 
inflation is to absorb increase in pay by offsetting improvements in 
productivity and performance.  
The other main consideration has been the change in macro-
economic policy and, in particular, the adoption of ‘non-
accommodating’ monetary regimes targeting relatively low rates of 
inflation with corresponding borrowing rates. Thus, the coming of 
European Monetary Union meant that governments were not only 
obliged to adapt their policies, helping to explain the incidence of 
‘social pacts’, but it also meant the spread across Europe of the 
German Bundesbank's regime. The intention and effect was not only 
to help bring down the rate of inflation – a major consideration in 
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distributive bargaining over pay – but also to make pay bargainers 
recognise that attempts to reach above-inflation settlements would 
now result in unemployment. In practice, trade unions have had to 
adjust the point of resistance to the prevailing level of inflation in the 
attempt to maintain living standards, while employers have done 
everything they can to minimise the impact on unit costs by insisting 
on major changes in working practices. The effect has been something 
of a convergence of pay settlements around the level of inflation (a 
'European going rate'
13
) which has taken some of the meaning out of 
national sector bargaining, at the same time as encouraging further 
decentralisation to secure the off-setting  productivity increases.  
The jury remains out on whether this shift is leading to a 
fundamental change in relationships between the parties as depicted in 
Table 5.2. Intuitively, it is appealing think that this is the case. 
Arguably, too, is not completely unrealistic – most issues are 
‘integrative’ rather than ‘distributive’. Yet embedding ‘integrative 
bargaining’ is far from easy. The parties may be able to come together 
in a crisis situation, especially when management needs the 
legitimation of employees and their representatives for very difficult 
decisions such as job cuts and major changes in terms and condition. 
Transferring the spirit and practice to more ‘normal’ times, however, 
is very difficult. This is above all in times of rapid change, when 
managers worry that ‘consultation’ and ‘negotiation’ will slow down 
decision making and trade union officials are anxious to avoid 
exposing themselves to charges of ‘concession bargaining’.  
Tradition also dies hard. In UK, for example, the then deputy 
Director General of the CIPD is quoted as saying that, ‘The British get 
dictation and they get negotiation, but they don’t get consultation’14. 
Arguably, a major consideration is the structure of collective 
bargaining for the reasons discussed in Chapter 2. In many EU 
countries, multi-employer bargaining at sector level tends to deal with 
‘distributive’ matters, leaving discussion at the level of works council 
or its equivalent to deal with ‘integrative’ ones. The negotiation of 
‘social pacts’ at national level has also set a favourable context for 
dialogue and deliberation. In the UK and the USA, by contrast, not 
only does the lack of a dual structure means that it is extremely 
difficult to separate ‘distribution’ from ‘integration’, but there are also 
few examples of national level concertation to draw on. This means 
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that managers and employee representatives have little opportunity to 
develop the social skills that are involved in high performance 
working. Perhaps inevitably the behaviours of ‘distributive 
bargaining’ tend to dominate, helping to account for and perpetuate a 
tradition of adversarial relations. Equally, the focus is on short-term 
‘effort bargaining’ rather than building trust and long-term 
relationships.  
 
An increasing resort to attitudinal structuring 
Arguably, although ever present in negotiation, ‘attitudinal 
structuring’ has become much more extensive in recent years both in 
terms of its coverage of issues and organisations. The nature and 
extent is more difficult to pin down than the increase in ‘integrative 
bargaining’, but there has certainly been an increase in 
communications activity, which is the key instrument. According to 
the UK’s WERS, for example, mechanisms of so-called ‘direct voice’ 
have increased considerably: the number of workplaces using team 
briefings, for example, more than doubled between 1984 and 2004
15
. 
In many respects, the development is the mirror image of the shift 
from ‘distributive’ to ‘integrative bargaining’ and is hardly surprising. 
Intensifying competition means greater pressure on performance, 
which translates into greater need for commitment. This is above all 
true of the service sector, where ‘appropriate’ employee attitudes have 
become more and more important. As Chapter 3 indicated, other 
important considerations have been the pressures to change 
expectations about some of the long-standing features of the 
employment relationship – for example, that there has to be a change 
in the balance of responsibility between employer and employees so 
far as careers and pensions are concerned.  
There are also been some eminently practical considerations 
involved. In countries where there is no statutory provision for 
employee works councils, such as the UK and USA, the decline of 
trade unions and collective bargaining means that there is no obvious 
employee representatives with whom to talk. If management wants to 
communicate, it has to do so with individual employees. For 
managers, communications is also the easy option, making far fewer 
demands in terms of individual social skills than consultation or face-
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to-face bargaining. It means, too, that they keep control of the process; 
there is little or no exchange explicitly involved – certainly nothing 
that threatens existing structures and ways of doing things – and the 
onus of change is shifted onto employees; and there are few 
opportunities for employees to question or challenge the management 
position. Developments in information technology have also increased 
the number of ‘arms-length’ means of communications available to 
managers such as email, websites and social networks. 
Arguably, however, although ‘attitudinal structuring’ may be much 
less demanding of managers, a considerable price is paid for relying 
exclusively on it. In the absence of opportunities for serious employee 
‘voice’, the danger is that managers do not get to hear about how 
things really are - if they do not have representatives to speak for 
them, employees are likely to be reluctant to express their true 
opinions directly for fear that their comments might be held against 
them. In the words of the final report of the CBI-TUC’s 2002 
Productivity Challenge Best Practice Working Group,  
Involving individual employees or teams in decisions that affect 
the day to day organisation of their work helps create a culture of 
autonomy and responsibility. And systems for encouraging 
employee feedback and suggestions are key to innovation and 
building commitment to continuous improvement.  
Collective voice is important in building a climate of trust 
where individual employees are confident that their contribution 
will be valued. Equally valuable is its role in helping to identify 
shared objectives and resolve conflict. The involvement of 
employees’ representatives can create the sense of mutuality that 
is essential for the sustainability of new working practices – the 
belief that both the employer and workers are reaping real benefits 
from improvements in work organisation. 
Excessive reliance on ‘attitudinal structuring’ is also exposing 
management to criticisms of manipulation and unethical behaviour. 
This is above all true of situations where management attempts to 
manage the emotions of employees. As one commentator asks, 'Is the 
management of organisational and more importantly employee value 
systems a step into the realm of manipulation potentially threatening 
employees' right to privacy and dignity?' 
16
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This helps to account for the scepticism with which the 
employment relations community regards the concept of the 
‘psychological contract’. The ‘psychological contract’ can be a useful 
concept when, as in the case of most of the UK literature, the older 
tradition is followed of seeing it as the perceptions of two parties of 
their mutual obligations. In the words of Cullinane and Dundon, the 
notion has ‘potential merit as a construct capable of correcting some 
of the limitations of the legalistic view of the employment 
relationship. It also has the potential to shed light on the often 
neglected and more uneven micro and socio-cognitive processes that 
take place between employee and employer'
17
. There are considerable 
doubts about its role, however, when it is seen exclusively in terms of 
the employee as it tends to be in recent US literature. It may be 
logically correct to argue that 'organisations do not have beliefs’18. If 
the ‘psychological contract’ is reduced to beliefs held by employees, 
however, it must raise questions about the validity of the very notion 
of a contract
19
. Even if it may not be the intention, it is also an open 
invitation to managers to ‘step into the realm of manipulation’. The 
following conclusion may seem harsh, but is widely shared: ‘In its 
present form, it [the ‘psychological contract’] symbolises an 
ideologically biased formula designed for a particular managerialist 
interpretation of contemporary work and employment’20. 
 
Coping with the collective action problem - developments in ‘soft 
regulation’  
A number of other long-established features of negotiation have come 
to prominence in recent years largely as a result of EU developments. 
As well as the tendency towards ‘framework’ directives and 
agreements, there is ‘co-ordinated bargaining’, ‘benchmarking’ and 
the EU’s ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC). In part, these 
developments are an institutional expression of the processes of 
‘isomorphism’ discussed in Chapter 4 and reflect the tendency for 
actors faced with common constraints to adopt similar solutions, that 
European integration is encouraging – ‘Europe is learning from 
Europe’ in Teague’s words21. In greater part, however, they are to be 
explained in terms of the nature of the ‘intra-organisational 
bargaining’ or collective action problem policy makers and 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
166 
 
practitioners are faced with in a multi-level governance situation. At 
EU levels in particular, given the problems of arriving at agreements 
that resonate with the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ (i.e. dealing with 
issues at the lowest feasible level), such forms of so-called ‘soft 
regulation’ have the inestimable advantage of helping to resolve both 
the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the collective action or 
‘intra-organisational bargaining’ problem.  
 Take, for example, ‘framework agreements’. These make it 
possible for the principals to set a sense of direction and yet to avoid 
failures to agree over the details that often bedevil negotiations on the 
horizontal dimension. At the same time, by delegating responsibilities 
to representatives at lower levels to tailor solutions to their immediate 
situation, it helps to relieve the collective action problem on the 
vertical dimension. Also, the degree of ‘softness’ can vary, with 
significant implications for effectiveness of implementation. There is 
considerable difference between a ‘framework agreement’ elaborating 
a set of principles but having no further consequences for 
representatives at local levels and one whose express intention is to 
‘incite’ negotiations at these levels and which also establishes 
mechanisms to monitor implementation. The contrast is even greater 
with a ‘framework agreement’ establishing a set of principles or 
minimum standards, which are binding on the parties at other levels, 
but within which these parties have scope to fashion their own 
solutions. In effect, the last outcome combines a ‘hard’ with a ‘soft’ 
dimension
22
.  
Another development has been ‘co-ordinated bargaining’, in 
which parallel sets of negotiators attempt to achieve the same or 
related outcome in separate negotiations. There are two main types. 
The first, the unilateral form, is where one or other of the parties is 
opposed to collective bargaining at that level and/or believes it 
unnecessary. The second, the joint form, is where the parties develop 
an understanding, which may be implicit rather than explicit, that co-
ordinated bargaining is likely to open up options not available under 
established collective bargaining arrangements.  
So far, ‘coordinated bargaining’ at the EU level has been largely 
unilateral, the European Metalworking Federation’s (EMF) initiative 
being the longest-established and most developed. It started in the 
mid-1990s, with the convening of its first collective bargaining 
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conference in 1993 and the separate and successful development of a 
common template for negotiations establishing European Works 
Councils with a series of multinational companies. Subsequently EMF 
adopted a bargaining co-ordination rule for wage negotiations in 1998, 
specifying that settlements should be equivalent to the cost of living 
plus a balanced share of economy-wide productivity gains, and a 
working time charter which lays down a minimum standard of 1750 
hours annual normal working time and an annual maximum of 100 
overtime hours. More recently, it has established minimum standards 
on the scope and quality of training aimed at realizing life-long 
learning. Its long-standing collective bargaining committee has been 
invigorated by the creation of a smaller working group which has 
driven forward these initiatives and, in tandem, EMF has established a 
comprehensive electronic database of collective bargaining 
information, aimed at both diffusing information across affiliates and 
monitoring outcomes of negotiations . Important too have been the 
nurturing of ‘reflexive mechanisms’ such as peer review and an 
annual summer school through which national negotiators become 
integrated into the co-ordination process.   
As Table 5.3 suggests, the rise of ‘benchmarking’ from 
management tool to regulatory instrument has been one of the most 
striking recent developments, coming to occupy a place at the heart of 
the EU’s approach to co-ordinating economic and social policy within 
and across the member states. As in the case of ‘coordinated 
bargaining’ and ‘framework agreements’, ‘benchmarking’ helps to 
deal with both the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ dimensions of the EU’s 
collective action problem. A broad direction can be set, minimizing 
the scope for disagreement over detail on the horizontal dimension. At 
the same time, deference to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ helps to 
relieve the collective action problem on the vertical dimension. 
Arguably, ‘benchmarking’ and the OMC have a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ promising greater democratic legitimacy and 
effectiveness in policy development and implementation
23
. The centre 
adopts the role of ‘policy entrepreneur’, but consults and involves the 
member states, ‘social partners’ and other interested parties in 
decisions on strategy. Involvement of national actors means that 
interventions may be more appropriate, and therefore more likely to 
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be put into practice. Rather than being tied down with ‘institutional 
harmonisation’, EU policy-makers can take a problem-solving 
approach with a longer-term focus that is flexible enough to adapt to 
changing circumstances and extend itself to new areas. The iterative 
cycle of ‘benchmarking’ also means that the policy process becomes 
less opaque (and therefore more legitimate) with the elaboration of 
clear goals and targets, the identification of best practice and member 
state and social partner scrutiny. ‘Benchmarking’ helps ensure the 
value of the OMC as a coherent policy mode, and one that 
acknowledges democratic principles of voluntarism and subsidiarity.  
Looking to the future, perhaps one of the most intriguing 
speculations is about the implications of the development of the EU’s 
multi-level governance arrangements. The coming of the Single 
European Market and the single currency have  encouraged a number 
of contradictory developments: decentralisation in the form of 
company and workplace bargaining as the parties seek to grapple with 
the implications of restructuring; greater centralisation in the form of 
‘social pacts’ at the cross-sector level as Governments to seek national 
level understandings with the ‘social partners’ on wage moderation, 
greater labour market flexibility and reform of social protection 
systems; and greater cross-national activity – in particular, at the cross 
sector and multinational company levels. In principle, there need not 
be a conflict between the different levels – indeed, coordination is 
necessary to avoid a process of ‘regime competition’, where one 
country competes with another. Even so, time and energy are limited 
resources. The parties are increasingly confronted with a variety of 
options along with the so-called ‘joint decision trap’24– the more 
successful activity at one level is in handling the situation, the more 
difficult it is to involve others.  
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Figure 5.1 ‘Pacts for employment and competitiveness’25 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, there was a major wave across Europe 
of company-level negotiations dealing with restructuring, so-called 
‘pacts for employment and competitiveness’ (PECs).  Although there 
was no typical PEC, most had two main objectives: to minimise 
reductions, preserve and/or stabilise employment; and to reduce the 
organisation’s costs and/or improve its ability to adapt, thereby 
contributing to future conditions for economic growth and job 
creation. Three main ideal-types could be identified reflecting the 
balance of emphasis between short term cost reductions to safeguard 
jobs and measures to improve the flexibility and adaptability of the 
organisation in the medium-term. In the first, agreements are 
essentially concerned with the ‘survival’ of the business or some of its 
operations. In the second, agreements are intended to aid the process 
of ‘retrenchment’ – the situation was not so much one of survival, but 
of slimming down in the light of changing market conditions. In the 
third, agreements were designed to help with the ‘adaptation’ of the 
business to deal with new situations, for example under market 
deregulation. The contents included the following: 
 
 guarantees of employment and/or no compulsory redundancy 
 investment for particular establishments 
 transformation of precarious into more stable jobs. 
 additional employment for groups such as the young and unemployed 
 the relocation of the workforce within the company  
 the introduction of ‘work foundations’ to improve the employment 
prospects of redundant workers  
 reduction in pay levels and associated benefits,  
 lower starter rates for new employees 
 commitments to moderate pay demands  
 increases linked to indicators such as prices, productivity, exchange 
rates. 
 share ownership 
 temporary or long-term reduction in the working week  
 greater variability in working hours without overtime premium  
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 the increased use of part-time work 
 extension of operating hours (e.g. weekend work) 
 conditions for using fixed-term contracts, temporary work and 
outsourcing 
 new forms of work organisation such as team work 
 training and development 
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Figure 5.2  Changing emphases in employment relations
26
 
 
The 'old' employment relations The 'new' employment relations 
 
Key assumptions 
 stability  
 conflict 
 social justice  
 standardisation  
 a predominant level of activity 
 centralisation  
 
Subject matter  
 claims/grievances 
 rights/obligations  
 pay and conditions  
 inputs 
 
Processes 
 distributive bargaining  
 agreement making 
 law making  
 vertical integration  
 enforcement/sanctions 
 
 
 change 
 co-operation  
 continuous improvement  
 diversity  
 multiple levels of activity 
 decentralisation (‘subsidiarity’) 
 
 
 
 information/ 
 standards/targets  
 employment and competitiveness  
 outputs 
 
 
 
 integrative bargaining  
 social dialogue  
 benchmarking/target setting  
 horizontal co-ordination 
 monitoring/learning 
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Table 5.3 All benchmarkers now
27
 
 
Benchmarking started life as a management tool to increase 
competitive performance. There are three main types. First is 
‘performance benchmarking’, involving quantitative comparisons of 
input and/or output measures. Second is ‘process benchmarking’, 
covering detailed scrutiny of the efficiency of particular business 
processes and activities, plus arrangements such as quality standards 
accreditation. Third is ‘strategic benchmarking’, which involves 
comparing the driving forces behind successful organisations, 
including leadership and the management of change. 
Since the mid-1990s, however, it is as a regulatory tool across a 
range of EU policy fields that benchmarking has rapidly acquired 
prominence, leading one European Commission President (Jacques 
Santer) to suggest that ‘We are all benchmarkers now’28. As well as 
the Community institutions and member states, trade unions too have 
embraced benchmarking as a means of underpinning their cross-
border bargaining co-ordination initiatives – the European 
Metalworking Federation is an example. Two main phases may be 
identified. Until the late 1990s, benchmarking was still largely seen as 
a management tool that policy-makers could utilise to promote 
improved competitiveness on the part of individual companies. By the 
turn of the decade it had become something more ambitious: a central 
plank of national policy development and implementation across a 
range of strategic activities. According to its former Secretary 
General, it was the ‘European Round Table’, which groups together 
major multinational companies, that has to be credited with its 
becoming a regulatory mechanism for the EU as a whole. Anxious to 
avoid further social regulation, and yet keep labour market reform on 
the agenda, it enthusiastically promoted the idea of benchmarking to 
policy makers as ‘more than simply number-crunching’. ‘It was a 
communication tool of enormous value’ which, crucially, ‘would help 
them work together towards common goals without jeopardising their 
freedom to take their own decisions in the light of their own 
circumstances’29. 
As an EU policy tool, benchmarking began to gather momentum 
with the approach of EMU, involving the setting of common 
objectives, the preparation of national action plans and peer group 
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review. The 1994 Essen European Council asked member states to 
establish employment programmes and to report annually to the 
Commission on their implementation. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty 
institutionalised this procedure, thereby giving benchmarking a Treaty 
basis: Article 118 stipulates that the Council can ‘encourage the 
member states to adopt initiatives aimed at improving knowledge, 
developing exchange of information and best practice, promoting 
innovative approaches and evaluating experiences in order to combat 
social exclusion’. Subsequently, the 2000 Lisbon Summit explicitly 
confirmed the ‘Open Method of Coordination’ as a governance 
method.  
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Power – a matter of prepositions 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Highlight the different types and ‘faces’ of power and 
their relevance in employment relations 
 
 Emphasise the asymmetrical distribution of power in 
the employment relationship and its implications 
 
 Discuss the why and wherefore of the tension between 
‘power to’ and ‘power over’ 
 
Summary 
'Politics‟ and „the political‟ are said to be concerned with „the 
distribution, exercise and consequences of power'.  The same could be 
said of employment relations. Two main types of power may be 
identified. The first, „power to‟, is very positive – it is about the 
capacity or ability to get things done. In the most basic of senses, 
„productive‟ and „transformative‟ power are ever present in work 
organisations – no product or service would be provided if it was not. 
The second, power „over‟ is about domination - for example, the 
ability of one party to get another to do something they would not 
otherwise do or to punish/discipline them for behaviour that the party 
thinks is inappropriate. This can be negative - it is more like a „zero 
sum‟ game, where one party loses what the other wins. In this case, 
attention focuses on two main aspects. One, following Lukes, is the 
different „faces‟ of power. Power is not just about decision making, 
but also setting the agenda and shaping preference. It therefore harks 
back to the „attitudinal structuring‟ that featured in the previous 
chapter. The other is the asymmetry or inequality of power. Put 
simply, subordination is a design feature of the employment 
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relationship – the exercise of the employers‟ residual control rights 
puts managers in a power „over‟ relationship with employees. Also the 
two parties to the employment relationship, while nominally equal, 
have very different resources at their disposal: the employee is an 
individual who has to work to make a living; the employer is typically 
a corporation with substantial time and money at its disposal. Such is 
the nature of the employment relationship, both cooperative and 
conflictual, that the two dimensions of power are in more less 
continuous tension. Attempts to shift the balance from the one to the 
other range from changes in management style, through semi-
autonomous team working to different forms of employee 'voice' and 
„management by agreement‟. One idea that seems to survive – it 
appeared on the agendas of both main political parties in the UK's 
general election of 2010 - is that of worker cooperatives or labour-
managed firms. Successful examples, albeit very different, include the 
John Lewis Partnership in the UK and the Mondragon Corporation in 
Spain‟s Basque country. Arguably, the main reason why worker 
cooperatives are not more widespread is that they would involve a 
fundamental re-distribution of power from capital in favour of labour. 
 
Introduction 
In the words of the author of a major textbook dealing with political 
analysis, 'politics‟ and „the political‟ are concerned with „the 
distribution, exercise and consequences of power'
1
. The same could be 
said of employment relations. Also as in politics, serious efforts are 
being made to operationalise the concept of power and so begin to 
answer some of the criticisms of its use – for example, that power is 
„poorly defined‟ and is „invoked to explain virtually anything‟2. Thus, 
power is a concept that is used in two main ways, both of which are 
critically important. The first sees power as the capacity to get things 
done – power „to‟ is a resource that is capable of advancing common 
goals; it is a „positive sum‟ game. The second equates power with 
domination or power „over‟ – the ability of one party to get another to 
do something they would not otherwise do or to punish/discipline 
them for behaviour that the party thinks is inappropriate. Power „over‟ 
can therefore be a largely „negative sum‟ game. Furthermore, power 
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„over‟ is seen as embracing not just decision making, but also the 
more covert forms of the exercise of power such as the ability to set 
the agenda and, even more fundamentally, to shape people‟s 
preferences, recalling the discussion of „attitudinal structuring‟ in 
Chapter 5. There is more or less continuous tension between the main 
types of power: the way power „over‟ is exercised in many 
organisations makes it difficult to maximise the benefits of power „to‟.  
 
Power 'to' 
The first main type of use of power in employment relations – „power 
to‟ - is very positive and is integral to the role of organisations 
introduced in Chapter 1. Power is seen as a resource that can be 
„productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with 
dignity‟3 In the most basic of senses, „productive‟ and „transformative‟ 
power are ever present in work organisations – no product or service 
would be provided if it was not. „Enterprise‟, after all, is one of the 
synonyms for „company‟. The Schumpeter column in The Economist 
expands on the point like this in encouraging business leaders to do 
more to make the case for what they do: 
… business is a remarkable exercise in cooperation. For all the 
talk of competition „red in tooth and claw‟, companies in fact 
depend on persuading large numbers of people – workers and 
bosses, shareholders and suppliers – to work together to a 
common end. This involves getting lots of strangers to trust one 
another. It also increasingly involves stretching that trust across 
borders and cultures. Apple‟s iPod is not just a miracle of design. 
It is also a miracle of cooperation, teaming Californian designers 
with Chinese manufacturers and salespeople in all corners of the 
earth. It is worth remembering that the word “company” is derived 
from the Latin words „cum‟ and „pane‟ – meaning „breaking bread 
together. 
Another rejoinder is that business is an exercise in creativity. 
Business people do not just invent clever products that solve 
nagging problems, from phones that can link fishermen in India 
with nearby markets to devices that can provide insulin to 
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diabetics without painful injections. They also create 
organisations that manufacture these products and distribute them 
about the world. Nandan Nilekani, one of the founders of Infosys, 
put the case for business as well as anyone when he said that the 
computer-services giant‟s greatest achievement was not its $2 
billion in annual revenue but the fact that it had taught his fellow 
Indians to „redefine the possible4. 
In the language of the resource-based view introduced in Chapter 
3, work organisations are „capability structures‟5. Important here is the 
recognition that an organisation‟s success/failure depends not so much 
on thinking in terms of more traditional „outside-in‟ assessments of 
market threats and opportunities leading to externally focused 
strategic responses or „positioning‟. Rather the approach is „inside-
out‟ focusing on the sources of internal strengths and weakness of the 
organisation, i.e. the unique or particular skills and ability „sets‟, 
capabilities‟ or competences that individuals in the organisation have 
and that give it a measure of competitive uniqueness
6
. Power is not 
just something that is possessed by individuals or groups, however. 
Power also resides in structures embedded in continuing social 
relationships that enable groups to contribute.  
Both the „hardware‟ and the „software‟ of the organisation are 
involved. In the first instance, they include the structures and systems 
of planning, controlling etc that that figure prominently in discussions 
of what management is about; job design, the grouping of jobs into 
activities and the structures used to co-ordinate these activities; 
personnel policies and practices including the organisation‟s systems 
of education, rewards and incentives; and technical systems such as 
databases and software programmes. 
It is this kind of thinking that helps to explain the increasing 
emphasis on bundles of personnel practices that featured in Chapter 2. 
As was explained there, the idea is that it is not so much the individual 
„best practice‟ elements in the standard prescriptive textbooks that are 
important. Rather what makes the difference is the extent to which 
these elements are „best fit‟, i.e. are complementary as well as 
supportive of and supported by the business strategy. Thus, team-
working and problem-solving groups are likely to have a positive 
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effect on labour productivity when combined with contingent pay 
designed to enhance employee motivation and commitment. But such 
„high performance work systems‟ are unlikely to be effective where 
low cost is to the priority of business strategy. Rather they go with 
high quality products and services.  
The „software‟ of organisations is seen as being made up of the 
prevailing norms and attitudes such as the „passionate beliefs 
associated with various kinds of technological knowledge‟7. For many 
commentators, this is where the notion of the „learning organisation‟ 
fits in, i.e. the idea of the organisation as an „active learning agency 
continually combining and recombining elements in its external and 
internal environment in order to develop the distinctive capacities that 
will enable it to survive‟8. In such organisations, senior managers 
recognise that „learning‟ is not just something that individuals do. It is 
what organisations have to do it in order to continuously improve. 
They therefore put „organisational learning‟ centre stage and make it 
the key principle for organizing business strategy and developing 
competitive advantage. Managing the processes involved, sometimes 
known as „knowledge management‟, also looms large, the 
understandable implication being that acquiring these capabilities is 
not something that just „happens‟.  
Interestingly in the light of the discussion about the „cognitive‟ 
dimension of institutions in Chapter 4, the NHS National Library for 
Heath suggests that the „ultimate aim‟ of knowledge management is 
„institutionalisation‟.  
 
It is useful to bear in mind that success in knowledge management 
does not involve building up a big new department or a whole 
network of people with „knowledge‟ in their job title. You may 
need to do these things to some degree in the medium-term. 
However the ultimate aim is for knowledge management to be 
fully‟ institutionalised‟. Or in other words, so embedded in the 
way your organisation does things, so intrinsic in people‟s day-to-
day ways of working, that nobody even talks about knowledge 
management any more – they just do it9. 
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For employees, involvement in the activities of such organisations 
can bring rewards not only in terms of income, but also personal 
development. Technological change for example, may not bring 
advantages just for managers – it may make work more satisfying for 
workers.  
More generally, even in organisations where „high performance 
working‟ and the „learning organisation‟ are not the rule, working for 
a particular company may bring a sense of pride, achievement and 
self-esteem. The result is that there may little experience of the power 
„over‟ to be discussed below. This is especially true of the successful 
organisation.  
Sometimes such sentiments are attributed to a state of „false 
consciousness‟ or to the „attitudinal structuring‟ discussed in previous 
chapters. Yet this is to ignore two points. First, employees have a 
range of interests that their employment satisfies - in Lukes‟ 
words,„everyone‟s interests are multiple, conflicting and of different 
kinds‟10. Second, ideology is not only something that managers 
impose on employees, though of course it can have that quality. 
Employees produce their own ideology, i.e. sets of beliefs which 
expressed and reinforced a particular set of power relations. It is also 
produced in the process of social interaction, as in rituals and 
ceremonies, but also in day-to-day life
11
.  
The dispute involving British Airways cabin crews introduced in 
the previous chapter will help to illustrate the point. A regular charge 
that the cabin crew and their representatives made was that it was BA 
managers who were exposing the organisations‟ reputation to threat. 
Not only was management acting irresponsibly in trying to impose 
changes at such a critical time, i.e. in the run-up to the Christmas/New 
Year holidays. Some of the changes being proposed would seriously 
damage the customer service with which they associated themselves 
in working for the „Worlds‟ favourite airline‟. 
Arguably, though, the „productive‟ and „transformative‟ power 
that RBV proponents refer to, involving individuals going the 
proverbial extra mile, is less obvious in employment than it is in work 
for voluntary organisations, In the first, work seems so often to be 
endured, whereas in the second tends to be enjoyed. Indeed, it is the 
absence of this form of power in work organisations that 
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commentators are effectively highlighting when they suggest that 
managers have a problem of engagement. It is an issue to which the 
chapter returns in the final section. 
 
Power 'over' 
It is the second type of power – the ability of one individual or group 
to dominate another/ to make them do something they would not 
otherwise wish to do – that has received most attention in employment 
relations. Two dimensions have to be considered. One is the different 
„faces‟ of such power. Power „over‟ is not just about decision making: 
it also embraces being able to set the agenda and structure attitudes, 
taking us back to the discussion of the different processes of 
negotiation in Chapter 5. The other is the inequality or asymmetry of 
power that is involved in the employment relationship. In theory, there 
are two equal parties in the dependency relationship that is the 
employment relationship. In practice, the parties are very unequal‟: 
not only is the inequality of power a design feature of the employment 
relationship - some people gives orders and others have to obey them 
– but the two parties also have very different resources available to 
them. The consequences have been far-reaching. Not only have trade 
unions and professional organisations emerged to offer countervailing 
power. Governments have almost invariably intervened in the form of 
legislation to achieve a balance between flexibility and security 
helping to explain why the employment relationship cannot be 
understand simply as a private relationship between two parties: it is, 
in practice, a multi-level phenomenon.  
 
The three ‘faces’  
Following Lukes
12
, the sociologist who first coined the term, the 
exercise of power „over‟ is seen as having three „faces‟. The first 
„face‟ equates power with a process that is very transparent and 
observable. Essentially, it is about domination and decision-making. 
„The focus is concrete behaviour and the making of decisions … 
Power occurs where one group‟s expressed views come into 
opposition with those of another, and power is the ability to secure 
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one‟s own aims‟13. Put simply, it could be a case of A getting B to do 
something that they wouldn‟t otherwise wish to do. Or of A creating 
situation that is unfavourable to B but that B cannot do anything 
about. The powerful, in other words, are those who hold sway in 
decision making.   
Such power relationships are to be found throughout work 
organisations, helping to explain why a political perspective on their 
understanding is so essential. The HR function in the UK is a case in 
point. At operational level, HR managers may appear to exercise 
considerable power „over‟ their managerial colleagues in operating 
functions  - for example, first line managers may complain that HR 
managers are constantly interfering, telling them what they can and 
cannot do in terms of the treatment of employees. At strategic level, 
however, it is a very different matter. A widely held is that personnel 
management is very much a „Cinderella‟ function. It gets its epithet 
not just because the majority of HR managers are women. Rightly or 
wrongly personnel management is associated with low level 
administrative routine with little or no power to influence the strategic 
direction of the business. This helps to explain why most courses on 
MBA programmes dealing with the area have to be entitled „Human 
Resource Management' or „Strategic Human Resource Management' if 
there are to be any takers. 
Important though the distribution, exercise and consequences of 
power „over‟ are for the managerial functions, our primary focus is on 
their implications for the conduct of the employment relationship. 
Perhaps the most obvious exercise of such power in employment 
relations – it certainly is the one that gains most media attention - is to 
be found in the case of „distributive bargaining‟ over wages discussed 
in the previous chapter. Management may „decide‟ that it cannot 
possibly afford a pay increase of more than X per cent. The trade 
union may „decide‟ that this is totally unacceptable and is able to 
mobilise sufficient support to win a strike ballot. In these 
circumstances, management may decide that making some concession 
is the lesser of the two evils. Alternatively, it may decide to call the 
trade union‟s bluff – the ballot goes ahead, the result is the same, but 
the trade union finds that it is unable to translate the mandate into 
strike action or the strike action fizzles out. In each case, there is a 
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patent difference of interest with one party seeking to impose it views 
on the other backed up by sanctions. 
Note that, as in the case of power „to‟, the exercise of power 
„over‟ in such situations is not just a question of individual behaviour. 
Two groups are involved, both deriving their „power‟ from the 
performance of their respective agency functions. Management is 
acting as the agent of shareholders, more of which in Chapter 8. The 
trade union similarly represents the interests of employees – indeed, as 
Chapter 9 argues, the fundamental logic of collective action that trade 
unions embody is rooted in the ability to offer a countervailing power 
to that which is built into the employment relationship in 
management‟s favour.  
Power „over‟, along with the ability of the parties to exercise it, 
does not exist in a vacuum, however. It very much depends on 
context. For example, in most countries the legal framework spells out 
in some detail the parameters within which power „over‟ in industrial 
disputes can be exercised. The status accorded to collective 
agreements and strikes is also important. Unlike in UK, in most EU 
countries, collective agreements are compulsory contracts: the terms 
and conditions are binding on the signatory organisations and their 
members. One major difference, however, involves the „peace 
obligation‟ under which the parties must refrain from industrial action 
over issues covered by the contract for its duration. In countries such 
as Germany and Sweden, the peace obligation is extremely strong, 
with infringements being subject to legal action. In the „Latin‟ 
countries, especially France, the peace obligation is extremely weak, 
largely because the constitutional right to strike is deemed to override 
it.  
Timing is also likely to be an important consideration. It is no 
coincidence, as Chapter 7 discusses in more detail, that strike activity 
has tended to correlate with levels of inflation and of employment: 
low levels of inflation and higher levels of unemployment are likely to 
mean that management is the more powerful, with the opposite being 
the case for trade unions. Important too is the history of the 
relationship for the reasons to do with „path dependency‟ discussed in 
Chapter 4. If there is long history of successful collective action, the 
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easier it is likely to be for the trade union to mobilise its members; if 
there is no such history, it may be impossible to do so even if, in every 
other respect, conditions are favourable. 
The second „face‟ starts from the proposition that „power is at its 
most effective when least observable‟14 - it is often called the power of 
„non-decision-making‟. Basically, it introduces the idea that power is 
not just about decision making, but also the ability to set the agenda. 
The concern is still with concrete behaviour and observable action; 
context, timing and history are also fundamentally important. There is, 
however, a shift in emphasis into the „corridors of power‟, where the 
exercise of power „over‟ may not be as visible and so as easily 
monitored as it is at the negotiating table.  
The process of joint consultation offers us a very good illustration 
of the exercise of the second „face‟ of power. There are two main 
types of consultation: „decision-based‟ and „option-based‟. In the first, 
management considers a range of possible ways, say, of restructuring 
operations in the light of changing market conditions. In due course, it 
decides on its preferred option and consults the views of trade unions 
or works council on how to handle the implications. In the second, 
instead of putting just its „decision‟ on the table, management reveals 
the full range of options it has been considering and invites views on 
these, with or without any expression of its own preferences. Clearly, 
in both cases, management controls the agenda, with the final decision 
resting with them. Whereas in the second case employees‟ 
representatives have the opportunity to discuss the full range of 
options, however, in the first they are restricted to the one 
management has decided on – indeed, they may never come to know 
what the other options were and so have an opportunity to express 
their alternatives preference. 
The third „face‟ of power is an altogether different proposition 
from the first two in as much as the focus shifts away from actual and 
observable behaviour. It is the ability to shape people‟s expectations 
and so is a form of ideological power. Lukes gives a strong flavour of 
what is involved in asking: 
… is it not the most invidious exercise of power to prevent people 
… from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
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cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their 
role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural or 
unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial?
15
 
In other words, the third „face‟ of power is another way of 
describing the process of „attitudinal structuring‟ that featured in the 
previous chapter dealing with negotiation. As was explained there, 
examples are to be found in the increasingly extensive management 
use of communication systems, where the aim is not just about to 
bring employees up-to-date with developments, i.e. giving them 
information. Rather it is to structure their attitudes and shape their 
preferences.  
A specific illustration of the force of Lukes‟ question in 
employment relations is to be found in some uses of the 
„psychological contract‟ discussed in the previous chapter. Very often, 
it seems, the underlying purpose of the emphasis is to change 
employees‟ perceptions of what they might expect of the employment 
relationship. In particular, in many cases they are being strongly 
encouraged to accept that it is no longer possible for the employer to 
meet two of the elements in the employment relationship that help to 
distinguish it from the labour services contract, namely the prospect of 
continuity of employment/a career and an adequate pension in 
retirement. Sadly, there is little if any recognition in the 
„psychological contract‟ literature that proponents are effectively 
encouraging managers to exercise Lukes‟ third (and „the most 
invidious‟) „face‟ of power – which is yet another reason why the 
employment relations community treats the concept with such unease. 
 
A very asymmetric relationship 
So far, although located in the context of the work organisation, the 
discussion could be applied to any type of social relationship. The 
next topic highlights one of its outstanding features of employment 
relationship. In theory, as Chapter 3 stressed, there are two equal 
parties to the employment relationship. In practice, the employment 
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relationship is a very unequal or asymmetric one, with one party (the 
employer) having domination or power 'over' the other (the 
employees).  
There are two main reasons for the asymmetry of power in the 
employment relationship. The first, as Chapter 3 explained, is that it is 
an intrinsic design feature of the employment relationship - employers 
„effectively purchase the rights of residual control‟16. By definition, 
the exercise of residual control rights puts the parties into a 
subordinate/superordinate relationship: the employment relationship 
involves a governance structure that is rooted in an organisational 
hierarchy, where managers give and employees receive orders. All in 
all, employees submit to an arrangement that is largely discretionary 
as well as open-ended, with considerable opportunities for the use 
(and abuse) of power both by individual managers and the overall 
structure of controls discussed in Chapter 4.  
Reinforcing the asymmetry of the relationship is the way in which 
the contract is viewed legally. This is particularly true of the UK and 
the USA, recalling the discussion of „nexus of contract‟ thinking in 
Chapter 3. In the words of one recent employment law textbook,  
The paradigm of an employment contract … contains an authority 
structure at its heart. In return for the payment of wages, the 
employer bargains for the right to direct the workforce in the most 
productive way. An employee consents to obey these instructions, 
and so enters into a relation of subordination. The authority 
structure may be articulated through formal rules of the 
organisation or day-today instructions from supervisors and 
managers. Since compliance with is authority structure is essential 
for the efficient operation of a contract that is incomplete by 
design, a disobedient employee must be sanctioned. The most 
visible sign of this authority structure is therefore the use of 
discipline by the employer, such as deductions from pay and 
dismissal from employment
17
. 
In the even more graphic words of perhaps the most eminent of 
UK employment lawyers (Kahn-Freund) describing the employment 
relationship: „In its inception, it is an act of submission, in its 
operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the 
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submission and subordination may be concealed by that indispensable 
figment of the legal mind known as the „contract of employment‟18.  
Seen from this perspective, the rival explanations of managerial 
hierarchy to be found in transaction cost analysis and radical theory 
are not as mutually exclusive as they are often painted. It may be that 
hierarchy is a necessary feature of work organisations on efficiency 
grounds as transaction cost theorists argue
19
. But it is also the case, as 
radical theorists have argued, that it guarantees a particular group, i.e. 
entrepreneurs and their agent managers, an essential role in the 
process of production and exchange
20
.  
The second respect in which the two parties to the employment 
relationship are very unequal brings in the issue of resources. The 
asymmetry of power „over‟ that is intrinsic to the employment 
relationship is reinforced by the unequal resources available to the two 
parties to influence each other in their dependency relationship. The 
employee is a single individual usually with very limited resources. 
He/she is relatively immobile and typically has much less information 
about the employment situation than the employer. Moreover, he/she 
has to work in order to secure income people. In the strong language 
of Marx, „Labourers rarely come willingly to the capitalist labour 
market. Rather as wage slaves, they were compelled to sell their 
capacity to labour to the capitalist in return for a wage that would give 
them access to the material necessities of food and clothing‟21. By 
contrast, the employer is a corporate entity most often with substantial 
resources at its disposal, which can be economic, political or 
ideological. Thus the employer has the capacity to deny the employee 
income; has the backing of the law in exercising their residual control 
rights; and, as has already been suggested in discussing the third „face‟ 
of power or „attitudinal structuring‟, is in a position to deploy a wide 
variety of techniques with which to seek to influence the „hearts and 
minds‟ of employees.  
Putting the main emphasis on employers is not to suggest that 
employees are totally powerless. Some employees are better placed 
than others in terms of their „structural‟ position. Some individuals are 
in a strong labour market position. For example, one of the arguments 
that the banks put forward for paying exorbitant bonuses is that their 
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dealers and traders will move to other employers if any attempt is 
made to rein them in. In this case, the immediate context means that 
they seem able to defy both their shareholders and governments in 
adopting this position.  
A wider group in a strong position comprises those who are able 
to establish a considerable control over the supply of labour usually 
through extensive training periods, a closed shop and strict codes of 
discipline. Historically, the craft societies that dominated the first 
phase of trade union organisation are examples. Latterly, it would 
occupations involved in the professions that enjoy this advantage. In 
the UK, for example, organisations such as the British Medical 
Association have been able to achieve a very considerable degree. In 
this case, it is not just a matter of pay and conditions. Effectively, their 
position enables them to have a major influence on allocation of 
capital resources as between hospitals and general practice and the 
different medical specialisms.  
Arguably, though, the opportunities for employees to exercise 
such potentially „productive‟ or „transformative‟ power are relatively 
rare: the most that employees can usually do is to try to veto 
management‟s use of power „over‟, thereby contributing to a „zero 
sum‟ game situation. For example, Edwards reminds of the debate that 
took place in the UK over the power associated with trade unions in 
the 1970s. The popular perception encouraged by the media was that 
trade unions were „too powerful‟. Yet it could be argued that they „too 
weak‟.  Certainly trade unions were able to exercise „power over‟ 
management in „the sense of pursuing wage claims or bargaining on 
the shop floor … [yet they] lacked „power to‟ press through a 
programme of modernization that would secure their members‟ long-
term interests
22
. Edwards goes on to suggest that this largely because 
of the ideological dimension … an absence of concepts that can 
challenge the prevailing orthodoxy‟. 
Even groups and occupations that are unable to organise 
collectively, let alone exercise the controls associated with the 
professions, are not without some power. This is because of the 
continuous nature of the employment relationship discussed in 
Chapter 3. Thus, employees who feel aggrieved by a management 
action have a wide range of opportunities to get their own back. This 
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is above all true of situations where employees are directly involved 
with customers as in the increasing service sector where managers 
have to worry reputational effects. „Organisational misbehaviour‟, as 
the next chapter explains, can take a wide range of activities from 
working without enthusiasm through to sabotage. Important too is that 
the costs of monitoring can be prohibitively expensive. It is for these 
reasons that managers usually do not exploit their power‟ over‟ to its 
fullest extent – going beyond employees‟ „zone of acceptance‟ 
discussed in the previous chapter can be self-defeating. 
There are also two other considerations. One is the legal 
framework. Unfair dismissal is likely to result in a claim to an 
Employment Tribunal or its equivalent. Minimum wages legislation 
makes it more difficult for employers to exploit employees in the 
pejorative sense. The other consideration is the so-called „reputational 
effects‟ of management actions23. Large public companies in 
particular will not want to be known for unfair or aggressive actions. 
Not only is the „bad‟ press that it brings likely to make it more 
difficult to recruit high quality staff. In some cases, it may have a very 
damaging effect on the public image with a considerable loss of sales.  
„Naming and shaming‟ has become a tactic that groups that Non-
governmental organisations, as well as trade unions, regularly now 
use. 
In terms of consequences, it is the unequal power relationship that 
helps to explain why trade unions and professional organisations have 
almost invariably grown up to represent employees‟ interests at work. 
It is also the unequal power relationship that provides the rationale for 
state intervention in the form of individual employment rights, support 
for trade unions and collective bargaining, and dispute resolution 
machinery. In effect, the state is intervening on behalf of what society 
recognises is the weaker party. Thus, in the UK, the employment law 
textbook quoted earlier talks in terms of the 'normative claim for 
labour law to constitute an autonomous legal domain within which 
inequality of bargaining power between worker and employer may be 
taken for granted, and where protection of the worker against unfair 
exploitation is therefore a paramount and systemic rationale for law-
making and for adjudication'
24
.  
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Implicit here is a rejection of one of the notions at the heart of 
„nexus of contract‟ thinking, namely that the company is a „private 
association with which the state ought to have very little to do with
25
. 
Rather the company is to be seen as a public association. In as much 
as the state supports the company in it day-to-day operation in a 
variety of different ways, it arguably earns the right to intervene with 
measures designed to minimise any abuse of the employer‟s 
discretionary rights that might otherwise be damaging to society as a 
whole. It is point to which Chapter 10 returns in considering the role 
of public policy.  
One of the most interesting questions is the extent to which such 
intervention has taken the edge of the pressure for collective action. 
The „juridification‟ of the employment relationship discussed in 
Chapter 3 leaves considerable room for managers to act 
„opportunistically‟, i.e. to take advantage of the asymmetry of power 
to push to the extreme the „zones of acceptance‟ discussed in Chapter 
5. Arguably, however, it has helped to take some of the edge off the 
abuse of managerial power – in particular, by helping to ensure greater 
consistency of management behaviour. It has also given employees a 
mechanism for appealing when they feel managers have abused their 
power. The wider implications of „juridification‟ is an issue to which 
Chapter 9 will return in discussing the reasons for the decline in trade 
union membership and the coverage of collective bargaining over the 
last three decades 
 
Coping with continuous tension? 
If this discussion of power „over‟ and power „to‟ appears to be 
somewhat philosophical, it is important to emphasise that much of the 
day-to-day reality of employment relations reflects the more or less 
continuous tension between the two dimensions. Indeed, its 
contradictory nature is one of the great paradoxes of the employment 
relationship. Achieving the kind of power „to‟ that the Economist‟s 
Schumpeter columns extols sits very uneasily with the nature and 
extent of the hierarchical arrangements typically involved in 
exercising power „over‟. It may be possible in moments of crisis, but 
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achieving it regularly and consistently appears to be much more 
difficult. 
Part of the problem is that the close association of managers with 
the design and operation of the organisation structure is double-edged 
in its implications. On the one hand, it means that the control that they 
exercise is not necessarily experienced as power „over‟. Rather it 
comes across as authority – in Fox‟s words, it is „a relationship in 
which the superordinate is perceived by the subordinate as having the 
right to make decisions which must be accepted as binding‟26. At the 
same time, however, authority is a very fragile state. Having 
responsibility means that managers are constantly on trial. In Fox‟s 
words again,  
Authority is not an attribute which can be built into the social 
system rather as one builds-motive power into the technological 
system. It is a relationship which requires appropriate behaviours 
from both superordinate and subordinate. It is one in which the 
subordinate extends 'consent' to the order-giving role of the 
superior, i.e. legitimises the norms governing this relationship‟27.  
Any mistake or indiscretion very quickly becomes transparent and 
threatens to undermine managers‟ authority in the eyes of both 
colleagues and subordinates Authority is said to lie in the right to 
expect and command obedience. It will not do, however, to infer that 
authority exists simply because management norms have conferred 
this right upon certain specific roles. What if the subordinate does not 
acknowledge the right? It is he who confers legitimacy upon the 
superordinate's claim for obedience-or withholds it ... Perhaps 
inevitably, it is when they are uncertain about their positions and/or 
they suffer a loss of authority that managers fall back on resort to 
„power over‟. The problem is that the more they do this, the less 
chance there is of maintaining their authority. Furthermore, over-use 
of power over can become a habit, which becomes mutually re-
enforcing. Industrial action often occurs when managers overestimate 
the power they have. They go over the top. There is a strong adverse 
reaction, to which they feel they have to respond with the exercise of 
greater power creating a vicious spiral in the process.  
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Perhaps even more important in the tension is if managers open 
themselves to the charge that they are abusing their power „to‟. It 
could be when they lose their reputation for technical competence – 
for doing what they are paid to do. Or it could be when they are seen 
to be taking more out of the business than they are putting in - it could 
be higher pay or perks or status or privileges. This is above all true of 
situations in which employees are expected to pay the price for 
management failure in terms of redundancy or closure.  
The setting up of manufacturing operations in the UK of the 
Japanese car companies – Honda in Swindon, Nissan in Sunderland 
and Toyota near Derby – offers a good illustration of the point. 
Interviews with employees carry a very similar message. Japanese 
managers are tough and stand no nonsense but, unlike many of their 
UK or US counterparts, they are damn good at their job – producing 
reliable cars at affordable prices. Another reason for the respect in 
which they are held is that they seemingly show little of UK 
managers‟ interest in the trappings and status of management – they 
are very visible, wear the same overalls, share the same canteens and 
do not seem to be obsessed with the size of their company car. 
This example draws attention to some of the underlying and more 
elusive considerations in fully understanding the exercise of power. 
The different status and perceptions of the role of managers is not 
something that individual managers are wholly responsible for. They 
are deeply rooted in the wider society.  
The same is true of the relative status and importance accorded to 
the different management functions, which is so important in 
understanding the impact of corporate governance arrangements 
discussed in Chapter 8. Even the most cursory international 
comparison leads to the inescapable conclusion that there are 
fundamental cross-national differences that have very little to do with 
universally objective criteria. Rather they reflect the development of 
individual professions and occupations and the power/domination that 
they have been able to wield in the society. In the UK, the finance 
function and financial engineering enjoy a pre-eminent position 
reflecting the structure of financial markets and the raising of capital. 
In Germany, by contrast, the engineering/production function is much 
more powerful – partly because the status it enjoys in the higher 
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education system and partly because of the significance of the 
manufacturing sector more generally. Once in a position of such 
power these functions are able to wield considerable influence not just 
over the strategies of individual companies, but also business 
developments more generally. 
In any event, down through the years, there have been many ideas 
for resolving the tension between power „to‟ and power „over‟, even if 
they have not been framed in this language. Thus, in the 1920s, there 
was considerable emphasis on the leadership skills of supervisors and 
the need for training in human relations. In the 1950s and 1960s, as 
Chapter 2 pointed out, there was emphasis on job design and issues of 
work organisation. In particular, semi-autonomous team working 
came to be seen as the great panacea for alienation and involvement as 
well as cutting out excessive and expensive managerial hierarchies. In 
the words of Peters,  
There is ample evidence that … economic performance will 
increasingly depend on quality, service, constant 
innovation/improvement, and enhanced flexibility/ 
responsiveness. Committed, flexible, multi-skilled, constantly 
retrained people, joined together in self-managing teams, are the 
only possible implementers of this strategy‟28.  
Differences between managers and the managed also came to be 
seen as an issue, especially as Japanese manufacturers began to make 
the difference. From the early 1970s, there were significant moves 
towards single status terms and conditions that closed the gap on a 
wide range of highly symbolic differences such as canteen facilities 
and the funding of pensions. Open plan offices also came into vogue. 
The delegation of responsibility continues to carry most hopes. To 
paraphrase Worsely and Moynagh, it is expected that more and more 
companies will be forced by competitive pressures to increase their 
products‟ and services sophistication, requiring them to transform 
their workplaces
29
. Competitive pressures, technology and customer 
relations, in turn, encourage greater decentralisation and team 
working. Coupled with the increasing attention focusing on winning 
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commitment, it means that individual employees are likely to be given 
greater discretion.  
There is substantial evidence of significantly increased skill levels 
and that „the most prevalent employer policy with regard to work 
organisation has been a move towards „responsible autonomy‟‟30. Yet, 
as research is already showing, where workers have assumed new 
responsibilities and have had more involvement in work organisation, 
there is a strong tendency for managers to seek new forms of control. 
Most obviously there are rigorous performance targets, peer 
monitoring, frequent appraisals and other forms of surveillance. As 
authoritative bodies such as the UK‟s Audit Commission31 and the 
House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee
32
 have 
recognised in the case of public services, centralised and detailed 
targets, very often reflecting short-term political pressures, have 
considerably distorted management priorities as well as riding 
roughshod over local consultative processes. As well as “middle 
managers‟ resistance, worries about risk are also expected to seriously 
weaken the delegation of authority
33
.  
Other proposals have gone beyond what might be described as 
„hygiene‟ remedies to deal directly with the power imbalance. Thus 
the idea of some form of collective employee 'voice' has been strongly 
canvassed. Individual 'voice' mechanisms such as team briefings, 
quality circles and suggestions schemes may be necessary, but are not 
in themselves sufficient because they do nothing to affect the power 
relationship. Managers who resist collective forms are denying 
themselves an opportunity to hear how it really is. A second debate 
has taken place about the type of collective 'voice' mechanism. Many 
countries have introduced democratically-elected statutory works 
council-type institutions with rights ranging from information and 
consultation to co-determination. The weakness in this, goes the 
argument, is that such bodies are insufficiently independent. In the 
UK, in particular, rather than being posed as complementary, works 
council-type institutions have been seen as a threat to traditional 
collective bargaining, helping to explain the TUC's considerable 
ambivalence to the EU's 2005 national information and consultation 
directive. 
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It is also in the UK that attempts were made in the 1970s to 
promote the idea of „management by agreement‟ in the form of 
collective bargaining
34
. Here the starting point was Flanders‟ famous 
dictum, that if managers wanted to regain control, they would have to 
share it
35
. Arguably, it was employers‟ fear of having collective 
bargaining in the boardroom that it made it impossible to reach a 
consensus about worker directors on the Bullock Committee of 
Inquiry into industrial democracy in the mid 1970s. 
One idea that seems to survive – it appeared on the agendas of 
both main political parties in the UK's general election of 2010 - is 
that of worker cooperatives or labour-managed firms. In principle, in a 
truly competitive market economy, it should not matter whether it is 
capital that hires labour or labour that hires capital
36
. On the face of it, 
however, of the three main forms of control (the traditional share-
holder-managed, state enterprises and worker cooperatives or labour-
managed firms), the last would appear to be far superior in terms of 
shifting the balance from power 'over' to power 'to'. As Table 6.1 
suggests, worker cooperatives provide goods and services in ways that 
minimise the „economic autocracy‟ of the traditional (shareholder-
managed) firm. They are not exploitative in the way that such firms 
are – employees enjoy the fruits of their own labour. Excessive 
hierarchy can be avoided and appointments made to hierarchical 
positions in a way that promotes efficiency and commands general 
respect (which are two of Williamson‟s37 criticisms of traditional 
managerial hierarchies). Perhaps above all, to paraphrase Vanek
38
, 
whereas in the traditional shareholder-managed firm, people enter the 
equation with a negative sign as costs to be minimised, in the worker 
cooperative they and their development are central. Additionally, there 
are the social capital benefits that worker cooperatives bring. In the 
words of the International Co-operative Alliance, co-operatives are 
based on the values of „self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, 
equality, equity and solidarity‟; there is „concern for community‟ and 
employment is „an exercise in economic democracy‟39.  
Worker cooperatives are also not just abstract concepts. There are 
many of them and many varieties. In the UK, the highly profitable 
John Lewis Partnership (known as „Britain‟s favourite retailer‟), 
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employs almost 70,00 people in its department (John Lewis) and food 
(Waitrose) stores. In Spain's Basque country, the Mondragon 
Corporation employs over 92,000 people working in companies in 
finance, industry, and retail, along with a university and a number of 
technology centres. Arguably, too, although not a very good 
advertisement for the model, many banks and financial institutions 
have increasingly come to resemble worker cooperatives in as much 
as the interests of the workers come first. 
The obvious question is that, if worker cooperatives bring the 
advantages they appear to do, why are there not many more of them? 
Some of the reasons advanced turn on the practicalities of the 
operation of worker cooperatives and their relative efficiency. Critics 
argue that the decision making processes are not as dynamic as those 
in the traditional shareholder-managed business; that meeting both co-
operative aims and business needs requires complex management; that 
the different groups are prone to conflict; that cooperatives have 
difficulty in recruiting and/or retaining people with managerial 
abilities. Another line of explanation picks up the argument in Chapter 
4 about „path dependency‟ and critical mass. Moving from 
shareholder-managed firms to labour-managed ones would not be 
straightforward in an era when shareholding is much more dispersed 
than when Spedan Lewis transferred control of his company to its 
employees in 1950. Without a critical mass, it would also be difficult 
to convince people that this was a realistic proposition.  
The power considerations discussed earlier in this chapter also 
have to be taken into account. Worker cooperatives do not just mean 
that the power of managers is reduced. Much more fundamentally, 
there would not be the same opportunities for external shareholders to 
extract appropriate anything like the same level of 'rents' they are able 
to from traditionally-run businesses – arguably, the banks, with their 
very high levels of profits, being the exception that proves the rule. 
The advocacy of worker cooperatives by the two main parties in 
the UK's 2010 general election also needs to be put into context. In 
both cases, the proposals were targeted primarily at the public sector. 
Both parties may be sincere in the belief that their proposals would 
bring the kind of benefits outlined in the Statement on Co-operative 
Identity. It is difficult to escape the conclusion, however, that political 
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expediency was the main motivation and the earlier discussion of the 
'faces of power' highly relevant. Thus government and local 
authorities will continue to retain the ultimate power to set budgets 
and impose targets. Meanwhile, devolving day-to-day operations to 
bodies such as worker cooperatives means that policy makers will be 
able, to some extent, to distance themselves from responsibility for 
decisions that are likely to lead not just to a reduction in the services 
available, but also a loss of jobs and a worsening of services. As the 
„Comprehensive Spending Review‟ of October 2010 revealed, there 
will be deep cuts in public expenditure reflecting the rise of the 
national debt incurred in overcoming the banking and financial crisis 
of 2007-09.
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 Table 6.1 Three types of control structure
40
 
 
 Traditional Corporations 
(Shareholder-managed firms) 
State Enterprises 
 
Worker Cooperatives 
(Labour-managed firms) 
 
 Purpose 
Earn profit and increase value 
of shares 
Provide goods and services 
for citizens. 
Maximise net and real worth of all 
owners. 
Organisation 
 Organised and controlled by 
investors 
 Organised and controlled 
by state 
 Organised and controlled by 
worker-members 
 
 Incorporated under relevant 
incorporation laws - varies 
by country 
 Chartered by relevant 
level of government 
 Incorporated under relevant 
incorporation laws - varies by 
country 
 
 Except for closely held 
companies anyone may buy 
stock Stock may be traded in 
the public market 
 No stock 
 Only worker-members may own 
stock, one share per member No 
public sale of stock 
Ownership  Stockholders  State  Worker members 
Control  By Investors- managed form  By state  By worker members 
 
 Policies set by stockholders 
or board of directors. 
 Policy set by government 
planners. 
 Policy set by directors elected by 
worker-members, or by assembly 
of worker-members 
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Table 6.1 Three types of control structure (cont.) 
 
Sources of Capital 
 Investors, banks, pension 
funds, the public 
       The state 
 By members or lenders who have 
no equity or vote 
 
 From profitable subsidiaries 
or by retaining all or part of 
the profits 
 
 From net earnings, a portion of 
which are set aside for 
reinvestment 
Distribution of 
Net Margin 
Capital Dividends 
To stockholders on the basis of 
number of shares owned No 
limit, amount set by owner or 
Board of Directors 
     To the State 
To members after funds are set 
aside for reserves and allocated to a 
collective account Limited to an 
interest-like percentage set by 
policy 
Operating 
Practices 
 Owners or managers order 
production schedules and set 
wages and hours, sometimes 
with union participation 
 Managers order 
production schedules and 
set wages and hours, 
sometimes with union 
participation 
 Workers set production schedules 
either through elected boards and 
appointed managers or directly 
through assemblies 
 
 Working conditions 
determined by labour law 
and collective bargaining. 
 Working conditions 
determined by labour law 
and collective bargaining. 
 Working conditions determined 
by labour law and assembly of 
worker-members or internal 
dialogue between members and 
managers. 
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Changing expressions of conflict 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Explain why the employment relationship is 
characterised by conflict as well as cooperation  
 
 Review the manifest expressions of conflict at work  
 
 Consider the changing patterns of these expressions 
and the reasons for them 
 
Summary 
The employment relationship is characterised by conflict as well as 
cooperation, reflecting its enduring features and, in particular, an in-
built ‘structural antagonism’. Conflict, which can be defined as the 
discontent arising from a perceived clash of interests, can involve 
individuals and/or groups and take a number of expressions. The most 
manifest are disputes that employees initiate, either individually or 
collectively, in response to employer action such as a disciplinary 
charge or change in working practices or a refusal to meet a wage 
demand. ‘Other expressions’ include forms of ‘organisational 
misbehaviour’ such as working without cooperation, theft and 
sabotage. Absenteeism, accidents and resignations may also be 
indicators of discontent. In terms of patterns, the incidence of strikes 
has declined massively over the last twenty five years not just in the 
UK but other OECD countries as well. By contrast, individual 
disputes remain a prominent feature in the UK, with measures such as 
Employment Tribunal claims increasing substantially though still 
affecting a relatively small percentage of workplaces. Meanwhile, 
other expressions of conflict such as absenteeism and resignations 
show no signs of reducing. Yet, contrary to the relationship that this 
suggests, the different forms of conflict are not, in the most part, 
substitutes to one another, with the issues as well as the parties being 
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different. The more opportunities employees have to air their 
grievances, especially through employee ‘voice’ mechanisms, the 
more they are likely to do so. In the absence of these opportunities and 
mechanisms, conflict is likely to manifest itself in much higher levels 
of employee turnover. Legislative change may have played some part 
in the reduction in strike activity, but the fact that most countries 
experienced similar falls in recent years suggests that other factors 
were also at work. As well as a weakening in the structure of 
collective organisation, seen in reduced trade union density and 
bargaining coverage, these include shifts in the distribution of 
employment between sectors and occupations; increasing competition 
in both product and capital markets as a result of trade liberalisation 
and globalisation; an increase in human resource ‘professionalism’ 
and ‘proceduralisation’ reflecting the ‘juridification’ of employment 
relations; and a changing ideological context. 
 
Introduction: a ‘structured antagonism’ 
Conflict can be defined as the ‘discontent arising from a perceived 
clash of interests’1. Conflict at work can involve a variety of 
individuals and different groups. For example, different sections of 
employees may see their interests in conflict – demarcation disputes 
are a case in point. The same goes for the different functions of 
management or for managers at different levels of the organisation. 
Conflict at work may also reflect discontent with government policy 
that has significant implications for wages and conditions – an 
example would be the strikes in October 2010 protesting against the 
French government decision to raise the pension age as this text was 
being completed. It is normally thought of as something that arises 
from the conduct of the employment relationship, however, reflecting 
what has been described as an in-built ‘structural antagonism’2. 
Importantly, this does not necessarily mean that there is a general 
conflict of interest – as Chapter 2 stressed, employees have many 
interests that the employment relationship may serve. It does mean, 
though, that the potential for specific conflicts of interest is ever 
present and that the expressions of such conflicts, be they over the 
fixing of wages and conditions or the exercise of the employer’s 
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discretionary rights, is not just a matter of faulty procedures, ‘bad’ 
management or willful employees.  
The reason why conflict looms so large in employment relations is 
because of the enduring features of the employment relationship 
outlined in Chapter 3. Chief among these is the exploitative nature of 
the employment relationship. Employers 'exploit' employees in as 
much as they deploy their labour and/or knowledge power in order to 
meet their objectives which, in the case of private sector companies, is 
to generate a surplus. Unlike the independent worker, moreover, many 
employees have little or no say in how their labour or knowledge is 
deployed, reflecting the asymmetric or unequal power relationship 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
Also fundamentally important is the contradictory nature of the 
employment relationship. In as much as they 'sell' their labour and/or 
knowledge power to be used at the discretion of the employer's agents, 
the employment relationship involves employees in an act of 
submission or subordination. This means that, in democratic societies, 
the contrast between their organisational and civil lives could hardly 
be sharper. Employees as citizens are not only encouraged to have 
expectations about justice and due process, but also have the right to 
vote to determine those who govern them and the way that they 
govern. For those who have to manage it, the employment relationship 
is contradictory for different reasons. In as much as employees 
represent both a cost and an investment, compromises inevitably have 
to be made. They are under pressure to cut costs to be bone and yet at 
the same time have to motivate employees not just to obey managers’ 
instructions, but also to exercise their judgment and initiative. 
The fact that the employment relationship is indeterminate means 
that there is also great uncertainty, fuelling the prospect of divergent 
goals and interpretation. Contracts of employment, it will be recalled 
from Chapter 3 are ‘incomplete by design’, in the sense that the details 
of the work to be done are largely left to be decided by managerial 
direction: for employees, it is the equivalent of signing Simon's 'blank 
cheque'. For employers, the implications are no less profound. In 
effect, they are purchasing not a finite amount of work, as in the case 
of the labour service contract, but the employee's ability to work. 
Nothing is automatic about the employment relationship, however, 
and the exercise of the employer's ex post or residual control rights is 
far from straightforward. Managers need employees to do more than 
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simply comply with instructions. They need their co-operation and 
commitment to continuously improve performance. The sting in the 
tail is that the motivation and commitment so critical to performance 
reflect not just the economic return, but also the job satisfaction and 
emotional reward that people derive from their work. The upshot is 
that negotiation and the exercise of power are integral to work 
organisations, regardless of the presence of trade unions. 
Unlike the labour services agreement, the employment 
relationship is also continuous or open-ended. Being continuous 
means that there are more or less constant pressures on and 
opportunities for the parties to act opportunistically, i.e. to seek to 
adjust the exchange in their favour. Historically, it was employees and 
their trade unions that were most associated with such change and the 
focus was on terms and conditions. More recently, with intensifying 
pressure on business performance, it is managers who have come to 
the fore, with the emphasis shifting to 'continuous improvement' and 
'smarter working' as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Finally, as several previous chapters have emphasised, the 
employment relationship involves a complex ‘governance’ regime of 
institutions or rules. The scope for differences over both substance and 
process is considerable. Alongside a hierarchically-based structure 
dealing with work organisation and ‘performance management’ will 
be found statutory employment rights and collective agreement 
provisions (where trade unions are recognised), along with a raft of 
local informal norms (‘custom and practice’) and expectations of 
behaviour imported from the wider society. ‘Psychological contracts’ 
reflecting individual employee experience also have to be built into 
the equation. Encompassing such divergent paradigms, the 
relationship is by its very nature given to conflict as well as 
cooperation.  
In recognition of the potential for the employment relationship to 
give rise to conflict, governments have almost invariably intervened to 
minimise the impact. As well as encouraging the parties themselves to 
put in place procedures for resolving there differences, they have also 
introduced state-funded machinery for resolving both individual and 
collective disputes. As a later section describes, in some countries 
these are part of the general court system; in others there are specialist 
labour courts; in yet a further group, there specialist and independent 
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agencies such as employment tribunals with practitioner as well as 
legal involvement.  
 
Expressions of conflict 
Conflict at work cannot be measured – there may be considerable 
discontent that is hidden or suppressed. It is only the expressions of 
conflict that are visible and so quantifiable. The most manifest and 
popularly understood expressions are disputes that employees 
originate. These may be collective or individual. In the first instance, 
sometimes known as ‘organised’ conflict, a trade union or a work 
group is the instigator. It could be the result of a disagreement over the 
tangible benefits of the employment relationship such as wages and 
conditions reflecting the continuous nature of the relationship. Or it 
could involve the exercise of management's residual control rights 
and/the imposition of sanctions for what managers regard as breaches 
of discipline.  
The action could take the form of a strike or stoppage of work and 
other forms of industrial action such as overtime bans, work to rule 
and 'blacking' of work. It could be official or ‘unofficial’ action 
depending on whether it was sanctioned by the union – a key 
distinguishing feature of ‘organised’ conflict in the UK in the 1960s 
and 1970s was that it was largely autonomous, unofficial and 
informal.  
In the case of individual disputes, the conflict could result from 
managers acting in ways that employees deem to be unfair. It could be 
because the employee believes that they have been wrongly 
disciplined or dismissed or because they have been discriminated 
against. Inconsistency of treatment can also be an underlying 
consideration
3
. Again, a range of possibilities is involved. The most 
visible is the raising of a grievance or the pursuit of a claim to a labour 
court or employment tribunal. But there are also what have come to be 
known as ‘other expressions’ of conflict. These include forms of 
‘organisational misbehaviour’4 such as working without cooperation, 
theft and sabotage. Absence and resignation are also included. 
Obviously, not all such activity can be counted as conflict - 
absenteeism may reflect genuine sickness. Nonetheless, there is 
evidence that employees use absenteeism, accidents and resignations 
as forms of ‘exit’ from unsatisfactorily-regarded relationships when 
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more familiar, or more organised, forms of expression are either 
unavailable or are less attractive
5
.  
Although conflict at work is usually asociated with employee 
action, employers cannot be left out of the equation. As already 
indicated, most employee expressions take place in response to 
employer action reflecting disatisfaction with some element of the 
existing employment relationship – in the words of the US saying, 
‘management moves and the union grieves’. Such employer actions 
range from enforcing higher levels of performance and stricter 
application of disciplinary and dismissal procedures through 
outsourcing and subcontracting to redundancies and closures. Just as it 
takes two to tango, so it also takes two for there to be a strike – it is 
not so much the trade union claim that results in a strike; it is 
managers’ rejection of the claim. Managers may even ‘engineer’ a 
strike if it suits their circumstances – many strikes in the UK motor 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s, it has been suggested, took place 
following a period of over-production.  
Employers can also express their disatisfaction with the state of 
play more directly by taking ‘industrial action’ of their own. In the 
case of individual employees, they can use disciplinary procedures to 
deal with behaviour that they think is unacceptable. In the case of 
trade unions, they can resort to the lockout to deal with strikes or the 
threat of strikes. Although a rarity these days, employers’ 
organisation-orchestrated lockouts were the main offensive weapon 
which employers used to fashion their early relations with trade 
unions. As Chapter 4 emphasised, the lockout played an especially 
critical role in the development of the institutional framework of 
employement relations in countries such as Sweden and the UK.  
For the UK, there is also evidence of increased stress and bullying 
as the recession following the financial crisis has hit home. In the 
words of a Helpline Adviser from the North East in a recent Acas 
Policy Discussion Paper, 
There is a cascade of stress down the management chain. The MD 
shouts at senior management who takes it out on the line manager 
which in turn affects the employees. The uncertainty in companies 
is leading to more problems between colleagues. It is not 
necessarily being raised with employers as people are scared to be 
seen as making a fuss and problems can escalate quickly. 
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Changing patterns 
The decline of strikes 
There are a number of measures of strike activity. The main ones are 
the absolute number of strikes, the number of workers involved and 
the number of working days lost (WDL) as a result of industrial 
disputes and in most cases also the total number of employees. Of 
these, it is the third measure (WDL) that is the preferred indicator for 
most observers
6
. This is because, on their own, neither of the first two 
measures is a good indicator of the overall situation; WDL is also 
regarded to be less affected by statistical measurement problems in 
particular because of differences in statistical reporting by the 
individual countries of the ‘number of strikes’.  
Very clear, as Tables 7.1 and 7.2 confirm, is that, although major 
conflicts have far from disappeared, there has been a considerable 
decline in the number of WDL as a result of strikes. In the words of 
one recent European survey,  
In the 1970s, European employers and employees every year lost 
on average almost 420 working days for every 1000 employees 
through industrial conflict. In the 1980s this figure declined to 
200, in the 1990s to 56 and today seems to have stabilised at a 
level of just over 50 days lost, little more than an eighth of the 
level in the strike-prone 1970s ... In absolute figures, the number 
of working days lost (WDL) due to industrial conflict has fallen 
from over 48 million in the 1970s to just 7.2 million days today
7
. 
It is not just that there has been a decline in the number of very 
large and prolonged strikes, such as the British miners’ strike in 1984–
85 or those (mainly political) strikes in Italy and Spain in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The underlying trend for shorter and minor strikes also 
seems to show a decline. In Denmark, for instance, the level of WDL 
has dropped from around 70 per 1000 employees per year to 40 
disregarding large conflicts in the period from 1970 to 2003
8
. 
The decline has also been regardless of a country’s longer-term 
strike proneness. Countries such as Italy and Spain, which had almost 
twice the incidence of industrial conflict (both in terms of workers 
involved and of WDL) as in northern Europe in the 1970s, show a 
particularly dramatic decline. But there has also been decline in 
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countries that were in the middle of the pack (such as France) and at 
the other end of the spectrum (i.e. the Netherlands, Germany and 
Sweden). Even though there remain considerable differences between 
the countries in terms of relative strike-proneness, the variance has 
also become smaller than in the 1970s.  
Comparatively speaking, the UK used to be above the middle of 
the range for WDL, but since the 1990s has been in the middle or just 
below the middle. Further details of the trends in strike activity in the 
UK will be found in Table 7.3. 
The USA also shows strong evidence of a long term decline. US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics suggest that, throughout the period 1948-
1970, the number of WDL was never less than 150, with peaks of 
700+ in the late 1940s/early 1950s, 900+ in the early 1960s and 600+ 
in the early 1970s. Thereafter there has been more or less continuous 
decline. The average number of WDL in the 1990s was less that 50 
and in recent years has been even lower still
9
. 
A comparison by sector suggests a shift in the balance
10
. 
Historically, sectors such as mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
construction and transport tended to dominate the overall pattern. 
Although still prominent, they are less so than they used to be. In 
recent years it is the contribution of the public sector that has grown.  
 
Individual disputes 
Most countries have specialist procedures for dealing with disputes 
between individual employees and employers – the exception among 
the countries included in the comparison in the Appendix is the 
Netherlands, where such disputes are handled in the normal courts. In 
Germany and Sweden, there is a hierarchy of Labour Courts 
(Arbeitsgerichte and Arbetsdomstolen respectively). In the UK, there 
are Employment Tribunals (ETs) (originally named ‘Industrial 
Tribunals’) and in France Conseils de prud’hommes, both of which 
also have appeals to higher levels. A common feature is the relative 
accessibility of these bodies. In Germany and Sweden, the labour 
court comprises a legal chair plus social partner representatives, while 
in the UK they are accompanied by people of practical experience. In 
France, members of the Conseils de prud’hommes are elected every 
five years from lists put forward by trade unions and employers’ 
organisations.  
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Differences in jurisdiction and reporting arrangements make it 
difficult to compare the pattern of individual disputes between the 
countries. There are nonetheless two observations that can be made. 
First, there would appear to be considerable differences in the number 
of disputes going before the various bodies. At one end of the 
spectrum is Sweden, where the number of cases amounted to only just 
400 in 2008
11
. By contrast, the level in the other countries is 
considerably higher even allowing for the differences in the size of the 
workforce. In France, there were nearly 176,000 cases before the 
Conseils de prud’hommes in 200112. In Germany, the Arbeitsgerichte 
heard some 600,000 cases in 2007
13
. In the Netherlands, the number 
of dismissal cases alone amounted to around 70,000 in 2002
14
. 
Second, there is the rate of change. Here the UK stands out. As Table 
7.4 shows, the number of cases has risen considerably since the 
introduction of Employment Tribunals in 1965. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the number rarely exceeded 40,000 per annum; by 1995, it had 
grown to 100,000 – a level that has been exceeded in several years 
since
15
. In the other EU member countries, by contrast, the number of 
such disputes has been relatively stable or declining. In Germany, for 
example, the number of case fell by around a third between 1997 and 
2007. 
 
Other expressions of conflict 
Evidence from the UK suggest that only a minority of employees 
experiencing a problem at work choose any kind of formal approach 
to addressing their complaint. For instance, one review reports that 
only a quarter (24 per cent) of those who had experienced a problem at 
work had put their concern in writing to their employer and just three 
per cent had brought an ET case as a result of their complaints
16
. No 
data are available for the other countries, but it is likely that only a 
minority of problems similarly go beyond the workplace – in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden especially, most individual 
grievances would seem to be resolved in the workplace either by 
works councils (Germany and the Netherlands) or discussions 
between management and trade union officials (Sweden). 
The one other expression of conflict for which internationally 
comparative data are available is that of sickness absence. As Bonato 
and Lusinyan observe on the basis of Eurostat New Cronos data,  
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In the period 1995–2003, the share of employees [in Europe] on 
sickness leave was 2.8 per cent, on average, which is very close to 
the 2.6 per cent registered in the United States ... There are wide 
differences across countries, however. Absence seems to be 
particularly high in the Netherlands (6 per cent), Sweden (5.2 per 
cent), Norway (5.0 per cent) and the United Kingdom (3.9 per 
cent)
17
.  
The figures for France and Germany, the other countries included in 
the comparison in the Appendix, were 2.9 per cent and 1.5 per cent 
respectively. 
In percentage terms these figures do not amount to very much. In 
absolute terms, it is a different matter. Thus in the UK, fifty times as 
many days have been lost through absence in some recent years as 
through strikes. Absenteeism, according to the CBI, costs around 
£12.2 billion each year
18
. 
In most countries, Bonato and Lusinyan found that public sector 
employees were more likely to be on sick leave than those in the 
private sector, which to some extent reflects the large proportion of 
women in public employment. The difference in sickness absence 
between public and private sector is also wider in countries 
characterised by high overall absence. In Nordic countries, where the 
share of public sector employment is particularly large, this 
‘composition’ effect was deemed to be quite important. 
The review also confirmed that labour force characteristics are 
important in determining sickness absence. In particular, good health - 
proxied by life expectancy - and low labour force participation reduce 
absence. But age shows no significant independent impact. Gender is 
also important, with women more likely to be on sick leave than men. 
Working time arrangements have a significant impact too. In 
particular, while more flexibility— measured by the share of part-time 
employment and flexible working time arrangements— helps to 
reduce sickness absence, longer usual hours of work tend to increase 
it. The results also suggest that more flexible work arrangements 
reduce the impact of long working hours on attendance.  
It seems that absence levels do not change very much from year to 
year. There is some evidence, though, that they are procyclical in 
some countries. This is true, for example, of the Netherlands and 
Sweden, where there is a statistically significant relationship between 
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absence and the unemployment gap defined as the percentage 
deviation of the unemployment rate from its trend. 
In the UK, a range of data has been used to try to measure other 
expressions of conflict. One indicator is provided by Citizens Advice 
Bureaus (CABs), who record the number of employment-related 
problems raised with it bureaux each year. Another comes from the 
British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS). Since 1983 it has asked 
employees working 10 or more hours per week to rate relations 
between management and other employees at their workplace. WERS 
has asked a similar question of workplace managers in each of its five 
surveys. There is also a measure of overall job satisfaction, available 
from the British Household Panel Survey each year since 1991, 
The validity of tracking such attitudinal ratings of the employment 
relations climate over time can be questioned. As a recent review of 
the evidence points out, however, it is striking how uniform the 
message coming though appears to be. Employment-related problems 
reported to the CABs peaked in the mid-1990s. Similarly, whilst there 
are some fluctuations in the BSAS series from year to year, the 
prevalence of poor relations seemed to have risen in the BSAS 
through the 1980s and early 1990s, to reach a high point in the mid to 
late-1990s. A measure of overall job satisfaction, available from the 
British Household Panel Survey each year since 1991, also shows a 
peak in dissatisfaction in the mid-1990s, with another following in the 
late 1990s
19
.  
The reasons for this trend have not been firmly established. One 
study attributes the decline in job satisfaction in the mid to late-1990s 
to a decrease in task discretion and an increase in work 
intensification
20
. Data from BSAS point towards improvements in 
management style since the mid-1990s, which may well have 
contributed to better relations. A question which asks employees 
whether ‘management always try to get the better of employees if they 
get the chance’ is available only intermittently since 1984 but follows 
a broadly similar pattern to ratings of climate, showing a peak of 
discontent in mid to late 1990s. Responses to a question asking 
whether ‘the workplace is well managed’ follow the same broad 
pattern, with ratings falling between 1983 and 1993/4 and rising 
thereafter. There is also some evidence to suggest that material 
features of people’s jobs – and thus some potential sources of 
discontent – improved in the decade since the mid-1990s. Fitzner, for 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
218 
 
example, presents evidence of a decline in the risk of redundancy, a 
reduction in average working hours, and widespread gains in real 
wages over the past ten years
21
. However, as previous chapters have 
suggested, circumstances have changed in the wake of the financial 
crisis – in the words of the Acas Policy Discussion Paper already 
quoted, ‘Growing unemployment, downward pressure on wages and 
greater uncertainty over job security inevitably increase the strain on 
workplace relationships and the potential for conflict’22. 
 
Challenging questions 
A substitution effect? 
An initial question that is begged by the preceding discussion is 
whether the different expressions of conflict are substitutes for one 
another; whether, in particular, individualised conflict is the ‘flipside’ 
of the decline in union power and collective action
23
. Certainly, in the 
case of the UK, Tables 7.3 and 7.4 appear to suggest that the growth 
in ET applications is the mirror image of the decline in collective 
disputes. Moreover, these trends taken together bolster arguments that 
the fall in trade union membership and coverage of collective 
bargaining has refracted in the wider individualisation of the 
employment relationship. 
Yet closer inspection of the data suggests that this portrayal may 
be over-simplistic. None of the other countries, it will be recalled, has 
experienced an increase in individual disputes going before the formal 
machinery. The relationship in the UK is also far from 
straightforward. For it is not just a case of the actors being different, 
but also the issues. Except in rare cases such as a walkout in support 
of sacked colleagues, collective action has typically been prompted by 
concerns about pay levels, other general terms and conditions, and 
redundancies. In contrast, ET claims have typically been concerned 
with underpayment (rather than levels) of wages, unfair selection for 
dismissal or discriminatory behaviour. Furthermore, ET claims are 
rarely brought in the context of a continuing employment relationship. 
In the case of unfair dismissal claims, for example, re-employment has 
long been regarded as the ‘lost remedy’.  
It remains to be seen whether this pattern is changing. The recent 
growth in multiple ET cases involving a single issue (or set of issues) 
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affecting a number of people in the same workplace or organisation 
suggests it might be. Indeed, the Gibbons report into dispute 
resolution attributes the growth in multiple cases directly to collective 
issues, commenting that the rate of such cases ‘fluctuates substantially 
because it is heavily influenced by large scale disputes’24. The equal 
pay 'multiples' described earlier, many of which are union led, are the 
most notable example.
25
  
 
The role of institutions 
A second question concerns the role of different institutional 
arrangements in either promoting or resolving underlying feelings of 
discontent. Conflict can be ignored, suppressed or resolved as well as 
lead to disputes. Other things being equal, though, it is more likely to 
evolve into a dispute when there is a recognised vehicle for 
articulating concerns that employees believe offers the prospect of 
resolving the issue at stake. If there are no collective disputes or 
grievance procedures, workers are less likely to be able to raise their 
concerns within the workplace and so are more likely to ‘resolve’ the 
conflictual situation by quitting. In the UK, the WERS evidence from 
sectors such as 'Hotels and restaurants' and 'Other business services' 
supports this point. Workplaces here not only register the lowest 
levels of grievances and ET claims along with the lowest levels of 
grievance procedures, but also report above average rates of voluntary 
resignations
26
.  
The UK evidence also supports the idea that workplace 
representation encourages the internal resolution of disputes. Thus, 
workplaces with representative ‘voice’ arrangements involving trade 
unions report much higher levels of collective disputes and grievances 
than those that do not. By contrast, the average rate for ET claims per 
1000 employees is much lower in unionised workplaces than non-
unionised ones.  
As for the association between 'voice'/'agency' mechanisms and 
other expressions of conflict, WERS suggests that that representative 
‘voice’ arrangements are associated with comparatively low rates of 
disciplinary sanctions and resignations, whereas the opposite is true of 
workplaces with no voice or non-union ‘voice’. On the other hand, 
perhaps more surprisingly, workplaces with no ‘voice’ or non-union 
‘voice’ report lower levels of absenteeism. Arguably, it is the greater 
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exposure to the dynamics of workplace debates, together with their 
awareness of the possibility of conflict and disputes, that also helps to 
explain the higher proportion of employees in these ‘voice’ 
workplaces reporting ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ relations between 
managers and employees. Overall, it seems that workplaces with no 
‘voice’ mechanisms are characterised by strong disciplinary regimes 
in which the main expression of conflict takes the form of employees 
exiting from the organisation.   
Looking across countries, one issue is the relationship between the 
pattern of strikes and the level of collective bargaining – in particular, 
whether it is multi-employer or single-employer. Other things being 
equal in countries characterised by multi-employer bargaining strikes 
tend to be rarer but larger, reflecting the number of workers covered 
by collective agreements. A similar pattern is observable in the public 
sector in the UK. There also appears to be an association between the 
pattern of strikes and the role of the state. In the ‘Latin’ countries of 
France, Italy and Spain there is a stronger tradition of the 
‘demonstration’ stoppage designed to promote government 
intervention, helping to explain the relative size of strikes. 
As for the incidence of individual disputes, perhaps the most 
striking, if not surprising, conclusion turns on the balance between 
reliance on legal regulation as opposed to collective bargaining. The 
greater the reliance on legal regulation, it seems, the greater the 
incidence of tribunal and labour court applications. Germany, France 
and the Netherlands, for example, have very high levels of 
applications. In Sweden, on the other hand, where collective 
bargaining is the more accepted way of doing things, there is 
proportionately much less resort to the court system - the numbers are 
in the hundreds rather than the many thousands of the other 
countries
27
. Historically, the UK was closer to Sweden – the tribunal 
system did not come into being until 1965. Increasingly, however, as 
Table 7.4 suggests, the UK has moved closer to those countries with a 
longer tradition of legal involvement in the handling of individual 
disputes. 
In discussing the causes of sickness absence, Bonato and  
Lusinyan find a strong connection between the levels of absence and 
the generosity of sickness and the unemployment insurance system
28
. 
They go on to suggest that, in Sweden, the relationship is substantially 
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stronger than the cross-country average, more than twice as large. 
Absence is also lower when employers bear larger costs of sickness 
insurance. Characteristics of labor market institutions affect the 
absence rate in different ways, both directly and through their 
interaction with the business cycle and sickness insurance provisions. 
Employment protection has a significant positive impact on absence 
rates both directly and when interacted with the unemployment gap. 
 
Why the decline in strike activity? 
A third and especially challenging question is why the trends in 
disputes have taken the pattern they have and why, in particular, there 
has been such a significant decline in collective disputes. The 
following paraphrases Scheuer’s summary of the explanations 
suggested in the literature: 
Labour law and changes in the legal framework. In the UK, there has 
been a great deal of emphasis on the legal dimension - the programme 
of legislative change to restrict the activities of trade unions, instituted 
in Britain under the Thatcher governments in the 1980s. In Metcalf’s 
words, 'the strike threat ... was weakened by a succession of laws 
which permitted a union to be sued, introduced ballots prior to a 
strike, and outlawed both secondary and unofficial action'
29
. However, 
whilst legislative change may have played some part, the fact that 
most countries have also experienced substantial falls in collective 
disputes over this period suggests that other factors were also at work. 
As Chapter 9 argues, there is also a case for suggesting that it is not so 
much legislation dealing with trade unions and collective bargaining 
that has had influenced strike activity. More important has been 
legislation dealing with individual employment rights: ‘juridification’ 
has encouraged a shift away from ‘collectivism’ towards 
‘individualism’. 
Declining trade union density. The most evident explanation for the 
decline in strike activity is the general weakening of trade union 
organisation that is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. Yet it 
cannot be the only explanatory factor. For even in countries where 
trade union membership has been relatively stable, such as Sweden, 
strike levels have dropped significantly.  
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Declining collective bargaining coverage: Certainly there has been a 
decline in the coverage of collective bargaining in some countries as 
Chapter 9 also describes in more detail. But such decline is by no 
means universal because of legal provisions for extending the terms 
and conditions of collective agreements. Furthermore, countries such 
as France and Germany have high levels of collective bargaining 
coverage, but their levels of industrial conflict vary substantially. 
Unemployment levels. Unemployment may have played a role in 
earlier periods
30
. Judging from the patterns, however, it is clear that 
neither the decline in industrial conflict nor the cross-national 
variation can be adequately explained by unemployment levels. While 
industrial conflict fell in concert with increasing unemployment in the 
1970s, the recovery of employment in the 1980s and onwards was not 
accompanied by increasing strike activity, neither generally nor in 
those countries benefiting most from labour market improvement. 
Sectoral and occupational changes. It has long been argued that the 
shift from manufacturing to services, along with the associated trend 
in employment from manual worker to salaried employee, adversely 
affects solidarity and militancy. In practice, however, increased public 
employment may have increased the tendency to strike (because of the 
centralisation of collective bargaining and a high degree of 
employment security); conversely, increases in the private service 
sector and the ‘knowledge economy’ may pull in the opposite 
direction. Increasing privatisation may have contributed to a 
downward trend in strikes, but this can only have been a major factor 
in recent years. 
Globalisation. The strengthening of the EU internal market, together 
with the gradually increasing liberalisation of global trade through the 
World Trade Organisation, entails less state protection and state 
financial intervention to safeguard employment. Consequently, 
striking for state support for ailing producers such as shipyards has 
much less appeal. At the same time, globalised competition means 
that, should they strike, employees may see their jobs going ‘off-
shore’ to lower cost countries. That said, there is no evidence that 
differential exposure to international economic forces can help explain 
cross-national variations in WDL. In the UK, trade liberalisation and 
globalisation would appear to have been especially important in 
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accounting for the decline of collective disputes in manufacturing. 
Intensifying competitive pressures in an increasingly global market 
place not only helps to explain the demise of many of the larger 
workplaces where collective action took place, such as in the 
automotive sector, but also a decline in such action in the workplaces 
that remain. Survival has become the name of the game, raising the 
cost of collective disputes to both employers and employees.  
Individualisation. A change in the balance of risks and opportunities 
may make strikes a less attractive option for employees who are more 
individualistically oriented, with a higher estimate of the sacrifices 
involved and a lower expectation of gains. If this is the case, however, 
the increase in individualisation has to be explained, which means 
taking into account the other factors that have already been 
considered.  
Embeddedness. This takes us back to Chapter 4 and the discussion of 
‘path dependency’. Scheuer puts the point like this,  
national traditions of either high or low conflict may become 
established over time and shape the behaviour of the industrial 
relations actors. Within countries, one may likewise observe such 
learned patterns in particular companies or industries … 
Institutional factors may be judged to play a substantial role: 
legal–regulative institutions affect the dynamics of industrial 
conflict, while normative or cultural–cognitive institutions play a 
role in explaining national variation. In sum, strikes are often 
based on and have to be understood as rational calculations, 
embedded in an institutional system, which to a large extent 
affects the actual calculation: not necessarily economic, however, 
for calculations may be value-based
31
. 
Turning to individual disputes, it is the seemingly inexorable rise 
of ET cases in the UK that stands out. Arguably, it is here that the law 
has played a critical role, with what has been termed the ‘explosion’ in 
individual employment rights extending the effect of legality into 
areas of the employment relationships which had previously been a 
matter of voluntary determination
32
. The expansion, which reflects 
developments in the EU's social dimension as well as British 
governments' domestic agendas, means that more areas of working life 
and more employees are covered by the law, as they have been for 
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much longer in the other countries. At the beginning of the 1980s, 
there were around 20 individual employment rights under which an 
employee may bring a claim. By 2008, there were in excess of 60
33
. 
Yet it is not just the growth in rights that has contributed to the rise in 
claims, but frequent changes in the law stemming from the 
‘uncertainty’ experienced by employees and employers about their 
respective responsibilities and obligations. Moreover, those rights 
which have been introduced also rarely involved a collective 
representation role in their enforcement, thereby contributing to the 
individualisation of the employment relationship
34
.  
But underlying considerations were almost certainly also of 
relevance. These include a greater awareness of the system 
encouraged by landmark cases attracting considerable press attention. 
Telling here is that the rise in applications does not just reflect an 
increase in the number of employment rights. The incidence of those 
claims against underpayment of wages, breach of contract and unfair 
dismissal (though the latter is subject to greater fluctuation) which 
continue to be the main issues of contention, has risen even if their 
overall proportion has fallen. As Burgess and his colleagues suggest, it 
is difficult to escape the conclusion that a key factor has been an 
increase in the average value of awards over the period - in part due to 
the raising of the ceiling of awards and, in the case of discrimination, 
the lifting of any ceiling to comply with European law
35
. 
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Table 7.1 Annual average WDL per year in 15 European 
Countries by decade, 1970–200336 
 
 
Period       Dependent  WDL (000)  Simple   Weighted   
    employment (000)   average   average 
 
1970–79  115,342   48,280   351   419 
 
1980–89  129,807   25,947   175   200 
 
1990–99  147,640  8,278   70   56 
 
2000–03  142,511   7,257   44   51 
 
Note: Simple average is average of averages of countries (disregarding country size). 
Weighted average is calculated on aggregate numbers, as shown in the table. 
Countries are those with available data for almost the whole period: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Western Germany until 1993), 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom. 
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Table 7.2 Annual average strike participation per 1000 employees, 
1970–200337 
 
Country        1970–1979          1980–1989          1990–1999          2000–2003 
 
Denmark  41.4   39.5   39.6   26.3 
Finland  174.5   136.0   38.3   28.2 
Norway   4.0   13.6   10.2   11.4 
Sweden   4.9 2  8.4   7.4   5.4 
Ireland   34.2   37.3   11.9   12.3 
UK   70.6   47.7   8.5   14.1 
Austria  na   4.2   4.9   2.7 
Germany na   na   4.3   3.7 
Switzerland  0.3   0.2   0.8   3.7 
France  90.2   6.5   0.8   0.6 
Belgium  23.3   7.8   3.4   2.8 
Netherlands 5.1   3.8   4.7   3.0 
Portugal  na   17.7   17.8   8.6 
Italy  491.4   318.9   91.3   112.9 
Spain   221.0   271.3   173.3   162.8 
 
 
Average  96.8   66.6   27.8   26.6 
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Table 7.3 The changing pattern of strikes in the UK
38
 
 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, official statistics showed a decline in 
strike activity, with this being seen most obviously in the falling 
number of stoppages. The number of working days lost also showed a 
decline, albeit with a shallower gradient, if one excludes the ‘spikes’ 
in the series caused by the ‘winter of discontent’ and the miners’ 
dispute (which alone accounted for over 80 per cent of days lost in 
1984). Even so, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the average number 
of days lost per year in stood at around seven  million working days in 
official records, or 300 days per 1000 employees. Each successive 
year between 1986 and 1994 registered the lowest number of 
stoppages since World War 2, however, with the numbers of 
stoppages and working days lost stabilising at these historically low 
levels since 1994. Thus, by the early years of the twenty-first century, 
days lost to officially-recorded stoppages stood at around 0.5 million 
per annum or just 20 days per 1000 employees.  
In the 1980s, the first two Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
(WIRS) surveys showed the extent to which strikes were either 
concentrated or dispersed across workplaces in the economy. The first 
survey showed that one in ten workplaces (11 per cent) had 
experienced some strike action in the year 1979-1980 - one in five in 
private manufacturing and one in seven in the public sector, but fewer 
than one in twenty in private services.  
These data also that, in 1980, manufacturing establishments 
accounted for almost two-fifths of all workplaces experiencing strike 
or non-strike action, but less than one fifth in 1984. Public sector 
workplaces, in contrast, had become more prone to industrial action. 
Having accounted for one half of all workplaces experiencing such 
action in 1980, they accounted for over two-thirds in 1984 – a 
dominance that they retain to the present day.  
The third WIRS in 1990 and the fourth in 1998 confirmed the 
steep decline in strike action - the overall proportion of workplaces 
experiencing any form of industrial action came down from one in 
eight to just one in fifty. The receding power of trade unions in the 
private sector was one part of the story, but not obviously to any 
greater extent than in previous periods. More notable in the 1990s, it 
seemed, was the changing experience of the public sector. Here, 34 
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per cent of workplaces reported some form industrial action in 1990, 
but in 1998 that figure stood at just 5 per cent.  
The period since 1998 has seen relative stability in the survey 
estimates of the incidence of strike action among private sector 
workplaces, with the percentages experiencing either official or 
unofficial action standing at or below 2 per cent in both private 
manufacturing and private services. There was, however, a rise in the 
public sector between 1998 and 2004. One in seven public sector 
workplaces experienced industrial action in the year preceding the 
2004 survey, commonly a strike or employees’ ‘working to rule’, 
compared with one in twenty in 1998. This helps to explain the most 
notable trend in official statistics in recent years, which has been the 
rise in the number of workers involved per stoppage. This has arisen 
as the result of the decline in private sector stoppages, with national 
public sector disputes now dominating the statistics to a greater degree 
than ever before.  
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Table 7.4 The changing pattern of Employment Tribunal cases in 
the UK
39
 
 
Following the introduction of unfair dismissal legislation in the 1960s, 
there was a steady growth in ' case load, with the total volume of 
applications growing four-fold to just over 41,000 by 1980. These 
were located largely under unfair dismissal and redundancy pay 
jurisdictions, though claims relating to equal pay and to sex and race 
discrimination were also within the ETs' scope. The 1980s saw a small 
downward trend with applications falling to 29,000 in 1988. Here the 
steady growth in cases relating to equality issues plus a new right to 
claim against infringement of wages payments was offset by a small 
decline in unfair dismissal cases. In the 1990s, there was considerable 
overall growth, with cases soaring to in excess of 100,000 by 1999 
and reaching 130,000 in 2000/2001. It was during this period that 
employees were given new rights to bring cases relating to Breach of 
Contract, and discrimination on grounds of disability (1995) and age, 
sexual orientation and religion or belief (2006). Applications have 
remained high, albeit with fluctuations, peaking again in 2006/7 when 
132,500 applications were registered.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, the subject matter of applications has 
changed with the coming of new rights. In 1986, unfair dismissal 
represented three quarters of claims and in 2008, 40 per cent. In the 
same year, discrimination cases around 15 per cent of all applications. 
There has also been an increase in the volume of applications 
involving more than one issue. In 1998, according to Acas' Annual 
Report, just under half of all applications in the preceding year had 
two or more jurisdictions, compared with only around one third in the 
year before that. In 2006/7, 132,500 registered claims covered a mix 
of 238,500 jurisdictions or an average of 1.8 per claim.  
Another indicator of complexity is the level of representation. In 
the mid-1980s around four in every ten applicants were represented. 
Twenty years later, according to the 2004 ‘Survey of Employment 
Tribunal Applications’ (SETA), 55 per cent of applicants and 59 per 
cent of employers had a representative handling their case, whilst 
most others had sought active professional support.  
A further feature of the current caseload is the incidence of 
multiple claims involving more than one applicant bringing the same 
case against the same employer. In 2005/6, 55 per cent of the total 
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claims received were multiple claimant, a sizeable proportion of 
which related to equal pay claims brought against local authorities in 
relation to the 1997 national agreement to seek ‘single status’ of pay 
across employees.  
Overall, the WERS series suggests that, in spite of the growth, ET 
claims affect only a minority of workplaces. Between 1980 and 1990, 
around 10 per cent of workplaces with twenty five or more employees 
experienced a claim in the year preceding the survey, the figure rising 
to 13 per cent and 15 per cent in subsequent WERS. WERS data also 
accord with other sources in suggesting that it is medium-sized 
businesses that generate a disproportionate share of claims. The 
suggestion is that medium-sized organisations are caught between two 
posts, being disadvantaged by the absence of the close working 
relationships characterising small firms yet at the same time not 
benefiting from the formality of the larger ones. 
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Understanding management  
 
Main tasks 
 
 Understand why there has been far less change in 
work organisation than many pundits expected 
 
 Discuss the nature of management’s role – 
whether, in particular, management is a ‘strategic 
actor’ or a ‘systems actor’  
 
 Highlight the reasons for and consequences of the 
‘permanent restructuring’ that characterises 
management behaviour in recent years 
 
 
Summary 
It is management, defined as a group of people with responsibility to 
the board of directors or its equivalent for running the organisation, 
which exercises the discretionary rights that are the employment 
relationship‟s distinguishing feature. Historically, in comparison with 
trade unions and the state, management seemed to be a relatively 
unproblematic, if not unimportant, employment relations actor. 
Seemingly, it had settled for a particular way of doing things and to be 
more concerned with maintaining the status quo than changing it. 
Increasingly, however, there is a consensus that management has 
become the major force for change in the arrangements governing the 
employment relationship, reflecting increasing competition in capital 
as well as product markets. The nature and extent of change, however, 
are far from straightforward. At workplace level, there is little 
evidence of the changes in work organisation and strategic approach 
that a wide range of commentators expected and/or have called for. At 
company level, the situation is very different. Developments such as 
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„divisionalisation‟, „budgetary devolution‟ and „marketisation‟ have 
resulted not just in radically different ways of controlling workplaces, 
but also fundamental changes in the shape and size of companies. 
Coupled with the emphasis on „shareholder value‟ that developments 
in „financialisation‟ are encouraging, the result is more or less 
„permanent restructuring‟ making it difficult to develop any 
consistency of approach. Employees are also being required to work 
harder at the same time as the security associated with the traditional 
model of the employment relationship declines. The extent of these 
changes nonetheless differs from one country to another reflecting the 
different the „varieties of capitalism‟ and legal systems. This is 
because management is not so much a „strategic actor‟ as a „systems 
actor‟. It is an agent of the prevailing form of capital, driven by a logic 
of efficiency, but influenced by the interplay between two sets of 
deeply embedded institutions: on the one hand, those of employment 
relations and, on the other, those of corporate governance and finance. 
Arguably, of these two sets, it is the second that is the more important, 
becoming ever more so with the development of a global market for 
capital. 
 
Introduction: the ‘great conundrum’ 
The term „management‟ can be used to refer to three very different 
things: a process, i.e. planning, controlling, co-ordinating, developing, 
motivating, leading etc; a resource that brings together land, labour 
and capital to produce goods and services; and a group of people, 
comprising a range of positions from that of supervisor through to 
chief executive, with responsibility to the board of directors or its 
equivalent for running the organisation
1
. The primary focus in 
employment relations is on the third of these - it is managers who 
exercise the discretionary rights that are the employment 
relationship‟s distinguishing feature. As Chapter 4 pointed out, there 
are three main areas where the managerial hierarchy finds expression. 
Most attention focuses on personnel policies and practice, which 
covers recruitment and selection, training, appraisal, reward and 
discipline. Also important, however, are decisions about the nature of 
work organisation and the wider arrangements for the coordination 
and control encapsulated in the term „organisation structure‟. 
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Historically, as Chapter 4 pointed out, most employment relations 
commentators paid no more than perfunctory attention to 
management‟s role. By comparison to trade unions and the state, 
management seemed to be a relatively unproblematic, if not 
unimportant, actor. Three main types of control emerged reflecting the 
thinking of the likes of Weber
2
, Fayol
3
 and Taylor
4
, together with the 
experience of „command and control‟ in the armed forces: „direct 
control‟ via supervision, „technical control‟ in form of machine-paced 
technology, and „bureaucratic control‟ involving rules and procedures. 
For the most part, the day-to-day exercise of these controls was 
largely seen as an administrative function involving first-line 
supervisors supported by relatively low status personnel managers, 
many of whom were involved in welfare activities.  
It was fear of „organised‟ or collective conflict that ensured that 
the management of the employment relationship figured prominently 
on companies' agendas, helping to explain why management-trade 
union relations came to comprise the core of industrial relations 
studies. In some cases, for example in the USA, the determination to 
keep trade unions out of the workplace was a major factor in the 
development of welfare practices
5
; in others, such as Germany, 
employers supported alternative „company unions‟. In the UK, where 
craft unions were able to entrench themselves in the workplace in 
industries such as engineering, management resorted to lock-outs to 
impose „procedures for the avoidance of disputes‟. In most countries, 
prodded and prompted by governments anxious to institutionalise 
conflict, management agreed to make many of the rules and 
procedures of „bureaucratic control‟ the subject of collective 
bargaining with trade unions as a means of legitimating their 
authority. For reasons that Chapter 4 explained, this was above all true 
at moments of political and economic crisis such as the periods 
following the two World Wars, in the case of the European countries, 
or the depression years of the 1930s in the USA. Yet such agreement 
was not unconditional: collective bargaining involved a process of 
mutual recognition in which trade unions were de facto required to 
recognise management‟s right to manage. Seemingly, management 
was not unhappy with these arrangements – in the years that followed, 
most of the focus centred on maintaining the status quo than changing 
it. To paraphrase Dunlop, management was one of a number of actors 
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working within an industrial relations system of institutions, processes 
and rules shaped by technology, markets and the balance of power in 
the wider society: it was assumed to share the same interests or 
'ideology' of the state and trade unions in having a relatively stable 
framework within which it could get on with the tasks of planning, 
controlling and co-ordinating the business‟ activities6.  
From the 1980s, as Chapter 4 suggested, interest in management 
moved centre stage reflecting the view that it had become the major 
force for change in the arrangements governing the employment 
relationship. A widespread consensus seemingly emerged among 
analysts, governments and international agencies about the why and 
wherefore of this development: management had to modify the 
traditional control structures associated with hierarchy, bureaucracy 
and specialisation because of the changing nature of competition. The 
starting point was the recognition that people were not simply one of 
the factors of production along with money and machinery, but the 
major source of competitive advantage – in the UK, People: the Key 
to success was the title of a 1987 National Economic Development 
Office/Manpower Services publication. The prescription implied not 
just a change in beliefs and assumptions. In the case of work 
organisation, increasing employees‟ participation in the design of 
work processes was recommended, along with the sharing of task-
specific knowledge, with the emphasis on semi-autonomous team 
working with managers assuming the role of enablers and developers. 
In the case of personnel policies and practices, the emphasis was to be 
on „high performance working‟ – coupling team working with 
individualised training and development, along with performance 
management linked to reward systems to enhance commitment and 
involvement. The specialist function was also to drop its „Cinderella‟ 
image and shift from the largely administrative role associated with 
personnel management and take on responsibility for ensuring a more 
strategic approach that aligned policies and practices with business 
strategy.  
Much of the thinking had its roots in the neo-human relations 
school associated with the likes of Maslow
7
, Herzberg
8
 and 
McGregor
9
. This recognised that labour was not a commodity and 
motivation was management‟s main problem. Also increasingly 
important was the „resource based view‟ discussed in Chapter 3. It 
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was the changing context of business, however, that provided the main 
impetus. Especially important here was the growing dominance of 
Japanese companies in highly visible sectors such as cars and 
electronics arising from their use of new 'lean production' methods 
such as 'just-in-time', kaizen  („continuous improvement‟), and the 
direct participation of the workforce. Bearing in mind the emergence 
of low cost manufacturers, above all in China, the status quo was 
deemed to be unsustainable: the future lay with quality products and a 
quality workforce. Moving into the new millennium, intensifying 
competition and/or pressure on scarce resources, coupled with the 
growing importance attached to the notions of the 'knowledge 
organisation' and „knowledge economy‟, supposedly reinforced these 
imperatives - more and more companies would be forced by 
competitive pressures to increase the sophistication of their products 
and services, requiring them to transform their workplaces
10
.  
In practice, however, even allowing for the cross-national 
differences discussed in Chapter 2, most features of work organisation 
have proved to be extremely durable. In over-viewing developments, 
one commentator puts it like this: 
When compared with the momentous changes we've witnessed 
over the past half century in technology, life styles, and geo-
politics, the practice of management seems to have evolved at a 
snail's pace. While a suddenly resurrected 1960s era CEO would 
undoubtedly be amazed by the flexibility of today's real-time 
supply chains and the ability to provide 24/7 customer service, he 
or she would find a great many of today's  management rituals 
little changed  from those that governed corporate life a 
generation or two ago. Hierarchies may have gotten flatter but 
they haven't disappeared. Front-line employees may be smarter 
and better trained, but they're still expected to line up behind 
obediently behind executive decisions. Lower-level managers are 
still appointed by more senior managers. Strategy still gets set at 
the top … 11 
For the UK, Table 8.1 summarises the detailed results of the 2004 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), which are 
consistent with the findings of the European Foundation‟s working 
conditions surveys outlined in Chapter 2. There is certainly little 
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evidence of autonomous team working and the bundles of practices 
associated with 'high performance working'; the number of 
workplaces with a comprehensive strategy also appears to be very 
small. Although there appears to be a new breed of HR managers, who 
are better qualified and have greater responsibilities, there are few 
signs of them getting a seat at the top table. At the same time, 
however, it appears that there has been a considerable increase in 
performance management; there is also a close relationship between 
those that adopt a more strategic approach and two key variables: the 
extent of changes taking place and the significance of labour costs.  
 
‘Systems actor’ rather than ‘strategic actor’ 
Arguably, the main reason for failing to understand what was 
happening or, rather, not happening, was that observers were looking 
at management through the wrong lens. For much of the 1980s and 
1990s the conventional wisdom was to see management as a „strategic 
actor‟. In part, as Chapter 1 pointed out, this reflected a growing 
recognition that the original systems model of industrial relations 
associated with Dunlop was seriously limited – industrial relations 
could not be treated as a self-contained world in isolation from wider 
society, while management behaviour could not simply be explained 
in terms of its dealings with trade unions and governments. In part, it 
reflected the growing importance being attached to „strategy‟ and 
„strategic choice‟ in the social sciences more generally12. Thus, rather 
than being regarded as members of an interlocking employment 
relations system working to its own internal logic, management, trade 
unions and governments came to be seen as 'agents' who shape the 
environment in which they operate and who are also influenced by 
forces from outside the world of employment. By implication, the 
environment does not determine behaviour; the parties - above all, the 
management of the large companies - have some discretion or choice 
in deciding what courses of action or strategies to follow. As Chapter 
4 suggested, the most explicit use of the „strategic choice‟ approach is 
to be found in the work of Kochan and his colleagues in the USA, 
where it was almost elevated to the status of a theory
13
. Management 
is seen as a strategic actor in two particular senses: its actions are held 
to be critical not only in determining the choice of business strategy to 
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be pursued, but also the main changes taking place in employment 
relations.  
Although the approach's focus on the purposive behaviour of the 
parties, rather than on the outcome of some form of autonomous 
system working to its own logic, was a positive step, it arguably made 
a number of highly questionable assumptions. One is that strategy 
formulation is a straightforward process. But, as business theorists 
have increasingly recognised, strategy is a most problematic 
concept
14
. At best, strategies, understood as a sense of a direction, 
emerge as a result of a series of decisions made by people at many 
levels in the organisation; they involve continual reassessments and 
readjustments of position. Depending on the particular ways in which 
management runs the organisation, strategies, in the sense of a set of 
medium- and long-term plans, may not emerge at all; there may 
simply be a series of vague statements or a few key financial ratios. In 
the circumstances, it may not be feasible to expect the detailed 
integration of personnel policies and practices implied in the 
prescription of Kochan and his colleagues, let alone the fundamental 
shift in attitudes and behaviours entailed, for example, in managing a 
change in culture or task participation.  
A second, crucial, assumption is that managers have the degree of 
choice with which they are credited. Clearly, managers, especially 
those who run large private sector companies, have enormous 
resources at their disposal and a significant measure of control over 
large numbers of employees. Yet they still may not be willing or able 
to shape their environment in ways that may seem logical to the 
analyst. To go back to the discussion in Chapter 4, management is not 
immune to the pressures of „path dependency‟. Each of the three 
considerations regarded as particularly important in explaining why 
people can become „locked‟ into a particular path are in play. Thus, a 
major consideration in the introduction of „high performance working‟ 
is the costs associated with change in terms of training and learning. 
The existing institutional framework also represents a major problem -
the introduction of „serious‟ team working has significant implication 
for almost every aspect of personnel policy, ranging from recruitment 
and selection, through training and development to appraisal and 
reward. Finally, there is the importance of vested interests. Very often 
it is managers themselves who represent the biggest barrier to changes 
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in work organisation. Major changes in the direction of semi-
autonomous team working, for example, not only have implications 
for the inter-personal skills of individual managers, but also their 
numbers, privileges and status as a group. Arguably, it is for a 
combination of these reasons that most major instances of change 
involve crisis situations and/or „greenfield‟ situations. 
Important though „path dependency‟ is in understanding why even 
management finds it difficult to change, it does not help us very much 
to explain the differences between countries identified in previous 
chapters. For this, it is necessary to develop another strand of the 
„varieties of capitalism‟ thinking introduced in Chapter 3. This is that 
the trajectories of capitalist development not only give rise to 
institutions that are interdependent, but also different „configurations‟ 
that have particular strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of 
economic activity. Thus, the interdependency may rise to so-called 
„complementarities‟, where institutions in different areas (for 
example, the financial system and the corporate governance 
arrangements) come to be mutually reinforcing; equally, they may 
also involve „tensions‟ that may have destabilising or adverse 
economic effects (for example, the role of the state and the financial 
system). It is within these „complementarities‟ and „tensions‟ that 
managers have to work
15
. 
The starkest contrast is drawn between the two main types of 
capitalism outlined in Chapter 3 and revolves around the extent to 
which the economy is, or is not, „coordinated‟: the „stakeholder‟ or 
„insider‟ systems found in the „co-ordinated market economies‟ 
(CMEs) of the continental European countries and the „shareholder‟ or 
„outsider‟ systems characteristic of the „liberal market economies‟ 
(LMEs) of the USA and UK. In the CMEs, the emphasis is said to be 
on non-market relations, collaboration, credible commitments and 
deliberative calculation on the part of firms. In terms of behaviour, 
enterprises embedded in „insider‟ systems are said to be likely to 
emphasise longer-run performance, and to pursue investment 
strategies which involve long-term commitments to product and 
process innovation and associated skill development. In contrast, the 
essence of the LMEs is described in terms of „outsider‟ systems, with 
arms-length, competitive relations and formal contracting, resulting in 
much more emphasis on short-run financial performance and the 
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adoption of  investment strategies which are driven by purely financial 
criteria
16
.  
Such differences shape the implicit contracts, comprising informal 
understandings on issues that are difficult to contract for formally, 
reached between the parties. In CMEs the basis exists under „insider‟ 
systems for generating and sustaining the trust necessary to support 
wide-ranging implicit contracts. There are incentives both for 
managers to invest in skill development and for employees to acquire 
skills. Employees are likely to be regarded as enduring assets who 
form a potential source of competitive advantage. In LMEs, by 
contrast, the absence of employee stakeholder rights does not 
encourage the development of „high trust‟ relationships and the 
implicit contracts which depend on them. Neither managers nor 
employees can be confident that their investments will be protected, 
which means weaker incentives to train or be trained. Employees are 
likely to be regarded as disposable liabilities and to be the focus of 
short-run cost minimisation by management. Proponents of the LMEs 
argue that fluid labour markets, together with easy access to stock 
market capital and the profit imperative, make LME firms the „radical 
innovators‟ they have proven to be in recent years, in sectors ranging 
from bio-technology through semiconductors, software, and 
advertising to corporate finance. The logic of LME dynamics revolves 
around the centrality of „switchable assets‟, i.e., assets whose value 
can be realised if diverted to multiple purposes. In the CMEs, by 
contrast, long-term employment strategies, rule-bound behaviour and 
durable ties between firms and banks underpinning patient capital 
provision predispose firms to be „incremental innovators‟ in capital 
goods industries, machine tools and equipment of all kinds. In contrast 
to the LMEs, the logic of the CMEs revolves around „specific or co-
specific assets‟, i.e., assets whose value depends on the active co-
operation of others
17
. 
As Chapter 2 suggested, although some object to the description 
of the UK as an 'hour glass economy', its employment structure is 
nonetheless skewed towards services, which have large numbers of 
both high- and low-paying employees – finance is an example of the 
former and hotels and restaurants the latter. The UK also has a 
concentration of businesses in sectors with low R&D, where pay 
levels are likely to be low, together with high proportion that compete 
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on the basis of costs rather than quality and „numerical‟ rather than 
„functional‟ flexibility18.   
In summary, to answer the question posed at the beginning of this 
section, management is a „systems‟ rather than a „strategic actor‟ so 
far as employment relations policy and practice are concerned. Indeed, 
its strategic choices are much more limited than may at first appear. 
Superficially, the nature and extent of managerial hierarchy, along 
with personnel polices and practices, reflect the type of product and 
the balance between cost and quality. More fundamentally, as Table 
3.3 in Chapter 3 has already outlined, the business strategy that lies 
behind these reflects the interplay between two sets of deeply 
embedded institutions: on the one hand, the institutions, processes and 
rules of employment relations and, on the other, the prevailing 
structures of corporate governance and finance. Arguably, of these 
two sets, it is the second, the structures of corporate governance and 
finance, which is the more important, becoming ever more so with the 
development of a global market for capital. In that it is not just 
employment relations institutions that have to be taken into account, 
therefore, the approach is very different from the portrayal of 
management as a „systems actor‟ in the original Dunlop version. Also 
different, as the financial and economic crisis of 2007-9 has 
confirmed, is that there is no shared ideology. Reality is massively 
contested and the power of capital in much greater evidence. It is a 
subject to which the next chapter returns. 
 
‘Permanent restructuring’ 
A further step in understanding management behaviour takes us back 
to the notion of „critical junctures‟ introduced in Chapter 4 and 
involves appreciating the why and wherefore of the 'permanent 
restructuring‟ that has come to characterise developments in many 
large organisations in recent years, above all in the UK and USA. One 
source of this restructuring has been major changes in the 
arrangements for co-ordination and control with significant 
implications for the way organisations are run. The overall effect, with 
wide ranging implications for the management of the employment 
relationship, has been to exaggerate the importance of measurable 
results and targets. A second, and arguably even more important 
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source, has been the shift in emphasis from product market to capital 
market competition (so-called „financialisation‟) leading to heightened 
merger, acquisition and disposal activity, with redundancy becoming 
the accepted way in which firms handle the consequences regardless 
of the overall economic situation. Indeed, 'headcount' reductions are 
typically put forward as a major consideration in justifying the 
initiative.  
 
From management by task to management by performance 
There have been changes in the internal co-ordination and control 
structures of large organisations that add up to little short of a 
revolution in the ways they are being managed. Above all, they 
involve a fundamental shift from the management by task 
characteristic of traditional organisational structures to management 
by performance. Critically, too, these changes affect the public as well 
as the private sector.  
 
Three related changes in particular deserve attention: 
Divisionalisation. This involves dividing the large-scale hierarchical 
organisation into a number of semi-autonomous strategic businesses 
units (SBUs) that operate as individual profit and/or cost centres that 
may be product and/or territory-based. In a phrase the organisation 
becomes „decentralised operationally, but centralised strategically‟19. 
Critically important is that headquarters retains control over target-
setting and resource allocation, in effect operating as a 'central banker' 
shifting resources to and from the divisions depending on achievement 
of specified targets and/or return on investment. In the UK, 
divisionalisation has also been introduced into the public sector: for 
example, the National Health Service has been divided into „Trusts‟, 
while the Civil Service has a plethora of „executive agencies‟. 
Budgetary devolution.  Budgetary devolution involves the allocation 
of responsibility for managing activities within financial resources or 
targets. Again, in the UK, it is a feature of the public as well as the 
private sector. Like „divisionalisation‟, with which it nearly always 
goes hand in hand, „budgetary devolution‟ can operate at a number of 
levels: it can relate to an SBU within a company or, an executive 
agency within the civil service or a trust within the NHS and also to 
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the internal units within such divisions – it can even involve bundles 
of activities. Budget formulation and control constitute one of the 
most important regular activities that corporate offices undertake. 
They establish key performance indicators (KPIs) for strategic 
business units (SBUs) and for managers themselves. These KPIs 
emphasise financial performance with corporate managers often 
„managing by numbers‟ and intangible human assets and behaviour 
tending to be ignored since they cannot be „counted‟20.  
‘Marketisation’. This is a short-hand for the greater application of 
market principles to decision making. Externally, it is reflected in 
developments such as 'competitive tendering', „market testing‟ and the 
subcontracting or outsourcing of activities previously undertaken in-
house, very often involving 'off-shoring' to another country where 
labour costs are much lower. Internally, it involves the introduction of 
'markets‟, with different units being regarded as 'purchasers' and 
'providers' trading products and services with one another. As Chapter 
3 has emphasised, it is this development that has led to the 
fragmentation of work and contracts, blurring organisational 
boundaries and the disordering of hierarchies, raising questions about 
the continuing validity of the traditional model of the employment 
relationship depending on a single employer. 
Although the thinking behind these changes is not new - General 
Motors pioneered „divisionalisation‟ as a means of instilling greater 
accountability more than 80 years ago – there are two main reasons 
for their growth in recent years. One is the pressure of competition, 
which puts a premium on managing performance. In the private 
sector, this comes from the process of „financialisation‟ discussed 
below. In the public sector, it comes from competition for scarce 
resources. In both circumstances, traditional „management by task‟ 
structures are said to be not only costly and inefficient but also a 
major barrier to the management of performance.  
The second reason for the changes is the revolution in information 
processing facilities made possible by the coming of the microchip 
and associated developments in computer software. These have 
provided managers with instruments of arms-length control and co-
ordination that are far more effective and efficient than task-based 
structures. More or less instant up-to-date data on activity and costs 
can be used not only to monitor performance against targets, but also 
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make „coercive comparisons‟ between individual units leading to the 
more or less continuous stretching of targets.  
 
An era of ‘financialisation’ 
Alongside this, there is a widely held view that the approach of UK 
management in particular has been influenced strongly by the LME 
system of corporate governance, with its orientation to short-term 
results and treatment of employees as a cost to be minimised, rather 
than a resource to be nurtured and developed
21
. Specific features of 
the UK‟s „shareholder capitalism‟ seen as important in understanding 
management‟s employment relations behavior include:   
 a privileged position for shareholders and an overwhelming 
emphasis on shareholder value as the key business driver as 
opposed to the interests of other stakeholders 
 a high concentration of institutional share ownership by 
investment trusts and pension funds which encourages a focus on 
short-term profitability, rather than long-term market share or 
added value, as the key index of business performance 
 relative ease of take-over, which not only reinforces the pressure 
on short-term profitability to maintain share price, but also 
encourages expansion by M&A rather than by internal growth, 
while reconfiguring the corporation through outsourcing, off-
shoring and restructuring to remove parts of the business from the 
portfolio 
 a premium on 'financial engineering' as the core organisational 
competence, the domination of financial management over other 
functions and numbers driven as opposed to issue driven planning. 
The pressures on company managers from these features 
intensified in recent years. Some idea of the sheer scale of the M&As 
taking place in the UK can be gauged by studying Table 9.1, which 
shows acquisitions by foreign-owned and domestically-owned 
companies over the period 1997-2006. 
As Froud and her colleagues remind us, since the mid-1980s 
traditional M&A forms have been joined by other kinds of investment/ 
divestment
22
. These include inter-business sell-offs, where ownership 
of a particular unit changes hands; spin-offs, where the divested part 
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of the company is floated and shares distributed to shareholders of the 
parent; and purchases by internal management (MBOs) or external 
management (MBI) buy-outs. Leveraged buyouts (LBOs), which are 
heavily financed by debt, have also figured.   
A walk down any High Street in the UK brings life to the 
statistics. Even before the banking and financial crisis of 2007-9, 
many building societies had become banks and part of larger groups. 
Abbey National now belongs to Spain‟s Banc Santander, Cheltenham 
and Gloucester to LloydsTSB, and the Woolwich to Barclays, while 
Halifax is part of a wider group involving the Bank of Scotland. The 
banks themselves have not been immune: Natwest is part of Royal 
Bank of Scotland Group and the Midland has been absorbed by 
HSBC. 
In manufacturing, the changing landscape is, if anything, even 
more dramatic. Many companies that were once household names 
have simply disappeared. Courtaulds, the chemicals/textile 
manufacturer, was split into two independent companies in 1990 that 
were subsequently absorbed by Akzo-Nobel and Sara Lee 
respectively. Lucas Industries, the engineering company, merged with 
the USA‟s much smaller Verity in 1996, the merged company being 
taken over three years later by the TWR, which proceeded to divest 
most of the businesses. British Steel merged with the Dutch company 
Hoogovens in 1999 to form the Corus Group, which was brought by 
Tata Steel of India in 2007. GEC, the UK's largest engineering 
company in its day, is no more after a disastrous restructuring at the 
time of the dotcom boom/bust in 2001. Even the mighty bell weather 
of British business that was ICI has gone: a division into heavy and 
speciality chemicals in the 1990s was followed by absorption into 
Akzo-Nobel and AstraZenica respectively. 
Fundamentally important is that whereas in earlier decades, 
market position was the main driver – be it diversification to spread 
risk in the 1970s or more focus („sticking to the knitting' in Peters and 
Waterman's phrase
23
) in the 1980s
 
- in the 1990s, financial 
considerations came to the fore. In the 1970s and 1980s, to paraphrase 
Froud and her colleagues, competition was based on product and 
process, most notably in sectors such as cars and consumer 
electronics; pressure was exerted through the product market, with 
consumers making firms winners or losers by virtue of their combined 
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purchasing power; the management challenge was represented in 
physical terms - 'lean production' was about better factories with lower 
build hours, less inventory and higher quality; and there was a leading 
role for Japanese companies such as Toyota whose practices were 
widely imitated and transplanted
24
. By the late 1990s, the emphasis of 
competition shifted to financial results in the form of current and 
projected cash returns on investment using cross-sector league tables 
such as MVA (market value added) and EVA
TM 
(economic value 
added), with the returns on investment in one firm explicitly compared 
against all others regardless of product  or sector; pressure was exerted 
through the capital market by shareholders via buy, sell and hold 
decisions; the management challenge came to be represented in 
narrow financial terms; and there was a renewed leadership role for 
US companies. Overall, a key consequence of what has come to be 
known as „finanzialisation‟, has been to intensify the pressure on 
managers to increase returns to shareholders: the proportion of profits 
paid out to shareholders in the form of dividends and share 'buy-backs' 
rose from just over 40 per cent in the 1960s and 1970s to around 70 
per cent in the 1980s and 1990s
25
.  
Promoting many of these developments have been new forms of 
private investment funds, which have assumed an increasingly 'active' 
role in seeking to influence company share performance:   
Hedge Funds. These are aggressively managed with the aim of 
delivering the highest returns for their members, typically wealthy 
individuals or professional investors such as insurance companies 
and pension funds. Essentially, they make sophisticated bets on 
the future direction of an asset or even a whole financial market. 
They invest in stock, bonds, currencies, futures, options, indexes, 
using techniques such as „short selling‟ (selling borrowed 
securities when prices are considered overvalued to then re-
purchase them after an anticipated drop in value) and „leveraging‟ 
(borrowing money to invest).  
Private Equity Groups. These are „private‟ (as opposed to 
„public‟) companies that typically take a controlling interest in a 
business with a view to delisting it from public stock exchanges, 
holding it private during which time they may restructure its 
internal organisation as well as reserve capital, and re-listing it on 
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the stock market through an „initial public offer‟26. High profile 
businesses taken over in recent years in the UK include the AA 
motoring organisation, Boots the chemist, and the department 
store chain Debenhams.  
Sovereign Investment Funds. These are state-backed funds that 
governments use to reinvest for the longer term some of the 
returns from depleting assets such as oil and gas. Notable 
examples include the Norwegian Government‟s Pension Fund, the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and the China Investment 
Corporation. The investment strategies of these funds tend to 
more long term, but they size means they can be critical in 
particular takeover situations. 
„Financialisation‟ was not just a matter of „path dependency‟. The 
immediate catalyst was deregulation of the financial sector in the 
1980s (so-called „Big Bang‟) and the accompanying globalisation of 
capital markets. In the UK, the „City of London‟ was given much freer 
rein, with access to credit and credit markets being substantially eased 
across the world. The effect was to increase opportunities to borrow 
(leverage) on the basis of expected rises in asset values. As well as 
giving a very considerable boost to the activities of Private Equity 
Groups and Hedge Funds, it also fueled the growth of a veritable 
'industry' of business intermediaries who derive their income from 
share price-related activities ranging from the buying and selling of 
shares to M&A. In the UK, as Folkman and his colleagues argue, 
while senior managers in major companies benefited considerably 
from the incentive schemes and share options they were encouraged to 
put into place, their numbers at around 500 were hardly sufficient to 
carry the full weight of responsibility for what was happening
27
. 
Rather it was senior investment bankers, city analysts and traders, 
accounting and law partners, consultants, and senior advertising and 
PR executives who provided much of the impetus. In the case of 
M&A, for example, they could typically expect to make in fees two to 
three per cent of the value of the transaction
28
. In 2003, their numbers 
were estimated to be around 20,000 on the basis of tax returns of those 
earning more than £250,000 a year
29
. 
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Implications  
It is difficult to underestimate the impact of these changes on day-to-
day employment relations in the UK. It is not just that many 
employees find themselves working for very different organisations 
from the ones they joined, with significant implications for their pay, 
career prospects and pensions or that some are now in jobs where the 
employer who pays may be different from the one who directs. As 
authoritative bodies such as the Audit Commission
30
 and the of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee of Commons 
Public Administration Select Committee have recognised in the case 
of public services, centralised and detailed targets, very often 
reflecting short-term political pressures, have considerably distorted 
management priorities as well as riding roughshod over local 
consultative processes
31
. More generally, the sheer pace and extent of 
the change that these developments have encouraged are important. 
Crucially, it has made it very difficult for operating managers to 
develop any consistency in approach to HRM, let alone create the 
long-term relationships that „high performance working‟ entails32. 
Short-term pressures to maximise the share price or, in the case of 
public services, implement top-down policy changes from 
governments, mean that day-to-day management of organisations is 
constantly being disrupted. Adding to the problem in many 
organisations is the rapid turnover among managers – expectations 
raised and promises made by one manager can be quickly set aside or 
disabused by another. Inevitably, the time and energies of HR 
managers tend to be consumed in managing the operational 
implications of restructuring, helping to explain the significance of the 
extent of change cited in the previous section. Indeed, many large 
organisations are littered with half-finished initiatives that had to be 
interrupted because of M&A or divestment activity
33
. In these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that operational managers seem to 
be „muddling through‟ rather than creating the long-term relationships 
that „high performance working‟ entails – they cannot do much else. 
The developments described here have also had implications for 
our understanding of the nature of management that take us back to 
the discussion in the previous section. It has long been recognised that 
management is not a homogeneous group, comprising a range of 
positions from that of supervisor through to chief executive. Yet the 
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assumption was that a common thread was present, making it possible 
to think in terms of a professional body of expertise involving 
planning, controlling, co-ordinating, developing, motivating, leading 
etc. For most managers directly involved in managing operations at 
workplace and divisional levels, this continues to be the case, albeit 
reconciling the conflicting requirements to cut costs to the bone and 
yet at the same time promote the commitment necessary for 
innovation becomes ever more difficult. Arguably, however, recalling 
the comments of the CBI‟s Director General in Chapter 2, 
'financialisation‟ and 'divisionalisation' mean that, unlike their 
forbears, very senior managers at headquarters level are increasingly 
detached from these processes, along with the communities in which 
they take place. In Khurana‟s words, they are like „hired hands', with 
their job boiling down to „financial engineering‟ and/or target setting, 
coupled with extreme risk taking
34
. 
 
Prospects for the future 
In the UK, on the basis of reports from member companies, the the 
same Director General of the CBI, Richard Lambert, recently 
suggested that there were likely to be changes in management 
behaviour described here as a result of the recession that engulfed the 
world following the financial crisis of 2007-9
35
. Most companies 
expected that, with their reliance on debt falling, there would be less 
focus on „financial engineering‟ and more emphasis on day-to-day 
operations. Accompanying this shift would be a more collaborative 
approach with the different groups of „stakeholders‟ in the business. 
For example, companies would work more extensively with schools 
and colleges to fund and design courses that were more closely 
aligned with their needs. R & D partnerships with universities and 
other businesses would also expand. Similarly, they had learnt that 
there were risks in focusing too much on lowest cost suppliers; they 
would also be working more closely with key suppliers, having learnt 
the hard way that their operations were being placed at risk by their 
financial problems - in some cases, they were thinking about financing 
their suppliers themselves. Concerns about operational and 
reputational risk, as well as rising energy and transport costs, would 
encourage them to bring their supply chains closer to home. A more 
collaborative relationship with employees was also expected. Indeed, 
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it was already being reflected in the „remarkable story of what 
happened to the employment numbers‟ outlined in Chapter 3: output 
had fallen by 6.2 per cent from the peak, but unemployment was down 
just 1.9 per cent. All in all, the strongest messages coming through 
reflected their concern about business reputation and the declining 
trust in business. All this, suggests Lambert that the era of maximizing 
shareholders value might be drawing to a close. „Suppliers, customers, 
employees, communities: their interests are aligned with those of 
shareholders over the long term, but not necessarily over the short. If 
they are going to be given greater weight in business decision-making, 
then ideas about profit maximisation will have to change‟. Here he 
quotes two other sources with approval. One is Jack Welch, the 
former boss of General Electric and one of the CEOs most associated 
with the concept of shareholder value, who told the Financial Times 
that he now thought it was „the dumbest idea in the world‟. The other 
is Peter Drucker, the business „guru‟, who suggested that business 
enterprises should be seen as „organs of society. They do not exist for 
their own sake, but to fulfill a specific social purpose and to satisfy a 
specific need of a society, a community, or individuals. They are not 
ends in themselves, but means‟. 
The problem, which Lambert recognises but does not have an 
answer for, is that the market for capital is global rather than national. 
He reminds us that less than half the shares in the FTSE 100 
companies are now owned by UK investment institutions. Moreover, 
these shareholder groups tend to be heavily focused on trading and 
short term performance, „preferring to take the certainty of short term 
capital gains rather than the risks of longer term returns‟. Nowhere 
were the implications more obvious, he adds, than in the hostile 
takeover of Cadbury‟s at the beginning of 2010. Ahead of the bid, less 
than a third of Cadbury shares were held by the institutions that have 
traditionally been associated with company ownership in the UK– 
pension funds, unit trusts and the like. Many of these argued that it 
was in the best interests for Cadbury to stay independent – it was 
Kraft whose future prospects were more uncertain - and that Kraft‟s 
final offer was some way short of what they believed the company 
was worth. Yet the takeover process took on an air of inevitability. As 
the bid dragged on, foreign investors started to take their profits - 
mainly by selling their shares to short term traders and hedge funds. 
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Lambert quotes the words of the Cadbury‟s chairman after the deal 
was completed:  
At the end of the day, there were simply not enough shareholders 
prepared to take a long term view of Cadbury and prepared to 
forego short-term gain for longer-term prosperity. Individuals 
controlling shares which they had owned for only a few days or 
weeks determined the destiny of a company that had been built 
over almost 200 years.  
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Table 9.1 HR policies and practices: Evidence from the UK’s 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey  
 
Recent years have certainly seen reductions in the tiers of managers in some 
organisations – British Steel, which is now a subsidiary of Tata Steel, is a good 
example
36
. These have rarely been accompanied, however, by the widely-promoted 
semi-autonomous team working. According to the 2004 WERS, around three-
quarters of workplaces (72 per cent) reported that some employees were involved in 
formally designated teams
37
. Yet only a small number of these, just 6 per cent, said 
that employees were allowed to appoint their own team leaders. Other data, from the 
2001 Skills Survey, also suggests that, although there had been some increase in 
team working in the 1990s, there had been a substantial decline in task discretion
38
. 
Less than half of employees said that they had a lot of influence on how work was 
done or the order in which tasks were undertaken; only a third said so in relation to 
the tasks performed
39
.  
 
Individualism rather than collectivism? There has certainly been a shift in emphasis 
to individual employment relations. One indicator is the number of workplaces 
covered by collective bargaining. In 1980, some nine out of 10 workplaces in the 
private sector were covered. In 2004, this had dropped to less than two in 10 (16 per 
cent)
40
. Paralleling this development has been an increasing emphasis on 
performance management even where unions are recognised, as in the public sector. 
Yet, for all the talk, individualised contracts are very rarely found beyond the higher 
echelons of senior executives. Essentially, most contracts of employment tend to 
take a 'standard form', the written statement usually requiring the consultation of 
other documents that are expressly incorporated, such as staff handbooks and 
occupational pension schemes composed on advice from lawyers
41
. In theory, this 
makes it much easier to differentiate between each individual and pay him or her 
according to their performance. In practice, it is rare to find any difference between 
the pay of most employees and what there is, is most likely to be linked to length of 
service. „Merit pay‟ awards for most have an uncanny similarity to movements in 
inflation and should more accurately be called „cost of living awards‟. Where there 
is variety, it is found among poor performers, who rarely exceed 5 per cent, and high 
performers where usually less than 10 per cent are given above average awards.  
 
‘High performance working’? Despite the rhetoric and strong public policy support 
for the adoption of an integrated bundle of high performance or high involvement 
practices, the take-up has been low. In 1998, the then WERS reported that „high 
commitment management practices are associated with better economic 
performance, better workplace well being and a better climate of employment 
relations, but just 14 percent of all workplaces have a majority of them in place’42. 
WERS 2004 suggests very little evidence to indicate that the take up quickened in 
recent years. Take the three practices that, on this occasion, it uses as indicators of 
„high performance working‟, i.e. team working, multi-skilling and problem solving 
groups. The proportion of continuing workplaces combining these three practices 
rose from 22 per cent to 29 per cent between 1998 and 2004, but the increase was 
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much smaller (from 15 per cent to 19 per cent) if team working was restricted to 
groups exercising a degree of autonomy
43
.  
 
A strategic approach? The need for management to develop a more integrated 
approach to employment relations has been a constant theme since the publication of 
the Donovan Royal Commission report (1968) four decades ago. Yet, as review after 
review
44
 has concluded, although some individual cases stand out, it is very difficult 
to identify any general patterns or styles in British management‟s approach. WERS 
2004 showed that only four out of ten (38 per cent) of workplaces were accredited 
for by Investors in People (IiP), which requires them to have a planned approach to 
setting and communicating business objectives and developing people to meet those 
objectives
45
. Less than two-thirds of workplaces (61 per cent) reported having a 
strategic plan covering just one of three employment relations issues, i.e. employee 
development, employee job satisfaction, and employee diversity. 
 
Perhaps most interesting are the data on the workplaces that do appear to be 
pursuing a strategic approach. There are four findings that are important. First, there 
is no clear link between the measures of HRM strategies and product market 
strategies - quality, it seems, is not as critical in this context as many people believe. 
Second, there is a positive relationship between these measures and the amount of 
change that management has introduced at the workplace - the more changes being 
experienced, the greater the likelihood of a strategic approach to HRM. Furthermore, 
this positive relationship between HR integration and the probability of making 
changes held across eight types of change. Third, there is also a positive relationship 
between these measures and labour costs. Workplaces whose labour costs exceeded 
half their sales revenue or operating costs were significantly more likely than those 
with lower labour costs to have a strategic plan covering HRM, to involve specialist 
managers in its preparation and to be IiP qualified. Fourth, higher scores on the HR 
integration index were also associated with a higher incidence of contracted-our 
services. Attention to change, labour costs and contracting out are wholly consistent 
with the pressures for restructuring that many UK organisations have been 
experiencing for the reasons considered below. 
 
The HRM function: more than personnel management by another name? 
The WERS findings in respect of the specialist function are largely consistent with 
the picture emerging so far. Overall, it seems, the function continues to struggle to 
achieve the position and status associated with strategic HRM. Only just over one in 
four workplaces had a specialist manager who spent more than half of their time on 
HR matters
46
. In the economy as a whole, managers responsible for employment 
relations were involved in the preparation of a strategic plan in around half (53 per 
cent) of all workplaces (ibid, 64). In multi-establishment companies, only three out 
of five of private sector respondents reported having someone responsible for 
employment relations on the board of directors or top governing body: this is 
important because workplaces with board-level employment relations representation 
were much more likely to include employment relations in a strategic business plan 
(ibid, 62, 64). 
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Yet many more workplaces had specialists in 2004 (28 per cent) than in 1998 (17 
per cent) (ibid, 39). Moreover, not only had the proportion with 'human resource 
managers' increased –there are more 'human resource managers' than there are 
'personnel managers' - they were also likely to be better qualified (especially the 
female specialists who considerably outnumber their male counterparts), spend more 
time on employment relations issues, have more staff assisting them, and more 
likely to be responsible for pay and pension entitlements than personnel managers. 
The HR label also made a difference in terms of the autonomy that local managers 
have when making decisions about employment relations matters. Specialist 
managers were also likely to seek advice from external sources. Overall, if there is 
no great evidence of concern with 'grand' strategy, the specialist function does 
appear to be developing the all-round competence that commentators have 
advocated
47
. Equally, it does not appear that there has been any increase in the 
unloading of key responsibilities to either line managers or external agencies.  
 
Summary 
Changes in the policies and practices directly involved in managing the employment 
relationship turn out to be nowhere near as dramatic as many pundits have 
proclaimed. There is certainly little evidence of autonomous team working and 'high 
performance working'; the number of workplaces with a comprehensive strategy 
also appears to be very small. At the same time, however, it appears that there has 
been a considerable increase in performance management; there is also a close 
relationship between those that adopt a more strategic approach and two key 
variables: the extent of changes taking place and the significance of labour costs. 
There have also been developments in the specialist function: there appears to be a 
new breed of HR managers, who are better qualified and have greater 
responsibilities. 
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Table  4.1   Mergers and acquisitions in the UK, 1997-2006
48
 
 
  By UK companies  By foreign companies 
 Number Value £ 
billion 
Number Value £ 
billion 
 
1997 506 26.829 193 15.717 
1998 635 29.525 252 32.413 
1999 493 26.163 252 60.860 
2000 587 106.916 227 64.618 
2001 493 28.994 162 24.382 
2002 430 25.236 117 16.798 
2003 558 18.679 129 9.309 
2004 741 31.408 178 29.928 
2005 769 25.134 242 50.280 
2006 739 27.694 242 75.511 
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Trade unions and collective bargaining – 
 the end of an era?  
 
Main tasks 
 Explain the logic of trade unions and collective 
bargaining 
 Chart the decline in trade union density along with 
the coverage and scope of collective bargaining 
 Review the main challenges to trade unions and 
collective bargaining  
 Discuss future prospects for trade unions and 
collective bargaining 
 
Summary 
Almost invariably, trade unions and professional associations have 
emerged as a countervailing power to that of the employer. Although 
not always the main instigator of collective bargaining, this is the 
process with which they have become most associated: collective 
bargaining („joint regulation‟) made it possible for them to represent 
employees‟ interests in both fixing and administering the main terms 
and conditions of the employment relationship. In many cases, 
however, it was not just because of the „collective „goods‟ or, indeed, 
the „selective‟ incentives that many offered that trade union 
membership achieved very high levels. Also important was „social 
custom‟ – the widespread belief throughout society that membership 
was a duty and an obligation. Since the 1980s, however, both 
considerations appear to be waning in influence. There has been a 
decline in trade union density in most major countries, albeit the 
degree is very different between private sector and public sector and 
from occupation to occupation. There has also been a decline in the 
employee coverage of collective bargaining, although not as universal 
as that in trade union density, along with the scope of its subject 
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matter. A number of changes in the composition of employment help 
to account for these developments – the shift from manufacturing to 
services, the reduction in the size of workplaces, the increasing 
feminisation of the workforce and the growth of part-time working - 
but they are not as important as popularly believed. Arguably, the 
main explanation is that employers no longer see the benefits in 
collective bargaining that they used to. Considerations here include 
the very significant competitive pressures to maximise performance, 
meaning they can no longer compromise in way they used too; the 
adoption of non-accommodating monetary regimes reducing the scope 
for wage increases; „juridification‟ and the encouragement of more 
consistency in management‟s approach; and important ideological 
considerations such as‟ neo-liberalism‟s‟ dominance of national level 
policy making and „marketisation‟ at company level resulting in 
greater „fragmentation‟ of employment. Looking to the future, the 
prospects for most trade unions and collective bargaining look pretty 
bleak. None of the models proposed for trade unions („service‟, 
„partnership‟, „campaigning‟ and „organising‟) appears to be able to 
engender the mixture of „movement‟ and „organisation‟ that trade 
unions have traditionally been able to rely on. Arguably, the prospects 
for trade unions and collective bargaining will very much depend on 
the decisions of policy makers and the extent to which they value their 
contribution in upholding social justice and offering an alternative to 
legal enactment.  
 
The logic of trade unions and collective bargaining  
Countervailing power  
Trade unions have been a universal response to the asymmetry or 
inequality of power in the employment relationship. In Flanders 
much-quoted words, trade unions have „two faces, sword of justice 
and vested interest‟1. They are a „vested interest‟ in as much as their 
immediate concern is with the particular interest of their members. 
They are a „sword of justice‟ because, in offering protection to 
individual employees by limiting the arbitrary use of managerial 
power and lessening the dependences of workers on market 
fluctuations, they promote democratic involvement and a strong sense 
of idealism and social purpose. It is for these reasons that the right to 
form and join trade unions has been more or less universally enshrined 
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in legal codes in many countries and in the United Nations‟ 
„Declaration of Human Rights‟.  
In seeking to fulfil their purpose, trade unions have come to be 
associated with three main types of activities. First are the activities 
that trade unions undertake unilaterally in support of their members‟ 
interests. Typically, trade unions have offered a range of mutual 
insurance benefits for their members; those organised around a craft or 
profession have usually been in a position to exert considerable 
influence over their members‟ employment relationship via codes of 
conduct or extended periods of „apprenticeship‟. Second is the 
collective bargaining that they undertake jointly with employers, more 
of which below. Third, as is also explained below, is the 
representation of their member‟s interests to government with a view 
to securing legal rights.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Trade unions come in many shapes and sizes. At first sight, 
especially in the UK, trade union structure, i.e. the coverage by 
occupation and sector, appears to be a „hotch-potch‟. But there is a 
logic, which reflects the balance between the three sets of activities. In 
an initial phase, craft societies grew up based on highly skilled 
occupations such as those in the printing and engineering trades. Very 
often their control of the supply of labour, together with mutual 
insurance provisions, made it possible for them to set levels of pay 
and conditions more or less unilaterally – in the event of employers 
failing to meet their demands, the craft societies would deny the 
employers labour, using their mutual insurance funds as a form of 
strike pay. A second phase saw the emergence of semi and unskilled 
workers in large numbers in manufacturing industries such as 
engineering, shipbuilding and steel, along with utilities such as gas 
and water. In some cases, the craft societies absorbed them. In most, 
however, these groups were largely left to establish their own industry 
organisations or more general ones that recruited members across 
different industries – transport workers were often the link. In this 
case, rather than unilateral regulation, collective bargaining and legal 
enactment were the priorities. In a third wave, employees in the public 
sector increasingly unionised, along with white collar workers more 
generally. Like the craft societies in printing and engineering, skilled 
workers organised around the occupation, while semi and unskilled 
workers established dedicated public sector groupings or threw their 
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lot in with the general unions. In countries such as the UK a process of 
merger and amalgamation throughout helps to explain the patch work 
that is to be found today. 
Issues of identity were also closely related. As Hyman has neatly 
summarised, „three main identities either struggled for supremacy or 
else co-existed‟ depending of the specific national context in which 
they emerged
2
,. The first viewed unions as „interest organisations with 
exclusively labour market functions‟ – „pure and simple unionism‟ in 
the words of Samuel Gompers, who was one of the architects of the 
AFL-CIO in the USA. The second treated them as „vehicles for raising 
workers‟ status more generally and hence advancing social justice‟. 
The third regarded them as “schools of war‟ in a struggle between 
capital and labour‟. In practice, as well as reflecting the balance 
between collective bargaining and legal enactment, the differences 
manifested themselves in other notable ways: for example, the 
relationship with political parties and the use of the strike – a trial of 
strength with employers as against a much more symbolic public 
demonstration. 
Thus, trade unions in the USA have usually been associated with 
the „pure and simple unionism‟ or „business unionism‟: priority was 
given to collective bargaining and, while laying claim to be raising 
workers‟ status, there was a reluctance to be overly identified with any 
one political party. In the middle might be located trade unions in 
Germany, Netherlands and the UK – in each case, trade unions had 
strong links with political parties on the left (indeed, in the UK, it the 
trade unions who played a critical role in forming the Labour Party), 
but collective bargaining was of equal, if not greater priority, to legal 
action. At the other extreme were the trade unions in the Latin 
countries (France, Italy and Spain). Here the major general 
confederations that emerged have been associated with Communist 
parties and political action, in the form of political exchange involving 
the state, with legal enactment tending to be given priority over 
collective bargaining. Indeed, as Chapter 5 has already indicated, in 
France in particular, their reluctance to reach collective agreements 
was a symbolic act designed to deny management its legitimacy. 
The ability of trade unions to achieve their objectives is critically 
dependent on the power resources available. Trade unions have been 
described as a mixture of „movement‟ and „organisation‟: they need 
group identity that binds them together and ideology that promotes 
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collective action, the first for their vitality and the second for their 
power‟3. Also fundamentally important is the structural position in 
which they operate. Thus, some groups are much more difficult to 
substitute than others. This is especially so where the members have 
been able to achieve a measure of control over entry to the occupation 
or profession – historically, this often took the form of the „closed 
shop‟; more recently, „occupational licensing‟ is having a similar 
effect
4
. Equally, trade union power depends on the product market in 
which its members are involved. The ability of employer to concede 
varies considerably, reflecting the nature and extent of product market 
competition.  
Crucial too is the extent to which society and the state legitimise 
trade union activities as fulfilling a critical role in society – indeed, 
some commentators contrast the „coercive‟ power that reflects trade 
unions‟ structural position with the „legitimacy‟ power that is 
bestowed by the wider society
5
. Especially important here is the issue 
of recognition. Like those in the USA, trades unions in the UK suffer 
from the fact that the recognition process is workplace-based. In 
effect, this presents trade unions with a „catch 22‟ situation: they have 
to have members before they can reach collective agreements; but it is 
difficult to recruit members unless they can show the benefits of 
collective agreements that are available. By contrast in the continental 
European countries, where recognition is nationally or sectorally 
based, trade unions are under nothing like the same pressures. The 
role that such recognition gives them in social dialogue and other tri-
partite arrangements also helps to fuel the „social custom‟ argument 
for trade union membership discussed below.  
Trade union membership is also affected by access rights to the 
workplace
6
. Thus trade union membership remains relatively high in 
countries with substantial and longstanding access rights, e.g. Sweden 
and Belgium. By contrast, in countries where trade unions have few if 
any such rights, e.g. France, the UK and the USA, trade union density 
is below average and there has been greater membership loss.  
 
Joint regulation 
Almost everywhere, the growth of trade unions and collective 
bargaining was very much related. Indeed, it is with collective 
bargaining that trade unions have come to be closely identified. In key 
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respects, however, the term is a misnomer. As Flanders
7
 emphasised 
many years ago, collective bargaining is not the collective equivalent 
of individual bargaining in the way that the Webbs implied in their 
pioneering work
8
. Collective bargaining certainly deals with 
distributive issues, as Chapter 5 has emphasised, but trade unions are 
not „labour cartels‟. They also do not limit themselves to regulating 
the price of labour, but issues such as discipline and dismissal, 
promotion, and training, together with the promotion of a rule of law. 
„Stated in the simplest possible terms these rules provide protection, a 
shield, for their members. And they protect not only there material 
standards of living, but equally their security, status and self-respect; 
in short their dignity as human being‟9. Collective bargaining, in other 
words, was „an institution feeing labour from being too much at the 
mercy of the market‟10; it also helped to prevent favouritism, 
nepotism, victimisation and arbitrary discrimination.   
 A collective agreement … though it is frequently called a 
collective bargain and in some countries where it has legal force a 
collective contract, does not commit anyone to buy or sell labour. 
It does something quite different. It is meant to ensure that when 
labour is bought and sold … its price and the other terms of the 
transaction will accord with the provisions of the agreement. 
These provisions are in fact a body of rules intended to regulate 
among other things the terms of employment contracts. Thus 
collective bargaining is itself essentially a rule making process, 
and this is a feature which had no proper counterpart in individual 
bargaining
11
. 
Seen from this perspective, one of the things that collective 
bargaining brings is the opportunity for employee „voice‟ not only in 
the making of the rules but also their administration. From this 
involvement comes ownership and from ownership a measure of 
commitment. Not for nothing did many of the pioneers of employment 
relations study in the UK and the USA talk about „private systems of 
governance‟, „‟industrial jurisprudence, „industrial self-government‟, 
„secondary systems of „industrial citizenship‟, „industrial democracy‟ 
and the like
12
. In Dunlop‟s words, „a great deal of the complexity and 
beauty of collective bargaining involves the process of compromise 
and assessment of priorities within each side‟13. Arguably, it is for 
these reasons that collective bargaining came to be seen as a basic 
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ingredient of a democratic society and a major building block of the 
EU „social model‟.  
Self-evidently, the coming of trade unions was the catalyst for the 
development of collective bargaining. To understand why it developed 
and more recently declined, however, it is also necessary to taken into 
account the role of employers and government. Surprising as it may 
seem, in the initial phase the UK in industries such as printing and 
engineering, it was very often employers who were in the vanguard. 
The multi-employer bargaining for which they were largely 
responsible brought two main benefits. It not only provided a degree 
of „market‟ control by putting a floor under competition on wages and 
working time. It was also important in maintaining their „managerial‟ 
control: it pooled their strength vis-à-vis organised labour, enabling 
them to counter trade union „whipsawing‟ tactics with the threat of 
lock-outs that raised the costs of industrial action considerably; and it 
helped to neutralise the workplace from trade union activities by 
exhausting or setting limits to the scope for negotiation there. 
Collective bargaining, in other words, involved a form of mutual 
recognition in which management‟s right to manage was implicitly – 
and in some cases such as the engineering and metalworking 
industries in Sweden and the UK - explicitly recognised.  
Trade unions also helped in the performance of a number of 
management tasks. One is an „agency‟ function, which is especially 
important where there is a large number of employees undertaking the 
same or similar tasks: managers escape the time-consuming and costly 
process of dealing with employees individually and avoid the 
inconsistencies in treatment that can so easily arise. A second is that 
trade unions „voice‟ employee grievances and complaints.  Henry 
Mond, who was one of the architects of ICI, the giant chemical 
company in the UK, put it like this: „the trade unions are extremely 
useful to us in bringing to our notice matters that we should not 
otherwise be aware of‟14. A third is that trade unions help to manage 
discontent by legitimising disciplinary procedures and the like. 
In many countries, government was also very active. As Chapter 4 
highlighted, Governments saw collective bargaining as a means of 
institutionalising and containing industrial conflict, along with 
delivering other key policy goals, ranging from employment standards 
to price control. Crucially, collective bargaining offered an alternative 
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to statutory intervention. The state could encourage a form of self 
regulation and avoid imposing particular distributive outcomes. In the 
language of legal discourse, the law could be „reflexive‟ and 
„procedural‟15.  
The influence of employers and government is reflected in the 
structure of collective bargaining and, in particular, its level. Thus 
collective bargaining can be single-employer or multi-employer; 
single-employer bargaining can also be single or multi-establishment 
and multi-employer bargaining single-industry or multi-industry. In 
terms of agents, it can be restricted to trade unions or extended to 
cover other collective forms of employee representation including 
works councils or even work groups. In terms of subject, it can 
emphasise matters of substance or procedure. In terms of activity, it 
can be viewed as a rule making process leading to employment 
regulation or as a negotiating process, whose logic is as much about 
shaping on-going relationships as it is about resolving particular 
issues. As Chapter 5 explained, collective bargaining also involves a 
„vertical‟ as well as „horizontal‟ collective action problem: the parties 
have to reach some accommodation among themselves (the „vertical‟ 
dimension) before they are able to deal effectively with the other (the 
„horizontal‟ dimension). 
 
Three decades of decline 
In discussions of trade union membership, two main types of 
explanation are offered for why workers join trade unions
16
. The first 
turns on the benefits or incentives that membership brings. At first 
sight, these seem hardly problematic. Collective bargaining brings 
higher wages, shorter working time and better working conditions. 
The problem is that these have come to be regarded as collective or 
public goods. Because employers often do not make a distinction 
between union and non-union members, the individual employee has 
little incentive to join a union - he/she can save the membership fee 
and still enjoy the collectively agreed minimum standards.  
To solve this so-called „free-rider‟ problem, it is argued, selective 
incentives are needed in the form of private goods and/or services for 
union members only. Thus, in some countries, a general form of 
selective incentive is to be found in the operation of insurance 
schemes. This is seen to be especially important in the countries where 
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the so-called „Ghent‟ system operates (i.e. Belgium, Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden). Unemployment insurance is compulsory and controlled 
by the state, but the unions participate in its administration. In 
principle, every worker is welcome to join the insurance system 
without joining a union. However, insurance is often connected with 
union membership for two reasons: Unions can make it difficult for 
nonmembers to obtain unemployment insurance and control, or 
greatly influence, what is considered a „suitable job‟. Thus, 
individuals choose membership to gain better insurance conditions. 
The other type of explanation for trade union membership 
emphasises the role of „social custom‟. Selective incentives are 
unnecessary, it is argued, if belonging to a union provides „reputation 
gains‟17. If workers directly derive utility from belonging to a union 
and not being an outsider, they are assumed to be more prepared to 
join a union if others also join. If a union achieves a critical minimum 
density and thereby assures that the „reputation effect‟ works, a union 
can exist despite the „free-rider‟ problem. The problem is that the 
argument also works in reverse: the range of „selective benefits‟ that 
can be offered is limited and in times of „individualism trade union 
cannot rely on „social custom‟. In Simms and Charlwood‟s words, it is 
now „even more difficult than in earlier periods to identify, construct 
and promote a single coherent set of collective interests among 
workers‟18.  
 
Trade union density 
Visser offers the most authoritative overview
19
. Table 9.1 gives his 
details of trade union density, i.e. the proportion of the workforce in a 
trade union which is eligible, for the same selected countries that 
featured in the Appendix. The first point to note is that there is a very 
large variation - trade union membership as a proportion of the 
workforce is very high in Sweden and very low in France and the 
USA. Germany, the Netherlands and the UK occupy the middle 
ground - with just more than one-fifth of the working population in 
membership. The second point is that, having increased in the 1960s 
and 1970s - it reached 56 per cent in UK in 1979 - trade union density 
has declined considerably in five of the six countries. Indeed, each 
decade has been progressively worse from the trade union point of 
view. The one country in Table 9.1 not experiencing a decline is 
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Sweden - the only country in the selection in the Appendix in which 
trade unions are involved in a Ghent-type system of social insurance. 
But even in Sweden there has been a decline since 2005
20
. 
As Table 9.2 suggests, a more complicated pattern lies behind the 
overall figures. Trade union membership patterns largely reflect the 
structural features of the sector, workplace and the worker‟s 
employment status rather than personal characteristics. For example, 
in the UK and Sweden, the overall female unionisation rate is equal 
with or even higher than the male. At the same time, however, the 
unionisation of part-time workers, the majority of whom are female, is 
lower. The same is true of temporary or casual workers. Clearly, too, 
the decline in unionisation is concentrated very strongly in the private 
sector. In every one of the countries, unionisation in the public sector 
is considerably higher than in the private. In the USA, for example, 
density in the public sector is more than four times what it is in the 
private; in France and the UK, it is around three times. Also clear is 
that, within the private sector, although declining, density in 
manufacturing is higher than in services. In every case, it will be seen 
from Table 9.2, there are several percentage points‟ difference 
between the rates in the overall private sector and manufacturing. 
 
Collective bargaining coverage 
As the final row in Table 9.2 suggests, the differences between the 
single and multi-employer countries are especially marked in the case 
of the proportion of the workface covered by collective agreements. In 
the single-employer countries, shifts in trade union density almost 
automatically translate into collective bargaining coverage reflecting 
the fact that the agreement is only workplace or company-wide. The 
result is that collective bargaining coverage is only slightly above 
union membership in the USA and, with a wider margin, the UK.  
In the multi-employer countries, collective bargaining coverage is 
much less sensitive to changes in trade union density. The extreme 
case is France. Trade union density is very low, but collective 
bargaining almost universal. This is because of the overall role and 
status of collective agreements as both legally enforceable contracts 
and codes. Indeed, such is their status that, in countries such as 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, the provisions of multi-
agreement are extended to firms in the sector regardless of the 
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presence of trade union members among their employees. These 
factors tend to lower the opposition of employers against unions, as all 
share the same costs inflicted by unions (as well as benefits from 
union cooperation)
21
. Even so, things have not been standing still in 
the countries where multi-employer bargaining is the dominant 
pattern. Three main types of development have been taking place that 
threaten the long-term viability of collective bargaining. 
‘Fraying at the edges’. In some countries, multi-employer agreements 
are shrinking in their coverage of firms within a sector. This is 
especially evident in Germany. In the key metalworking sector, the 
membership density of Gesamtmetall, the employers‟ association, has 
declined steadily since 1980, when it stood at 58 per cent, to 44 per 
cent in the western part of the country in 1993 and 34 per cent in 
1998. In the eastern part of the country, it stood at only 17 per cent in 
1998, having fallen from 35 per cent in 1993
22
. The decline in the 
proportion of the metalworking workforce employed in member 
companies has, however, been slower and between 1993 and 1998 
levelled out, leading Hassel to conclude that „big companies tend to 
remain members of the employers‟ associations while small 
companies tend to resign‟23.  
‘Decentralisation’. As Chapter 5 explained, the agenda of collective 
bargaining has increasingly become oriented towards questions of 
competitiveness, adaptability and employment reflecting a shift from a 
process that was essentially „productivity-oriented‟ to one this 
„competition-oriented‟24. The main effect is that more and more issues 
are being decentralised for company or workplace determination, 
reflecting the „development of a „different paradigm” of industrial 
relations‟25. As Chapter 5 also pointed out, company-level 
negotiations dealing with restructuring, so-called „pacts for 
employment and competitiveness‟, became almost universal across 
EU countries in the 1990s. 
‘Hollowing out’. A number of devices have been used to introduce 
scope for company level variation within the framework of sector 
agreements raising concerns about their long term viability
26
. These 
vary in the degree of the „softness‟ introduced into the multi-employer 
agreement, Basically, this means two things: first, the extent to which 
they are consistent with the principle of universal standards that sector 
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agreements have traditionally promulgated; and, second, the extent to 
which the regulation provided is „complete‟, i.e. prescribes the 
parameters of local outcomes. A rough continuum is apparent in the 
degree of „softness‟ introduced into sector agreements under these 
different mechanisms, with complete opening clauses and framework 
agreements at one end and incomplete frameworks and specifying 
minimum standards at the other. The further towards the „softer‟ end 
of this continuum, the more the substantive content of sector 
agreements tends to become „hollowed-out‟ and the more they assume 
a procedural character.  
Thus, some forms of organised decentralisation, such as 
„hardship‟ and „opt-out‟ clauses, expressly provide for derogation 
from the universal standard, the credibility of which is potentially 
undermined. Examples of hardship clauses where the employer is able 
to pay less than the collectively agreed rate under special economic 
circumstances are to be found in construction and metalworking in 
eastern Germany and chemicals in the west. Opening clauses 
permitting derogation from the universal standard include those in 
Austria (metalworking) and Germany (banking, chemicals and 
metalworking) whereby companies can make local agreements on 
short-term working time reduction below the normal weekly level 
with no wage compensation, but with a guarantee of employment 
security for the term of the reduction.  
Developments in the Netherlands also suggest that the company-
level is far from being the end-point of the decentralisation process. In 
1999, the Foundation of Labour (the joint body responsible for 
advising the government on socio-economic decision making) reached 
an agreement promoting „tailored employment conditions‟. Referred 
to as a „multiple-choice model‟, the understanding encourages 
negotiators at lower levels to introduce, within the framework of the 
collective agreement, scope for greater individual choice with regard 
to certain employment conditions. There might be a trade-off, for 
example, between 'time and money' or current and deferred 
remuneration. By mid-2001, fourteen sectors had concluded 
agreements containing such à la carte arrangements and a further 
fourteen had commissioned exploratory studies. Individual companies 
concluding such agreements included ABN-AMRO and Philips.  
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Collective bargaining under pressure 
It is important to emphasise that the initial compromise between 
employers and trade unions, usually facilitated by the state, was just 
that – a compromise contingent on circumstances. It never created a 
„perfect equilibrium‟. While trade unions and employers might have 
had a common interest in achieving a measure of „market‟ regulation, 
their positions on the implications of collective bargaining for 
„managerial‟ regulation always differed. As the previous chapter 
observed, for trade unions, the collective agreement was the beginning 
of the process of seeking influence over the employment relationship; 
for employers it was the end – „neutralisation‟ of the workplace 
involved helped to uphold managerial prerogative.  
For several decades after the historical compromises, it was trade 
unions which pushed for a greater role for workplace negotiations, 
with management resisting. In recent years, there has been a role 
reversal. Management, above all in large MNCs, has been the main 
proponent of decentralisation while trade unions have sought to 
maintain the status quo.  
 
Factors in decline  
Chapter 7 discussed a number of explanations for the decline in 
strikes. Accounting for the decline in trade union density and 
collective bargaining involves a rehearsal of these. The difference, 
however, is that the quantitative data available about trade union 
membership are more robust that those dealing with strikes. 
Changing employment structure. In discussions of the widespread 
decline in trade union membership, much attention focuses on the 
changing patterns of employment - in particular, the decline of 
manufacturing and the growth of services, the increasing feminisation 
of the workforce, the growth of part-time and agency working and so 
on
27. It is known as the „compositional argument‟28. Historically, trade 
unions were primarily the product of the collective organisation of 
male full time workers in industries such as docks, metalworking, 
mining, printing and the railways. Crucially, they were rooted in 
„occupational communities‟ helping to explain a strong sense of 
solidarity. Collective interests and identities did not have to be 
constructed – they „existed‟. Arguably, the decline in such sectors and 
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their displacement by the burgeoning service industries has had 
considerable structural and attitudinal implications. Structurally, 
organising part time workers or those in small scattered workplaces is 
much more difficult than organising miners. Attitudes come into play 
in terms of what is expected of the union and its members. For manual 
workers in the traditional industries, it was a matter of „one for all and 
all for one‟ – there really was no alternative. For many white collar 
workers in the service sectors, however, the possibilities of individual 
careers mean that collective action does not necessarily come 
automatically. Similarly, the willingness to become involved in the 
union‟s activities and readiness to follow its advice or instructions in 
face of appeals form other sources is more of an individual 
calculation. Perhaps most importantly, the demise of the strong union 
bastions rooted in their occupational communities has undermined the 
strength of „social custom‟ in the trade union membership decision. 
Certainly their loss means that there few demonstration effects of 
trade unions in action resulting in „diminishing mobility potential‟29. 
Changes in employment structure are by no means the whole 
story, however. In the case of trade union membership, in particular, 
there is growing evidence to suggest that the direct „compositional 
effects‟ are not as important as it was thought. It is in the UK that the 
most exhaustive analysis has been possible, reflecting the availability 
of the representative WERS data. On the basis of these, it has been 
estimated that only around a third of the 28 percentage-point decline 
in trade union recognition is attributable to changes in workplace 
characteristics
30
. Similarly, only one-tenth of the decline in the 
incidence of collective bargaining in the private sector is due to 
compositional change. In the words of the authors of the most recent 
analysis, „We can confidently reject the notion that compositional 
change in the economy has played a major part in diminishing the role 
of collective bargaining‟31. Rather it was a matter of employers 
turning their backs on trade unions – preferring to „go‟ or „remain‟ 
non-union or to reduce the range of issues for which recognition is 
effective.  
 
Cyclical factors. The levels of inflation and unemployment, 
sometimes labeled „cyclical‟ factors, also play a role. Historically, low 
levels of inflation and high levels of unemployment have been deemed 
to have a negative effect on trade union density: the first reduces the 
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incentive to join, while the latter is believed to encourage employer 
resistance. This is especially so if unemployment insurance is 
mandatory and administered by the government. By the same token, 
rising consumer prices threaten employees‟ standard of living 
encouraging them join trade unions in order to defend their real 
wages. Low unemployment is also believed to strengthen trade 
unions‟ ability to win concessions and so make them more attractive32. 
Certainly the non-accommodating monetary regimes discussed in 
Chapter 5 have had the effect of producing relatively low levels of 
inflation and similarly low pay settlements in recent years. The 
association between levels of unemployment and trade union density, 
however, seems to be less strong that used to be the case. In the UK, 
for example, unemployment was falling throughout much of the 1990s 
and early years of the new millennium and yet trade union 
membership continued to decline. 
Intensifying competition. A third set of factors reflects increasing 
competition. There has long been recognised to be a close association 
between developments in collective bargaining and the nature and 
extent of the product market competition that companies experience – 
indeed, Commons drew attention to it more than a century ago in 
showing how the level of collective bargaining in shoe making went 
from local to district to national in line with the spread of the product 
market
33
. Thus, as the previous section indicated, a major factor in the 
development of collective bargaining was its ability to take wages out 
of competition. In recent years, however, the nature and extent of 
competition has changed dramatically, spreading beyond the 
boundaries of the national state with which collective bargaining had 
come to be associated. Especially important is the rise of first 
Japanese, and then Chinese manufacturers, the collapse of the former 
USSR and the incorporation of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary, Romania and others into the EU, offering alternative 
locations for investment. Compounding matters is that the increasing 
liberalisation of trade, both global through the WTO and regional as 
the result of the EU‟s „single market‟, means that it much more 
difficult for governments to intervene to protect employment.  
The underlying proposition is set out in the work of Reder and 
Ulman. In their words, „union organisation or its span of control must 
be at least as broad as the product market. Otherwise, non-unionised 
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firms would be able to sell goods for lower prices than unionised 
firms, resulting in loss of union jobs and declining membership‟34. On 
the basis of US experience, they argue that the organisational decline 
of unions may occur under either of two conditions.  
First, when product markets become spatially extended or 
further integrated, unless (their emphasis) union organisation 
expands with the market, or union decision making becomes 
more centralised. Second, when organisation shrinks within 
existing market boundaries, unless (their emphasis) negotiated 
wage increases cause non-union workers to join unions or 
regulations or other arrangements bar non-union entry or 
operation
35
. 
The ability of trade unions to take various terms of employment 
out of competition within national borders also depends on the 
framework of public policy. States can provide some protection 
against external competition by tariff and non-tariff barriers. Where 
there are floating exchange rates, they can also devalue the currency. 
Under developments such as the EU‟s Economic and Monetary 
Union, however, the capacity to maintain barriers and to devalue 
disappears. The combined effects of EU economic integration 
therefore weaken considerably national trade unions‟ ability to 
influence terms of employment. The challenge they pose to trade 
unions throughout the EU is rather chilling: 
The elimination or attenuation of this power could beset European 
unions with the same dilemma US unions have faced: either to 
create more highly centralised structures able to cope with unified 
markets (as US unions were able to do in the nineteenth century 
and again in the 1930s) or, lacking that capability, to suffer 
decentralisation and organisational loss (as happened to US 
unions in the 1970s and 1980s under the impact of legal 
deregulation and intensified international competition)
36
. 
The point is that intensifying competition means that employers 
find many of the provisions of collective agreements increasingly 
restrictive - for example, those dealing with hours of work may make 
it difficult to extend working time. The level of wages may higher 
than they would otherwise be - the so- called union „mark-up‟ has 
been declining. Managers can find also find it frustrating to have to 
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consult and negotiate in times of continuous change. Crucially, 
intensifying competition means that there are much smaller „rents‟ for 
employers to share with trade unions in the form of higher levels of 
wages. In the words of the major study of decline that draws on the 
UK‟s Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 
Over our quarter century, collective bargaining has retreated 
fastest in those workplaces that, relative to others, were in product 
markets with particular competitive characteristics. Their 
workplaces faced more geographically local competition. Their 
industries had lower profit levels. And their industries faced a 
relative worsening of profitability. The growth of collective 
bargaining in the twentieth century had been nurtured by 
imperfect competition. Tightening product market competition 
suffocated it
37
. 
Privatisation has also been „major contributor‟ to the decline of 
collective bargaining
38
. Many former state enterprises continue to 
enjoy a natural monopoly. But others do not and these hitherto 
sheltered industries have found themselves exposed to increased 
product market competition.  
Adding to the competitive pressures have been developments in 
capital markets. The liberalisation and deregulation of capital markets 
in 1980s and 1990s have put greater emphasis on company financial 
performance. As the previous chapter explained, the emergence of 
more active and aggressive investors such as hedge funds, private 
equity groups and sovereign wealth funds is especially important here. 
Coupled with the greater availability of capital to finance merger and 
acquisition activity, more and more emphasis has shifted onto 
financial results in the form of returns on investment regardless of 
product or sector. A key consequence of what has come to be known 
as „financialisation‟ has been to intensify the pressure on managers to 
increase returns to shareholders. 
‘Juridification’. Although much more difficult to quantify, another 
relevant factor is the process of „juridification‟ discussed in earlier 
chapters. In the UK, most attention has focused on legislation 
introduced between 1980 and 1993 designed to curtail trade union 
activity - it ranged from the outlawing of the closed shop, to a ban on 
picketing at other than the immediate place of work to statutory 
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balloting requirements for legally recognised industrial action. 
Arguably, however, as Chapter 7 suggested, it is the very considerable 
increase in individual rights that deserves most attention. For these 
have had two substantial effects: first, they have helped to soften the 
harsher features of the subordination intrinsic to managerial 
hierarchies; and, second, in requiring managers to introduce and 
follow set procedures for dealing with issues such as discipline, 
dismissal, and discrimination, they have helped to reduce the 
inconsistency (or „opportunism‟) of management behaviour that is so 
very often a major source of conflict. In short, „juridification‟ has 
encouraged a shift away from „collectivism‟ and towards 
„individualism‟ - the more individual employment rights there are, the 
weaker the case for trade unions and collective bargaining. In the 
words of Checchi and Lucifora, the legislative framework acts as a 
„substitute for union-provided protection‟39. 
 Ideological considerations. Recent years have also witnessed a very 
considerable undermining of the „legitimacy power‟ of trade unions 
and collective bargaining. In particular, the view that collective 
bargaining is a „public good‟ has come under challenge, its role in 
institutionalising and containing industrial conflict increasingly 
forgotten as the incidence of strikes has declined. Since the 1980s the 
„new ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism‟ in Europe has meant 
criticism of the both the goals and institutions associated with 
„political correction of market outcomes‟40. In as much as multi-
employer bargaining sets non-market wages, it is held to result in 
unemployment, thereby generating inequality in the labour market. 
Rather than being inclusive, too little wage differentiation favours 
'insiders' at the expense of 'outsiders'. The role of policy is to ensure 
that all individuals can hold their own equally in the market. The 
criticism is usually reinforced by contending that the political and 
institutional prerequisites for the kind of market-correcting behaviour 
associated with sector bargaining have largely disappeared with the 
changing structure of modern capitalism.  
Debates over the connections between bargaining structure and 
economic performance outlined in Chapter 2 are relevant too. A 
prevailing consensus developed amongst economic opinion that the 
relationship involved was non-linear 
41
. Highly centralised bargaining 
structures, such as those characterising the Nordic area at the time, 
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apparently performed better in terms of key economic outcomes, 
because the scope for externalising the wider economic effects of 
wage decisions is minimised, as did highly decentralised ones because 
they were disciplined by the market. The worst performing structures 
were those that were neither fully centralised nor decentralised, i.e. 
those based on the sector. Although this received economic wisdom 
has been subject to a thorough going re-appraisal by Traxler and his 
colleagues, who demonstrate the importance of the particular forms of 
bargaining co-ordination
42
, it continues to hold sway in many policy 
making circles.   
In countries such as the UK and USA, the influence of „neo-
liberalism‟ on policy making has meant that the emphasis is on 
markets and ensuring that they work effectively. To all intents and 
purposes,  this has meant the withdrawal of support for trade unions 
and collective bargaining, with a relatively limited role for 
government and low taxation. Almost invariably, proposals to 
improve matters lose out to the desire not to hamper employers‟ 
flexibility
43
. Crucially, too, there is a premium on macro-level target 
setting, along with the prioritisation of econometric data over other 
forms of evidence: qualitative issues do not easily lend themselves to 
this approach. In the other countries, „neo-liberalism‟ may have been 
rejected as an explicit statement of policy. Its impact has nonetheless 
been important. For example, the ability of governments to bail out 
business has been much curtailed by EU competition laws and the 
provisions of World Trade Agreements, both of which have been 
influenced by the „Washington consensus‟ referred to in the Preface.  
At company level, the influence of „neo-liberalism‟ is mirrored in 
„marketisation‟, i.e. the greater application of market principles to 
decision making. As Chapter 3 has explained, externally, there has 
been greater fragmentation of employment as the result of 
'competitive tendering', „market testing‟ and the subcontracting or 
outsourcing of activities previously undertaken in-house. Internally, as 
Chapter 8 described, 'markets‟ have been introduced, with different 
units being regarded as 'purchasers' and 'providers' trading products 
and services with one another.  
Also important are new ways of thinking associated with „human 
resource management‟ (HRM). HRM has been variously interpreted 
as encouraging a more strategic approach towards managing 
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employees and/or as more effectively utilising the workforce through 
new instruments of performance control. As the previous chapter 
mentioned, controversy continues to surround the „rhetoric‟ and 
„reality‟ of HRM, but definitions usually embrace a number of 
common elements: the view that employees are a strategic resource 
for achieving competitive advantage; emphasis on the coherence of 
personnel policies and their integration with business strategy; an 
approach to managing employees which is pro-active rather than 
reactive; and, perhaps above all, a shift in emphasis away from 
„collectivism‟ (management-trade union relations) towards 
„individualism‟ (management-employee relations) - helping to explain 
the stress on commitment of and exercise of initiative by individual 
employees; and elaboration of group and individual-based 
mechanisms of performance control.  
Such considerations have been especially important in the break 
up of multi-employer agreements in the finance sector not just in the 
UK, but also Denmark and the Netherlands. If employees really are 
crucial to securing competitive advantage, it becomes difficult to 
justify relinquishing control of wages and major conditions to an 
external agent, i.e. employers‟ organisations. As representatives of the 
Dutch trade unions explained to their colleagues from other countries, 
one consideration in the decision of the three major Dutch financial 
services groups, ABN-AMRO, ING and RABO, to withdraw from their 
sector agreements in banking and insurance in 1999 was a greater 
willingness to compete with one another in the labour market, 
undermining the principle of market regulation
44
.  
 
The dynamics of change 
It is not enough, however, simply to list the factors or, indeed, quote 
the econometric evidence of the links between trade union density, 
collective bargaining coverage and a range of variables. To understand 
what has been happening, it is also necessary to appreciate the 
dynamics of change. Take, for example, the very considerable 
reduction in the coverage of collective bargaining that took place in 
the UK between 1984 and 1998, along with a halving of trade union 
density. Very rarely was this a consequence of active and aggressive 
acts of derecognition. Rather it reflected a process of withering on the 
vine – in some cases, managers did not bother to recognise trade 
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unions in newly established workplaces; in others, the demise of the 
multi-employer agreement or the break-up of the company (multi-site) 
agreement similarly meant that some workplaces fell through the net. 
There was also a great deal of „implicit derecognition‟, i.e. a gradual 
reduction in the range and intensity of issues subject to negotiation – 
with the balance shifting in favour of consultation or communications. 
Increasingly, managers found that they could function perfectly 
adequately without trade unions
45
.  
Similarly, the „decentralisation‟ of collective bargaining and the 
„hollowing out‟ of multi-employer agreements in countries such as 
Germany and the Netherlands rarely reflected a deliberate strategy. 
Rather it was a consequence of the process involved. Employers have 
found it increasingly difficult to meet trade union aspirations for 
annual cost of living wage increases without any quid pro quo in the 
form of a reduction in labour costs and/or improved performance. The 
problem is that it is that it is difficult to do this on an industry basis, 
helping to explain the very considerable decentralisation to the 
company and workplace levels discussed in Chapter 5. Also many of 
the 'new' issues of flexibility etc that negotiators have to confront do 
not lend themselves to 'hard' regulation in the same way that wages 
and working time do.  
Complicating matters is the increasing difference of interest 
between large and smaller employers, many of which are in close (low 
cost) subcontracting relationships with one another. Larger companies 
increasingly operate within market segments whose horizons are 
international in scope, whereas for many SMEs, competition remains 
regionally or locally bounded. For larger companies, national, sector 
bargaining no longer provides a minimum substantive floor. Further, 
managers in these companies may be concerned to legitimate changes 
to practice amongst its own workforce by negotiating directly with 
company employee representatives. Conversely, smaller companies 
have less incentive and fewer resources to engage in company 
negotiations that trade off improvements in substantive terms and 
conditions in return for concessions in employment and working 
practices
46
.  
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Future prospects 
In considering the prospects for trade unions, a distinction has to be 
made between those that organise around a specific occupation or 
profession with a licence to practice and those that are more general in 
coverage. There is no reason to believe that the future of trade unions 
in the first group is in great doubt. Indeed, these are the ones whose 
membership has been growing. For the bulk of trade unions in the 
second group, however, the future looks much bleaker. If anything, 
the difficulties trade unions are experiencing in recruiting members, 
along with the pressures on collective bargaining, are likely to 
intensify. Conceivably, coupled with the worsening of the terms and 
conditions of employment, the austerity measure being introduced in 
many countries following the financial crisis could be a basis for the 
recruitment of new members
 47
. Equally, however, they could lead to 
further demoralisation, especially as trade unions are finding it 
difficult to link their role in the workplace with that in the wider 
society.  
There is no shortage of suggestions for what trade unions might 
do. The first, encapsulated in the „service‟ model, sees trade unions as 
providers of services – it takes us back to the „friendly societies‟ and 
„method of mutual insurance‟ of the Webbs, coupled with a 
representative role in individual disputes. The second relates to the 
discussion of „integrative bargaining‟ in Chapter 5 and might be 
described as the „partnership‟ model. As Chapter 5 suggested, such a 
model is applicable at workplace level in the form of „mutual gains 
bargaining‟ and at national level in the form of „social pacts‟. The 
third is the model of trade unions as populist „campaigning 
organisations‟ and involves a combination of social movement and 
interest organisation. The fourth is the „organising‟ model. Here the 
appeal is to workers‟ interests and the aim is to rebuild countervailing 
power through assertive organising tactics.  
The problem is that none of these possibilities appears to be able 
to engender the mixture of „movement‟ and „organisation‟ that trade 
unions have traditionally been able to rely on. Equally, combining the 
models, which is what many trade unions have been doing, does not 
seem to have the desired effect either. Similarly, a resort to merger 
and amalgamation is not helping as much as many advocates hoped - 
arguably, it means that too much time and energy is being spent on 
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internal administrative matters. Trade unions, it seems, face an 
increasingly hostile environment where they are „objects‟ rather than 
the „subjects‟ they used to be. Collective interests no longer „exist‟ – 
they have to be constructed. In trying to do this, in Sims and 
Charlwood‟s words, trade unions face „seemingly insurmountable 
challenges‟48. 
As for collective bargaining, further reductions in trade union 
membership may mean a decline in the coverage in the UK and the 
USA, but not necessarily so in countries such as Germany, France, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. This is above all true because of long-
standing differences in the legal status of multi-employer agreements. 
Whereas in the UK, multi-employer agreements were grounded in 
procedural rules and were voluntary „gentlemens‟ agreements‟, in 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden they are rooted in 
substantive rules and are legally-enforceable contracts and codes; in 
many cases, too, statutory provisions for trade union recognition are 
nationally-rather than workplace-based.  
Arguably, however, multi-employer bargaining is increasingly 
unlikely, except in rare situations, to take the form of the 
comprehensive contracts of old. The scope for company level 
negotiation is likely to be progressively widened as „organised 
decentralisation‟ is taken further and sector agreements increasingly 
become „framework‟ agreements, as many employers‟ organisations 
have argued. Another possibility is that twin-track arrangements 
emerge: large employers may abandon sector bargaining and establish 
their own company agreements, leaving the sector agreement to 
regulate the terms and conditions for medium- and small-sized 
companies. Also possible is what might be described as the „Irish‟ 
solution: in smaller countries sector bargaining finds itself squeezed 
between the national and the company level. In principle, a shift in 
emphasis from the national sector to the EU sector is also possible - in 
many respects, this would be wholly consistent with the historical 
trend in which collective bargaining follows the product market. The 
problem, however, is that for many companies the product market is 
not regional, e.g. EU-based, but global. Arguably, the most that can be 
hoped for beyond the national state is the kind of broad frameworks 
that a number of the larger MNCs have entered into. 
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The critical point to make is that, with further decline in trade 
unions‟ „structural‟ power, much will depend on the „legitimacy‟ 
power society bestows on them. If policy makers want trade unions 
and collective bargaining to continue to play an important role – and, 
as Chapter 2 has suggested, there are good grounds for them doing so 
– they will need to take appropriate action to secure their survival. For 
example, legislative initiatives could be tailored to ensure 
implementation by collective bargaining and/consultation. The same 
goes for minimum wage legislation. More could also be made of 
provisions for the legal extension of collective agreements. In any 
event, one thing seems clear. If policy makers carry on as if nothing is 
happening, decline is likely to continue by default.  
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Table 9.1 Trade Union density (%)   
 
Year EU France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK USA 
1970 
 
1980 
 
1990 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
% 
change 
 
70-80 
 
80-90 
 
90-00 
 
70-05 
37.8 
 
39.7 
 
33.1 
 
27.3 
 
25.3 
 
 
 
 
1.9 
 
-6.7 
 
-6.7 
 
-12.5 
21.7 
 
18.3 
 
10.1 
 
8.2 
 
7.8 
 
 
 
 
-3.4 
 
-8.1 
 
-1.9 
 
-13.9 
32.0 
 
34.9 
 
31.2 
 
25.0 
 
19.9 
 
 
 
 
2.9 
 
-3.7 
 
-8.6 
 
-12.1 
36.5 
 
34.8 
 
24.3 
 
23.1 
 
19.8 
 
 
 
 
-1.7 
 
-10.4 
 
-2.0 
 
-16.7 
67.7 
 
78.0 
 
80.8 
 
79.1 
 
76.0 
 
 
 
 
10.3 
 
2.8 
 
-2.8 
 
8.3 
44.8 
 
50.7 
 
39.3 
 
29.7 
 
28.8 
 
 
 
 
5.9 
 
-11.4 
 
-10.0 
 
-16.0 
23.5 
 
19.5 
 
15.5 
 
12.8 
 
11.6 
 
 
 
 
-2.5 
 
-4.0 
 
-3.1 
 
-11.9 
 
 
 
For further details of notes and sources, see Vissser
49
 and European Commission
50
. 
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Table 9.2 Trade union density and collective bargaining (%) 
 
 France
 
Germany
 
Neths
 
Sweden
 
USA
 
UK
 
 
 2003 
 
1997 2001 1997 2004 2004 
Total 8.2 27.0 25.0 82.2 12.5 28.8 
       
Men 9.0 29.8 29.0 83.2 13.8 28.5 
Women 7.5 17.0 19.0 89.5 11.1 29.1 
16-24   11.0 45.0 4.7 9.7 
 
F/Time 
 
- 
 
- 
 
27.0 
 
90.0 
 
13.9 
 
31.5 
P/time - - 19.0 83.0 6.4 21.1 
Standard - - 26.0 - - 29.5 
Casual 
 
  10.0 - - 17.2 
Public 15.3 56.3 38.8 93.0 36.4 58.8 
Private 5.2 21.9 22.4 77.0 7.9 17.3 
Manufacturing 7.5
 
45.0 28.0 95.0 12.9 24.6 
 
Collective 
bargaining 
coverage 
 
95.0 
 
63.0 
 
82.0 
 
92.0 
 
13.8 
 
35.0 
 
For further details of notes and sources, see Vissser
51
. 
 
  
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
290 
 
References 
                                                 
1
  Flanders, A. 1970. „Trade unions in the sixties‟, in Flanders, A. (ed) 
Management and Union: the theory and reform of industrial relations 
London: Faber. p.15. 
 
2
  Hyman, R. 1994. „Changing Trade Union Identities and Strategies‟, 
in Hyman, R. and Ferner, A. (eds) New Frontiers in European Industrial 
Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. p.131. 
 
3
  Flanders, A. 1970. „What are trade unions for?‟, in Flanders, A. (ed) 
Management and Union: the theory and reform of industrial relations 
London: Faber. p.43. 
 
4
  Humpris, A., Kleiner, M.M. and Koumenta, M. 2010. „Occupational 
regulation in the UK and US: labour market impact and policy implications‟. 
Paper prepared for the 60
th
 Anniversary Conference of the British 
Universities Association, Manchester Metropolitan University. 
 
5
  Simms, M. and Charlwood, A. 2009. „Trade unions, power and 
influence in achanged context‟, in T. Colling and M. Terry (eds) Industrial 
Relations: theory and practice. 3
rd
 edition. Chichester: John Wiley. p.128. 
 
6
  Ebbinghaus, B. and Visser, J. 1999. „When Institutions Matter: 
Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995‟, European 
Sociological Review, Vol. 15, February 1999, p.142; Scruggs, L. and Lange, 
P. „Where have all members gone? Globalisation, Institutions and Union 
Density‟, Journal of Occupational Psychology, Vol. 64, p.139. 
 
7
  Flanders, A. 1970. „Collective bargaining: a theoretical analysis‟, in 
Flanders, A. (ed) Management and Union: the theory and reform of 
industrial relations London: Faber. p. 215. 
 
8
   Webb, S. and Webb, B. The history of trade unionism, 1666-1920. 
London: Longmans. p.1. 
 
9
  Flanders, A. 1970. „What are trade unions for?‟, in Flanders, A. (ed) 
Management and Union: the theory and reform of industrial relations 
London: Faber. p.42. 
 
Trade unions and collective bargaining – the end of an era? 
291 
 
                                                                                                                   
10
  Flanders, A. 1970. „Collective bargaining: a theoretical analysis‟, in 
Flanders, A. (ed) Management and Union: the theory and reform of 
industrial relations London: Faber. p.225. 
 
11
  Flanders, A. 1970. „Collective bargaining: a theoretical analysis‟, in 
Flanders, A. (ed) Management and Union: the theory and reform of 
industrial relations London: Faber. p 215. 
 
12
  See, for example, Slichter, S., Healy, J.J. and Livernash, R.E. 1960. 
The impact of collective bargaining on management. New York: Brookings 
Institute; Marshall, T.E. 1991. Citizenship and Social Class, ed Bottomore 
(Pluto Press Edition). 
 
13
  Dunlop, J.T. „The social utility of collective bargaining‟, in Ulman, 
L. (ed) Challenges to collective bargaining. Prentice-Hall. 
 
14
  Quoted in Reader, W.J. 1973. The first quarter centrade unionry, 
1926-1952. Imperial Chemical Industries: A history, Vol 2. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. p.66. 
 
15
  Barnard, C and Deakin, S. 2000. „In search of coherence: social 
policy, the single market and fundamental rights', Industrial Relations 
Journal, 31(4), 331-45. p.341. 
 
16
  Visser, J. 2006. „Union Membership statistics in 24 countries‟. 
Monthly Labor Review, January; Lesch , H. 2004. „Trade union density in 
international comparison‟. CESifo Forum 4/2004. 
 
17
  For further details, see Lesch , H. 2004. „Trade union density in 
international comparison‟. CESifo Forum 4/2004. p.14. 
 
18
  Simms, M. and Charlwood, A. 2009. „Trade unions, power and 
influence in a changed context‟, in T. Colling and M. Terry (eds) Industrial 
Relations: theory and practice. 3
rd
 edition. Chichester: John Wiley. p.126. 
 
19
  Visser, J. 2006. „Union Membership statistics in 24 countries‟. 
Monthly Labor Review, January; European Commission. 2009 Industrial 
Relations in Europe in 2008. Brussels: DG Employment and Social Affairs. 
 
20
  EIRO. 2010. „Sweden: Industrial relations profile‟. Available at 
www.eu.eurofound.ie 
 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
292 
 
                                                                                                                   
21
  Visser, J. 2006. „Union Membership statistics in 24 countries‟. 
Monthly Labor Review, January. p.40. 
 
22
  Hassel, A. 1999. „The erosion of the German industrial relations 
system‟, British Journal of Industrial Relations 37(3). p.494.  
 
23
  Hassel, A. 2002. „The erosion continues: reply‟, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 40(2). p.312. 
 
24
  Schulten, T. 1998. „Collective bargaining in the metal industry under 
the conditions of the European Monetary Union‟, in Kauppinen, T. (ed) The 
Impact of EMU on Industrial Relations in the European Union.. Helsinki: 
Finnish Industrial Relations Association. p.209. 
 
25
  Léonard, E. 2001. „Industrial relations and the regulation of 
employment in Europe‟,  European Journal of Industrial Relations 7(1). 
p.30. 
 
26
  For further details and examples, see Marginson, P. and Sisson, K. 
2004. European integration and industrial relations. Multi-level governance 
in the making. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Chapter 6. See also Zagelmeyer, S. 
2000. Innovative Agreements on Employment and Competitiveness in the 
European Union and Norway. Luxembourg: Office for the Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
 
27
  See, for example, Lesch , H. 2004. „Trade union density in 
international comparison‟. CESifo Forum 4/2004; Visser, J. 2006. Union 
Membership statistics in 24 countries‟. Monthly Labor Review, January. 
 
28
  Hyman, R. 1994. „Changing Trade Union Identities and Strategies‟, 
in Hyman, R. and Ferner, A. (eds) New Frontiers in European Industrial 
Relations. Oxford: Blackwell. p.111. 
 
29
  Simms, M. and Charlwood, A. 2009. „Trade unions, power and 
influence in a changed context‟, in T. Colling and M. Terry (eds) Industrial 
Relations: theory and practice. 3
rd
 edition. Chichester: John Wiley. p.118. 
 
30
  Blanchflower, D.G. and Bryson, A. 2009. „Trade union decline and 
the economics of the workplace‟, in Brown, W., Bryson, A., Forth, J. and 
Whitfield, K. The Evolution of the Modern Workplace. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p.56. 
 
Trade unions and collective bargaining – the end of an era? 
293 
 
                                                                                                                   
31
  Brown, W., Bryson, A. and Forth, J. 2009. „Competition and the 
retreat from collective bargaining‟, in Brown, W., Bryson, A., Forth, J. and 
Whitfield, K. The Evolution of the Modern Workplace. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. pp.30-1. 
 
32
  Lesch , H. 2004. „Trade union density in international comparison‟. 
CESifo Forum 4/2004. pp.14-8. 
 
33
  Commons, J. 1909. „American Shoemakers 1648-1895: A sketch of 
industrial evolution‟. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 24. 38-83, 
reprinted in 1968 in Rowan, R. L. and Northrup, H.R. (eds) Readings in 
labor economics and labor relations, 60-76. Homewood: Irwin.  
 
34
  Reder, M. and Ulman, L. 1993. 'Unions and Unification', in Ulman, 
l, Eichengreen, B. and Dickens, W. T. (eds) Labor and an Integrated 
Europe. Washington DC: the Brookings Institute. p.16. 
 
35
  Reder, M. and Ulman, L. 1993. 'Unions and Unification', in Ulman, 
l, Eichengreen, B. and Dickens, W. T. (eds) Labor and an Integrated 
Europe. Washington DC: the Brookings Institute. p.16. 
 
36
  Reder, M. and Ulman, L. 1993. 'Unions and Unification', in Ulman, 
l, Eichengreen, B. and Dickens, W. T. (eds) Labor and an Integrated 
Europe. Washington DC: the Brookings Institute. p.38. 
 
37
  Brown, W., Bryson, A. and Forth, J. 2009. „Competition and the 
retreat from collective bargaining‟, in Brown, W., Bryson, A., Forth, J. and 
Whitfield, K. The Evolution of the Modern Workplace. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. pp.40-1. 
 
38
  Brown, W., Bryson, A. and Forth, J. 2009. „Competition and the 
retreat from collective bargaining‟, in Brown, W., Bryson, A., Forth, J. and 
Whitfield, K. The Evolution of the Modern Workplace. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. p.47. 
 
39
  Checchi, D. and C. Lucifora. 2002. „Unions and Labour Market 
Institutions in Europe‟,  Economic Policy, Vol. 35. p.391. 
 
40
  Schulten, T. 2002. „A European solidaristic wage policy?‟, 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 8(2), 173-96. pp.177-8. 
 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS MATTERS 
 
294 
 
                                                                                                                   
41
  Calmfors, L. and Driffill, J. 1988. „Bargaining structure, corporatism 
and macroeconomic performance‟. Economic Policy , 6, 13-61.  
 
42
  Traxler, F., Blaschke, S. and Kittel, B. 2001. National Labour 
Relations in Internationalised Markets. Oxford: OUP.  
 
43
  Dickens, L. 2008.‟ Legal regulation, institutions and industrial 
relations‟. Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations. No 89. Coventry: 
Industrial Relations Research Unit. 
 
44
  UNI-Europa. 2000. Pay benchmarking and the Euro – How should 
Uni-Europa respond? Geneva: UNI-Europa. 
 
45
  Brown, W., Bryson, A. and Forth, J. 2009. „Competition and the 
retreat from collective bargaining‟, in Brown, W., Bryson, A., Forth, J. and 
Whitfield, K. The Evolution of the Modern Workplace. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. pp.24-5. 
 
46
  Hornung-Draus Hornung-Draus, R. 2001. „Between e-economy, 
Euro and enlargement. Where are employer organisations in Europe 
heading?‟ Plenary paper presented to the 6th IIRA European Congress, Oslo, 
June 25-29. p.7. 
 
47
  Lesch , H. 2004. „Trade union density in international comparison‟. 
CESifo Forum 4/2004. p.18. 
 
48
  Simms, M. and Charlwood, A. 2009. „Trade unions, power and 
influence in a changed context‟, in T. Colling and M. Terry (eds) Industrial 
Relations: theory and practice. 3
rd
 edition. Chichester: John Wiley. p.143. 
 
49
  Visser, J. 2006. „Union Membership statistics in 24 countries‟. 
Monthly Labor Review, January, Table 3. 
 
50
  European Commission. 2009. Industrial Relations in Europe in 
2008. Brussels: DG Employment and Social Affairs.
 
Chart 3.1 
 
51
  Visser, J. 2006. „Union Membership statistics in 24 countries‟. 
Monthly Labor Review, January, Table 4. 
295 
 
10 
 
Public policy – 
balancing flexibility and security? 
 
Main tasks 
 
 Explain why the state plays such a pivotal role in 
employment relations 
 
 Outline the changing agenda that policy makers have 
had to confront 
 
 Consider the challenge of ‘casino’ capitalism 
 
Summary 
Although the nature and extent of the state‟s role has differed from 
country to country, it has nonetheless been pivotal everywhere in 
shaping the governance framework of the employment relationship. 
Indeed, the state has come to assume the role of „guarantor of the 
employment relationship‟. Historically, the main common concern 
was with industrial conflict - the machinery for handling disputes 
continues to be an important function. A recognition of the asymmetry 
of power in the employment relationship, coupled with the growth of a 
substantial working class with the vote, led to the introduction of 
individual employment rights and legislative support for employee 
„voice‟ in the form of employee works councils and/or support for 
collective bargaining. From the 1980s the thrust of public policy 
changed reflecting intensifying international competition and the rise 
of „neo-liberalism‟. „Flexicurity‟ became the watchword. The need to 
guarantee employees a measure of security in terms of rights was to be 
offset by greater flexibility for employers in terms of hiring and firing, 
setting working time and bearing the costs of employment, leading to 
major changes in pension and social security arrangements as well as 
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legislation on the employment relationship. Also featuring has been 
legislation dealing with family friendly working – partly to achieve 
greater equality, but also partly to encourage greater participation by 
women in employment. More recently, it is the financial and 
economic crisis that has dominated. If this is intensifying pressure to 
achieve greater flexibility in the form of concessions to capital, it is 
also beginning to draw attention to the threat that the speculative 
behaviour associated with so-called „casino capitalism‟ poses to the 
traditional functions of the work organisation in the development of 
human and social capital. Most of the attention is focusing on putting 
in place a regulatory framework that puts the break on such behaviour 
– this involves legislation dealing with the banks and the activities of 
hedge funds and other alternative investment funds. Takeover 
provisions are also under scrutiny. It remains to be seen whether the 
crisis leads to more radical thinking that brings into play „stakeholder‟ 
arrangements or alternative forms of work organisation such as 
worker co-operatives.  
 
Introduction: theories of the state 
As previous chapters have pointed out, the role of the state in 
employment relations has differed considerably from one country to 
another. In France, for example, this role has been all-pervasive and 
legal enactment rather than collective bargaining the dominant 
process. In the UK, by contrast, the state until recently largely stayed 
out of the area – 'voluntarism', 'abstentionism' and „collective laissez-
faire‟ were the guiding principles. In part, to develop a point in 
Chapter 3, this is because of differences in the timing and pace of 
industrialisation and in part because of very different conceptions of 
the role of the state. Be that as it may, the role of the state has been 
pivotal in every country with activity in four main areas. The first, and 
most obvious, takes the form of legislation dealing directly with the 
employment relationship or amendments to it such as the activities of 
trade unions and collective bargaining. The second might be described 
as the field of „employment policy‟. Most governments have 
introduced measures to ensure employment training and skills. They 
have also funded employment exchanges - affecting the incentive to 
take employment and employment opportunities. The third is that of 
social protection. More or less encompassing measures have been 
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provided for dealing with the situation of those unable to work or no 
longer able to work – these include basic provision for illness, 
incapacity and old age. The fourth area is the overall legal and 
economic context within which employment takes place. Especially 
critical in the first instance is the legal framework of corporate 
governance. In the second, the nature and extent of fiscal and 
monetary policies stand out. Not to be forgotten either is that the state, 
in both its national and local forms, is a very large employer in its own 
right. Whether it likes it or not, the state is effectively responsible for 
setting standards across the broad swathe of employment relations 
policy and practice.  
If what states „do‟ is relatively transparent, the motivation for 
doing it is much more complicated. In the words of Heyes and Nolan, 
the role of the state is „one of the most complex and under analysed, 
across the social sciences‟1. Complicating matters is that it is not only 
the nation state that has to be considered. In the case of European 
countries, the development of the European Union means that there is 
a transnational dimension to be considered as well – the EU is not a 
„superstate‟ and yet is more than an inter-governmental organisation, 
with a not inconsiderable competence in employment relations. 
Historically, as Heyes and Nolan describe, two main schools of 
thought emerged, albeit with a number of variants. For many years, 
the „pluralist‟ perspective was dominant. Essentially, this sees power 
within society being dispersed between different organised interests 
groups, each of which has the opportunity to pressurise the state to 
advance its interests. From this point of view, the state is seen as being 
largely neutral - its job is to hold the ring and try to balance the 
interests with which it is confronted as best it can within an overall 
constraint of maintaining law and order. In the early days of capitalist 
development, this meant largely responding to the interests of 
employers. With industrialisation, the emergence of a working class, 
and universal suffrage, however, things became more complicated, 
with policy becoming a product of more or less recurrent bargaining 
with and between employers and trade unions.  
At first sight, the second school of thought appears fundamentally 
different. Its starting point is Marx's comment in The Communist 
Manifesto that the state is but the „executive committee for managing 
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie‟. Far from being neutral, 
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in other words, the state is very much on the side of capital and is so 
because the basis of society is the economy. As Marxist theoreticians 
have argued in later works, however, this does not necessarily mean 
that the state reflects the immediately expressed interests of capital or 
a particular group of capital. The state‟s „structural‟ position in 
capitalist society means that its overriding concern has to be the long-
run viability of a system of wage-labour relations rather than the 
interests of any one particular group - following Poulantzas, the state 
is said to enjoy 'relative autonomy'
2. 
The result is that the state can 
appear to assume the role of the power broker that it has in the 
pluralist perspective. 
More recently, with the domination of neo-liberal thinking, 
economists' viewpoints have gained sway. For economists, the 
„market‟ is very much the preferred form of governance, with the role 
of the state stripped to the „irreducible minimum‟3. State intervention 
takes place (and, by implication, should only take place) in two main 
types of situation: first, where markets are deemed to be imperfect on 
account of natural monopoly; and, second, where markets lead to 
externalities, i.e. knock-on effects that create burdens for the wider 
society. Only in these cases is state intervention justified - in the first 
instance, to avoid the harmful effects of exercise of monopoly power 
by either employers or employees; in the second, to ensure that 
employers do not pass on unreasonable costs of their operations to 
society as a whole.  
Arguably, all three perspectives are needed to help us to 
understand the role of the state: none of them is sufficient by itself. 
This is above all true because the issues that policy makers have had 
to confront have changed over time. 
 
A changing agenda  
As Chapter 3 emphasised, the employment relationship involves 
flexibility and security. Following Crouch, a useful way of 
conceptualising the state‟s role is to think in terms of it having to 
manage the balance between employees‟ need for security and 
employers‟ requirements for flexibility4. Initially, the concern was to 
establish a stable framework within which the conduct of the 
employment relationship could take place. In this phase, the main 
emphasis was on achieving a sufficient level of security for employees 
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– it was in doing this that effectively became „guarantor of the 
employment relationship‟. From the 1980s, there has been more 
emphasis on employers‟ requirements for flexibility, reflecting 
developments in globalisation discussed in previous chapters, along 
with the dominance of „neo-liberal‟ thinking. 
 
‘Guarantor of the employment relationship’ 
Initially, having established the conditions in which the freedom of 
contract could thrive, the issue was how to deal with the conflict that 
inevitably followed from the conduct of the employment relationship. 
Typically, this manifested itself in crackdowns on the emergent trade 
unions. Relatively quickly, however, the balance of concern shifted 
with the state being obliged to do something about the adverse effects 
of the asymmetry of power in order to have a stable framework. In 
some cases, such as the UK, it meant factory legislation, along with 
slow and grudging support for trade unions and collective bargaining, 
coupled with the introduction of machinery for resolving disputes. In 
others, most notably Germany under Bismark, a raft of social security 
measures was introduced in an attempt to offer employees an 
alternative to the increasingly influential socialist agenda.  
The explanation for the about face is that an approach grounded in 
„elite consumers‟ and „insecure workers‟, to borrow Crouch‟s words, 
has major limitations
5
. First there are potentially „long-term social 
control problems‟ - economic conflict may threaten the stability of the 
overall system. An up-to-date example is that of China: the state is 
refusing to clamp down on protest over particularly low wages and 
insisting that employers recognise independent forms of employee 
representation for the purposes of negotiating over the terms and 
conditions of employment. Second, a totally 'free market' risks the 
state incurring the „social cost' of labour, helping to explain why 
minimum wage legislation is so widespread. As Chapter 2 explained, 
human capital can be compared to physical capital in that it requires 
some 'minimum on-going expenditure for upkeep, repair and 
depreciation if the input is to be maintained for current production and 
replaced for future production'
6
. Unlike physical capital, however, 
human capital is not something that employers 'own ' and so there is 
little incentive for them to take on this responsibility. If pay falls 
below its social costs, therefore, it is society that has to pick up the 
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bill, resulting in 'misallocation of resources and economic 
inefficiency'
7
. Another consideration is that some employers have 
wanted the state to intervene to prevent under cutting – indeed, the 
prevention of under cutting was one of the reasons Winston Churchill 
advanced in the UK in 1909 for introducing statutory minimum wages 
to be set by Trade Boards.  
A third consideration reflects the development of a consumer 
society and the 'welfare state' in which the state and its agencies 
became a very large employer in their own right. On the face of it, 
developments here appear to confirm to the „pluralist‟ model of the 
state – policymakers respond to pressure from a growing working 
class, along with the trade unions and political parties which campaign 
on its behalf. It was not quite as straightforward as this, however As 
Chapter 2 pointed out, a key consideration in the state becoming 
„guarantor of the employment relationship‟
8
 was the need to ensure 
that employees would be able to achieve sufficient levels of 
purchasing power to be „confident consumers‟9. Indeed, sustaining 
consumers who generate demand and hence profitability and growth 
became a core element of macroeconomic policy. 
Developments went furthest in Europe, with the term „European 
social model‟ acquiring widespread currency. At the risk of over-
simplification, the model was predicated upon three fundamental 
principles
10
. These were the right to work, including commitments to 
full employment and active employment policies; the right to social 
protection, involving encompassing basic social security cover for the 
non-working population; and the right to civilised standards in the 
workplace, covering issues of employment governance or regulation. 
Two further common features that came to be associated with the 
model were a relatively egalitarian wage and income distribution and 
a high degree of interest organisation on the part of employers and 
employees11. Seemingly, it represented a settlement of sorts.  
The „European social model‟ became the one for countries to 
aspire to. Thus ILO developed a list of the different forms of 
employment security, which will be found in Table 10.1. While all 
seven dimensions are important, the ILO emphasised, two are 
essential for basic security: income security and voice representation 
security. The ILO goes on to explain that the initiative is dedicated to 
the achievement of what it calls „decent work‟ or the „dream of 
helping to ensure that more people across the world find opportunities 
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to work in dignity, for the benefit of their families, communities and 
themselves'
12
.  
 
‘Flexicurity' 
In 1980s the mood changed and with it the issues that policy makers 
had to confront. With the increasing dominance of neo-liberal 
thinking, the European „social model‟ began to come under attack. 
Employment relations‟ links with competitiveness came to dominate 
policy discourse – the balance between flexibility and security, it 
seemed, had gone too far in favour of the latter. In Bordogna and 
Cella‟s words, employment relations became the „villain of the 
piece‟13, the European model being unfavourably compared to the US 
equivalent. At the risk of caricature, key features of the former were 
seen as an emphasis on employee rights introduced by collective 
bargaining and/or legal enactment, leading to security of employment 
and relatively high levels of wages and conditions. But there were 
downsides - inflexibility, a lack of competitiveness and high levels of 
unemployment. The US model was deemed to be the opposite. There 
may have been considerable insecurity, lower levels of wages and 
poorer working conditions for many, reflecting weak employee 
protection and „hire-and–fire‟ practice. Management was much freer 
of the restrictions of collective bargaining and legal regulation, 
however, supposedly leading to greater flexibility, improved 
competitiveness and a much lower rate of unemployment than in 
Europe.   
The overall context was set by the widespread shift of emphasis of 
macro-economic policy from the demand to the supply-side. To 
paraphrase Wilhagen, four main factors can be highlighted: the fast 
pace of international economic integration - the creation of the Single 
European market and the single European currency was especially 
important here; the rapid development of new technologies, 
particularly in the information and communication areas; the 
demographic ageing of European societies, together with relatively 
low average employment rates and high long-term unemployment, 
which put at risk the sustainability of social protection systems; and 
the development of segmented labour markets in many countries 
where both relatively protected and unprotected workers coexist (so-
called „insiders‟ and „outsiders‟)14. 
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Policy makers responded by seeking to shift the balance between 
the security associated with the traditional model and the greater 
flexibility that employers were deemed to require. In the UK, the talk 
was of „fairness and flexibility‟ and finding a „third way‟. In 
continental Europe, the term 'flexicurity', which originated in 
Denmark, became the watchword. Although there have been different 
interpretations, a broad consensus emerged about the four basic 
components involved:   
 Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements from the 
perspective of the employer and the employee. In the case of 
'employees', however, it is not just a matter of 'insiders', i.e. 
those who were already in employment, but also 'outsiders', 
i.e. those potential employees who were being denied 
opportunities because of the privileges enjoyed by 'insiders'. 
The main instruments were modern labour laws, collective 
agreements and the reform of work organisation allowing 
for the reconciliation of  employment and family 
responsibilities, 
 Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies. Here 
„employability‟ became the watchword. In other words, 
training and development were to be designed not just to 
ensure the continual acquisition and upgrading of competencies 
and skill of workers in their existing organisations, 
particularly the most vulnerable, but also to make it easier 
for them to find employment with other employers in the 
future.  
 Effective active labour market policies. These were to help 
people cope with rapid change, reduce unemployment spells 
and ease transitions between different „labour market‟ situations 
(from school to work, from one job to another, from 
unemployment to work and from work to retirement), 
 Modern social security systems embracing unemployment 
benefits, pensions and healthcare. Here the emphasis was to 
be not just on adequate income support, but also on the 
encouragement of employment and labour market mobility. 
This includes broad coverage of social protection 
provisions, including those that help people combine work 
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with private and family responsibilities such as childcare
15
. 
As previous chapters have explained, public policy put a great 
deal of emphasis on the „supply‟ side of the employment relationship, 
reflecting the increasing dominance of „neo-liberal‟ thinking. In many 
countries, there were reforms of employment protection legislation 
making it easier for employers to hire and fire
16
. As Chapter 5 
outlined, there were also important changes in pensions and social 
security provisions, along with those of training. At sector and 
company levels, as Chapters 5 and 9 pointed out, there was a shift in 
emphasis in collective bargaining from „distribution‟ to „integration‟, 
with the agenda more and more dominated by employers.  
By contrast, relatively little was done to influence the „demand 
side‟ – in the language of the debate in the EU it was more about 
promoting „activation‟ than „capability‟17. The European 
Commission‟s 1997 Green Paper, Partnership for a New Organisation 
of Work, which had advocated wide ranging changes in work 
organisation, was quietly forgotten. Similarly, little came of the 
recommendations of the Commission‟s Higher Level Group report on 
restructuring, which included that all companies with more than 100 
employees should produce a management of change report in 
consultation with employees and their representatives. In 2001, the 
European Commission drew up the list of indicators of „job quality‟ 
that were to be the basis for national bench marking. Here, too, 
however, the main emphasis was on the „supply‟ rather than the 
„demand‟ side. Significantly, issues such as „intrinsic job quality, 
„work organisation and work-life balance‟, and „social dialogue and 
worker involvement‟ also did not become subjects of the „open 
method of co-ordination‟18. If anything, the situation was even bleaker 
in the UK. In 1997, the in-coming Labour Government agreed to 
incorporate the chapter in the EU Treaty in important respects, little 
changed. Thereafter, however, Labour Governments not only 
consistently opposed further developments in the social dimension, 
including the information and consultation Directive and the inclusion 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU Treaty. But they also 
put themselves at the forefront of articulating the alternative neo-
liberal vision to the European „social‟ model based on making labour 
markets „work‟ more effectively. At home, they introduced a 
workplace-based statutory procedure for trade union recognition, but 
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otherwise did little to increase the „legitimacy power‟ of trade unions 
or collective bargaining. Indeed, as Appendix 1 argues, they missed 
opportunity after opportunity to deal with what might be described as 
the UK‟s institutional „gaps‟.  
Even so, timing and context also continued to be fundamentally 
important in helping to explain unfolding developments - ideology 
was not everything. An excellent example is the development of the 
EU's social dimension and its implications for the 'juridification' of the 
employment relations in the UK. For three decades or more, „neo-
liberalism‟ has reigned supreme in the UK and the balance of power 
between capital and labour has changed considerably. The decline in 
membership and the coverage of collective bargaining means that 
trade unions are no longer the pressure group they used to be in 
former times. By contrast, capital has grown considerably in influence 
reflecting its globalisation – policy makers, it seems, have become 
terrified of offending the 'markets'. Meanwhile policy responsibility 
for employment relations has become extremely fragmented, with no 
single focus and few people of experience and expertise responsible 
for it. Yet it is during this period that the UK has experienced a vast 
increase in legislation dealing with employment relations. In part, as 
Chapter 3 explained in discussing the process of „juridification‟, one 
of the great ironies is that privatisation and deregulation do not 
automatically bring about a reduction in the role of state as proponents 
expect - the uncertainty which such developments bring is a potential 
source of conflict leading to further regulation. In part, as Chapter 4 
explained in discussing the importance of „critical junctures‟, it 
reflects the contested nature and timing of the introduction of the 
Single European Market - „social Europe‟ was a by-product of 
'economic Europe' and the relative lack of legal regulation of the 
employment relationship meant that UK had to play „catch up‟. To 
illustrate this point, and the complexities of the issues involved, Table 
10.1 gives an overview of some of the many considerations that were 
involved. 
 
Public sector reform 
The reason for singling out the public sector is that the state employs 
either directly or indirectly something between a fifth and a quarter of 
the workforce in most countries – the wages bill is a very considerable 
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element in public expenditure. Public sector employment is also 
distinctive in several respects. As well as employing a relatively high 
proportion of professional workers, above all in sectors such as health, 
social services and public administration, it has many employees in 
relatively low paid jobs. The proportion of women employees is also 
higher than that of the private sector. Last, but by no means least, the 
setting of the terms and conditions of employment tends to be highly 
centralised in the interests of mobility and consistency. 
In these circumstances, and because of the potential impact of 
strikes, public sector employment relations have a high profile. For 
much of the post-world war 2 period, there was a widespread 
consensus that state should be „model employer‟ setting the example 
for employers in the private sector. This is true of both the substantive 
terms and conditions of employment and the procedures and processes 
by which they were established. The following description of the 
situation in the UK could be applied to the other countries included in 
the comparison: 
From 1945 onwards, public sector employment in health, 
education and social services grew rapidly as part of the 
development of the welfare state … the state was a „model 
employer‟ setting an example to the private sector by endorsing 
principles of fairness, involvement and equity in its treatment of 
its workforce. These principles were associated with the 
encouragement of trade union membership, support for centralised 
systems of collective bargaining and other forms of workforce 
participation which encouraged the expression and resolution of 
grievances
19
. 
This manifested itself in relatively generous pension arrangements 
and other terms and conditions. The pay of lower paid employees also 
tended to be higher than those in the private sector. As the previous 
chapter has shown, levels of unionisation were much higher in the 
public than the private sector and collective bargaining greater in its 
coverage. Public sector bodies were also to use their control of 
contracts to disseminate good practice more widely, for example, in 
the area of equality and diversity. 
The 1980s saw two major developments that have changed very 
considerably the „model employer‟ status with implications for the 
conduct of the employment relationship more generally. One was a 
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programme of privatisation. Some privatisation reflected domestic 
government agendas, most notably in the UK, where it affected the 
nationalised utilities such as gas, water, electricity and 
telecommunications. Others were because of wider considerations. In 
the case of EU member countries, for example, some privatisation 
resulted directly from policies promoting the rationalisation of sectors 
such as steel or the opening up of previously closed markets to 
European-wide competition, as in energy, telecommunications and 
airlines. In any event, the result was that considerable numbers were 
transferred from the public to the private sector and exposed to wider 
commercial pressures discussed in Chapter 9.  
The other development was the „new public sector management‟ 
(NPM) approach encouraged by the OECD, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. In Heyes and Nolan‟s words, „The 
central principle of NPM is that systems of public administration can 
be strengthened through the adoption of micro-management practices 
associated with the private sector‟20. The „divisionalisation‟, 
„budgetary devolution‟ and „marketisation‟ that featured in Chapter 8 
are important here. They make it possible to put „greater emphasis on 
measuring the performance of government departments and non-
departmental public bodies  … through setting targets and evaluating 
outcomes, improved accountability and coordinated policy 
development and service delivery‟21. 
The upshot is that the main principles that Bach identified above 
were over-turned. The public sector was no longer to set the trend. 
Rather the reverse was the case: „marketisation‟ meant that terms and 
conditions of employment were to reflect those in the private sector. 
In the UK, as Chapter 8 suggested, centralised and detailed targets, 
very often reflecting short-term political pressures, were introduced 
with little or no serious consultation with trade unions or their 
members, undermining the legitimacy of collective bargaining and 
social dialogue. 
 
The challenge of ‘casino’ capitalism 
The financial crisis that swept the world in 2007-9 has heightened 
considerably the policy dilemma at the heart of the „flexicurity‟ 
debate. The origins of the crisis, which lie in the growth in financial 
intermediation and the activity of the financial sector, also emphasise 
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the fundamental nature of the problem. One is the globalisation of 
economic activity following the liberalisation of finance and financial 
markets in the 1980s. In Wolf‟s words writing before the crisis, 
Over the past quarter-century … almost all … regulations have 
been swept away. Barriers between commercial and investment 
banking have vanished. Foreign exchange controls have 
disappeared from the high-income countries and have been 
substantially, or sometimes even completely, liberalised in many 
emerging market economies as well. The creation of the euro in 
1999 accelerated the integration of financial markets in the 
Eurozone, the world‟s second largest economy. Today, much of 
the global financial sector is as liberalised as it was a century ago, 
just before the First World War
22
. 
The other consideration is the revolution in computing touched on 
in Chapter 8. In Wolf‟s words again, 
This has permitted the generation and pricing of a host of complex 
transactions, particularly derivatives. It has also permitted 24-hour 
trading of vast volumes of financial assets. New computer-based 
risk management models have been employed across the financial 
sector. Today‟s financial sector is a particularly vigorous child of 
the computer revolution
23
. 
Also important were the implications of the resulting shift in the 
distribution of income from labour to capital raised in Chapter 2. 
Wage earners were encouraged to increase their debt to maintain the 
standard of living. But reliance on „house price Keynesianism‟24 or 
„privatised Keynesianism‟25 was only likely to be a temporary answer 
as events proved it to be. It was in the housing mortgage market in the 
UK and the USA that the financial crisis was immediately triggered.  
Arguably, the underlying problem is that the extent of the 
flexibility capital expects/requires poses a fundamental challenge to 
employment relations as they had developed as the basis of the 
economic system. In Crouch‟s words, „A modern market economy 
based on mass consumption … requires the majority of workers to 
have enough sense of certainty in their economic lives to be confident 
consumers‟26. But the developments in financial markets since the 
liberalisation of the 1980s make this increasingly difficult. One 
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consideration is the speculative behaviour of a relatively small group 
of organisations such as hedge funds, which have little interest in 
ownership of a particular share. Rather they take advantage of share 
trading systems which allow them to buy and sell in a Nano second to 
speculate. Indeed, a widely used practice is that of „short-selling‟, 
where the hedge fund effectively bets on a decline in the price of the 
shares that it borrows with a view to buying them back at cheaper 
price and so on. As Chapter 8 explained, an important side-effect was 
clearly illustrated in the case of the Kraft takeover of Cadbury, the 
confectioner manufacturer in 2010. Cadbury‟s fate was effectively 
sealed by fewer than less than a third of its shareholders, leading to 
charges from ministers that traditional institutional shareholders such 
as pension funds and insurance companies were acting, in the words 
of the then city minister, Lord Myners, like „absentee landlords‟27. 
Another has been the emergence of private equity groups with the 
ability to borrow („leverage‟) substantial sums of money on the basis 
of future returns. In this case, the debts that are incurred can destroy 
the business. In the words of John Moulton, who is himself a major 
player in the private equity industry, some deals are tantamount to 
„betting jobs against shareholder returns‟28. A third consideration, 
underpinning these developments, has been a change in the role that 
the banks have played. No longer, it seems, is their prime objective to 
lend to businesses to produce goods and services. Rather it is to 
maximise the returns from the development of business involving 
other financial institutions. Central to this has been a raft of 
instruments that policy makers, let alone members of the public, are 
only just beginning to become aware of. Perhaps the most notorious 
are the 'credit default swaps' that started out as a form of insurance 
against the possibility that an individual or company would renege on 
debt. Trading in these „derivatives‟ became a business in its own right, 
leading to the development of a „shadow‟ banking system where no 
one knew the risks being taken. Ironically, in the process, the divisions 
of the banks involved – notably the investment banks – have come to 
resemble a form of workers‟ cooperative discussed in Chapter 6. In 
Kaletsky‟s words, 
The peculiarity of the banking business … is that boards of 
directors, instead of representing the interests of shareholders, 
have maximised the earnings of the employees. Banks, perhaps 
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because of the partnership culture in the hedge funds with which 
they must co-exist, have increasingly been managed as worker 
cooperatives, in which the interests of the workers came first and 
those of outside providers of capital were treated as an 
afterthought'.
29
  
Adding insult to injury is the difficulties that governments are 
having as the result of the sovereign indebtedness incurred in helping 
the banks to recover. Triggering this phase of the crisis was the 
situation in Greece and other Eurozone countries in 2010. The whole 
basis of public finances has come to be questioned, with austerity 
measures being introduced in country after country to cut budget 
deficits and appease the bond markets. In effect, critics say, 
governments are being asked to accept the „privatisation of gains‟ and 
the „socialisation of losses‟30. 
Initially, there was some recognition of the wider issues involved, 
with questions being asked about the supremacy of politics or „the 
markets‟. This is above all true of continental European countries, 
where it was widely recognised that the crisis represented a 
fundamental threat to the „European social model‟. Very quickly, 
however, the main emphasis turned to fixing the system/ getting back 
to business as usual as quickly as possible. Most attention focuses on 
the situation of the banking sector and the „shadow‟ derivative 
markets. Along with new forms of taxation on bank profits and bonus 
payments, proposals for reform include the break-up of the big banks, 
the separation of retail banking from capital market banking, 
restrictions on proprietary trading and ownership of hedge funds by 
banks, and raising the level of capital that banks are required to hold. 
Greater transparency is also being demand, with derivatives and other 
features of „shadow banking‟ being moved on to exchanges. 
A second group of proposals target the process of 'financialisation' 
and the operation of the „casino economy‟. They include more 
stringent controls over the activities of hedge funds and alternative 
investment fund managers such as private equity companies, along 
with practices such as 'short-selling' and „leveraged buy-outs‟. In the 
UK, the „Takeover‟ panel is currently considering these. Much greater 
transparency of behaviour is also likely to be required. In the EU, for 
example, there is a directive dealing with alternative investment fund 
going through the system as this text was in preparation.  
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A third group deals with company stewardship and corporate 
governance. In the UK, reflecting the Cadbury experience, specific 
proposals include a short-term capital gains tax for shareholders who 
take early profits from selling their shares; making takeovers subject 
to more stringent criteria so that the opportunity for unlocking short-
run shareholder value is more difficult; putting a stop to „leveraged‟ 
takeovers – the emphasis should be on equity rather than debt; 
stripping short-term holders of voting rights and raising the 
acceptance level required for takeovers; and reducing the time table. 
There are also proposals to allow a „public interest‟ defence in the 
event of hostile takeovers.  
As the crisis has gone on, there have also been calls for another 
look at the purposes of companies. In the UK, in a speech at the 
Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment conference in London 
on 19 June 2010, Hector Sants, Chief Executive of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), suggested that greater intervention was 
needed from regulators to ensure decisions made by firms deliver the 
outcomes society expects: 
Historically regulators have avoided judging culture and 
behaviour as it has been seen as too judgemental a role to play. 
However, given the issues we continue to see over time, I believe 
this one-dimensional approach has to be questioned. Every other 
aspect of the regulatory framework is under scrutiny and we 
should not shy away from debating the culture question … 
I would strongly advocate intervention in the UK through 
changing the Companies Act framework for directors, for 
example. The current requirement for directors is to promote the 
success of the company. This is often interpreted in terms of 
shareholder value. Whilst this does include the need, for example, 
to „have regard to' the impact on the community, I do not believe 
that is sufficient. There must be a stronger and more explicit 
obligation to wider society. There must be clear recognition of the 
need for institutions to contribute to the common good. 
The last time there was an active debate about the relative merits 
of the 'stakeholder' and shareholder' models in the UK was in the mid-
90s. Proponents of the 'stakeholder' model like Hutton argued that 
'The great challenge – after the experience of both state socialism and 
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unfettered free markets – is to create a new financial architecture in 
which private decisions produce a less degenerate capitalism … The 
triple requirement is to broaden the area of stake-holding in companies 
and institutions, so creating a greater bias to long term commitment 
from owners, to extend the supply of cheap long term debt, and to 
decentralise decision making‟31. Ironically, among the many 
opponents of stake-holding was Adair Turner, then Director-General 
of the CBI and now, Sants‟ Chairman at the FSA. Referring to 'stake 
holding', Turner wrote in 2001,  
It all sounds rather attractive. But as a guide to practical policy it 
is at best a cul-de-sac, at worst dangerous. It sounds attractive to 
ask corporations to think through the social „balance sheet of 
gains and losses‟ but in practice it is an almost inoperable 
principle. Corporations can just about imperfectly identify the 
complex set of actions which will maximise their own profit 
within given constraints, but they are ill-equipped to calibrate the 
second and third and nth order social consequences of their 
actions and lack the legitimacy to make the trade-offs involved
32
.  
For Turner, capital-market pressures drive economic efficiency; 
the good society has to be achieved by other means. Indeed, a 
particular danger of pursuing the stakeholder approach, he went on to 
suggest, was that it would divert attention from „those specific 
interventions - redistribution, collective-goods provision, or regulation 
- which will make capitalism more humane‟33.  
At the time of writing towards the end of 2010, it remained 
unclear how robust the response to the challenge of „casino capitalism 
woulb be. Some commentators seem to think that sufficient measures 
will be introduced in the areas discussed above to ensure that the 
worst effects of „financialisation‟ will be curbed. But there are as yet 
few signs that the threats to the traditional model of the employment 
relationship are being understood, let alone a serious debate taking 
place about the „specific interventions‟ needed to deal with them. In 
the UK, as the CBI‟s The next 10 years report mentioned in Chapter 8 
suggests, there seems to be a recognition by senior managers of the 
need to move away from the short-termism fuelling „permanent 
restructuring‟. It is extremely doubtful, however, whether they will be 
willing to contemplate the type of change in company objectives that 
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Sants calls for. The same is true of proposals for increasing employee 
rights under acquired rights and collective redundancy legislation in 
ways that considerably raise the costs of behaviour that has potentially 
damaging consequences for employees and their local communities. 
Equally, although the idea of worker cooperatives has resurfaced, 
there is little discussion of how these or other alternative models of 
business organisation might be promoted on any sizeable scale. 
The problem is that the best of times is also the worst of times. 
Trade unions are too weak to promote anything like the level of crisis 
that the banks have. The HRM function does not have the clout 
necessary to promote a serious debate and its energies are likely to be 
absorbed in dealing with the redundancy and insecurity following the 
financial crisis. Looking at government, there is no evidence that the 
lessons from the financial crisis are being read across to employment, 
let alone a recognition that there are major implications for its role as 
„guarantor of the employment relationship‟ – with the recession biting, 
the main emphasis is on reducing the budget deficit, which means cuts 
not only in employment, but also in its terms and conditions. In the 
circumstances, the most likely outcome is a further worsening of the 
returns to labour. Coupled with the further development of an „hour 
glass‟ economy, in which the middle is increasingly hollowed out by 
technological change, the prospect is of a society in which „only the 
elites [will be able] to confidently consume, while workers work 
flexibly and can hardly afford to consume beyond subsistence 
levels‟34. It is also a recipe for continuing instability in financial 
systems as well as demoralisation and lack of engagement. Pessimistic 
as these conclusions will read, they are difficult to avoid. 
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Table 10.1  How ‘economic’ Europe contributed to 
‘juridification’35  
There are two main views about the reasons for what has been described as a 
„fundamental asymmetry‟36 between the economic and social dimension of 
European integration
37
. One sees the asymmetry as flowing from the 
essentially economic nature of European integration: in Delors‟ words 
„L‟Europe de la nécessité‟ rather than „L‟Europe de l‟idéal‟38. A second view 
contends that economic integration was „deliberately underdeveloped‟39. For 
the monetary authorities and employers' organisations especially, a process 
of market-led harmonisation was precisely what was attractive about EMU‟s 
construction. It would be impossible as well as undesirable to regulate social 
policies at supranational level. To remain competitive, however, countries 
would have to restructure their domestic economies in order to get rid of 
inefficiencies in their national welfare states and labour markets.  
Trade unions and their political allies were well aware of this thinking. 
There were worries that „economic Europe‟ would deliver a „nightmare‟ 
rather than a „dream‟40; that the European Central Bank, in seeking to fulfil 
its remit to maintain price stability, might set an unduly restrictive monetary 
policy thereby triggering deflation. If so, the burden of the subsequent 
adjustment would fall on wages and employment along with social 
protection systems. The same would hold in the face of asymmetric shocks, 
given the absence under EMU of the adjustment mechanisms available in 
other currency zones. Much as they have during the global financial crisis, 
governments would have to squeeze public expenditure, including that on 
social protection, while employers and trade unions would come under 
pressure to reduce labour costs in exchange for sustaining employment.  
Even so, most trade unions supported the EMU project. Alongside 
interests in the economic benefits, Foden identifies two main considerations. 
One might be labelled „the Europeanisation of economic policy making‟. 
Individually, Euro zone countries would find it difficult to take action to 
promote the expansion of their domestic economies to create jobs – 
„Keynesianism‟ was no longer possible in one country, it was argued, 
whereas the prospects looked much brighter if Europe became more of an 
entity. The other lay in the possibility of exerting influence over the wider 
political agenda: „In essence, the ETUC has been a supporter of, and in part, 
an actor in, the strategy of building „economic Europe‟ as a means of 
promoting „political Europe‟, and in particular, social Europe‟‟41. „Political‟ 
and „social‟ Europe, in other words, were expected to be „spill-over‟ effects 
of „economic‟ Europe42.  
In the event, the outcome was an uneasy compromise: there was more 
„social‟ Europe than many employers would have liked, but much less that 
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the ETUC wanted. But for the UK, which was in a unique position because 
of the tradition of „voluntarism‟, even the codification and extension of 
measures already available in most other countries meant that the so-called 
acquis touched on virtually every area of employment relations other than 
association, industrial action and wage determination. Listing only those 
areas where there has been major UK legislation gives us freedom of 
movement of workers; equal opportunities in terms of age, disability, 
gender, race, religion and sexual orientation; health and safety; 
collective redundancy and business transfers; working time; the proof 
of employment; information and consultation – both national and 
cross-national; maternity and parental leave; equal treatment for part-
time and temporary workers (with agency workers to come); pensions; 
employment agencies; data protection and corporate governance. 
Policy makers in other countries might have been opposed to the advanced 
social model that the ETUC was seeking, but they were not prepared to 
allow the UK to benefit from its inferior employment protection. As well as 
the free movement of labour, a single market and a single currency needed a 
level playing field in areas such as working time, health and safety, and so 
on. 
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Table 10.2 Types of employment security43 
 
Income security denotes adequate actual, perceived and expected income, 
either earned or in the form of social security and other benefits. It encompasses 
the level of income (absolute and relative to needs), assurance of receipt, and 
expectation of current and future income, both during working life and in old 
age or disability retirement. Income security protection mechanisms include a 
minimum wage machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, and 
progressive taxation. 
 
Representation security refers to both individual representation and collective 
representation. Individual representation is about individual rights enshrined in 
laws as well as the individuals‟ access to institutions. Collective representation 
means the right of any individual or group to be represented by a body that can 
bargain on their behalf and which is sufficiently large, sufficiently independent 
and sufficiently competent to do so. Independent trade unions with the right to 
collectively bargain over wages, benefits, and working conditions as well as to 
monitor working practices and strike have been typical forms of granting 
representation security. 
 
Labour market security arises when there are ample opportunities for adequate 
income-earning activities. It has a structural component, in that it represents the 
types and quantity of opportunities. Furthermore, it has a cognitive side, as it 
also features expectations that opportunities are or will become adequate. 
Policies aimed at enhancing this form of security have included full-employment 
oriented macro-economic policies, the creation of employment agencies, and 
other placing services. 
 
Employment security is protection against loss of income-earning work. 
Employment security exists in organisations and countries, in which there is 
strong protection against unfair or arbitrary dismissal and where workers can 
redress unfair dismissal. For the self employed, it means protection against 
sudden loss of independent work, and/or business failure. Typical forms of 
enhancing employment security have been protection against arbitrary dismissal, 
regulations on hiring and firing, and imposition of costs on employers for failing 
to adhere to rules. 
 
Job security signifies the presence of niches in organisations and across labour 
markets allowing the workers some control over the content of a job and the 
opportunity to build a career. Whereas employment security refers to the 
opportunity of a worker to continue working in an enterprise, job security refers 
to the worker‟s ability to pursue a line of work in conjunction with his or her 
interests, training and skills. Protection mechanisms have consisted of barriers to 
skill dilution such as craft boundaries, job qualifications, restrictive practices, 
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craft unions, etc. 
 
Work security denotes working conditions in organisations that are safe and 
promote workers‟ well being. Classic “occupational health and safety” 
provisions shielding workers from occupational hazards, diseases, and injuries 
are an integral part. Work security goes beyond this, though, in addressing the 
modern scourges of stress, overwork, absenteeism, and harassment. Protections 
include provisions and insurance against accidents and illness at work, and 
limits on working time. 
 
Skill reproduction security denotes workers‟ access to basic education as well 
as vocational training to develop capacities and acquire the qualifications needed 
for socially and economically valuable occupations. Ways to further skill 
reproduction security include policies to generate widespread opportunities to 
gain and retain skills through education, apprenticeships, and employment 
training. 
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Appendix 
The UK in comparative perspective 
Main tasks 
 
 compare the impact of employment relations in the 
UK with that in other countries  
 
 highlight the distinctive features of the UK's 
employment relations and corporate governance 
frameworks that help to account for this impact 
 
  suggestions for plugging some of the UK’s 
institutional ‘gaps’ 
 
Summary 
The UK compares relatively unfavourably on many of the indicators 
associated with the impact of employment relations. The employment 
rate may be higher in the UK than other countries. Yet its quality is 
relatively poor and the levels of pay low, resulting in relatively high 
levels of poverty and inequality, with implications for social mobility. 
Work organisation in the UK is typically rooted in the 'lean' and 
'traditional' models with extensive managerial hierarchies, which is 
not only bad for people's personal development and long-term health, 
but also extremely inefficient, helping to account for the UK's 
relatively poor competitiveness performance: working longer hours, 
higher levels of supervision and proportionately more senior 
managers, it seems, are no substitute for employees working smarter, 
while ‘numerical’ flexibility is inferior to ‘functional’ flexibility. As 
well as the type of work organisation, there are other institutional 
features that help to understand the impact employment relations has 
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in the UK. Employment protection legislation is limited, which means 
insecurity and a reluctance to embrace change. The decline of 
collective bargaining, above all at sector level, means that large 
sections of the workforce no longer enjoy the benefits of the 
additional standards that come from collective agreements. Coupled 
with the absence of any provision for national social dialogue, it also 
means that the role, status and membership of key intermediary 
organisations such as trade unions and employers’ organisations have 
been seriously affected: the UK no longer possesses the networks 
necessary for co-coordinating continuous improvement in key areas of 
personnel practice – training is perhaps the most obvious example. 
Along with limited employment protection, the relative lack of 
employee 'voice' – at workplace, sector and national level – means that 
employment is not contributing to social capital development to the 
same extent as it is in other countries. Also fundamentally important 
are the 'financialisation' and ‘permanent restructuring’ that the UK's 
corporate governance institutions have encouraged. These have made 
it very difficult for operating managers to develop any consistency in 
approach to employment relations, let alone create the long-term 
relationships that the 'learning' model requires. They have also 
discouraged the pursuit of business policies that emphasise quality 
products and services, helping to explain the UK's relatively poor 
overall competitive position. Encouraged by the weakness of trade 
unions and an institutional framework favouring ‘numerical’ rather 
than’ functional flexibility’, many UK managers continue to compete 
on the basis of  low-wage and low-skill labour with the wide ranging 
implications for poverty, health, quality of family life and 
competitiveness discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Introduction 
Having considered the impact of employment relations in a number of 
key areas, along with the nature and extent of the evidence for the 
links in Chapter 2, this Appendix turns to comparing and contrasting 
the UK with other countries. It is early days in the collection of robust 
cross-national comparative data dealing with issues such as social 
capital. As the European Commission points out in its Industrial 
Relations in Europe 2008 report, 'Data are missing for comparing 
systematically, and quantitatively, the contribution of industrial 
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relations, exploring differences across Member States and regimes, 
sectors, instruments and issue areas ... This is above all true of data 
that would make possible a multivariate approach'
1
.  This means that 
very little can be said about employment relations’ relative impact - 
clearly, for example, employment relations are not the only 
explanatory variable in the case of health or social capital 
development. Even so, there are a number of areas where comparable 
data exist, in particular courtesy of the four main international 
organisations and their agencies, i.e. the European Commission, the 
International Labour Organisation, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the United Nations. It is these data 
that structure the discussion that follows. To quote the European 
Commission again, 'if used with wisdom, the comparison of 
achievements and successes, or failures, across countries or regimes 
remains a useful learning device both for academics and practitioners, 
from which inspiration can be drawn'
2
. 
To ease the problem of digestion, five countries have been 
selected as the basis of comparison with the UK – France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the USA. Each of these is a major 
competitor and/or characterised by different institutional frameworks 
of employment relations, reflecting state tradition and/or national 
business system: France is an example of the ‘Latin’ model, Germany 
and the Netherlands the 'Rhineland', and Sweden the ‘Nordic’3. The 
USA is included because of its size and because it is often bracketed 
together with the UK on account of both its legal framework of 
employment relations and its brand of 'shareholder' capitalism. 
  
Social indicators 
An area where the UK compares relatively favourably is occupational 
safety. According to the most recent data from Eurostat published by 
the HSE, it emerges that in 2005: 
 The British rate of work-related fatal injury (1.4 per 100,000 
workers) was the lowest across the EU, the average rate, excluding 
transport accidents, being 2.3 per 100,000 workers.  
 The British rate of workplace non-fatal over-3-day injuries at 1,271 
per 100,000 workers was the third lowest among EU member 
states.  
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 Industries reporting above average incidence of fatal and serious 
injuries were agriculture, construction, manufacturing and 
transport
4
 
Further data on occupational health are available from the 
European Foundation's fourth working conditions survey. In their 
answer to the question ‘Does your work affect your health?’, only a 
fifth of UK respondents responded affirmatively, putting the UK at the 
bottom of the list
5
. All the other five countries reported higher levels, 
with the EU average being 35 per cent. The proportion taking leave 
because of ill-health was also less than Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. Only France had a smaller proportion
6
. 
Arguably, fatal and non-fatal injuries at work are the exception 
that helps to prove the rule. As a later section points out, it is in this 
area that the UK not only has extensive legislation guaranteeing 
employee 'voice' at the workplace level, but also long established 
social dialogue institutions in the form of the HSE. It is wholly 
consistent with the arguments of previous sections that it is because of 
these arrangements that health and safety policies and practices in the 
UK enjoy a very particular legitimacy. 
A different picture emerges, however, in the case of mental health. 
Wilkinson and Pickett’s have brought together the evidence from the 
WHO World Mental Health Survey Consortium) and national studies 
for Australia, Canada and the UK featured in Part 1. Consistent with 
the extensive income inequality, it emerges that the UK had one of the 
highest levels of mental illness of the 12 countries. Indeed, only the 
USA had a higher level. In the UK, more than one in five people had a 
mental illness, whereas in Germany fewer than one in ten did
7
. 
The UK’s comparatively good showing in occupational safety 
also fails to be repeated in the case of occupationally-related health 
As the Black report observes, life expectancy is the most commonly 
used comparative indicator of overall health, being based on objective 
mortality data collected routinely in most countries
8
. There are two 
measures: overall life expectancy calculated from birth and the 
probability of dying before reaching the age of 60. Here our source is 
the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 2007 
collection of Human Development Indicators. As will be seen from 
Table A1 (Row 2), overall life expectancy in the UK was 79 years in 
2005, which is higher than that of the USA, but less than the other EU 
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countries. The probability of dying before the age of 60 (Row 3) in the 
UK was on a par with France, Germany and the Netherlands, but some 
way behind Sweden. Arguably, for the reasons discussed in Part 1, 
these results reflect differences in work organisation, along with levels 
of income inequality, more of which below. 
For poverty and inequality, our source is again the UNDP's 2007 
collection of Human Development Indicators. Row 4 of Table A1 
gives details of the proportion of the population living below the 
poverty line. The UK clearly stands out: the proportion of the 
population below the line (12.5 per cent) is almost twice that in 
Sweden and one and half times that in the Netherlands, Germany and 
France. Only the USA has a higher proportion in this state.  
Row 5 of Table A1 gives details of the Gini coefficient, which it 
will be recalled is an overall  measure of the spread of a country's 
income distribution between the highest and lowest earners – the 
higher the figure, the greater the income inequality. It will be seen 
that, at 36.0, the UK again stands out, the level of income inequality 
being only exceeded by that of the USA.   
The UK also has a large gender pay gap. In 2006, according to the 
calculation of the TUC based on the European Commission's Equality 
Between Women and Men – 2008, the gender pay gap stood at 20 per 
cent in the UK, which is a third higher than the 27 country EU average 
of 15 per cent. Of the larger EU members, only Germany had a bigger 
gap (22 per cent)
9
. 
To achieve their levels of pay, many UK employees also have to 
work longer hours than their counterparts in most other countries, 
thereby intensifying the impact of employment on health and family 
life. Eurostat figures compiled by the European Commission for its 
2008 report suggest that, while overall average hours worked in the 
UK were similar to those other countries (i.e. around 40 hours), the 
proportion of the workforce working more than 48 hours was the 
highest in Europe even taking into account the new member states. At 
18 per cent, it was more than twice the EU average at 8 per cent. The 
proportion of the workforce working more than 48 hours in Sweden 
was 1.6 per cent and in the Netherlands 1.1 per cent
10
.  
Working longer does not necessarily mean working harder, 
however. The same European Commission report draws on the 
European Foundation's 2005 survey of working conditions to produce 
an index of work intensity combining answers to questions about 
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‘working at a very high speed’ and ‘working to tight deadlines’. 
Respondents in the UK, along with those in France and Netherlands, 
reported less intensity than the EU average. Of our five EU countries, 
only Germany and Sweden reported higher levels
11
. 
In the case of continuing vocational training (CVT), the UK 
appears at first sight to compare relatively favourably, being one of 
the few EU countries to achieve the Lisbon 2010 target of 12.5 per of 
the workforce in adult learning – indeed, its record  is only bettered by 
Sweden and the Netherlands
12
.  The more detailed analysis enabled by 
Eurostat's CVTS
 
paints a less flattering picture, however
13
. 
Checcaglini and Marion-Vernoux offer an overview of the most recent 
(2005) data. On the basis of the numbers of firms providing training, 
employees’ rates of access to vocational training and the mean number 
of hours an employee can expect to spend in training during a given 
year, they distinguish four groups of countries. The first group, which 
includes France and Sweden, was the most actively involved. Here 
around three-quarters of firms declared that they had trained at least 
one employee that year and almost one French employee out of two 
spent 28 hours on CVT on average, corresponding to 13 hours per 
employee. The UK is bracketed in the second group, along with 
Germany and the Netherlands. Here employees have lower rates of 
access to CVT courses and the number of hours is less. Thus, in the 
UK, less than one employee out of three on average benefited in 2005 
and the number of hours spent annually undergoing CVT per 
employee amounted to only about six hours, regardless of the size of 
firm. Furthermore, employees' rates of access to training courses in the 
UK had decreased by some 30 per cent since 1999
14
.  
As Chapter 2 emphasised, CVT is just the tip of the iceberg so far 
as the role of the workplace in developing human capital is concerned. 
Also important is on-the-job development. Here, as the discussion in 
the previous section confirms, UK workplaces would appear to offer 
less opportunity for learning than those in the other EU countries, the 
'lean' and 'traditional' models of work organisation being more 
prominent. 
In the case of occupational mobility, the UK is like the other 
countries in that relatively few women break through the ‘glass 
ceiling’, the lack of flexibility at senior levels being particularly acute. 
In the case of managers who are women, the UK was around the 
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average (i.e. around 31 per cent) in 2003
15
; The UK is around the 
average for membership of executive bodies, although here the 
average is much less at around 10 per cent
16
. In the case of 
representation of women among top levels of civil servants, the UK 
had one of the lowest proportions (10 per cent) in 2007; it was 
middling so far as level 2 is concerned at around between 20 and 30 
per cent
17
 
One feature that is distinctive is the pattern of part-time working 
in the UK. Along with the Netherlands and Sweden, the UK has one 
of the highest ratios of part-time to full-time working for women (42.3 
per cent in 2007)
18
. The average usual hours worked each week, 
however, is one of the lowest (19.4 hours)
19
. Part-time workers, it is 
widely acknowledged, suffer in terms of opportunities for promotion 
as well as training and development. Arguably, the shorter the hours 
they work, the greater the problem. 
The UK hardly does better on the more general social capital 
indicators. In the case of divorce, in 2005 (Table A1, Row 6) the 
number per 1,000 of population was, along with Germany, the highest 
of the five EU member countries. It had peaked in the 1980s, 
however, and had been stable or declining ever since
20
. In the case of 
the prison population (Table 5, Row 7) - a measure of how successful 
a country is eradicating the underlying causes of crime
21
 – the UK had 
the highest proportion of the five EU countries. Indeed, it was almost 
twice that in Sweden. 
There are, as previously pointed out, considerable difficulties 
associated with defining and measuring social capital. In the light of 
these, the level of trust in society has widely come to be regarded as a 
'very close proxy'
22
. The most commonly quoted indicator comes from 
the so-called 'World Values Survey, which is regularly conducted in 
most countries. Basically, it takes the form of the proportion of people 
who say that they trust ‘most people’. Row 8 in Table 5 gives the most 
recent results for the six countries. It will be seen that the UK ranks 
fifth, the level of trust being only half that in Sweden and the 
Netherlands; it is even exceeded by that of the USA. Only France has 
a lower score. 
The ILO’s 2004 economic security index offers us a final measure 
of the UK in comparative perspective (Table A1, Row 9). Briefly, this 
is a composite index which takes into account the seven forms of 
insecurity listed in Part 1. Sweden enjoyed the highest level of 
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security. The Netherlands, France and Germany also featured in the 
top ten. The UK was in 15th place and the US 25th.   
In summary, the UK compares relatively unfavourably on many 
of the social indicators associated with the impact of employment 
relations. This is particularly true of the indicators of poverty and 
inequality, occupationally-related health and social capital 
development. In as much as the levels of poverty and income 
inequality, coupled with long working hours, have significant 
implications for the quality of family life, it seems not unfair to 
suggest that employment relations goes some way to understanding 
the problems being experienced in this domain as well. Arguably, too, 
the exception proves the rule. Occupational safety is an area where the 
UK compares relatively favourably: it is also the area where the UK 
has long-standing employee 'voice' and social dialogue institutions. 
 
Economic indicators – reaping what is sown 
The focus now shifts onto the main commonly used indicators of 
macroeconomic performance and competitiveness – it will be recalled 
that these figured prominently in the two debates involving the 
connection between employment relations and macro-economic 
performance discussed in Chapter 2. Tables 7 and 8 replicate the data 
that Panic has brought together, dividing the recent past into two 
periods. The first, 1989–98, begins with the collapse of communism, 
followed by German reunification a year later
23
. The second period, 
1999– 2004, starts from the inception of European Monetary Union. 
In both case, the source is the OECD's Economic Outlook. 
At first sight, the UK’s record looks relatively impressive. Rows 1 
and 2 in Table A2 suggest that the UK enjoyed above average growth 
in both periods, helping to account for the relatively high levels of 
GPD reported in Table A1. Row 3 confirms that this was matched by 
relatively low levels of unemployment
24
 – especially in the second 
period. The growth in consumer prices or inflation (Row 4) was also 
relatively restrained, again, especially in the second period. The one 
indicator suggesting that things might not be quite as good as they 
seem appears in Row 5 and relates to the balance on trade. Along with 
the USA, the UK was the only country in negative territory in both 
periods. 
With the virtue of hindsight, it is clear that the UK’s performance, 
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along with the USA’s, flattered to deceive. It was largely based on 
consumer spending and heavy borrowing, the magnitude of which 
only became fully clear with the financial and banking crisis.  
As Panic persuasively argues, there are two other relevant 
comments to be made about the data in Table 6. The first relates to 
France and Germany, whose relatively poor performance 
commentators regularly attributed to their supposedly excessively 
regulated labour markets and costly social model. This performance 
largely reflected the constraints of European monetary policy during 
the two periods, with Germany having to cope with the added burden 
of unification. The second, which concerns the performance of 
Sweden and the Netherlands, reinforces the argument that economic 
performance and the quality of working life are far from being 
mutually exclusive. Sweden’s performance was similar to the UK’s 
and, if anything, the Netherlands’ slightly better; yet both these 
countries scored very highly on the OECD’s employment protection 
legislation index.  
Arguably, the competitiveness indicators in Table A3 give a more 
realistic picture of the UK’s relative position. As Row 1 confirms, in 
the first period, the UK experienced the biggest rise in manufacturing 
unit labour costs of the six countries. Absolute performance improved 
in the second period, but relatively was hardly better - Sweden 
achieved a reduction in unit costs. The changes in consumer prices 
relative to that of the manufacturing sector in other countries shown in 
Row 2 similarly show a decline in competitiveness: in the other 
countries there was a reduction or only a slight increase in relative 
prices, whereas in the UK there was an increase of almost 4 per cent. 
Rows 3 and 4 show the impact in terms of exports. The UK’s rate of 
growth of exports of goods and services (Row 3) fell behind that of 
the other European countries in the second period. Its export 
performance, which is shown in Row 4, was similarly weak. In the 
first period, it managed to match Germany's. In the second, however, 
it dropped not only in absolute but also relative terms, being exceeded 
by the four other EU countries. Overall, taking into account the 
various measures, Panic scores the UK lowest of the countries for 
export performance in both periods.  
Just in case there is any doubt, the UK's poor performance cannot 
be attributed to the incidence of industrial conflict as it was so often in 
the 1960s and 1970s. As Chapter 7 has shown, strikes in the UK 
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dropped to an all-time low in recent years, becoming largely a public 
sector phenomenon. In the words of one recent international 
comparison talking of the UK, 'Turbulent industrial relations in the 
1970s became more ‘peaceful’ in the 1980s, and in the 1990s conflict 
levels became as low as in the central European countries, a trend 
which has continued in the 2000s
25
.  
In drawing this section to a close, two points can be made, both of 
which run contrary to conventional wisdom. The first is that the UK’s 
‘light touch regulation’ approach can hardly be said to be associated 
with superior economic performance. True, UK can boast of higher 
rates of employment than France and Germany, but the quality of 
many of these jobs must be in doubt in the light of comparative data 
on low pay and work organisation. In terms of competitiveness, the 
UK scores poorly on a number of the key indicators. Arguably, this 
reflects reliance on the ‘lean’ and 'traditional' models of work 
organisation: working longer hours, higher levels of supervision and 
proportionately more senior managers, it seems, are no substitute for 
employees working smarter. ‘Numerical’ flexibility, to put it another 
way, is no match for ‘functional’ flexibility. The second is that the 
experience of countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden suggests 
that the quality of working life and economic performance are far 
from being mutually exclusive as they are so often portrayed in the 
UK.  Taking improving working life into account makes it possible for 
managers to get the motivation, commitment and loyalty that they 
increasingly need for success. Improved performance makes it 
possible for managers to bring about a sustained improvement in 
working lives.   
 
Institutional considerations 
Employment relations  
In terms of the UK’s national employment relations framework, three 
reasonably well-known features stand out, helping us to understand 
the impact that employment relations has in the UK. One is the extent 
of employment protection legislation (EPL). Even with the increase in 
individual employment rights in recent years, the UK is widely 
recognised to have one of the weakest frameworks of such rights
26
, 
offering little counterweight to the privileges of shareholders. Indeed, 
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in the OECD's list of countries by employment protection legislation, 
the UK is second only to the USA in terms of the weakness of its 
employment security provisions
27
.  
The second distinctive feature is the limited provision for 
employee 'voice'. The statutory right of representation for the purposes 
of collective bargaining is workplace rather than sector or nationally-
based as it is in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden
28
. 
Effectively, like their counterparts in the USA, trade unions in the UK 
are faced with a 'catch 22' situation - they have to have members to 
secure recognition, but they cannot demonstrate the benefits of 
membership without recognition. There are also no statutory 
provisions for compulsory works council-type bodies as there are in 
France, Germany and the Netherlands: the way in which the Labour 
Government implemented the EU national level information and 
consultation directive in 2004 effectively enabled employers to avoid 
setting up collective 'voice' mechanisms, which was the directive’s 
intention.  
The UK also stands out on, again along with the USA, on account 
of its highly decentralised structure of collective bargaining
29
. The 
tentative forms of national level social dialogue that emerged in the 
1960s and 1970s were abandoned in the 1980s. The incoming Labour 
Government of 1997 followed its Conservative predecessors in setting 
its face against systematic national level social dialogue - 
‘partnership’ has been seen primarily as an organisation-based rather 
than national level activity
30
. Critically, being rooted in procedural 
rather than substantive rules, the UK did not develop the detailed 
sector multi-employer agreements that supplement and extend the 
legislative framework in most other EU member countries
31
. Save for 
a few sectors such as engineering construction and printing, multi-
employer collective bargaining at sector level has been in decline 
since the 1960s. The result is that, whereas in 1980 collective 
bargaining covered some nine out of ten workplaces in the private 
sector, by 2004 this had dropped to less than two in ten
32
.  
The decline of collective bargaining, above all at sector level, 
means that large sections of the workforce no longer enjoy the 
benefits of the additional standards that come from collective 
agreements. Coupled with the absence of any provision for national 
social dialogue, it also means that the role, status and membership of 
key intermediary organisations such as trade unions and employers’ 
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organisations have been seriously affected: the UK no longer 
possesses the networks necessary for co-coordinating continuous 
improvement in key areas of personnel practice – continuing 
vocational training is perhaps the most obvious example. Along with 
limited employment protection, the relative lack of employee 'voice' – 
at workplace, sector and national level – means that employment is 
not contributing to social capital development to the same extent as it 
is in other countries. Arguably, too, there is a greater reluctance to 
embrace change. 
One particular result is that, unlike many EU member countries, 
the UK has been unable to take advantage of the increasing flexibility 
built into EU employment directives, reflecting their increasing 
‘reflexive’ and ‘procedural’ orientation. In the absence of national and 
sector arrangements for social dialogue, it is effectively restricted to 
the legislative route in transposing EU initiatives. Standards and 
entitlements have had to be laid down in law, with mechanisms other 
than collective bargaining, such as employment tribunals and/or the 
courts, ensuring compliance and redress. An unfortunate consequence 
is a growth of legal dependency. The parties to the employment 
relationship are encouraged to resort to legislation rather than trying to 
sort things out for themselves – something which, hardly surprisingly, 
does little to help to promote engagement or trust and therefore social 
capital development.  
The main exception to these generalisations is health and safety. 
In this area, the UK not only has extensive legislation guaranteeing 
employee 'voice' at the workplace level, but also long established 
social dialogue institutions, in the form of the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE), dating back to the Robbins report of the early 
1970s
33
. This has enabled the HSE to go beyond an enforcement role 
to be a major influence on the promotion of good practice. 
Although they have featured in case studies and general 
overviews, lack of data has meant that it has rarely been possible to 
make systematic cross-national comparisons at workplace level. 
Fortunately, the flow of such data is beginning to improve. Especially 
valuable are the European Foundation's living and working conditions 
surveys introduced in Chapter 2. It will be recalled from Lorenz and 
Valerie’s analysis draws on the 2000 survey results to distinguish four 
main models of work organisation. Especially relevant is the 
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distinction between the 'learning' and 'lean' models. Both draw on 
employees’ capacity for continuous learning and problem-solving, but 
the one emphasises worker autonomy, while the other prioritises 
managerial control and tight quantitative norms to fix the pace of 
work. It emerges that, even allowing for different degrees to which 
national producers are positioned on the high-technology or high 
quality end of product markets, there are significant differences 
between countries. Table A4, which draws on the 2005 survey results, 
gives details of the relative incidence of the four models.  
Quite clearly, compared to the other four EU countries, it is the 
'lean' rather than the 'learning' model that predominates in the UK. 
Indeed, the proportion of 'learning' workplaces in the UK is even less 
than the 27-country average, while that for the 'lean' model' is higher: 
the UK's proportion of 'learning' workplaces is less than half that of 
Sweden, while its figure for 'lean' ones is twice as many. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the UK also stands out on account of the high 
proportion of 'traditional' workplaces – almost twice that of Sweden 
and, again, above the 27-country average
34
. 
The same survey also makes it possible to get an impression of the 
extent of managerial hierarchies in the different countries. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this mirrors the dominant model of work organisation. 
Consistent with the top down control of the 'lean' and 'traditional' 
models, the UK employs more 'senior managers' proportionately than 
the other EU countries. Indeed, of the 27 EU member countries only 
Ireland and Italy reported higher proportions. In the UK, something of 
the order of 14 per cent to 15 per cent was categorised as 'senior 
managers' as against an EU average of just under 10 per cent. In the 
Netherlands and France, the proportion was about the average at 
around 8 per cent. In Sweden and Germany, only just over four per 
cent were in the 'senior manager' category
35
.  
There is yet a third set of relevant findings from the European 
Foundation' working conditions survey that bear on work 
organisation. This involves the relative importance in determining the 
pace of work of the direct control of a superior as opposed to the 
demands from other people. Consistent with the other sets of findings, 
it emerges that, in the UK, the balance is much more in favour of the 
direct control of a superior than in France, Germany, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. Indeed, in the words of the survey report, whereas in 
countries such as Sweden the direct control of a superior is 'almost 
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negligible' in determining work, in the UK it remains 'important'
36
.  
In short, the UK stands out not just on account of its national 
institutional framework – one that gives little employment protection 
and scarcely any provision for employee 'voice'. Also distinctive are 
the institutional arrangements involved in managing the employment 
relationship at the level of the organisation. Managerial hierarchies, it 
seems, are more extensive in the UK than in other countries and there 
is much greater reliance on 'lean' and 'traditional' models of work 
organisation involving supervision. By contrast, the 'learning model' 
that encourages employee autonomy and initiative is less in evidence. 
 
Corporate governance  
As Chapter 8 pointed out, there are also a number of features of the 
corporate governance arrangements of the UK’s brand of ‘shareholder 
capitalism’ that are distinctive and highly relevant to the conduct of 
employment relations. At the risk of repetition, they are: 
 a privileged position for shareholders and an overwhelming 
emphasis on shareholder value as the key business driver as 
opposed to the interests of other stakeholders 
 a high concentration of institutional share ownership by investment 
trusts, pension funds and hedge funds, which encourages a focus on 
short-term profitability as the key index of business performance  
rather than long-term market share or added value 
 relative ease of take-over, which not only reinforces the pressure on 
short-term profitability to maintain share price, but also encourages 
expansion by M&A rather than by internal growth, along with the 
reconfiguring of the corporation through outsourcing, off-shoring 
and restructuring 
 a premium on 'financial engineering' as the core organisational 
competence, the domination of financial management over other 
functions and numbers driven as opposed to issue driven 
planning
37
. 
As Chapter 8 emphasised, many of these features came to be 
exaggerated, following financial deregulation in the 1980s and the 
accompanying globalisation of capital markets. Apart from the USA, 
no country has been more affected by 'financialisation' than the UK. 
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Along with high levels of M&A activity
38
 and other kinds of 
investment/ divestment heavily financed by debt, evidence for this 
comes in several forms: the rise in the number and financial assets of 
hedge funds
39
, the financial resources leveraged by private equity 
companies
40 
and the levels of executive pay and stock options
41 
 that 
helped to fuel the significant growth in income inequality.  
Not only has the ‘permanent restructuring’ that 'financialisation'  
encourages made it difficult for operating managers to develop any 
consistency in approach to employment relations. It has also 
discouraged the pursuit of business policies that emphasise quality 
products and services, helping to explain the UK's relatively poor 
overall competitive position. Encouraged by the weakness of trade 
unions and an institutional framework favouring ‘numerical’ rather 
than ‘functional’ flexibility, many UK managers have continued to 
compete on the basis of  low-wage and low-skill labour. As well as 
hardly encouraging employees to go the proverbial extra mile, 
working harder rather than smarter has the wide ranging implications 
for the poverty, health, quality of family life and competitiveness 
discussed in previous sections. 
 
Conclusions and implications 
For UK policy makers, this comparison must make grim reading. For 
two conclusions are pretty inescapable. The first is that many of the 
objectives they have set themselves – ending child poverty, enhancing 
the quality of family life, improving health, increasing social mobility 
and  building a knowledge economy
42
 – are unlikely to be achieved 
unless there are substantial changes in the UK's institutional 
framework of employment relations. Above all, there has to be a shift 
from the ‘traditional’ and ‘lean’ forms of work organisation that are so 
harmful to people’s health and personal development as well as being 
a drag on business performance. The second is that the 'market' is not 
going to deliver such as shift, any more than it is a responsible 
banking system. The same goes for the 'learning organisation' and 
‘knowledge economy’. The shrinking in the size and influence of the 
financial sector, along with a reining in of 'financialisation', may lead 
to a refocusing on product and process as the main forms of 
competition and, in terms of horizons, greater emphasis on the long as 
opposed to the short term – all of which will put a premium of better 
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employment relations. Even so, it will be very difficult for individual 
companies to shift from ‘traditional’ and ‘lean’ forms of work 
organisation on their own – policy makers will have to help to bring 
these changes about, be it in the traditional forms of intervention of 
legislation and taxation or the ‘softer’ initiatives of the ‘nudge’ 
approach much favoured by the present Coalition Government
43
. 
It is not difficult to come up with suggestions for plugging the 
UK's institutional ‘gaps’ that go with the grain of existing structures 
and processes - David Coats and his former colleagues at the Work 
Foundation have put forward a wide-ranging programme of changes
44
; 
the author of this text has also made a number of suggestions
 45
. The 
problem is getting policy makers to recognise the critical importance 
of the workplace in influencing behaviour. Proof of the point lies in 
the failure to make anything of the opportunities that have been 
available  in recent years – they include the EU Directive providing 
for national level information and consultation machinery, which 
would have given employees, through their representatives, an 
opportunity to make an input to major business decisions, thereby 
promoting their legitimacy and contributing to engagement; the 
Company Law Commission’s recommendation that larger companies 
should produce Operating and Financial Reviews covering policies 
and practices across a range of social and environmental issues, which 
would have provided the basis for widespread benchmarking and 
continuously improving standards; and the ‘Warwick Agreement’ 
proposal for sector forums, which would have made it possible to 
develop strategies for productivity, health and safety, pay, skills and 
pensions’ in low paid industries with large numbers of ‘vulnerable 
workers’. Each of the opportunities was missed – some for ideological 
reasons, but mostly because of short-term political considerations, 
reflecting the contested nature of policy-making in the area. For, in 
practice, the Labour Governments’ much-vaunted ‘third way’ meant 
little more than a ‘pendulum approach’: anything resembling a 
concession to trade unions, such as signing the social chapter or a 
commitment to introduce statutory trade union recognition, had 
quickly to be balanced by downplaying its significance and/or limiting 
its impact. 
Arguably, very little is likely to change until there is some joined 
up policy making in the area. This would mean bringing back a 
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Department of Employment as Coates recommends
46
 or revamping 
Acas as an agency reporting through the cabinet office as the present 
author has suggested
47
. For such developments to happen, however, 
policymakers have to recognize the key message of this text,  
namely that employment relations matter. 
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Table A1 Social indicators
48
 
 France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK USA 
 
GDP per head (PPP, US $), 2005 
  
30,386 29,461 32,684 32,525 33,238 41,890 
Life expectancy at birth, 2005 
 
80.2 79.1 79.2 80.5 79.0 77.9 
Probability at birth of dying 
before 60th birthday (per cent of 
cohort, 2000-5)
 
8.9 8.6 8.3 6.7 8.7 11.6 
Population below 50% of the 
median poverty line, 2004-5
 
7.3 8.4 7.3 6.5 12.5 17.0 
Gini index of income inequality 
various dates
 
32.7 28.3 30.9 25.0 36.0 40.8 
 
Social trust (per cent of those 
who trust ‘most people’) 
23 36 69 76 30 36 
ILO Economic Security Index, 
2004
 
0.83 0.79 0.86 0.98 0.74 0.61 
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Table A2 Macroeconomic indicators (annual averages, per cent: A=1989–98; B=1999–2004)49 
 France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK USA 
 A     B A     B A     B A     B A     B A     B 
 
Growth of real aggregate 
demand  
2.4    1.9 0.7   1.3  1.4   2.0 1.9   3.6  3.1    3.0 3.4    0.6 
Growth of GDP (at constant 
prices)  
2.2    2.1 1.2   1.8  1.7   2.4 2.8   3.8 2.7    3.0  3.0    1.6 
Unemployment (standardised)  10.6   9.4 7.2   8.5   5.8   3.3   6.7     5.6    8.1    5.2     5.9    5.2 
 
Consumer prices  2.2    1.8  2.7   1.3 2.1   2.8 4.0    1.4 4.0    1.2 3.3    2.5 
 
Balance on trade in goods and 
services as  per cent of GDP  
0.7   1.1 0.0  0.9 4.2  3.1    0.7    5.4       -1.9.  -2.1 -1.4  -4.4     
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Table A3 Changes in international competitiveness (annual averages, per cent): A =1989–98; B=1999–200450 
 
 France Germany Netherlands Sweden UK USA 
 A     B A     B A     B A     B A     B A     B 
 
Relative unit labour costs in 
manufacturing (a) 
-1.4     1.1 1.4     0.0 0.5    1.2 -2.4    -2.3 4.4    1.2 -0.4   -1.2 
Relative consumer prices (a) -0.2     -0.3 0.2     -0.8 -0.5    1.3 -1.0    -1.0 1.2    3.9  0.4 
 
Growth of exports of goods and 
services 
6.5      3.6 5.7     5.6 4.5    5.7 6.5     4.5  5.7    3.4 7.9     2.6 
Export performance (b) 0.6    -1.8 -1.1    0.4 0.9    -0.7 0.6     0.4 -0.4    -2.2 0.6    -2.8 
 
a  In dollar terms, relative to that of the manufacturing sector in 42 countries. Minus indicates improvements in competitiveness. 
b Change in each country’s volume of exports of all goods and services relative to that of the volume of total imports of goods and 
services into its export markets. Minus indicates that the performance is deteriorating. 
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Table A4 National differences in work organisation models (% of 
employees)
51
 
 
  'Discretionary Learning'   'Lean '   'Taylorist'   'Traditional'  
 
 
France    47.7   23.8  17.5       11.0 
 
Germany   44.3   19.9  18.4  17.4 
 
Netherlands   51.6  24.3  11.4  12.7 
 
Sweden    67.5   16.0  6.9     9.6 
 
United Kingdom   31.7   32.4  17.7   18.2 
 
EU-27    38.4   25.7  19.3   16.4 
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